_________________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Financial Intelligence Directorate of National Security Agency (FID)
|
|
Sanctions:
As a member of the EU, the country is party to all EU Sanctions
as well as UN sanctions.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Bulgaria is not considered an important regional financial center.
However, it has a well-developed financial sector in comparison to
other Balkan countries and relatively lax regulatory controls. The
country’s large gray economy and the prevalence of cash
transactions make it especially vulnerable to money laundering.
Bulgaria is a major transit point for the trafficking of drugs and
persons into Western Europe, generating criminal proceeds that
are subsequently laundered in Bulgaria. According to Bulgarian
law enforcement, the main sources of laundered funds in 2010
were from both domestic and foreign criminals engaging in drug
trafficking, smuggling, human trafficking, tax fraud, credit card
fraud, and internet fraud. Public corruption is a pervasive problem
in Bulgaria, and many suspect that some public tenders were
used to conceal money laundering. The government has made
significant efforts to curb corruption and prosecuted several high-
level public officials, including former ministers.
Numerous high-profile anti-smuggling operations have generally
had a deterrent effect on contraband. However, smuggling,
particularly of cigarettes, alcohol, and fuel, remains a serious
problem, reportedly sustained by corrupt Bulgarian businessmen
and politicians trying to avoid paying value added taxes and
excise duties. Despite law enforcement efforts, cigarette
smuggling remains rampant due to the crisis-driven fall in
disposable income and the government’s increase of excise
duties. Contraband, including stolen cars, and clothes, also
generates funds laundered through the financial system.
As organized crime groups move into legitimate business
operations, money laundering is becoming more sophisticated
and difficult to trace. Criminals invest laundered money in casinos,
night clubs, and dealerships selling expensive cars, boats, and
other luxury goods imported from the United States and Europe.
Despite a dramatic slowdown in construction due to the economic
crisis, the tourism sector continues to be one of the favorite
money laundering routes for organized criminal groups.
There are six free trade zones in Bulgaria that are supervised by
the Ministry of Finance. The free trade zones are located in
Burgas, Vidin, Ruse, Svilengrad, Plovdiv and Dragoman. The
goods produced in these zones are exported without duties.
Although this is becoming a less common scheme due to
Bulgaria's European Union (EU) membership, some still believe
that free trade zones are used to avoid paying customs fees,
especially on gas derivatives and cigarettes.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF U.S.
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: NO civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks; money exchangers; insurance
companies, brokers and agents; investment brokers, dealers,
funds and managers; trust and company service providers;
notaries, lawyers, auditors, and accountants; gaming businesses;
real estate brokers; dealers in precious metals and stones; the
postal service; political parties; and sport clubs
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: YES
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks; money exchangers; insurance
companies, brokers and agents; investment brokers, dealers,
funds and managers; trust and company service providers;
notaries, lawyers, auditors, and accountants; gaming businesses;
real estate brokers; dealers in precious metals and stones; the
postal service; political parties; and sport clubs
Number of STRs received and time frame: 1,380 (January –
November 2010)
Number of CTRs received and time frame: 182,332 (January –
November 2010)
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: 83 (2009); 75 (January – October 2010)
Convictions: 18 against 37 people (2009); 15 against 28 people
(January – October 2010)
Assets forfeited: criminally: $10,360,000 (January – October 2010)
civilly: $500,000 (January – November 2010)
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Bulgaria is a member of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Anti-
Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
(Moneyval), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional
body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found here: http:
//www.coe.int/t/dgh/moneyval/Countrie/Bulgaria_en.asp
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
Bulgaria has undertaken steps to deter financial crimes and
continues to maintain the numbers of money laundering
prosecutions. In May 2010 the Bulgarian government closed a
loophole in reporting requirements by issuing new guidance
requiring banks to track previously unreported cash withdrawals.
This new guidance came into force in December 2010. The
government is also seeking to amend its asset forfeiture law to
allow civil asset forfeiture independent of a criminal conviction.
The amendments would also expand the scope of the law to allow
forfeiture proceedings against third persons and legal entities
possessing property acquired through criminal activity. If passed,
these changes would greatly speed up the process and make it
more difficult for criminals to hide and launder illegal assets.
In March 2010, a trial court convicted six members of a high-
profile criminal group for laundering EU assistance funds. The
court sentenced the group to a total of 42 years of imprisonment
and confiscated property worth approximately $8.2 million. The
money was laundered through a U.S.-registered offshore
company and then reinvested in resorts on the Bulgarian sea
coast. This is the first case in Bulgaria in which the defendants
were convicted of money laundering prior to obtaining a
conviction for the predicate crime.
Due to a 2007 restructuring, the Financial Intelligence Directorate
(FID), Bulgaria’s FIU, is now a directorate within the State Agency
for National Security (DANS); it is no longer an individual legal
entity with its own budget. The FID has 32 memoranda of
understanding with Financial Intelligence Units (FIU)’s from
Europe, the Americas, and Australia. Since moving to DANS, the
FID has not been authorized to sign any additional or updated
memoranda of understanding to exchange financial intelligence
with its counterpart FIUs in other countries. Due to DANS’ legal
requirements, FID's yearend statistics are also no longer released
to the public.
Given the size of Bulgaria's financial system and the
sophistication of money laundering schemes, staffing in the FID is
not commensurate with Bulgaria's money laundering problems. As
part of DANS, the FID is not able to fill temporary vacancies and
currently Bulgaria only has five individuals conducting onsite
inspections. Also, in part due to its staffing shortages, the FID has
been criticized for not effectively analyzing the information it
receives from reporting entities.
The FID and the Bulgarian National Bank circulate the names of
suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations found on the
UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List, the list of
Specially Designated Global Terrorists designated by the United
States pursuant to Executive Order 13224, and those designated
by the relevant EU authorities. At the end of 2010, the FID was
examining two reports of potentially terrorist-related assets.
Reporting compliance by non-bank financial institutions,
especially by exchange bureaus, casinos and notaries, continues
to be very low. This can be attributed to numerous factors,
including a lack of understanding of, or respect for the legal
requirements; lack of inspection resources; and the general
absence of effective regulatory control over the non-bank
financial sector. The government should systematically track non-
bank transactions as well as cross-border electronic currency
transactions to prevent Bulgaria from being an entry point to
funnel illicit money into the European financial system.
______________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Bulgaria is a transit country for heroin, as well as a minor
producer of illicit synthetic narcotics. Bulgaria's location astride
Balkan heroin transit routes makes it vulnerable to international
trafficking organizations transporting narcotics into the European
Union. Organized crime groups operating in Bulgaria have
increased their influence and involvement in the international
narcotics trade. These groups are sophisticated, well-financed,
and entrenched within Bulgarian society. Bulgaria’s Black Sea
ports continue to be exploited by drug traffickers to smuggle
cocaine from South America to Europe and heroin from Turkey
and Iran to Europe.
The only illicit drug crop known to be cultivated in Bulgaria is
cannabis, primarily for domestic consumption. Bulgaria continues
to be a source of some synthetic drugs, though production has
declined in recent years.
Counternarcotics efforts are primarily the responsibility of several
specialized police services within the Ministry of Interior (MOI),
and the Customs Agency under the Ministry of Finance (MOF).
The MOI continues to strengthen institutional capacity, with its
General Directorate for Combating Organized Crime (GDBOP)
taking an increasingly effective lead in counternarcotics
investigations and operations. The Customs Agency continues to
implement reforms and registered a slight increase in drug
seizures over last year.
Bulgaria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
Bulgaria is a source and, to a lesser extent, a transit and
destination country for women and children who are subjected to
sex trafficking, and men, women, and children subjected to
conditions of forced labor. Bulgarian women and children are
subjected to sex trafficking within the country, particularly in resort
areas and border towns, as well as in the Netherlands, Belgium,
France, Austria, Italy, Germany, the United States, the Czech
Republic, Finland, Greece, Italy, Spain, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Switzerland, Turkey, and Cyprus. Ethnic Roma men, women, and
children are particularly vulnerable to becoming trafficking victims
and are overrepresented among identified trafficking victims.
Bulgarian men, women, and children are subjected to conditions
of forced labor in Greece, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Slovenia, and
the United Kingdom. Some Bulgarian children are forced into
street begging and petty theft within Bulgaria and also in Greece,
Italy, and the United Kingdom.
The Government of Bulgaria does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. During the reporting period,
the Government of Bulgaria sustained progress by adopting a
national referral mechanism and making greater efforts to ensure
that no victims of trafficking were punished. In 2010, the
government increased the number of victims identified by law
enforcement personnel and increased funding for child victims of
trafficking. The government opened a second trafficking shelter
for adults in February 2011; bureaucratic problems, however,
prevented the shelters from helping more than one victim in total.
Although the government increased the number of officials
investigated for trafficking-related offenses, they did not convict or
criminally punish any officials complicit in trafficking-related crimes
and less than 40 percent of trafficking offenders convicted in
2010 served time in prison.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2009
During 2009, 29 Bulgarians attended U.S. government-sponsored
counterterrorism training courses within the context of the
Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, administered by the
Embassy’s Office of Defense Cooperation. This training had
courses in intelligence, security, operations, legal processes, and
civilian-military cooperation. In July, 15 analysts from the Defense
Information Service received a two-day seminar on terrorist
network analysis and terrorist finance.
Bulgaria participated in the International Security Assistance
Force in Afghanistan with approximately 470 service members. At
U.S. request, Bulgaria added its first Operational Mentor and
Liaison Team in February and agreed to add a second. On a
yearly basis since 2004, Bulgaria has deployed a frigate in
support of the Mediterranean Operation Active Endeavor (OAE).
OAE’s mission is to conduct maritime operations in the OAE area
of operations to demonstrate NATO’s resolve to help deter,
defend, disrupt, and protect against terrorist activity.
In November, the new center-right government achieved a major
success with the passage of two bills designed to overhaul the
structure and operation of the Ministry of Interior and the agency
responsible for counterterrorism, the State Agency for National
Security (DANS). The two pieces of legislation eliminate
duplication of effort and unclear responsibilities, making it easier
for them to cooperate and share information. The DANS
amendments explicitly restored the powers of the Financial
Intelligence Directorate (FID) to conduct on-site inspections of
banks and other financial institutions, and collect “bank secret”
information for money laundering and terrorist financing cases.
The FID remained vigilant against terrorist financing and
continued to cooperate with the U.S. government on identifying
and investigating terrorist assets. The FID reliably distributed lists
of individuals and organizations linked to terrorism to all of the
banks in Bulgaria, the Ministry of Interior, Customs, and the
Border Police. The FID has been responsive to all mandated
UNSCR-designated terrorist organizations, and has also been
supportive and cooperative on U.S. government designated
individuals and organizations. The FID has advised the banking
sector to use the Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets
Control OFAC website as a reliable information resource for
individuals and organizations associated with terrorism. The FID
continued to provide feedback, including information on the
response level of Bulgaria’s banks, to the U.S. Treasury
Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, as well as to
the U.S. Embassy.
As a member of the EU, the country is party to all EU Sanctions
as well as UN sanctions.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Bulgaria is not considered an important regional financial center.
However, it has a well-developed financial sector in comparison to
other Balkan countries and relatively lax regulatory controls. The
country’s large gray economy and the prevalence of cash
transactions make it especially vulnerable to money laundering.
Bulgaria is a major transit point for the trafficking of drugs and
persons into Western Europe, generating criminal proceeds that
are subsequently laundered in Bulgaria. According to Bulgarian
law enforcement, the main sources of laundered funds in 2010
were from both domestic and foreign criminals engaging in drug
trafficking, smuggling, human trafficking, tax fraud, credit card
fraud, and internet fraud. Public corruption is a pervasive problem
in Bulgaria, and many suspect that some public tenders were
used to conceal money laundering. The government has made
significant efforts to curb corruption and prosecuted several high-
level public officials, including former ministers.
Numerous high-profile anti-smuggling operations have generally
had a deterrent effect on contraband. However, smuggling,
particularly of cigarettes, alcohol, and fuel, remains a serious
problem, reportedly sustained by corrupt Bulgarian businessmen
and politicians trying to avoid paying value added taxes and
excise duties. Despite law enforcement efforts, cigarette
smuggling remains rampant due to the crisis-driven fall in
disposable income and the government’s increase of excise
duties. Contraband, including stolen cars, and clothes, also
generates funds laundered through the financial system.
As organized crime groups move into legitimate business
operations, money laundering is becoming more sophisticated
and difficult to trace. Criminals invest laundered money in casinos,
night clubs, and dealerships selling expensive cars, boats, and
other luxury goods imported from the United States and Europe.
Despite a dramatic slowdown in construction due to the economic
crisis, the tourism sector continues to be one of the favorite
money laundering routes for organized criminal groups.
There are six free trade zones in Bulgaria that are supervised by
the Ministry of Finance. The free trade zones are located in
Burgas, Vidin, Ruse, Svilengrad, Plovdiv and Dragoman. The
goods produced in these zones are exported without duties.
Although this is becoming a less common scheme due to
Bulgaria's European Union (EU) membership, some still believe
that free trade zones are used to avoid paying customs fees,
especially on gas derivatives and cigarettes.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF U.S.
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: NO civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks; money exchangers; insurance
companies, brokers and agents; investment brokers, dealers,
funds and managers; trust and company service providers;
notaries, lawyers, auditors, and accountants; gaming businesses;
real estate brokers; dealers in precious metals and stones; the
postal service; political parties; and sport clubs
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: YES
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks; money exchangers; insurance
companies, brokers and agents; investment brokers, dealers,
funds and managers; trust and company service providers;
notaries, lawyers, auditors, and accountants; gaming businesses;
real estate brokers; dealers in precious metals and stones; the
postal service; political parties; and sport clubs
Number of STRs received and time frame: 1,380 (January –
November 2010)
Number of CTRs received and time frame: 182,332 (January –
November 2010)
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: 83 (2009); 75 (January – October 2010)
Convictions: 18 against 37 people (2009); 15 against 28 people
(January – October 2010)
Assets forfeited: criminally: $10,360,000 (January – October 2010)
civilly: $500,000 (January – November 2010)
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Bulgaria is a member of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Anti-
Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
(Moneyval), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional
body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found here: http:
//www.coe.int/t/dgh/moneyval/Countrie/Bulgaria_en.asp
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
Bulgaria has undertaken steps to deter financial crimes and
continues to maintain the numbers of money laundering
prosecutions. In May 2010 the Bulgarian government closed a
loophole in reporting requirements by issuing new guidance
requiring banks to track previously unreported cash withdrawals.
This new guidance came into force in December 2010. The
government is also seeking to amend its asset forfeiture law to
allow civil asset forfeiture independent of a criminal conviction.
The amendments would also expand the scope of the law to allow
forfeiture proceedings against third persons and legal entities
possessing property acquired through criminal activity. If passed,
these changes would greatly speed up the process and make it
more difficult for criminals to hide and launder illegal assets.
In March 2010, a trial court convicted six members of a high-
profile criminal group for laundering EU assistance funds. The
court sentenced the group to a total of 42 years of imprisonment
and confiscated property worth approximately $8.2 million. The
money was laundered through a U.S.-registered offshore
company and then reinvested in resorts on the Bulgarian sea
coast. This is the first case in Bulgaria in which the defendants
were convicted of money laundering prior to obtaining a
conviction for the predicate crime.
Due to a 2007 restructuring, the Financial Intelligence Directorate
(FID), Bulgaria’s FIU, is now a directorate within the State Agency
for National Security (DANS); it is no longer an individual legal
entity with its own budget. The FID has 32 memoranda of
understanding with Financial Intelligence Units (FIU)’s from
Europe, the Americas, and Australia. Since moving to DANS, the
FID has not been authorized to sign any additional or updated
memoranda of understanding to exchange financial intelligence
with its counterpart FIUs in other countries. Due to DANS’ legal
requirements, FID's yearend statistics are also no longer released
to the public.
Given the size of Bulgaria's financial system and the
sophistication of money laundering schemes, staffing in the FID is
not commensurate with Bulgaria's money laundering problems. As
part of DANS, the FID is not able to fill temporary vacancies and
currently Bulgaria only has five individuals conducting onsite
inspections. Also, in part due to its staffing shortages, the FID has
been criticized for not effectively analyzing the information it
receives from reporting entities.
The FID and the Bulgarian National Bank circulate the names of
suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations found on the
UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List, the list of
Specially Designated Global Terrorists designated by the United
States pursuant to Executive Order 13224, and those designated
by the relevant EU authorities. At the end of 2010, the FID was
examining two reports of potentially terrorist-related assets.
Reporting compliance by non-bank financial institutions,
especially by exchange bureaus, casinos and notaries, continues
to be very low. This can be attributed to numerous factors,
including a lack of understanding of, or respect for the legal
requirements; lack of inspection resources; and the general
absence of effective regulatory control over the non-bank
financial sector. The government should systematically track non-
bank transactions as well as cross-border electronic currency
transactions to prevent Bulgaria from being an entry point to
funnel illicit money into the European financial system.
______________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Bulgaria is a transit country for heroin, as well as a minor
producer of illicit synthetic narcotics. Bulgaria's location astride
Balkan heroin transit routes makes it vulnerable to international
trafficking organizations transporting narcotics into the European
Union. Organized crime groups operating in Bulgaria have
increased their influence and involvement in the international
narcotics trade. These groups are sophisticated, well-financed,
and entrenched within Bulgarian society. Bulgaria’s Black Sea
ports continue to be exploited by drug traffickers to smuggle
cocaine from South America to Europe and heroin from Turkey
and Iran to Europe.
The only illicit drug crop known to be cultivated in Bulgaria is
cannabis, primarily for domestic consumption. Bulgaria continues
to be a source of some synthetic drugs, though production has
declined in recent years.
Counternarcotics efforts are primarily the responsibility of several
specialized police services within the Ministry of Interior (MOI),
and the Customs Agency under the Ministry of Finance (MOF).
The MOI continues to strengthen institutional capacity, with its
General Directorate for Combating Organized Crime (GDBOP)
taking an increasingly effective lead in counternarcotics
investigations and operations. The Customs Agency continues to
implement reforms and registered a slight increase in drug
seizures over last year.
Bulgaria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
Bulgaria is a source and, to a lesser extent, a transit and
destination country for women and children who are subjected to
sex trafficking, and men, women, and children subjected to
conditions of forced labor. Bulgarian women and children are
subjected to sex trafficking within the country, particularly in resort
areas and border towns, as well as in the Netherlands, Belgium,
France, Austria, Italy, Germany, the United States, the Czech
Republic, Finland, Greece, Italy, Spain, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Switzerland, Turkey, and Cyprus. Ethnic Roma men, women, and
children are particularly vulnerable to becoming trafficking victims
and are overrepresented among identified trafficking victims.
Bulgarian men, women, and children are subjected to conditions
of forced labor in Greece, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Slovenia, and
the United Kingdom. Some Bulgarian children are forced into
street begging and petty theft within Bulgaria and also in Greece,
Italy, and the United Kingdom.
The Government of Bulgaria does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. During the reporting period,
the Government of Bulgaria sustained progress by adopting a
national referral mechanism and making greater efforts to ensure
that no victims of trafficking were punished. In 2010, the
government increased the number of victims identified by law
enforcement personnel and increased funding for child victims of
trafficking. The government opened a second trafficking shelter
for adults in February 2011; bureaucratic problems, however,
prevented the shelters from helping more than one victim in total.
Although the government increased the number of officials
investigated for trafficking-related offenses, they did not convict or
criminally punish any officials complicit in trafficking-related crimes
and less than 40 percent of trafficking offenders convicted in
2010 served time in prison.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2009
During 2009, 29 Bulgarians attended U.S. government-sponsored
counterterrorism training courses within the context of the
Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, administered by the
Embassy’s Office of Defense Cooperation. This training had
courses in intelligence, security, operations, legal processes, and
civilian-military cooperation. In July, 15 analysts from the Defense
Information Service received a two-day seminar on terrorist
network analysis and terrorist finance.
Bulgaria participated in the International Security Assistance
Force in Afghanistan with approximately 470 service members. At
U.S. request, Bulgaria added its first Operational Mentor and
Liaison Team in February and agreed to add a second. On a
yearly basis since 2004, Bulgaria has deployed a frigate in
support of the Mediterranean Operation Active Endeavor (OAE).
OAE’s mission is to conduct maritime operations in the OAE area
of operations to demonstrate NATO’s resolve to help deter,
defend, disrupt, and protect against terrorist activity.
In November, the new center-right government achieved a major
success with the passage of two bills designed to overhaul the
structure and operation of the Ministry of Interior and the agency
responsible for counterterrorism, the State Agency for National
Security (DANS). The two pieces of legislation eliminate
duplication of effort and unclear responsibilities, making it easier
for them to cooperate and share information. The DANS
amendments explicitly restored the powers of the Financial
Intelligence Directorate (FID) to conduct on-site inspections of
banks and other financial institutions, and collect “bank secret”
information for money laundering and terrorist financing cases.
The FID remained vigilant against terrorist financing and
continued to cooperate with the U.S. government on identifying
and investigating terrorist assets. The FID reliably distributed lists
of individuals and organizations linked to terrorism to all of the
banks in Bulgaria, the Ministry of Interior, Customs, and the
Border Police. The FID has been responsive to all mandated
UNSCR-designated terrorist organizations, and has also been
supportive and cooperative on U.S. government designated
individuals and organizations. The FID has advised the banking
sector to use the Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets
Control OFAC website as a reliable information resource for
individuals and organizations associated with terrorism. The FID
continued to provide feedback, including information on the
response level of Bulgaria’s banks, to the U.S. Treasury
Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, as well as to
the U.S. Embassy.
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| Further Tables |
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
| BULGARIA |
| KnowYourCountry |
|
|
| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |