|
|
FATF Statement re AML Strategic Deficiencies:
Date: 16 February 2012
Bolivia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime,
including enacting CFT legislation and regulations. Despite Bolivia’
s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and
GAFISUD to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Bolivia
has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan,
and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Bolivia should
work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) ensuring
adequate criminalisation of money laundering (Recommendation
1); (2) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special
Recommendation II); (3) establishing and implementing an
adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist
assets (Special Recommendation III); and (4) establishing a fully
operational and effective Financial Intelligence Unit
(Recommendation 26). The FATF encourages Bolivia to address
its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of
implementing its action plan.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:
Bolivia is not a regional financial center, but money laundering
activities continue to take place. These illicit financial activities are
related primarily to narcotics trafficking, corruption, tax evasion,
and smuggling and trafficking of persons. Casinos, cash
transporters, informal exchange houses, and wire transfer
businesses are not subject to anti-money laundering controls.
The Bolivian banking supervision entity has declared that any non-
registered exchange houses will be shut down. The Bolivian
financial system is highly dollarized, with approximately 40% of
deposits and loans distributed in U.S. dollars rather than
Bolivianos, the local currency (down from 90% in 2004). Bolivia
has 13 free trade zones for commercial and industrial use located
in El Alto, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Oruro, Puerto Aguirre, and
Desaguadero.
In December 2008, the Egmont Group expelled the Financial
Investigation Unit (UIF), Bolivia’s financial intelligence unit (FIU),
from its membership, due to a lack of terrorism financing
legislation in Bolivian law. To regain Egmont membership, Bolivia
must reapply and provide written evidence of its FIU’s compliance
with Egmont FIU definitions and requirements.
Bolivia is included in the October 2011 Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) Public Statement because it has not made sufficient
progress in implementing its action plan and continues to have
certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, including inadequacies in
its criminalization of both money laundering and terrorist financing.
For additional information focusing on terrorist financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: NO
Criminalization of Money Laundering:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: List approach
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
KYC covered entities: Banks, insurance companies, securities
brokers and financial intermediaries
Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:
Number of STRs received and time frame: Not available
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
STR covered entities: Banks, insurance companies, securities
brokers and financial intermediaries
Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:
Prosecutions: 110 cases related to money laundering, corruption,
and terrorist financing in 2011
Convictions: Not available
Records exchange mechanism:
With U.S.: MLAT: NO Other mechanism: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: Not available
Bolivia is a member of the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), a FATF-style regional
body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found here: http:
//www.gafisud.info/pdf/InformeBolivia.pdf
Enforcement and implementation issues and comments:
The expulsion of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration from
Bolivia in November 2008 has continued to diminish the
effectiveness of several financial investigative groups operating in
the country, including Bolivia’s Financial Investigative Team, the
Bolivian Special Counternarcotics Police, and the Bolivian Special
Operations Force. Nevertheless, the Counternarcotics Police’s
Financial Intelligence and Analysis Group provided the
investigative leads for three major cases in 2011, two related to
investigations by regional counterparts. Most money laundering
investigations continue to be in the Department of Santa Cruz and
are associated with narcotics trafficking organizations.
Bolivia’s expulsion from the Egmont Group bars the UIF from
participating in Egmont Group meetings or using the Egmont
Secure Web (the primary means of information exchange among
Egmont Group member FIUs). Bolivia is currently working toward
rejoining the Egmont Group and the passage of its TF law in 2011
is a step in the right direction.
Bolivia’s AML law does not include all offenses recommended in
the international standards. Bolivia should seek to extend its laws
to the widest range of predicate offenses.
In September 2011, the Government of Bolivia (GOB) passed new
legislation criminalizing terrorist financing. Like the AML law, this
law is not sufficiently broad to meet international standards. All
terrorist activity must be connected to a group, and “terrorism”
appears to be narrowly defined. The financing of an individual
terrorist would be covered only if he/she also takes part in such a
group. At present there is neither regulation nor guidance on the
treatment of suspicious transactions potentially related to terrorist
financing, though Bolivian authorities stated guidance will be
issued in the last quarter of 2011 and workshops will be organized
to communicate the guidelines to responsible entities. Some
progress has been made with the new legislation criminalizing TF.
However, Bolivia has still to demonstrate that its procedures for
monitoring sanctions lists and taking freezing actions can occur in
a matter of hours and that the freeze can be maintained
indefinitely.
In 2011, the UIF investigated 395 cases involving 1,338 people for
suspicious transactions and referred 39 cases to the prosecutor's
office. Eleven entities doing banking transactions illegally were
closed down. The continued lack of personnel, combined with
inadequate resources and weaknesses in Bolivia’s basic legal and
regulatory framework, limits the UIF’s reach and effectiveness.
Given the UIF’s limited resources relative to the size of Bolivia’s
financial sector, compliance with reporting requirements is
extremely low. The exchange of information between the UIF and
appropriate police investigative entities is also limited, although
the UIF does maintain a database of suspect persons that
financial entities must check before conducting business with
clients.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Bolivia is the world's third largest cocaine producer and a
significant transit zone for Peruvian-origin cocaine. Existing
reports indicate that most Bolivian-origin cocaine exports flow to
other Latin American countries, especially Brazil, for domestic
consumption or onward transit to West Africa and Europe. U. S.
government surveys estimate that approximately one percent of
the cocaine seized in the United States and submitted for testing
originates from Bolivia.
On September 15, 2011, the President of the United States
determined for the fourth consecutive year that the Government
of Bolivia “failed demonstrably” to make sufficient efforts to meet
its obligations under counternarcotics (CN) conventions. This
Presidential determination was based, in part, on evidence that
Bolivia had yet to reverse the increases in net coca cultivation of
the past several years, although in 2010 it appeared that
production had stabilized; however, without the ability to conduct
yield studies previously conducted by the Drug enforcement
Administration (DEA), there is no assurance that production has
not risen. The 2010 U.S. government estimate of pure cocaine
production potential remained at the 2008-2009 levels of 195
metric tons, 70 percent higher than in 2006, and potential export
quality cocaine production at 240 metric tons
The National Drug Control Council, chaired by the Ministry of
Government, is the Bolivian government’s central policymaking
body for CN. The mandate of Vice Ministry for Social Defense's
(VMSD) is to combat drug trafficking, regulate coca production,
and advance coca eradication and drug prevention and
rehabilitation. The Special Counternarcotics Police Force (FELCN)
comprised of approximately 1,700 personnel, an increase from
1,500 personnel in 2010, reports to the VMSD. The Joint
Eradication Task Force conducts coca eradication with
approximately 2,300 military, police and civilian personnel, an
increase of 300 since 2010.
Bolivian President Evo Morales remains the president of the coca
growers’ federation in the Chapare region of Bolivia, one of the
two major coca growing areas in Bolivia. His administration
maintains a "social control" policy for illicit coca eradication in
which the Bolivian government negotiates with coca growers to
obtain their consent for eradication. In 2011, Bolivia intensified
coca eradication efforts, reporting the eradication of more than
10,000 hectares for the first time since 2002, even as eradication
forces continued to meet resistance from coca growers. However,
illegal coca cultivation for drug production remains high, and the
Bolivian government maintains inadequate controls to prevent
diversion of licit coca to illicit cocaine production.
The Government of Bolivia’s ability to identify, investigate and
dismantle drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and follow
actionable law enforcement leads developed in Bolivia remains
diminished following the expulsion of all U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) personnel from Bolivia in January 2008.
Colombian, Brazilian, Peruvian and other foreign nationals in
Bolivia engage in financing, producing and exporting drugs and
laundering drug proceeds. The Bolivian government denies that
foreign drug cartels are present on Bolivian soil.
According to the Latin American Center of Scientific Investigation
(CELIN), illegal drug use is a growing problem in Bolivia.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
Bolivia is principally a source country for men, women, and
children who are subjected to conditions of sex trafficking and
forced labor within the country or abroad. A large number of
Bolivians are found in conditions of forced labor in Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Peru, Spain, and the United States in sweatshops,
factories, and agriculture. A Bolivian consular official noted an
increase in exploited Bolivian laborers in Brazil during the year.
Within Bolivia, young women and girls from rural areas are
subjected to sex trafficking in urban areas. Bolivian women and
girls are also subjected to sex trafficking in neighboring countries,
including Argentina, Peru, and Chile. Members of indigenous
communities are at risk of forced labor within the country,
particularly in the Chaco region. A significant number of Bolivian
children are subjected to conditions of forced labor in mining,
agriculture, and as domestic servants. Reports also indicate some
families lease their children for forced labor in mining and
agriculture near border areas with Peru. In Chile and Brazil,
authorities identified some Bolivian children forced to courier
drugs. Despite some officials’ assertions otherwise, some NGOs
and the human rights ombudsman report that a small number of
children serve in the Bolivian armed forces. The country’s porous
borders facilitate the movement of undocumented migrants, some
of whom may be victims of trafficking.
The Government of Bolivia does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making
significant efforts to do so. The government maintained law
enforcement efforts against sex trafficking crimes involving
children and, with support from a foreign government, opened
four trafficking investigative units during the reporting period in
border areas with identified trafficking problems. Despite these
efforts, convictions of trafficking offenders remained
disproportionately low compared with high numbers of trafficking
victims identified by Bolivian authorities. The government did not
show evidence of adequately addressing forced labor, and most
victim services were available only to girl sex trafficking victims.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: There did not appear to be any credible evidence that
international terrorist organizations were present, nor of any plans
or intentions within such groups to commit terrorist acts within
Bolivia. There were reports that a handful of individuals
associated with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) were present. The Peruvian government has made
accusations that Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement training
camps were present in Bolivia. The Government of Bolivia
cooperated with the United States only minimally on
counterterrorism and did not share counterterrorism information
with the U.S. government. In June, President Morales accused the
United States of using counterterrorism as an excuse for
involvement in other countries' affairs and "to control presidents
and governments and the countries' natural resources.”
Legislation and Law Enforcement: In March, the Minister of
Government reaffirmed the Bolivian government’s commitment to
a "war against terrorists" operating in Bolivia. The government
included terrorist financing measures as part of the Marcelo
Quiroga Santa Cruz Anti-Corruption law, which authorizes prison
sentences of five to 10 years for such activities.
The Government of Bolivia enacted measures to improve border
security by issuing machine-readable passports (though without a
biometric chip) to Bolivian citizens.
Countering Terrorist Finance: The Bolivian financial system did
not provide strong controls or safeguards for preventing its use
by terrorists. Still, there is no evidence that terrorist organizations
used Bolivian financial institutions. Bolivia is a member of the
Financial Action Task Force Against Money Laundering in South
America (GAFISUD), which recommended in 2010 that Bolivia
improve its current money laundering legislation to conform with
the standards of the Financial Action Task Force. Bolivia has yet
to criminalize terrorist financing or allow for the blocking of
terrorist assets. Its Financial Investigative Unit lacks the authority
to receive, analyze, and communicate information related to
terrorist financing.
Regional and International Cooperation: The Government of
Bolivia cooperated well with Peru, Colombia, and surrounding
countries on counterterrorism.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Date: 16 February 2012
Bolivia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime,
including enacting CFT legislation and regulations. Despite Bolivia’
s high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and
GAFISUD to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Bolivia
has not made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan,
and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Bolivia should
work on addressing these deficiencies, including by: (1) ensuring
adequate criminalisation of money laundering (Recommendation
1); (2) adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special
Recommendation II); (3) establishing and implementing an
adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist
assets (Special Recommendation III); and (4) establishing a fully
operational and effective Financial Intelligence Unit
(Recommendation 26). The FATF encourages Bolivia to address
its remaining deficiencies and continue the process of
implementing its action plan.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:
Bolivia is not a regional financial center, but money laundering
activities continue to take place. These illicit financial activities are
related primarily to narcotics trafficking, corruption, tax evasion,
and smuggling and trafficking of persons. Casinos, cash
transporters, informal exchange houses, and wire transfer
businesses are not subject to anti-money laundering controls.
The Bolivian banking supervision entity has declared that any non-
registered exchange houses will be shut down. The Bolivian
financial system is highly dollarized, with approximately 40% of
deposits and loans distributed in U.S. dollars rather than
Bolivianos, the local currency (down from 90% in 2004). Bolivia
has 13 free trade zones for commercial and industrial use located
in El Alto, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Oruro, Puerto Aguirre, and
Desaguadero.
In December 2008, the Egmont Group expelled the Financial
Investigation Unit (UIF), Bolivia’s financial intelligence unit (FIU),
from its membership, due to a lack of terrorism financing
legislation in Bolivian law. To regain Egmont membership, Bolivia
must reapply and provide written evidence of its FIU’s compliance
with Egmont FIU definitions and requirements.
Bolivia is included in the October 2011 Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) Public Statement because it has not made sufficient
progress in implementing its action plan and continues to have
certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, including inadequacies in
its criminalization of both money laundering and terrorist financing.
For additional information focusing on terrorist financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: NO
Criminalization of Money Laundering:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: List approach
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
KYC covered entities: Banks, insurance companies, securities
brokers and financial intermediaries
Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:
Number of STRs received and time frame: Not available
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
STR covered entities: Banks, insurance companies, securities
brokers and financial intermediaries
Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:
Prosecutions: 110 cases related to money laundering, corruption,
and terrorist financing in 2011
Convictions: Not available
Records exchange mechanism:
With U.S.: MLAT: NO Other mechanism: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: Not available
Bolivia is a member of the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), a FATF-style regional
body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found here: http:
//www.gafisud.info/pdf/InformeBolivia.pdf
Enforcement and implementation issues and comments:
The expulsion of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration from
Bolivia in November 2008 has continued to diminish the
effectiveness of several financial investigative groups operating in
the country, including Bolivia’s Financial Investigative Team, the
Bolivian Special Counternarcotics Police, and the Bolivian Special
Operations Force. Nevertheless, the Counternarcotics Police’s
Financial Intelligence and Analysis Group provided the
investigative leads for three major cases in 2011, two related to
investigations by regional counterparts. Most money laundering
investigations continue to be in the Department of Santa Cruz and
are associated with narcotics trafficking organizations.
Bolivia’s expulsion from the Egmont Group bars the UIF from
participating in Egmont Group meetings or using the Egmont
Secure Web (the primary means of information exchange among
Egmont Group member FIUs). Bolivia is currently working toward
rejoining the Egmont Group and the passage of its TF law in 2011
is a step in the right direction.
Bolivia’s AML law does not include all offenses recommended in
the international standards. Bolivia should seek to extend its laws
to the widest range of predicate offenses.
In September 2011, the Government of Bolivia (GOB) passed new
legislation criminalizing terrorist financing. Like the AML law, this
law is not sufficiently broad to meet international standards. All
terrorist activity must be connected to a group, and “terrorism”
appears to be narrowly defined. The financing of an individual
terrorist would be covered only if he/she also takes part in such a
group. At present there is neither regulation nor guidance on the
treatment of suspicious transactions potentially related to terrorist
financing, though Bolivian authorities stated guidance will be
issued in the last quarter of 2011 and workshops will be organized
to communicate the guidelines to responsible entities. Some
progress has been made with the new legislation criminalizing TF.
However, Bolivia has still to demonstrate that its procedures for
monitoring sanctions lists and taking freezing actions can occur in
a matter of hours and that the freeze can be maintained
indefinitely.
In 2011, the UIF investigated 395 cases involving 1,338 people for
suspicious transactions and referred 39 cases to the prosecutor's
office. Eleven entities doing banking transactions illegally were
closed down. The continued lack of personnel, combined with
inadequate resources and weaknesses in Bolivia’s basic legal and
regulatory framework, limits the UIF’s reach and effectiveness.
Given the UIF’s limited resources relative to the size of Bolivia’s
financial sector, compliance with reporting requirements is
extremely low. The exchange of information between the UIF and
appropriate police investigative entities is also limited, although
the UIF does maintain a database of suspect persons that
financial entities must check before conducting business with
clients.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Bolivia is the world's third largest cocaine producer and a
significant transit zone for Peruvian-origin cocaine. Existing
reports indicate that most Bolivian-origin cocaine exports flow to
other Latin American countries, especially Brazil, for domestic
consumption or onward transit to West Africa and Europe. U. S.
government surveys estimate that approximately one percent of
the cocaine seized in the United States and submitted for testing
originates from Bolivia.
On September 15, 2011, the President of the United States
determined for the fourth consecutive year that the Government
of Bolivia “failed demonstrably” to make sufficient efforts to meet
its obligations under counternarcotics (CN) conventions. This
Presidential determination was based, in part, on evidence that
Bolivia had yet to reverse the increases in net coca cultivation of
the past several years, although in 2010 it appeared that
production had stabilized; however, without the ability to conduct
yield studies previously conducted by the Drug enforcement
Administration (DEA), there is no assurance that production has
not risen. The 2010 U.S. government estimate of pure cocaine
production potential remained at the 2008-2009 levels of 195
metric tons, 70 percent higher than in 2006, and potential export
quality cocaine production at 240 metric tons
The National Drug Control Council, chaired by the Ministry of
Government, is the Bolivian government’s central policymaking
body for CN. The mandate of Vice Ministry for Social Defense's
(VMSD) is to combat drug trafficking, regulate coca production,
and advance coca eradication and drug prevention and
rehabilitation. The Special Counternarcotics Police Force (FELCN)
comprised of approximately 1,700 personnel, an increase from
1,500 personnel in 2010, reports to the VMSD. The Joint
Eradication Task Force conducts coca eradication with
approximately 2,300 military, police and civilian personnel, an
increase of 300 since 2010.
Bolivian President Evo Morales remains the president of the coca
growers’ federation in the Chapare region of Bolivia, one of the
two major coca growing areas in Bolivia. His administration
maintains a "social control" policy for illicit coca eradication in
which the Bolivian government negotiates with coca growers to
obtain their consent for eradication. In 2011, Bolivia intensified
coca eradication efforts, reporting the eradication of more than
10,000 hectares for the first time since 2002, even as eradication
forces continued to meet resistance from coca growers. However,
illegal coca cultivation for drug production remains high, and the
Bolivian government maintains inadequate controls to prevent
diversion of licit coca to illicit cocaine production.
The Government of Bolivia’s ability to identify, investigate and
dismantle drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and follow
actionable law enforcement leads developed in Bolivia remains
diminished following the expulsion of all U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) personnel from Bolivia in January 2008.
Colombian, Brazilian, Peruvian and other foreign nationals in
Bolivia engage in financing, producing and exporting drugs and
laundering drug proceeds. The Bolivian government denies that
foreign drug cartels are present on Bolivian soil.
According to the Latin American Center of Scientific Investigation
(CELIN), illegal drug use is a growing problem in Bolivia.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
Bolivia is principally a source country for men, women, and
children who are subjected to conditions of sex trafficking and
forced labor within the country or abroad. A large number of
Bolivians are found in conditions of forced labor in Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Peru, Spain, and the United States in sweatshops,
factories, and agriculture. A Bolivian consular official noted an
increase in exploited Bolivian laborers in Brazil during the year.
Within Bolivia, young women and girls from rural areas are
subjected to sex trafficking in urban areas. Bolivian women and
girls are also subjected to sex trafficking in neighboring countries,
including Argentina, Peru, and Chile. Members of indigenous
communities are at risk of forced labor within the country,
particularly in the Chaco region. A significant number of Bolivian
children are subjected to conditions of forced labor in mining,
agriculture, and as domestic servants. Reports also indicate some
families lease their children for forced labor in mining and
agriculture near border areas with Peru. In Chile and Brazil,
authorities identified some Bolivian children forced to courier
drugs. Despite some officials’ assertions otherwise, some NGOs
and the human rights ombudsman report that a small number of
children serve in the Bolivian armed forces. The country’s porous
borders facilitate the movement of undocumented migrants, some
of whom may be victims of trafficking.
The Government of Bolivia does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making
significant efforts to do so. The government maintained law
enforcement efforts against sex trafficking crimes involving
children and, with support from a foreign government, opened
four trafficking investigative units during the reporting period in
border areas with identified trafficking problems. Despite these
efforts, convictions of trafficking offenders remained
disproportionately low compared with high numbers of trafficking
victims identified by Bolivian authorities. The government did not
show evidence of adequately addressing forced labor, and most
victim services were available only to girl sex trafficking victims.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: There did not appear to be any credible evidence that
international terrorist organizations were present, nor of any plans
or intentions within such groups to commit terrorist acts within
Bolivia. There were reports that a handful of individuals
associated with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) were present. The Peruvian government has made
accusations that Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement training
camps were present in Bolivia. The Government of Bolivia
cooperated with the United States only minimally on
counterterrorism and did not share counterterrorism information
with the U.S. government. In June, President Morales accused the
United States of using counterterrorism as an excuse for
involvement in other countries' affairs and "to control presidents
and governments and the countries' natural resources.”
Legislation and Law Enforcement: In March, the Minister of
Government reaffirmed the Bolivian government’s commitment to
a "war against terrorists" operating in Bolivia. The government
included terrorist financing measures as part of the Marcelo
Quiroga Santa Cruz Anti-Corruption law, which authorizes prison
sentences of five to 10 years for such activities.
The Government of Bolivia enacted measures to improve border
security by issuing machine-readable passports (though without a
biometric chip) to Bolivian citizens.
Countering Terrorist Finance: The Bolivian financial system did
not provide strong controls or safeguards for preventing its use
by terrorists. Still, there is no evidence that terrorist organizations
used Bolivian financial institutions. Bolivia is a member of the
Financial Action Task Force Against Money Laundering in South
America (GAFISUD), which recommended in 2010 that Bolivia
improve its current money laundering legislation to conform with
the standards of the Financial Action Task Force. Bolivia has yet
to criminalize terrorist financing or allow for the blocking of
terrorist assets. Its Financial Investigative Unit lacks the authority
to receive, analyze, and communicate information related to
terrorist financing.
Regional and International Cooperation: The Government of
Bolivia cooperated well with Peru, Colombia, and surrounding
countries on counterterrorism.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
| Further Tables |
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
| BOLIVIA |
| KnowYourCountry |
|
|
| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |