|
|
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Burkina Faso is not a regional financial center. Its economy is
primarily cash-based, and most economic activity takes place in
the informal sector. Only an estimated six percent of the
population has bank accounts. Burkina Faso lacks the resources
necessary to protect its borders adequately and to monitor the
movement of goods and people. Because the country’s borders
tend to be largely unregulated, illegal narcotics operations and
black market currency exchanges easily flow in an unregulated
manner in and out of the country and from one country to another
within the region. Regional corruption, a lack of resources, and
overburdened and weak judicial and law enforcement systems are
also major challenges.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF U.S.
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: NO
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: The Public Treasury, Central Bank of West
African States (BCEAO), financial organizations, independent
legal professionals involved in financial transactions, auditors,
real estate agents, fund transporters, owners of casinos and
lotteries, travel agencies, NGOs
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: The Public Treasury, BCEAO, financial
organizations, independent legal professionals involved in
financial transactions, auditors, real estate agents, fund
transporters, owners of casinos and lotteries, travel agencies,
NGOs
Number of STRs received and time frame: 40 from January 2009
to November 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: 0
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: 0
Convictions: 0
Assets forfeited: criminally: 0 civilly: 0
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Burkina Faso is a member of the Inter Governmental Action Group
Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial
Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Its most recent
mutual evaluation can be found here: http://www.giaba.org/index.
php?type=c&id=39&mod=2&men=2
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) is working at
the regional level to draft revised anti-money laundering (AML)
regulations. Limited resources hamper the Government of Burkina
Faso’s (GOBF) ability to enforce current AML laws and
regulations. The newly created financial intelligence unit (CENTIF)
is not yet fully operational and is still working to establish itself as
an institution. All six staff members of the CENTIF have been
nominated and have started work but lack the training and
capacity to fully enforce the law and its attendant regulations.
There is little enforcement and no formal method for tracking the
movement of goods and money into and out of the country at
border checkpoints or at either of the country's two commercial
airports. CENTIF, law enforcement agencies and customs do not
have the means and expertise to control the widespread informal
monetary and commercial sectors. Informal money exchange and
transfers are common and not currently monitored.
Records exchange with countries outside of the WAEMU region is
possible via bilateral agreement. The GOBF continued its
cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism efforts and
also participated in numerous regional efforts to combat terrorism.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012:
Cannabis, amphetamines, and diverted licit medications remain
the three principal drugs abused in Burkina Faso. There are also
a very limited number of cocaine and heroin addicts. Toxic
inhalants are used by the poorest drug addicts, especially street
kids. Natural herbs with reported psychoactive effects are utilized
in some traditional ceremonies. Illicit drug production in Burkina
Faso is limited to cannabis cultivation. Cannabis cultivation has
been reported across Burkina Faso, but is more prevalent along
the southern borders, the outskirts of Ouagadougou, near Bobo
Dioulasso, and close to Boromo.
Burkina Faso borders six countries, making it a natural transit
point for drugs moving from coastal West Africa across the Sahel
to Europe. Its porous, largely unmonitored borders and lack of
trained border control personnel and inspection equipment make
it hard for Burkina Faso enforcement to counter all types of
trafficking. Burkinabe officials, however, believe that Burkina is not
a West African drug hub and that there are no established
networks or distribution centers in Burkina Faso. The interdiction
of drugs remains a low priority for the Government of Burkina
Faso when compared with other economic, social, and political
issues.
Hard drugs are not imported into Burkina for local consumption,
and Burkina Faso does not manufacture any hard drugs to export
to other markets. The Ouagadougou airport is neither known to
be a hub for drug couriers nor an important drug transshipment
point. Although some Burkinabe citizens are employed in the drug
industry and profit indirectly from the transiting drug trade, they
are not producers, organizers, financiers, or major players.
Instead, they are organized, frequently as drug mules or small-
scale street pushers, by criminals from Nigeria, Togo, Ghana,
Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea Bissau.
Drug shipments and couriers in Burkina Faso are sometimes
intercepted by the national police, gendarmerie, and customs
officials. Interdiction of these couriers is the source of most of
Burkina enforcement’s drug seizures. Over the last two years, a
number of drug traffickers intercepted in Burkina Faso have
ingested drug-filled pellets or have had cocaine or cannabis
hidden on their bodies. Ouagadougou airport security officials
have limited technical equipment and training to detect and
interdict the drugs, but they have received basic training in drug
courier profiling and know how to look for particular passenger
behavior such as nervousness and late, hasty check-ins. France
provided drug scanning equipment in 2011, although the
materials have not been fully integrated into the airports
operations due to ongoing construction. AFRICOM provided drug
testing kits in 2011. Airport security officials are particularly
vigilant with passengers on those airlines that have historically
been favored by traffickers in Africa.
The National Gendarmerie was successful in intercepting a
number of significant cannabis and Indian hemp shipments in
2011. In March the Gendarmerie seized nearly 800 kilograms of
hemp and cannabis, and another 1,055 kilograms in July, both
near the economic capital of Bobo Dioulasso. The shipments were
transported by numerous couriers on bicycles and are thought to
have originated in Ghana and destined for Mali. In July, 145
kilograms of hemp were seized on the Burkina Faso-Mali border.
From January to June the Customs office in Nako (10 kilometers
from the Ghana border) reported they had seized 6.8 metric tons
of drugs, up from 4 tons in all of 2010. In September, police
intercepted more than 100 kilograms of cannabis in Houndé, not
from from Bobo-Dioulasso. All drugs seized are catalogued,
photographed then destroyed.
Although customs officials at border posts and airports are
financially rewarded for detecting and seizing undeclared goods,
receiving 25 percent of the overall value of undeclared goods,
this is not the case for drugs, which are considered "unproductive
goods." While funding to provide customs officials with bonuses
for drug seizures has been used in the past, budget shortfalls
have stymied these efforts. Drug seizures declined in parallel with
the loss of these bonuses. Predictably, customs officials prefer to
focus on interdicting the smuggling of non-narcotic goods since it
brings them financial rewards.
Burkina Faso's overall drug policy is directed by the National
Committee to Combat Drugs. The Committee has asked for
additional resources, and for its transformation into a National
Drug Office; this proposed reorganization has yet to be
addressed by the Government of Burkina Faso. All laws
applicable to drugs are included in the "Code des Drogues."
Burkina Faso has received funding and technical assistance from
the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) and in-
country drug experts are occasionally invited to attend European
Union or ECOWAS conferences. France has provided
drug/chemical detection kits as well as training, as has AFRICOM.
As a matter of government policy, Burkina Faso does not
encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic
or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the
laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.
Burkina Faso is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN
Convention against Corruption and the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
Burkina Faso is a country of origin, transit, and destination for
women and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.
Burkinabe children are forced into labor as farm hands, gold
panners and washers, street vendors, domestic servants,
beggars recruited as pupils by unscrupulous religious teachers,
and exploited in the sex trade. Burkinabe children are also
transported to Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, or Niger for subsequent forced
labor or sex trafficking. Burkina Faso is a transit area for
traffickers transporting children from Mali to Cote d’Ivoire, and
may be a destination for children trafficked from other countries in
the region. To a lesser extent, traffickers recruit Burkinabe women
for forced prostitution in Europe. Women from other West African
countries are fraudulently recruited for employment in Burkina
Faso, and subsequently subjected to situations of forced labor in
restaurants, domestic servitude, and forced prostitution.
The Government of Burkina Faso does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. The government recognizes
that child trafficking is a problem in the country, and it continued
its efforts to proactively identify child victims. A police operation
launched following an INTERPOL-supported training event was
successful in rescuing 103 children from situations of forced
labor, many at artisanal gold mining sites, and the Ministry of
Social Action reported identifying an additional 557 child victims
during the year. The government did not take steps to identify
adult victims of trafficking among vulnerable populations, such as
women in prostitution. During the year, the government sustained
anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts which led to the arrest of
24 suspected traffickers and the conviction of six trafficking
offenders. However, the government struggled to obtain complete
data on its law enforcement efforts.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: The Government of Burkina Faso remained a serious,
stable ally, fully cognizant of the threats posed by regional
extremism in the Sahel and elsewhere in West Africa. Burkina
Faso’s counterterrorism capabilities were limited owing to financial
constraints, but it was consistently responsive to U.S. requests for
cooperative operations. In an effort to improve its
counterterrorism capabilities, senior Burkinabe officials requested
U.S. assistance in the form of training and equipment and
specifically identified regional intelligence sharing, border
security, and airport security as three vulnerabilities to address.
There was still no formal method for tracking movement into and
out of the country at border checkpoints or at either of the
country's two commercial airports in Ouagadougou and Bobo
Dioulasso.
Although there were no terrorist incidents in Burkina Faso in
2010, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remained a threat,
particularly in the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso tri-border area where
AQIM attempted to locate and kidnap Westerners.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The President of Burkina Faso
issued a decree in 2010 underscoring his support for the
Suppression of Terrorism law passed in 2009 by the National
Assembly. The law’s passage and the President's decree
demonstrated the country's political will to ensure that its territory
is not used as a staging ground for violent extremists or
transnational terrorist attacks.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Burkina Faso was a member of the
Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in
West Africa, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body.
The Government of Burkina Faso provided UN lists of designated
terrorists or terrorist entities to financial institutions. There were
no known terrorist financing prosecutions in 2010.
Regional and International Cooperation: The Burkina Faso
government participated in regional and international
counterterrorism conferences and training exercises. It expressed
its desire to collaborate with neighboring countries to counter
violent extremism through a multilateral approach, such as
participating in joint training exercises and regional partnerships.
Burkina Faso cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts and
participated in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP). Its cooperation and partnership in the TSCTP were
demonstrated in May when the government hosted U.S. Africa
Command's (AFRICOM) annual regional counterterrorism exercise
FLINTLOCK 10 and attended a related Joint Combined Exchange
Training program in Mali. Burkina Faso's government also
participated in numerous regional efforts to combat terrorism,
including with the Economic Community of West African States,
the AU, and other international organizations.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The
Government of Burkina Faso and the Embassy conducted several
joint projects, including a medical outreach program in the far
north of Burkina Faso, a predominantly Muslim and Touareg
region. The government encouraged regular and ongoing inter-
faith dialogues as a way to mitigate extremism.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Burkina Faso is not a regional financial center. Its economy is
primarily cash-based, and most economic activity takes place in
the informal sector. Only an estimated six percent of the
population has bank accounts. Burkina Faso lacks the resources
necessary to protect its borders adequately and to monitor the
movement of goods and people. Because the country’s borders
tend to be largely unregulated, illegal narcotics operations and
black market currency exchanges easily flow in an unregulated
manner in and out of the country and from one country to another
within the region. Regional corruption, a lack of resources, and
overburdened and weak judicial and law enforcement systems are
also major challenges.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF U.S.
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: NO
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: The Public Treasury, Central Bank of West
African States (BCEAO), financial organizations, independent
legal professionals involved in financial transactions, auditors,
real estate agents, fund transporters, owners of casinos and
lotteries, travel agencies, NGOs
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: The Public Treasury, BCEAO, financial
organizations, independent legal professionals involved in
financial transactions, auditors, real estate agents, fund
transporters, owners of casinos and lotteries, travel agencies,
NGOs
Number of STRs received and time frame: 40 from January 2009
to November 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: 0
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: 0
Convictions: 0
Assets forfeited: criminally: 0 civilly: 0
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Burkina Faso is a member of the Inter Governmental Action Group
Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial
Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Its most recent
mutual evaluation can be found here: http://www.giaba.org/index.
php?type=c&id=39&mod=2&men=2
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) is working at
the regional level to draft revised anti-money laundering (AML)
regulations. Limited resources hamper the Government of Burkina
Faso’s (GOBF) ability to enforce current AML laws and
regulations. The newly created financial intelligence unit (CENTIF)
is not yet fully operational and is still working to establish itself as
an institution. All six staff members of the CENTIF have been
nominated and have started work but lack the training and
capacity to fully enforce the law and its attendant regulations.
There is little enforcement and no formal method for tracking the
movement of goods and money into and out of the country at
border checkpoints or at either of the country's two commercial
airports. CENTIF, law enforcement agencies and customs do not
have the means and expertise to control the widespread informal
monetary and commercial sectors. Informal money exchange and
transfers are common and not currently monitored.
Records exchange with countries outside of the WAEMU region is
possible via bilateral agreement. The GOBF continued its
cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism efforts and
also participated in numerous regional efforts to combat terrorism.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012:
Cannabis, amphetamines, and diverted licit medications remain
the three principal drugs abused in Burkina Faso. There are also
a very limited number of cocaine and heroin addicts. Toxic
inhalants are used by the poorest drug addicts, especially street
kids. Natural herbs with reported psychoactive effects are utilized
in some traditional ceremonies. Illicit drug production in Burkina
Faso is limited to cannabis cultivation. Cannabis cultivation has
been reported across Burkina Faso, but is more prevalent along
the southern borders, the outskirts of Ouagadougou, near Bobo
Dioulasso, and close to Boromo.
Burkina Faso borders six countries, making it a natural transit
point for drugs moving from coastal West Africa across the Sahel
to Europe. Its porous, largely unmonitored borders and lack of
trained border control personnel and inspection equipment make
it hard for Burkina Faso enforcement to counter all types of
trafficking. Burkinabe officials, however, believe that Burkina is not
a West African drug hub and that there are no established
networks or distribution centers in Burkina Faso. The interdiction
of drugs remains a low priority for the Government of Burkina
Faso when compared with other economic, social, and political
issues.
Hard drugs are not imported into Burkina for local consumption,
and Burkina Faso does not manufacture any hard drugs to export
to other markets. The Ouagadougou airport is neither known to
be a hub for drug couriers nor an important drug transshipment
point. Although some Burkinabe citizens are employed in the drug
industry and profit indirectly from the transiting drug trade, they
are not producers, organizers, financiers, or major players.
Instead, they are organized, frequently as drug mules or small-
scale street pushers, by criminals from Nigeria, Togo, Ghana,
Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea Bissau.
Drug shipments and couriers in Burkina Faso are sometimes
intercepted by the national police, gendarmerie, and customs
officials. Interdiction of these couriers is the source of most of
Burkina enforcement’s drug seizures. Over the last two years, a
number of drug traffickers intercepted in Burkina Faso have
ingested drug-filled pellets or have had cocaine or cannabis
hidden on their bodies. Ouagadougou airport security officials
have limited technical equipment and training to detect and
interdict the drugs, but they have received basic training in drug
courier profiling and know how to look for particular passenger
behavior such as nervousness and late, hasty check-ins. France
provided drug scanning equipment in 2011, although the
materials have not been fully integrated into the airports
operations due to ongoing construction. AFRICOM provided drug
testing kits in 2011. Airport security officials are particularly
vigilant with passengers on those airlines that have historically
been favored by traffickers in Africa.
The National Gendarmerie was successful in intercepting a
number of significant cannabis and Indian hemp shipments in
2011. In March the Gendarmerie seized nearly 800 kilograms of
hemp and cannabis, and another 1,055 kilograms in July, both
near the economic capital of Bobo Dioulasso. The shipments were
transported by numerous couriers on bicycles and are thought to
have originated in Ghana and destined for Mali. In July, 145
kilograms of hemp were seized on the Burkina Faso-Mali border.
From January to June the Customs office in Nako (10 kilometers
from the Ghana border) reported they had seized 6.8 metric tons
of drugs, up from 4 tons in all of 2010. In September, police
intercepted more than 100 kilograms of cannabis in Houndé, not
from from Bobo-Dioulasso. All drugs seized are catalogued,
photographed then destroyed.
Although customs officials at border posts and airports are
financially rewarded for detecting and seizing undeclared goods,
receiving 25 percent of the overall value of undeclared goods,
this is not the case for drugs, which are considered "unproductive
goods." While funding to provide customs officials with bonuses
for drug seizures has been used in the past, budget shortfalls
have stymied these efforts. Drug seizures declined in parallel with
the loss of these bonuses. Predictably, customs officials prefer to
focus on interdicting the smuggling of non-narcotic goods since it
brings them financial rewards.
Burkina Faso's overall drug policy is directed by the National
Committee to Combat Drugs. The Committee has asked for
additional resources, and for its transformation into a National
Drug Office; this proposed reorganization has yet to be
addressed by the Government of Burkina Faso. All laws
applicable to drugs are included in the "Code des Drogues."
Burkina Faso has received funding and technical assistance from
the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) and in-
country drug experts are occasionally invited to attend European
Union or ECOWAS conferences. France has provided
drug/chemical detection kits as well as training, as has AFRICOM.
As a matter of government policy, Burkina Faso does not
encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic
or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the
laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.
Burkina Faso is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN
Convention against Corruption and the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
Burkina Faso is a country of origin, transit, and destination for
women and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.
Burkinabe children are forced into labor as farm hands, gold
panners and washers, street vendors, domestic servants,
beggars recruited as pupils by unscrupulous religious teachers,
and exploited in the sex trade. Burkinabe children are also
transported to Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, or Niger for subsequent forced
labor or sex trafficking. Burkina Faso is a transit area for
traffickers transporting children from Mali to Cote d’Ivoire, and
may be a destination for children trafficked from other countries in
the region. To a lesser extent, traffickers recruit Burkinabe women
for forced prostitution in Europe. Women from other West African
countries are fraudulently recruited for employment in Burkina
Faso, and subsequently subjected to situations of forced labor in
restaurants, domestic servitude, and forced prostitution.
The Government of Burkina Faso does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. The government recognizes
that child trafficking is a problem in the country, and it continued
its efforts to proactively identify child victims. A police operation
launched following an INTERPOL-supported training event was
successful in rescuing 103 children from situations of forced
labor, many at artisanal gold mining sites, and the Ministry of
Social Action reported identifying an additional 557 child victims
during the year. The government did not take steps to identify
adult victims of trafficking among vulnerable populations, such as
women in prostitution. During the year, the government sustained
anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts which led to the arrest of
24 suspected traffickers and the conviction of six trafficking
offenders. However, the government struggled to obtain complete
data on its law enforcement efforts.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: The Government of Burkina Faso remained a serious,
stable ally, fully cognizant of the threats posed by regional
extremism in the Sahel and elsewhere in West Africa. Burkina
Faso’s counterterrorism capabilities were limited owing to financial
constraints, but it was consistently responsive to U.S. requests for
cooperative operations. In an effort to improve its
counterterrorism capabilities, senior Burkinabe officials requested
U.S. assistance in the form of training and equipment and
specifically identified regional intelligence sharing, border
security, and airport security as three vulnerabilities to address.
There was still no formal method for tracking movement into and
out of the country at border checkpoints or at either of the
country's two commercial airports in Ouagadougou and Bobo
Dioulasso.
Although there were no terrorist incidents in Burkina Faso in
2010, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remained a threat,
particularly in the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso tri-border area where
AQIM attempted to locate and kidnap Westerners.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The President of Burkina Faso
issued a decree in 2010 underscoring his support for the
Suppression of Terrorism law passed in 2009 by the National
Assembly. The law’s passage and the President's decree
demonstrated the country's political will to ensure that its territory
is not used as a staging ground for violent extremists or
transnational terrorist attacks.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Burkina Faso was a member of the
Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in
West Africa, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body.
The Government of Burkina Faso provided UN lists of designated
terrorists or terrorist entities to financial institutions. There were
no known terrorist financing prosecutions in 2010.
Regional and International Cooperation: The Burkina Faso
government participated in regional and international
counterterrorism conferences and training exercises. It expressed
its desire to collaborate with neighboring countries to counter
violent extremism through a multilateral approach, such as
participating in joint training exercises and regional partnerships.
Burkina Faso cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts and
participated in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP). Its cooperation and partnership in the TSCTP were
demonstrated in May when the government hosted U.S. Africa
Command's (AFRICOM) annual regional counterterrorism exercise
FLINTLOCK 10 and attended a related Joint Combined Exchange
Training program in Mali. Burkina Faso's government also
participated in numerous regional efforts to combat terrorism,
including with the Economic Community of West African States,
the AU, and other international organizations.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The
Government of Burkina Faso and the Embassy conducted several
joint projects, including a medical outreach program in the far
north of Burkina Faso, a predominantly Muslim and Touareg
region. The government encouraged regular and ongoing inter-
faith dialogues as a way to mitigate extremism.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
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| Further Tables |
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
| BURKINA FASO |
| KnowYourCountry |
|
|
| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |