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FATF Statement re AML Strategic Deficiencies
Date: 16 February 2012
In October 2011, Algeria made a high-level political commitment to
work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic
AML/CFT deficiencies. Since then, Algeria has taken steps
towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by enacting
AML/CFT legislation. However, the FATF has not yet assessed
this legislation due to its very recent nature. The FATF will assess
this legislation, and, in any case, Algeria should continue to work
on implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies,
including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing
(Special Recommendations I and II); (2) establishing and
implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying, tracing
and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III), (3)
improving and broadening CDD measures and ensuring that they
apply to all financial institutions (Recommendation 5); (4) ensuring
a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence
Unit (FIU), in particular addressing the operational autonomy of
the FIU and the authority of the FIU to request and access
information (Recommendation 26); and (5) enacting and
implementing appropriate mutual legal assistance legislation
(Special Recommendation V). The FATF encourages Algeria to
address its deficiencies and continue the process of implementing
its action plan.
____________________________________________________________
Sanctions:
November 28, 2011 - The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab
member states), of which this country is a member, has approved
imposing sanctions on Syria. These include: -
* Cutting off transactions with the Syrian central bank
* Halting funding by Arab governments for projects in Syria
* A ban on senior Syrian officials travelling to other Arab countries
* A freeze on assets related to President Bashar al-Assad's
government
The declaration also calls on Arab central banks to monitor
transfers to Syria, with the exception of remittances from Syrians
abroad.
For further information, click here
The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab member states), of which
this country is a member, has boycotted Israel in a systematic
effort to isolate Israel economically in support of the Palestinians,
however, the implementation of the boycott has varied over time
among member states..
There are three tiers to the boycott. The primary boycott prohibits
the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting
countries. The secondary boycott prohibits individuals, as well as
private and public sector firms and organizations, in member
countries from engaging in business with any entity that does
business in Israel. The Arab League maintains a blacklist of such
firms. The tertiary boycott prohibits any
entity in a member country from doing business with a company or
individual that has business dealings with U.S. or other firms on
the Arab League blacklist.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
The extent of money laundering through formal financial
institutions in Algeria is thought to be minimal due to stringent
exchange control regulations and an antiquated banking sector.
The partial convertibility of the Algerian dinar enables the Banque
Nationale Algerienne (Algeria’s central bank) to monitor all
international financial operations carried out by public and private
banking institutions. Notable criminal activity includes trafficking,
particularly of drugs and cigarettes, but also arms; kidnapping;
theft; trafficking in stolen vehicles; extortion; and embezzlement.
Public corruption remains a major concern as does terrorism.
Algerian authorities are increasingly concerned with cases of
customs fraud and trade-based money laundering. Other risk
areas for financial crimes include unregulated alternative
remittance and currency exchange systems; tax evasion; abuse of
real estate transactions; commercial invoice fraud; and a cash-
based economy. Most money laundering is believed to occur
primarily outside the formal financial system, given the large
percentage of financial transactions occurring in the informal gray
and black economies. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
which originated in Algeria, has a history of terrorist activities in
Algiers and elsewhere in the country, including suicide attacks,
kidnappings for ransom, roadside bomb attacks, and
assassinations.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: NO
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: NO
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks, financial leasing institutions, investment
and shareholding companies
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks, financial leasing institutions, investment
and shareholding companies, the post office, insurance
companies, gaming establishments, investment houses, exchange
offices, attorneys and notaries, accountants, real estate agents,
customs agents, public officers (translators, judicial officers,
auctioneers, receivers) and dealers of gems, precious metals,
antiques and artwork
Number of STRs received and time frame: 260 in 2009
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: One in 2009
Convictions: Not available
Assets forfeited: criminally: Not available civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Algeria is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial
Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force
(FATF)-style regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation is
not yet available online, but will be posted here: http://www.
menafatf.org/
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
The Government of Algeria has taken many steps to enhance its
statutory regime against money laundering and terrorist financing.
It needs to move forward to implement those laws and eliminate
bureaucratic barriers among various government agencies.
However, deficiencies remain that must be addressed, particularly
in the coverage of know-your-customer and compliance
programs. The Algerian authorities should promote interagency
cooperation between all stake holders. The Algerian Financial
Intelligence Processing Cell, (CTRF) - the financial intelligence
unit - should be the focal point for receiving and analyzing
reports, and information exchange of suspicious transactions
related to anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing
activity (AML/CFT). This would require the CTRF to develop in-
house analytical and information technology capabilities. The
CTRF should continue outreach to the formal and informal
financial sectors and continue efforts to adhere to international
standards. In addition, given the scope of Algeria’s informal
economy, new efforts should be made to identify value transfer
mechanisms not covered in Algeria’s anti-money
laundering/counter-terrorist finance (AML/CFT) legal and
regulatory framework. Algerian law enforcement and customs
authorities should enhance their ability to investigate trade-based
money laundering, value transfer, and bulk cash smuggling used
for financing terrorism and other illicit financial activities.
______________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Algeria is principally a transit point for drugs – especially hashish
bound for Europe - rather than a center of production or
consumption itself. The Government of Algeria (GOA) is actively
working to address the problem with increased resources devoted
to education, interdiction, and treatment. Although its security
forces are primarily focused on ongoing counter-terrorism efforts,
officials have become increasingly concerned about the link they
say exists between al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
drug traffickers.
The bulk of the drugs transiting Algeria consists of Moroccan-
origin cannabis (especially cannabis resin-hashish) and a growing
quantity of South American cocaine. The majority of these drugs
travel by sea to Europe, while some share is smuggled overland
to Middle Eastern destinations. Algeria‘s borders stretch 6,000
kilometers, mostly across broad and sparsely-policed swathes of
the Sahara. These long and porous borders with Morocco,
Western Sahara, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Libya, and Tunisia make
it difficult for Algerian security forces to detect and halt smugglers.
Drug use is not generally a significant problem in Algeria,
although the problem is on the rise. Marijuana is the most widely
abused drug, but there is a small and growing consumption of
hard drugs including cocaine and heroin. The government is
expanding facilities for treating drug addiction, and this year aims
to have an outpatient drug treatment facility in every province of
the country. Some production of illicit drugs occurs in Algeria,
principally cultivation of cannabis in the southeast and around
Algiers, but not in large quantities.
The GOA has taken a number of steps to counter the drug
problem, including increases in enforcement personnel, enhanced
training, and the purchase of more modern equipment. The GOA
is formulating a five-year strategy (2011-2015) to more effectively
deal with drug problems. Algeria has tough laws against illegal
drugs, with sentences of up to 2 years for use and 10 to 20 years
for drug trafficking and distribution. Algeria is a party to the 1988
UN Drug Convention, the UN Convention against Corruption and
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The
GOA does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or
facilitate illicit production or transport of illegal drugs. Algeria has
a large and capable security apparatus hardened by almost two
decades of counter-terrorism efforts against al-Qa’ida-associated
Islamic militants. The National Office for the Fight Against Drugs
and Addiction (Known by its French acronym, ONLCDT)
coordinates the GOA’s drug policies and produces its official
reports on the drug problem in Algeria. The National
Gendarmerie, Customs, and National Police (DGSN) are
responsible for day-to-day enforcement. During the first nine
months of 2011, Algerian authorities dismantled over 140 drug
trafficking networks and seized over 38,141 kilograms of drugs.
The statistics reported by the GOA cannot be independently
verified and are occasionally at odds with open source reporting.
The GOA indicated to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) that in 2009 74 tons of hashish were seized along with
barely more than a kilogram of cocaine and 700 grams of heroin.
In 2010 hashish seizures dropped to 23 tons, while amounts of
cocaine and heroin seized remained similar to 2009. Through the
first nine months of 2011 the GOA reported to DEA that 31 tons of
hashish were seized as well as almost two kilograms of cocaine
and 200 grams of heroin.
A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between the U.S. and
Algeria was signed in April 2010, and awaits U.S. Senate
ratification. Algeria would benefit from stepped-up training to
boost the counternarcotics capabilities of its security forces. The
GOA has generally been receptive to U.S. training offers and
assistance for law enforcement officers, with several successful
training sessions held in the past year. In September, the
Department of Justice provided an INL-funded Overseas
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT)
program course on narcotics trafficking investigations and
prosecutions. The GOA would likely be receptive to additional
training offered to it.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 3)
Algeria is a transit and, to a lesser extent, a destination and
source country for men, women, and children subjected to forced
labor and sex trafficking. Most commonly, sub-Saharan African
men and women enter Algeria voluntarily but illegally, often with
the assistance of smugglers, for the purpose of traveling to
Europe. Some of these women are forced into prostitution.
Criminal networks which sometimes extend to sub-Saharan Africa
and to Europe are involved in both smuggling and human
trafficking. The “chairmen,” or leaders, of the “African villages” –
small non-Algerian ethnic enclaves located in and around the
southern city of Tamanrasset – are among those responsible for
forcing women into prostitution. To a lesser extent, some sub-
Saharan African men, mostly from Mali, are forced domestic
workers; homeowners sometimes confiscate identification
documents to coerce and to maintain their labor. Some Algerian
women are also forced into prostitution. Civil society groups
believe that, as Europe tightens its border controls, Algeria is
becoming more of a destination for both undocumented migration
and trafficking. Over the past year, the “cost” – both in terms of
fees and threats of exploitation – of a migrant’s trip to and through
Algeria have increased due to a greater crackdown against
undocumented migration. One 2011 report also noted that 23
Algerian children and six men were identified as trafficking victims
in Norway.
The Government of Algeria does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not
making significant efforts to do so. The government made no
discernible effort to enforce its 2009 anti-trafficking law. It also
failed to identify and protect trafficking victims and continued to
lack adequate measures to protect victims and prevent trafficking.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continued to
pose a significant terrorist threat in the mountainous areas east of
Algiers. AQIM primarily targeted Algerian security forces, but
civilians were also wounded or killed because of AQIM criminal
activity. Algerian security forces isolated AQIM in the north, and
the group launched fewer successful terrorist attacks but
continued to execute suicide attacks, attacks using improvised
explosive devices (IED), and ambushes in the areas east of
Algiers.
The government has succeeded in reducing the flow of money to
terrorists. Residents of the Kabylie region repeatedly took to the
streets to protest kidnappings for ransom, prompting terrorists to
release at least five hostages without receiving payment. In
August, however, the president (equivalent to a town mayor) of
Baghlia commune in Boumerdes was killed near his home,
presumably by AQIM retaliating against protests Baghlia residents
held earlier in the year to denounce kidnappings.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: AQIM perpetrated notable terrorist
attacks in rural areas, including a cross-border attack in the south
between Mali and Algeria, the first vehicle-borne suicide bombings
since 2008 using of an improvised bomb attack method commonly
used in Iraq. As the attacks highlighted below indicate, Algeria
experienced a spike in terrorist incidents during the summer and
just prior to the start of Ramadan, which began August 11. During
Ramadan, there was a brief but significant uptick in AQIM attacks,
compared to the same period in 2008 and 2009, possibly
triggered by aggressive Algerian counterterrorism operations.
2010 incidents included:
* On June 11, a suicide truck bomb killed five police and wounded
30 others at a paramilitary police barracks in Timizar, 30 miles
east of Algiers.
* On July 14, four linked "daisy-chain" IEDs killed four soldiers and
wounded 13 others on patrol near Tizi Ouzou, 80 miles east of
Algiers. Linking bombs in this fashion was a new technique for
AQIM, which has a history of adopting methods of attack used
elsewhere by al-Qa'ida or affiliated groups, especially in Iraq.
* On August 31 and September 1, three attacks took place within
24 hours. Terrorists stormed a mosque near Ain Defla, 60 miles
southwest of Algiers, killing one and injuring eight. Near
Boumerdes, a suicide bomber drove a pickup truck loaded with
explosives into a military convoy 45 miles east of Algiers, killing
two soldiers and wounding 30 others. A barrage of homemade
rockets caused no injuries when they were fired at the judicial
police headquarters 40 kilometers north of Tizi Ouzou.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: Algerian security forces –
primarily gendarmerie troops under the Ministry of National
Defense – conducted periodic sweeping operations in the Kabylie
region southeast of the capital, targeting groups of AQIM fighters.
During the year, open source reports indicated that security
forces killed or captured approximately 1,175 suspected terrorists.
In December, a Boumerdes court sentenced six terrorists in
absentia to death on a variety of charges, including murder,
attempted murder, and belonging to a terrorist organization. Also
in December, authorities suspended consideration of amnesty for
120 terrorists who had applied for amnesty under Algeria's
Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation but who had
resumed terrorist activity.
Also in December, the Interior Ministry began efforts to disband
the communal guard forces, retiring older members and
incorporating others into the army and municipal police forces.
The Algerian government established the communal guard in
1996 by arming civilians to combat terrorism in the area between
the cities of Blida, Algiers, and Medea. As terrorist incidents
declined in that area, the government decided to disband the
guard but used its forces to bolster counterterrorism units in the
army and police.
Algerian law enforcement agencies cooperated with the United
States and other foreign governments to prevent terrorist attacks
against foreigners. The United States signed a Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty with Algeria in April, creating a framework for
increased legal cooperation between Algeria and the United
States. The United States provided multiple training courses to
Algerian police, judges, and customs officials on cyber crime, bulk
cash smuggling, and counterterrorism tactics.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Algeria is a member of the Middle
East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a
Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and its mutual
evaluation report was adopted by that body in its December
MENAFATF Plenary. Algeria has no specific legislation to freeze
terrorist assets but maintained that its ratification of international
terrorist financing conventions gave it the authority to do so.
In July, a presidential decree mandated that all financial
transactions over US$ 6,671 be conducted by credit card, check,
or other non-cash method in an effort to increase financial
transparency, track illegal financing of terrorism and reduce the
possibility of corruption.
Regional and International Cooperation: Algeria continued its
efforts to create a viable regional mechanism to deal with AQIM in
the countries to its south. It convened three separate meetings of
regional foreign ministers, military chiefs of staff, and intelligence
chiefs in Algiers to discuss coordinating a response to the threat
of terrorism in the trans-Sahara region. Algeria, Mali, Mauritania,
and Niger established a combined military command center in
Tamanrasset in southern Algeria in September, and later
established an intelligence sharing center in Algiers designed to
feed information to the command center in Tamanrasset.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Beginning in
2010, the Algerian government enlisted religious scholars and
former terrorists to appear on its Radio Quran radio station and
appeal directly to terrorists still fighting in the mountains.
Programs featured Islamic scholars from Algeria and Gulf
countries who argued against the doctrines used by AQIM to
justify terrorist operations. Former Algerian terrorists appeared on
these programs and appealed to terrorists to stop fighting and
surrender to Algerian authorities. Other radio programs instructed
listeners in various aspects of Islamic law. Algerian newspapers
reported that the radio appeals played a major role in convincing
scores of terrorists to lay down their arms and take advantage of
government amnesty. Under the Charter for Peace and National
Reconciliation, the Algerian government has offered amnesty to
terrorists who surrender and have not committed major terrorist
acts, such as bombings and rape.
The government has the authority to prescreen and approve
sermons before they are delivered during Friday prayers. In
practice, each province and county employs religious officials to
review sermon content. The Ministry of Religious Affairs'
educational commission is responsible for establishing policies for
hiring teachers at Quranic schools and ensuring that all imams
were well-qualified and follow governmental guidelines aimed at
stemming violent extremism. The government also has youth
outreach programs through the Muslim Scouts.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Date: 16 February 2012
In October 2011, Algeria made a high-level political commitment to
work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic
AML/CFT deficiencies. Since then, Algeria has taken steps
towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by enacting
AML/CFT legislation. However, the FATF has not yet assessed
this legislation due to its very recent nature. The FATF will assess
this legislation, and, in any case, Algeria should continue to work
on implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies,
including by: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing
(Special Recommendations I and II); (2) establishing and
implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying, tracing
and freezing terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III), (3)
improving and broadening CDD measures and ensuring that they
apply to all financial institutions (Recommendation 5); (4) ensuring
a fully operational and effectively functioning Financial Intelligence
Unit (FIU), in particular addressing the operational autonomy of
the FIU and the authority of the FIU to request and access
information (Recommendation 26); and (5) enacting and
implementing appropriate mutual legal assistance legislation
(Special Recommendation V). The FATF encourages Algeria to
address its deficiencies and continue the process of implementing
its action plan.
____________________________________________________________
Sanctions:
November 28, 2011 - The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab
member states), of which this country is a member, has approved
imposing sanctions on Syria. These include: -
* Cutting off transactions with the Syrian central bank
* Halting funding by Arab governments for projects in Syria
* A ban on senior Syrian officials travelling to other Arab countries
* A freeze on assets related to President Bashar al-Assad's
government
The declaration also calls on Arab central banks to monitor
transfers to Syria, with the exception of remittances from Syrians
abroad.
For further information, click here
The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab member states), of which
this country is a member, has boycotted Israel in a systematic
effort to isolate Israel economically in support of the Palestinians,
however, the implementation of the boycott has varied over time
among member states..
There are three tiers to the boycott. The primary boycott prohibits
the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting
countries. The secondary boycott prohibits individuals, as well as
private and public sector firms and organizations, in member
countries from engaging in business with any entity that does
business in Israel. The Arab League maintains a blacklist of such
firms. The tertiary boycott prohibits any
entity in a member country from doing business with a company or
individual that has business dealings with U.S. or other firms on
the Arab League blacklist.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
The extent of money laundering through formal financial
institutions in Algeria is thought to be minimal due to stringent
exchange control regulations and an antiquated banking sector.
The partial convertibility of the Algerian dinar enables the Banque
Nationale Algerienne (Algeria’s central bank) to monitor all
international financial operations carried out by public and private
banking institutions. Notable criminal activity includes trafficking,
particularly of drugs and cigarettes, but also arms; kidnapping;
theft; trafficking in stolen vehicles; extortion; and embezzlement.
Public corruption remains a major concern as does terrorism.
Algerian authorities are increasingly concerned with cases of
customs fraud and trade-based money laundering. Other risk
areas for financial crimes include unregulated alternative
remittance and currency exchange systems; tax evasion; abuse of
real estate transactions; commercial invoice fraud; and a cash-
based economy. Most money laundering is believed to occur
primarily outside the formal financial system, given the large
percentage of financial transactions occurring in the informal gray
and black economies. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
which originated in Algeria, has a history of terrorist activities in
Algiers and elsewhere in the country, including suicide attacks,
kidnappings for ransom, roadside bomb attacks, and
assassinations.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: NO
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: NO
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks, financial leasing institutions, investment
and shareholding companies
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks, financial leasing institutions, investment
and shareholding companies, the post office, insurance
companies, gaming establishments, investment houses, exchange
offices, attorneys and notaries, accountants, real estate agents,
customs agents, public officers (translators, judicial officers,
auctioneers, receivers) and dealers of gems, precious metals,
antiques and artwork
Number of STRs received and time frame: 260 in 2009
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: One in 2009
Convictions: Not available
Assets forfeited: criminally: Not available civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Algeria is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial
Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force
(FATF)-style regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation is
not yet available online, but will be posted here: http://www.
menafatf.org/
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
The Government of Algeria has taken many steps to enhance its
statutory regime against money laundering and terrorist financing.
It needs to move forward to implement those laws and eliminate
bureaucratic barriers among various government agencies.
However, deficiencies remain that must be addressed, particularly
in the coverage of know-your-customer and compliance
programs. The Algerian authorities should promote interagency
cooperation between all stake holders. The Algerian Financial
Intelligence Processing Cell, (CTRF) - the financial intelligence
unit - should be the focal point for receiving and analyzing
reports, and information exchange of suspicious transactions
related to anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing
activity (AML/CFT). This would require the CTRF to develop in-
house analytical and information technology capabilities. The
CTRF should continue outreach to the formal and informal
financial sectors and continue efforts to adhere to international
standards. In addition, given the scope of Algeria’s informal
economy, new efforts should be made to identify value transfer
mechanisms not covered in Algeria’s anti-money
laundering/counter-terrorist finance (AML/CFT) legal and
regulatory framework. Algerian law enforcement and customs
authorities should enhance their ability to investigate trade-based
money laundering, value transfer, and bulk cash smuggling used
for financing terrorism and other illicit financial activities.
______________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Algeria is principally a transit point for drugs – especially hashish
bound for Europe - rather than a center of production or
consumption itself. The Government of Algeria (GOA) is actively
working to address the problem with increased resources devoted
to education, interdiction, and treatment. Although its security
forces are primarily focused on ongoing counter-terrorism efforts,
officials have become increasingly concerned about the link they
say exists between al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
drug traffickers.
The bulk of the drugs transiting Algeria consists of Moroccan-
origin cannabis (especially cannabis resin-hashish) and a growing
quantity of South American cocaine. The majority of these drugs
travel by sea to Europe, while some share is smuggled overland
to Middle Eastern destinations. Algeria‘s borders stretch 6,000
kilometers, mostly across broad and sparsely-policed swathes of
the Sahara. These long and porous borders with Morocco,
Western Sahara, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Libya, and Tunisia make
it difficult for Algerian security forces to detect and halt smugglers.
Drug use is not generally a significant problem in Algeria,
although the problem is on the rise. Marijuana is the most widely
abused drug, but there is a small and growing consumption of
hard drugs including cocaine and heroin. The government is
expanding facilities for treating drug addiction, and this year aims
to have an outpatient drug treatment facility in every province of
the country. Some production of illicit drugs occurs in Algeria,
principally cultivation of cannabis in the southeast and around
Algiers, but not in large quantities.
The GOA has taken a number of steps to counter the drug
problem, including increases in enforcement personnel, enhanced
training, and the purchase of more modern equipment. The GOA
is formulating a five-year strategy (2011-2015) to more effectively
deal with drug problems. Algeria has tough laws against illegal
drugs, with sentences of up to 2 years for use and 10 to 20 years
for drug trafficking and distribution. Algeria is a party to the 1988
UN Drug Convention, the UN Convention against Corruption and
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The
GOA does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or
facilitate illicit production or transport of illegal drugs. Algeria has
a large and capable security apparatus hardened by almost two
decades of counter-terrorism efforts against al-Qa’ida-associated
Islamic militants. The National Office for the Fight Against Drugs
and Addiction (Known by its French acronym, ONLCDT)
coordinates the GOA’s drug policies and produces its official
reports on the drug problem in Algeria. The National
Gendarmerie, Customs, and National Police (DGSN) are
responsible for day-to-day enforcement. During the first nine
months of 2011, Algerian authorities dismantled over 140 drug
trafficking networks and seized over 38,141 kilograms of drugs.
The statistics reported by the GOA cannot be independently
verified and are occasionally at odds with open source reporting.
The GOA indicated to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) that in 2009 74 tons of hashish were seized along with
barely more than a kilogram of cocaine and 700 grams of heroin.
In 2010 hashish seizures dropped to 23 tons, while amounts of
cocaine and heroin seized remained similar to 2009. Through the
first nine months of 2011 the GOA reported to DEA that 31 tons of
hashish were seized as well as almost two kilograms of cocaine
and 200 grams of heroin.
A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between the U.S. and
Algeria was signed in April 2010, and awaits U.S. Senate
ratification. Algeria would benefit from stepped-up training to
boost the counternarcotics capabilities of its security forces. The
GOA has generally been receptive to U.S. training offers and
assistance for law enforcement officers, with several successful
training sessions held in the past year. In September, the
Department of Justice provided an INL-funded Overseas
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT)
program course on narcotics trafficking investigations and
prosecutions. The GOA would likely be receptive to additional
training offered to it.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 3)
Algeria is a transit and, to a lesser extent, a destination and
source country for men, women, and children subjected to forced
labor and sex trafficking. Most commonly, sub-Saharan African
men and women enter Algeria voluntarily but illegally, often with
the assistance of smugglers, for the purpose of traveling to
Europe. Some of these women are forced into prostitution.
Criminal networks which sometimes extend to sub-Saharan Africa
and to Europe are involved in both smuggling and human
trafficking. The “chairmen,” or leaders, of the “African villages” –
small non-Algerian ethnic enclaves located in and around the
southern city of Tamanrasset – are among those responsible for
forcing women into prostitution. To a lesser extent, some sub-
Saharan African men, mostly from Mali, are forced domestic
workers; homeowners sometimes confiscate identification
documents to coerce and to maintain their labor. Some Algerian
women are also forced into prostitution. Civil society groups
believe that, as Europe tightens its border controls, Algeria is
becoming more of a destination for both undocumented migration
and trafficking. Over the past year, the “cost” – both in terms of
fees and threats of exploitation – of a migrant’s trip to and through
Algeria have increased due to a greater crackdown against
undocumented migration. One 2011 report also noted that 23
Algerian children and six men were identified as trafficking victims
in Norway.
The Government of Algeria does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not
making significant efforts to do so. The government made no
discernible effort to enforce its 2009 anti-trafficking law. It also
failed to identify and protect trafficking victims and continued to
lack adequate measures to protect victims and prevent trafficking.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continued to
pose a significant terrorist threat in the mountainous areas east of
Algiers. AQIM primarily targeted Algerian security forces, but
civilians were also wounded or killed because of AQIM criminal
activity. Algerian security forces isolated AQIM in the north, and
the group launched fewer successful terrorist attacks but
continued to execute suicide attacks, attacks using improvised
explosive devices (IED), and ambushes in the areas east of
Algiers.
The government has succeeded in reducing the flow of money to
terrorists. Residents of the Kabylie region repeatedly took to the
streets to protest kidnappings for ransom, prompting terrorists to
release at least five hostages without receiving payment. In
August, however, the president (equivalent to a town mayor) of
Baghlia commune in Boumerdes was killed near his home,
presumably by AQIM retaliating against protests Baghlia residents
held earlier in the year to denounce kidnappings.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: AQIM perpetrated notable terrorist
attacks in rural areas, including a cross-border attack in the south
between Mali and Algeria, the first vehicle-borne suicide bombings
since 2008 using of an improvised bomb attack method commonly
used in Iraq. As the attacks highlighted below indicate, Algeria
experienced a spike in terrorist incidents during the summer and
just prior to the start of Ramadan, which began August 11. During
Ramadan, there was a brief but significant uptick in AQIM attacks,
compared to the same period in 2008 and 2009, possibly
triggered by aggressive Algerian counterterrorism operations.
2010 incidents included:
* On June 11, a suicide truck bomb killed five police and wounded
30 others at a paramilitary police barracks in Timizar, 30 miles
east of Algiers.
* On July 14, four linked "daisy-chain" IEDs killed four soldiers and
wounded 13 others on patrol near Tizi Ouzou, 80 miles east of
Algiers. Linking bombs in this fashion was a new technique for
AQIM, which has a history of adopting methods of attack used
elsewhere by al-Qa'ida or affiliated groups, especially in Iraq.
* On August 31 and September 1, three attacks took place within
24 hours. Terrorists stormed a mosque near Ain Defla, 60 miles
southwest of Algiers, killing one and injuring eight. Near
Boumerdes, a suicide bomber drove a pickup truck loaded with
explosives into a military convoy 45 miles east of Algiers, killing
two soldiers and wounding 30 others. A barrage of homemade
rockets caused no injuries when they were fired at the judicial
police headquarters 40 kilometers north of Tizi Ouzou.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: Algerian security forces –
primarily gendarmerie troops under the Ministry of National
Defense – conducted periodic sweeping operations in the Kabylie
region southeast of the capital, targeting groups of AQIM fighters.
During the year, open source reports indicated that security
forces killed or captured approximately 1,175 suspected terrorists.
In December, a Boumerdes court sentenced six terrorists in
absentia to death on a variety of charges, including murder,
attempted murder, and belonging to a terrorist organization. Also
in December, authorities suspended consideration of amnesty for
120 terrorists who had applied for amnesty under Algeria's
Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation but who had
resumed terrorist activity.
Also in December, the Interior Ministry began efforts to disband
the communal guard forces, retiring older members and
incorporating others into the army and municipal police forces.
The Algerian government established the communal guard in
1996 by arming civilians to combat terrorism in the area between
the cities of Blida, Algiers, and Medea. As terrorist incidents
declined in that area, the government decided to disband the
guard but used its forces to bolster counterterrorism units in the
army and police.
Algerian law enforcement agencies cooperated with the United
States and other foreign governments to prevent terrorist attacks
against foreigners. The United States signed a Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty with Algeria in April, creating a framework for
increased legal cooperation between Algeria and the United
States. The United States provided multiple training courses to
Algerian police, judges, and customs officials on cyber crime, bulk
cash smuggling, and counterterrorism tactics.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Algeria is a member of the Middle
East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a
Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and its mutual
evaluation report was adopted by that body in its December
MENAFATF Plenary. Algeria has no specific legislation to freeze
terrorist assets but maintained that its ratification of international
terrorist financing conventions gave it the authority to do so.
In July, a presidential decree mandated that all financial
transactions over US$ 6,671 be conducted by credit card, check,
or other non-cash method in an effort to increase financial
transparency, track illegal financing of terrorism and reduce the
possibility of corruption.
Regional and International Cooperation: Algeria continued its
efforts to create a viable regional mechanism to deal with AQIM in
the countries to its south. It convened three separate meetings of
regional foreign ministers, military chiefs of staff, and intelligence
chiefs in Algiers to discuss coordinating a response to the threat
of terrorism in the trans-Sahara region. Algeria, Mali, Mauritania,
and Niger established a combined military command center in
Tamanrasset in southern Algeria in September, and later
established an intelligence sharing center in Algiers designed to
feed information to the command center in Tamanrasset.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Beginning in
2010, the Algerian government enlisted religious scholars and
former terrorists to appear on its Radio Quran radio station and
appeal directly to terrorists still fighting in the mountains.
Programs featured Islamic scholars from Algeria and Gulf
countries who argued against the doctrines used by AQIM to
justify terrorist operations. Former Algerian terrorists appeared on
these programs and appealed to terrorists to stop fighting and
surrender to Algerian authorities. Other radio programs instructed
listeners in various aspects of Islamic law. Algerian newspapers
reported that the radio appeals played a major role in convincing
scores of terrorists to lay down their arms and take advantage of
government amnesty. Under the Charter for Peace and National
Reconciliation, the Algerian government has offered amnesty to
terrorists who surrender and have not committed major terrorist
acts, such as bombings and rape.
The government has the authority to prescreen and approve
sermons before they are delivered during Friday prayers. In
practice, each province and county employs religious officials to
review sermon content. The Ministry of Religious Affairs'
educational commission is responsible for establishing policies for
hiring teachers at Quranic schools and ensuring that all imams
were well-qualified and follow governmental guidelines aimed at
stemming violent extremism. The government also has youth
outreach programs through the Muslim Scouts.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
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| ALGERIA |
| KnowYourCountry |
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
|
Background
Although Algeria is not considered as a regional financial centre and
despite the absence of a relatively high rate of crimes in Algeria, it is
noticed that there are some economic crimes, on top of them,
corruption, smuggling, forgery and illicit trafficking. This indicates that
there are risks related to ML. As for the possibility of TF, a lot of risks
related to terrorist activities by the existence of internal
terrorist groups in addition to executing terrorist operations have come
out. Moreover, there is a link between criminal groups that smuggle
drugs and do kidnapping operations and terrorist groups. All
these factors form high-level risks in the field of ML/TF.
Algeria criminalized ML in 2004, and started its combating against
terrorism and terrorism financing since 1995, as it has criminalized the
TF act being one of the acts described as terrorism or vandalism acts.
In 2005, the Algerian lawmaker has put some provisions by virtue of
AML/CFT law, by virtue of which TF act has been defined. Algeria
established the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in 2002. Consequently,
the main aspects of the legal framework have been covered to
establish a new AML/CFT system in Algeria. It is worth to be noted the
existence of a practical hindrance concerning CFT as the lawmaker
ordained that there should be a link between the terrorist crime and its
financing, which contradicts with the international standards regarding
this matter.
Algeria has established an AML/CFT system that includes a number of
positive points. The most important comment that should be
highlighted in this system is the non-issuing of all legal tools
required for fulfilling basic requirements mentioned in the 40
Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations of AML/CFT.
On the other hand, the AML/CFT system in Algeria did not include
all the financial institutions; in addition, the categories subject to the
Law are not obligated with some of the basic requirements according
to the international AML/CFT standards.
Click here to view full Mutual Evaluation Report
Although Algeria is not considered as a regional financial centre and
despite the absence of a relatively high rate of crimes in Algeria, it is
noticed that there are some economic crimes, on top of them,
corruption, smuggling, forgery and illicit trafficking. This indicates that
there are risks related to ML. As for the possibility of TF, a lot of risks
related to terrorist activities by the existence of internal
terrorist groups in addition to executing terrorist operations have come
out. Moreover, there is a link between criminal groups that smuggle
drugs and do kidnapping operations and terrorist groups. All
these factors form high-level risks in the field of ML/TF.
Algeria criminalized ML in 2004, and started its combating against
terrorism and terrorism financing since 1995, as it has criminalized the
TF act being one of the acts described as terrorism or vandalism acts.
In 2005, the Algerian lawmaker has put some provisions by virtue of
AML/CFT law, by virtue of which TF act has been defined. Algeria
established the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in 2002. Consequently,
the main aspects of the legal framework have been covered to
establish a new AML/CFT system in Algeria. It is worth to be noted the
existence of a practical hindrance concerning CFT as the lawmaker
ordained that there should be a link between the terrorist crime and its
financing, which contradicts with the international standards regarding
this matter.
Algeria has established an AML/CFT system that includes a number of
positive points. The most important comment that should be
highlighted in this system is the non-issuing of all legal tools
required for fulfilling basic requirements mentioned in the 40
Recommendations and 9 Special Recommendations of AML/CFT.
On the other hand, the AML/CFT system in Algeria did not include
all the financial institutions; in addition, the categories subject to the
Law are not obligated with some of the basic requirements according
to the international AML/CFT standards.
Click here to view full Mutual Evaluation Report
| Further Tables |
| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |