|
|
Sanctions:
EU embargo on arms. For further information: -
http://ec.europa.
eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:
China is swiftly becoming a major global financial center, with a
rapidly growing economy and increased integration in the
international market. The primary sources of criminal proceeds
are corruption, narcotics and human trafficking, smuggling,
economic crimes, intellectual property theft, counterfeit goods,
crimes against property, and tax evasion. Money is generally
laundered through bulk cash smuggling, trade-based fraud
(over/under pricing of goods, falsified bills of lading and customs
declarations, counterfeit import/export contracts), real estate, and
both the formal and underground banking systems.
Most money laundering cases currently under investigation
involve funds obtained from corruption and bribery. Proceeds of
tax evasion, recycled through offshore companies, often return to
China disguised as foreign investment and, as such, receive tax
benefits. Chinese officials have noted that most acts of corruption
in China are closely related to economic activities that accompany
illegal money transfers.
Chinese authorities have observed that the increase in AML
efforts by banks has been accompanied by increased laundering
through the underground banking system and trade fraud. Value
transfer via trade goods, including barter exchange, is a common
component in Chinese underground finance. Many Chinese
underground trading networks in Africa, Asia, the Middle East,
and the Americas participate in the trade of Chinese-
manufactured counterfeit goods.
China is not a major offshore financial center. China has multiple
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and other designated
development zones at the national, regional, and local levels.
SEZs include Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Hainan,
along with 14 coastal cities and over 100 designated development
zones.
For additional information focusing on terrorism financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: YES
Criminalization of Money Laundering:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: List approach
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
KYC covered entities: Banks, securities dealers, insurance
companies
Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:
Number of STRs received and time frame: 61,852,018 in 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: China does not
separate STRs and CTRs
STR covered entities: Banks, securities dealers, and insurance
companies
Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:
Prosecutions: Not available
Convictions: 11,456 in 2010
Records exchange mechanism:
With U.S.: MLAT: NO Other mechanism: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
China is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as
well as the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) and
the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing (EAG), both of which are FATF-style regional
bodies (FSRB). Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found
here: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/33/11/39148196.pdf
Enforcement and implementation issues and comments:
In 2011, the Government of China (GOC) adopted special
legislation that defines the legal scope of “terrorist activities”
related to the crime of terrorist financing (among other crimes)
and provides the legal basis for the establishment of a national,
interagency terrorist asset freezing body that, if robustly
implemented, should bring China into greater compliance with the
requirements of UNSCRs 1267 and 1373.
The GOC should strengthen AML/CFT enforcement efforts to
keep pace with the sophistication and reach of criminal and
terrorist networks. Although mandatory, the courts do not
systematically pursue the confiscation of criminal proceeds, which
undermines any disincentive to commit the crime. The GOC
should ensure that all courts are aware of and uniformly
implement the mandatory confiscation laws. China also should
enhance coordination among its financial regulators and law
enforcement bodies to better investigate and prosecute
offenders. China’s Ministry of Public Security should continue
ongoing efforts to develop a better understanding of how
AML/CFT tools can be used to support the investigation and
prosecution of a wide range of criminal activity.
U.S. law enforcement agencies note that the GOC has not
cooperated sufficiently on financial investigations and does not
provide adequate responses to requests for financial investigation
information. In addition to the lack of law enforcement based
cooperation, the GOC’s inability to enforce U.S. court orders or
judgments obtained as a result of non-conviction based forfeiture
actions against China-based assets remains a significant barrier
to enhanced U.S. - China cooperation in asset freezing and
confiscation.
The GOC should expand cooperation with counterparts in the
United States and other countries, and pursue international
linkages in AML/CFT efforts more aggressively. U.S. agencies
consistently seek to expand cooperation with Chinese
counterparts on AML/CFT matters and to strengthen both policy-
and operational-level cooperation in this critical area. While China
continues to make significant improvements to its AML/CFT legal
and regulatory framework and is gradually making progress
toward meeting the international standards, implementation,
particularly in the context of international cooperation, remains
lacking.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
China is a growing transit and destination country for illicit drugs,
and a major producer of precursor chemicals. Heroin from
Southeast and Southwest Asian countries bound for international
markets transits China, including heroin entering northwestern
China from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. Southeast Asian
heroin that enters China from Burma transits southern China to
various international markets by maritime transport.
Precursor chemicals produced for legitimate use are frequently
diverted by organized crime syndicates to manufacture illicit
substances such as cocaine, heroin and crystal
methamphetamine. The country’s close proximity to the Golden
Triangle, and its numerous coastal cities with large and modern
port facilities, such as Qingdao, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou,
and Hong Kong, make it an attractive transit venue for illicit drugs.
As the Chinese economy has become more integrated in the
world economy, drug crimes and drug users in China have
increased. In 2010, 611 cases were uncovered with the seizure of
more than 1,500 kg of drugs, representing a 50% increase
compared with 2009. Large-scale organized criminal groups traffic
drugs to certain major cities in northern and southeastern China.
Chinese authorities continue to take steps to integrate China into
regional and global counternarcotics efforts. However, corruption
in drug-producing and drug transit regions of China and lack of
transparent regulations limit what dedicated law enforcement
officials can accomplish. China is party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2 Watch List)
China is a source, transit, and destination country for men,
women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.
Women and children from neighboring countries including Burma,
Vietnam, Laos, Mongolia, Russia, and North Korea, and from
locations as far as Romania and Zimbabwe are reportedly
trafficked to China for commercial sexual exploitation and forced
labor. While the majority of trafficking occurs within China’s
borders, there are reports in recent years that Chinese men,
women, and children may be subjected to conditions of sex
trafficking and forced labor in numerous countries and territories
worldwide. Low- and medium-skilled Chinese workers migrate
voluntarily to many countries for jobs, but in some countries
subsequently may face conditions indicative of forced labor, such
as withholding of passports and other restrictions on movements,
nonpayment of wages, and threats. High recruitment fees,
sometimes amounting to as much as $70,000, compound Chinese
migrants’ vulnerability to debt bondage and other situations of
trafficking.
Trafficking is most pronounced among China’s internal migrant
population, which is estimated to exceed 150 million people.
Forced labor remains a notable problem, including in brick kilns,
coal mines, and factories, some of which operate illegally and take
advantage of lax supervision in the poorer regions of China.
There were reports of forced labor, including forced begging, of
children and adults during the reporting period, including in
Hebei, Shanxi, and Sichuan Provinces. In Xinjiang, for example,
media reports in December indicate a construction factory boss
enslaved 11 mentally disabled workers who were regularly beaten
and forced to work long hours. In Shanxi Province, one mentally
disabled worker was lured with the promise of a job paying $10
per day, but was then forced to work in a brick kiln where he was
beaten and prevented from escaping. In recent years, workers
participating in a government-sponsored program to transfer rural
labor to jobs in the interior of China, including children, were
allegedly coerced into the program through threats or fines for
noncompliance; there were no official reports of this in 2010.
Authorities in parts of Xinjiang province reportedly imposed
mandatory labor of children for cotton-picking in at least three
cases. Forced labor was a problem in some drug detention
centers, according to NGO reporting; some detainees were forced
to work up to 18 hours a day without pay for private companies
working in partnership with Chinese authorities. Many prisoners
and detainees in “reeducation through labor” facilities were
required to work, often with no remuneration. Authorities held
individuals in these institutions as a result of administrative
decisions. NGO reports state that forced labor is also a problem
in penal institutions. Some reports show working conditions in
Chinese manufacturing factories that may indicate forced labor,
including forced and unpaid overtime, excessive work hours,
restrictions on movement and breaks, and withholding of wages.
Some children found in these conditions are particularly
vulnerable to forced labor.
There continue to be reports that some Chinese children are
forced into prostitution, and various forms of forced labor,
including begging, stealing, and work in brick kilns and factories;
in previous years, there were reports of children forced into flower
selling. Some children in work-study programs supported by local
governments have been reported to face conditions of forced
labor in factories and farms. The children of migrants are
particularly vulnerable to trafficking, although the government
implemented programs to provide mentoring and support services
to reduce their risk of neglect leading to trafficking. The overall
extent of forced labor in China is unclear in part because the
government releases only limited information on the subject.
Well-organized international criminal syndicates and local gangs
play key roles in both internal and cross-border trafficking. The
Ministry of Public Security reported in January 2011 that the
number of Chinese women forced into prostitution overseas was
rising as they fall prey to international criminal gangs. Experts and
NGOs report that China’s population planning policies, coupled
with a cultural preference for sons, creates a skewed sex ratio in
China, which may contribute to the trafficking of women and
children from within China and from Mongolia, North Korea,
Russia, Burma, Laos, and Vietnam for forced marriage.
The Government of the People’s Republic of China does not fully
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking. The government did not demonstrate evidence of
significant efforts to address all forms of trafficking or effectively
protect victims; therefore, China is placed on Tier 2 Watch List for
a seventh consecutive year. China was not placed on Tier 3 per
Section 107 of the 2008 Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act, however, the government has a written plan
that, if implemented, would constitute making significant efforts to
bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking and is devoting sufficient resources to
implement that plan. China increased its attention to trafficking of
women and children nationwide; continued inter-agency
coordination on anti-trafficking initiatives; established nationwide
and local hotlines to report trafficking cases; increased funding for
labor inspections; significantly increased prosecutions for
offenses the government labeled as trafficking, which includes
cases that are not trafficking offenses; updated the criminal code
to expand the prohibition on forced labor and increase the
prescribed penalty; worked with foreign governments and
INTERPOL to improve law enforcement coordination on
trafficking; and trained shelter managers on victim protection. The
government began drafting the 2012 National Plan of Action for
anti-trafficking efforts, which should be released in December
2011, in consultation with international organizations; at the
publication of this report, the details of the draft plan were not
public. The government’s crackdown on prostitution and child
abduction reportedly included rescuing victims of trafficking and
punishing trafficking offenders. Nonetheless, China continues to
conflate trafficking with child abduction for adoption, rendering the
full extent of the government’s anti-trafficking efforts unclear.
Despite basic efforts to investigate some cases of forced labor
that generated a high degree of media attention and the plans to
hire thousands of labor inspectors, the impact of these measures
on addressing the full extent of trafficking for forced labor
throughout the country remains unclear. China continued to lack a
formal, nationwide procedure to identify systematically victims of
trafficking; however, the national police academies instituted anti-
trafficking training for all new recruits, and a national directive
instructed law enforcement officers to treat people in prostitution
as victims of trafficking until proven otherwise. The government
did not to provide comprehensive victim protection services to
both internal and foreign victims of trafficking throughout the
country, but is beginning to train shelter managers and refer
victims to protection services. Victims may be punished for
unlawful acts that were a direct result of their being trafficked – for
instance, violations of prostitution or immigration and emigration
controls. Chinese authorities continue to detain and forcibly
deport North Korean trafficking victims who face punishment upon
their return to North Korea for unlawful acts that were sometimes
a direct result of being trafficked. The government’s inadequate
data collection system continued to impede progress in recording
and quantifying anti-trafficking efforts.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: China held counterterrorism military exercises with
Thailand in October, participated in regional counterterrorism
exercises with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member
states in September, and provided equipment to Pakistan for
counterterrorism training in May. China's domestic
counterterrorism efforts remained primarily focused against the
East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP), also known as the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). In January 2010, ETIP
released videos in Uighur, a Turkic language indigenous to China’
s western Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), to claim
credit for alleged actions in revenge for the "July 5 incident" of
2009, when racially-motivated riots in the XUAR capital led to the
reported deaths of both Uighurs and Han Chinese, and to call on
Muslims in Xinjiang to carry out a "jihad" against China.
China does not always distinguish between legitimate political
dissent and the advocacy of violence to overthrow the
government, and has used counterterrorism as a pretext to
suppress Uighurs, a predominantly Muslim ethnic group that
makes up a large percentage of the population within the XUAR.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: On August 19, three people drove an
explosive-laden vehicle into a crowd in the city of Aksu, XUAR,
killing three civilians and three police officers, and wounding 15
other civilians and police officers. The Chinese government
attributed this incident to "separatists, extremists, and terrorists."
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The U. S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Legal Attaché’s Office in Beijing held several
meetings and briefings with the Chinese Ministry of Public Security
(MPS) Terrorism Department on a number of terrorist-related
issues. The Legal Attaché’s Office has presented specific
investigations that potentially could be worked jointly between the
FBI and MPS; to date, the MPS has not responded to these
requests.
China participated in the Megaports program. Through provision
of training and donation of radiation detection equipment, the U.S.
Department of Energy improved China's capacity to detect and
interdict smuggled nuclear and radiological materials in
preparation for the 2010 Shanghai World Expo and the 2010 Asia
Games.
Countering Terrorist Finance: China has yet to develop a regime
to freeze terrorist assets that meets international standards or
that adequately implements UNSCRs 1267 and 1373. This was
identified by China's central bank as a future priority in China's
"2008-2012 National Anti-Money Laundering/Counterterrorist
Financing (AML/CTF) Strategy" paper. There remained a need for
better implementation and enhanced coordination between
financial regulators and law enforcement authorities. U.S.
agencies continued to seek expanded cooperation with Chinese
counterparts on terrorist and other illicit finance matters and to
strengthen both policy- and operational-level cooperation in this
critical area.
Terrorist financing is a criminal offense in China. In 2010, China
demonstrated progress in addressing certain deficiencies in
AML/CTF. China increased the number of money-laundering
investigations, prosecutions, and convictions. The central bank
issued a new regulation clarifying the suspicious transaction
reporting obligations of Chinese banks, as well as penalties for
lack of compliance. In April, the U.S. Treasury Department and
China's central bank established an AML/CTF working group
under the auspices of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue to provide an important channel for addressing both
policy and operational cooperation. China is an active, full
member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia-
Pacific Group (APG), and the Eurasian Group, but has not joined
the Egmont Group.
Regional and International Cooperation: In November, Chinese
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, with his Russian and Indian
counterparts, emphasized the need for full international
cooperation in counterterrorism efforts, particularly within the
framework of the UN, to prevent terrorist attacks and to prosecute
terrorists and their supporters. In September, China hosted a
diplomatic conference under the auspices of the International Civil
Aviation Organization that resulted in two new legal instruments
related to civil aviation security. China signed both instruments at
the conclusion of the diplomatic conference. China also ratified
the International Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism.
In response to an October 2009 proposal by the United States,
Chinese President Hu Jintao endorsed the joint development of a
Nuclear Security Center of Excellence at the April 2010 Nuclear
Security Summit. The center’s functions will include training to
bolster bilateral efforts to prevent terrorists, terrorist
organizations, and proliferating states from accessing nuclear and
radiological materials. In 2010, we had regular bilateral
counterterrorism consultations with the Chinese, including at the
Second Annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue, but cooperation
remained limited.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
EU embargo on arms. For further information: -
http://ec.europa.
eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:
China is swiftly becoming a major global financial center, with a
rapidly growing economy and increased integration in the
international market. The primary sources of criminal proceeds
are corruption, narcotics and human trafficking, smuggling,
economic crimes, intellectual property theft, counterfeit goods,
crimes against property, and tax evasion. Money is generally
laundered through bulk cash smuggling, trade-based fraud
(over/under pricing of goods, falsified bills of lading and customs
declarations, counterfeit import/export contracts), real estate, and
both the formal and underground banking systems.
Most money laundering cases currently under investigation
involve funds obtained from corruption and bribery. Proceeds of
tax evasion, recycled through offshore companies, often return to
China disguised as foreign investment and, as such, receive tax
benefits. Chinese officials have noted that most acts of corruption
in China are closely related to economic activities that accompany
illegal money transfers.
Chinese authorities have observed that the increase in AML
efforts by banks has been accompanied by increased laundering
through the underground banking system and trade fraud. Value
transfer via trade goods, including barter exchange, is a common
component in Chinese underground finance. Many Chinese
underground trading networks in Africa, Asia, the Middle East,
and the Americas participate in the trade of Chinese-
manufactured counterfeit goods.
China is not a major offshore financial center. China has multiple
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and other designated
development zones at the national, regional, and local levels.
SEZs include Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Hainan,
along with 14 coastal cities and over 100 designated development
zones.
For additional information focusing on terrorism financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: YES
Criminalization of Money Laundering:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: List approach
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
KYC covered entities: Banks, securities dealers, insurance
companies
Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:
Number of STRs received and time frame: 61,852,018 in 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: China does not
separate STRs and CTRs
STR covered entities: Banks, securities dealers, and insurance
companies
Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:
Prosecutions: Not available
Convictions: 11,456 in 2010
Records exchange mechanism:
With U.S.: MLAT: NO Other mechanism: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
China is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as
well as the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) and
the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing (EAG), both of which are FATF-style regional
bodies (FSRB). Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found
here: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/33/11/39148196.pdf
Enforcement and implementation issues and comments:
In 2011, the Government of China (GOC) adopted special
legislation that defines the legal scope of “terrorist activities”
related to the crime of terrorist financing (among other crimes)
and provides the legal basis for the establishment of a national,
interagency terrorist asset freezing body that, if robustly
implemented, should bring China into greater compliance with the
requirements of UNSCRs 1267 and 1373.
The GOC should strengthen AML/CFT enforcement efforts to
keep pace with the sophistication and reach of criminal and
terrorist networks. Although mandatory, the courts do not
systematically pursue the confiscation of criminal proceeds, which
undermines any disincentive to commit the crime. The GOC
should ensure that all courts are aware of and uniformly
implement the mandatory confiscation laws. China also should
enhance coordination among its financial regulators and law
enforcement bodies to better investigate and prosecute
offenders. China’s Ministry of Public Security should continue
ongoing efforts to develop a better understanding of how
AML/CFT tools can be used to support the investigation and
prosecution of a wide range of criminal activity.
U.S. law enforcement agencies note that the GOC has not
cooperated sufficiently on financial investigations and does not
provide adequate responses to requests for financial investigation
information. In addition to the lack of law enforcement based
cooperation, the GOC’s inability to enforce U.S. court orders or
judgments obtained as a result of non-conviction based forfeiture
actions against China-based assets remains a significant barrier
to enhanced U.S. - China cooperation in asset freezing and
confiscation.
The GOC should expand cooperation with counterparts in the
United States and other countries, and pursue international
linkages in AML/CFT efforts more aggressively. U.S. agencies
consistently seek to expand cooperation with Chinese
counterparts on AML/CFT matters and to strengthen both policy-
and operational-level cooperation in this critical area. While China
continues to make significant improvements to its AML/CFT legal
and regulatory framework and is gradually making progress
toward meeting the international standards, implementation,
particularly in the context of international cooperation, remains
lacking.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
China is a growing transit and destination country for illicit drugs,
and a major producer of precursor chemicals. Heroin from
Southeast and Southwest Asian countries bound for international
markets transits China, including heroin entering northwestern
China from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. Southeast Asian
heroin that enters China from Burma transits southern China to
various international markets by maritime transport.
Precursor chemicals produced for legitimate use are frequently
diverted by organized crime syndicates to manufacture illicit
substances such as cocaine, heroin and crystal
methamphetamine. The country’s close proximity to the Golden
Triangle, and its numerous coastal cities with large and modern
port facilities, such as Qingdao, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou,
and Hong Kong, make it an attractive transit venue for illicit drugs.
As the Chinese economy has become more integrated in the
world economy, drug crimes and drug users in China have
increased. In 2010, 611 cases were uncovered with the seizure of
more than 1,500 kg of drugs, representing a 50% increase
compared with 2009. Large-scale organized criminal groups traffic
drugs to certain major cities in northern and southeastern China.
Chinese authorities continue to take steps to integrate China into
regional and global counternarcotics efforts. However, corruption
in drug-producing and drug transit regions of China and lack of
transparent regulations limit what dedicated law enforcement
officials can accomplish. China is party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2 Watch List)
China is a source, transit, and destination country for men,
women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.
Women and children from neighboring countries including Burma,
Vietnam, Laos, Mongolia, Russia, and North Korea, and from
locations as far as Romania and Zimbabwe are reportedly
trafficked to China for commercial sexual exploitation and forced
labor. While the majority of trafficking occurs within China’s
borders, there are reports in recent years that Chinese men,
women, and children may be subjected to conditions of sex
trafficking and forced labor in numerous countries and territories
worldwide. Low- and medium-skilled Chinese workers migrate
voluntarily to many countries for jobs, but in some countries
subsequently may face conditions indicative of forced labor, such
as withholding of passports and other restrictions on movements,
nonpayment of wages, and threats. High recruitment fees,
sometimes amounting to as much as $70,000, compound Chinese
migrants’ vulnerability to debt bondage and other situations of
trafficking.
Trafficking is most pronounced among China’s internal migrant
population, which is estimated to exceed 150 million people.
Forced labor remains a notable problem, including in brick kilns,
coal mines, and factories, some of which operate illegally and take
advantage of lax supervision in the poorer regions of China.
There were reports of forced labor, including forced begging, of
children and adults during the reporting period, including in
Hebei, Shanxi, and Sichuan Provinces. In Xinjiang, for example,
media reports in December indicate a construction factory boss
enslaved 11 mentally disabled workers who were regularly beaten
and forced to work long hours. In Shanxi Province, one mentally
disabled worker was lured with the promise of a job paying $10
per day, but was then forced to work in a brick kiln where he was
beaten and prevented from escaping. In recent years, workers
participating in a government-sponsored program to transfer rural
labor to jobs in the interior of China, including children, were
allegedly coerced into the program through threats or fines for
noncompliance; there were no official reports of this in 2010.
Authorities in parts of Xinjiang province reportedly imposed
mandatory labor of children for cotton-picking in at least three
cases. Forced labor was a problem in some drug detention
centers, according to NGO reporting; some detainees were forced
to work up to 18 hours a day without pay for private companies
working in partnership with Chinese authorities. Many prisoners
and detainees in “reeducation through labor” facilities were
required to work, often with no remuneration. Authorities held
individuals in these institutions as a result of administrative
decisions. NGO reports state that forced labor is also a problem
in penal institutions. Some reports show working conditions in
Chinese manufacturing factories that may indicate forced labor,
including forced and unpaid overtime, excessive work hours,
restrictions on movement and breaks, and withholding of wages.
Some children found in these conditions are particularly
vulnerable to forced labor.
There continue to be reports that some Chinese children are
forced into prostitution, and various forms of forced labor,
including begging, stealing, and work in brick kilns and factories;
in previous years, there were reports of children forced into flower
selling. Some children in work-study programs supported by local
governments have been reported to face conditions of forced
labor in factories and farms. The children of migrants are
particularly vulnerable to trafficking, although the government
implemented programs to provide mentoring and support services
to reduce their risk of neglect leading to trafficking. The overall
extent of forced labor in China is unclear in part because the
government releases only limited information on the subject.
Well-organized international criminal syndicates and local gangs
play key roles in both internal and cross-border trafficking. The
Ministry of Public Security reported in January 2011 that the
number of Chinese women forced into prostitution overseas was
rising as they fall prey to international criminal gangs. Experts and
NGOs report that China’s population planning policies, coupled
with a cultural preference for sons, creates a skewed sex ratio in
China, which may contribute to the trafficking of women and
children from within China and from Mongolia, North Korea,
Russia, Burma, Laos, and Vietnam for forced marriage.
The Government of the People’s Republic of China does not fully
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking. The government did not demonstrate evidence of
significant efforts to address all forms of trafficking or effectively
protect victims; therefore, China is placed on Tier 2 Watch List for
a seventh consecutive year. China was not placed on Tier 3 per
Section 107 of the 2008 Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act, however, the government has a written plan
that, if implemented, would constitute making significant efforts to
bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking and is devoting sufficient resources to
implement that plan. China increased its attention to trafficking of
women and children nationwide; continued inter-agency
coordination on anti-trafficking initiatives; established nationwide
and local hotlines to report trafficking cases; increased funding for
labor inspections; significantly increased prosecutions for
offenses the government labeled as trafficking, which includes
cases that are not trafficking offenses; updated the criminal code
to expand the prohibition on forced labor and increase the
prescribed penalty; worked with foreign governments and
INTERPOL to improve law enforcement coordination on
trafficking; and trained shelter managers on victim protection. The
government began drafting the 2012 National Plan of Action for
anti-trafficking efforts, which should be released in December
2011, in consultation with international organizations; at the
publication of this report, the details of the draft plan were not
public. The government’s crackdown on prostitution and child
abduction reportedly included rescuing victims of trafficking and
punishing trafficking offenders. Nonetheless, China continues to
conflate trafficking with child abduction for adoption, rendering the
full extent of the government’s anti-trafficking efforts unclear.
Despite basic efforts to investigate some cases of forced labor
that generated a high degree of media attention and the plans to
hire thousands of labor inspectors, the impact of these measures
on addressing the full extent of trafficking for forced labor
throughout the country remains unclear. China continued to lack a
formal, nationwide procedure to identify systematically victims of
trafficking; however, the national police academies instituted anti-
trafficking training for all new recruits, and a national directive
instructed law enforcement officers to treat people in prostitution
as victims of trafficking until proven otherwise. The government
did not to provide comprehensive victim protection services to
both internal and foreign victims of trafficking throughout the
country, but is beginning to train shelter managers and refer
victims to protection services. Victims may be punished for
unlawful acts that were a direct result of their being trafficked – for
instance, violations of prostitution or immigration and emigration
controls. Chinese authorities continue to detain and forcibly
deport North Korean trafficking victims who face punishment upon
their return to North Korea for unlawful acts that were sometimes
a direct result of being trafficked. The government’s inadequate
data collection system continued to impede progress in recording
and quantifying anti-trafficking efforts.
For full report click here
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US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: China held counterterrorism military exercises with
Thailand in October, participated in regional counterterrorism
exercises with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member
states in September, and provided equipment to Pakistan for
counterterrorism training in May. China's domestic
counterterrorism efforts remained primarily focused against the
East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP), also known as the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). In January 2010, ETIP
released videos in Uighur, a Turkic language indigenous to China’
s western Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), to claim
credit for alleged actions in revenge for the "July 5 incident" of
2009, when racially-motivated riots in the XUAR capital led to the
reported deaths of both Uighurs and Han Chinese, and to call on
Muslims in Xinjiang to carry out a "jihad" against China.
China does not always distinguish between legitimate political
dissent and the advocacy of violence to overthrow the
government, and has used counterterrorism as a pretext to
suppress Uighurs, a predominantly Muslim ethnic group that
makes up a large percentage of the population within the XUAR.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: On August 19, three people drove an
explosive-laden vehicle into a crowd in the city of Aksu, XUAR,
killing three civilians and three police officers, and wounding 15
other civilians and police officers. The Chinese government
attributed this incident to "separatists, extremists, and terrorists."
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The U. S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Legal Attaché’s Office in Beijing held several
meetings and briefings with the Chinese Ministry of Public Security
(MPS) Terrorism Department on a number of terrorist-related
issues. The Legal Attaché’s Office has presented specific
investigations that potentially could be worked jointly between the
FBI and MPS; to date, the MPS has not responded to these
requests.
China participated in the Megaports program. Through provision
of training and donation of radiation detection equipment, the U.S.
Department of Energy improved China's capacity to detect and
interdict smuggled nuclear and radiological materials in
preparation for the 2010 Shanghai World Expo and the 2010 Asia
Games.
Countering Terrorist Finance: China has yet to develop a regime
to freeze terrorist assets that meets international standards or
that adequately implements UNSCRs 1267 and 1373. This was
identified by China's central bank as a future priority in China's
"2008-2012 National Anti-Money Laundering/Counterterrorist
Financing (AML/CTF) Strategy" paper. There remained a need for
better implementation and enhanced coordination between
financial regulators and law enforcement authorities. U.S.
agencies continued to seek expanded cooperation with Chinese
counterparts on terrorist and other illicit finance matters and to
strengthen both policy- and operational-level cooperation in this
critical area.
Terrorist financing is a criminal offense in China. In 2010, China
demonstrated progress in addressing certain deficiencies in
AML/CTF. China increased the number of money-laundering
investigations, prosecutions, and convictions. The central bank
issued a new regulation clarifying the suspicious transaction
reporting obligations of Chinese banks, as well as penalties for
lack of compliance. In April, the U.S. Treasury Department and
China's central bank established an AML/CTF working group
under the auspices of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue to provide an important channel for addressing both
policy and operational cooperation. China is an active, full
member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia-
Pacific Group (APG), and the Eurasian Group, but has not joined
the Egmont Group.
Regional and International Cooperation: In November, Chinese
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, with his Russian and Indian
counterparts, emphasized the need for full international
cooperation in counterterrorism efforts, particularly within the
framework of the UN, to prevent terrorist attacks and to prosecute
terrorists and their supporters. In September, China hosted a
diplomatic conference under the auspices of the International Civil
Aviation Organization that resulted in two new legal instruments
related to civil aviation security. China signed both instruments at
the conclusion of the diplomatic conference. China also ratified
the International Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism.
In response to an October 2009 proposal by the United States,
Chinese President Hu Jintao endorsed the joint development of a
Nuclear Security Center of Excellence at the April 2010 Nuclear
Security Summit. The center’s functions will include training to
bolster bilateral efforts to prevent terrorists, terrorist
organizations, and proliferating states from accessing nuclear and
radiological materials. In 2010, we had regular bilateral
counterterrorism consultations with the Chinese, including at the
Second Annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue, but cooperation
remained limited.
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Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
Follow-up Report China (February 2102)
The FATF has approved and published the follow-up report for China.
The first mutual evaluation report of China was adopted in June 2007
when China became a full member of the FATF.
China was placed on an enhanced follow-up process as a result of
partially compliant and non-compliant ratings in certain of the Core and
Key Recommendations in its mutual evaluation report. China reported
back at each FATF Plenary on the progress it had made in addressing
the deficiencies identified in the mutual evaluation report. China made
significant progress and in October 2008, the Plenary agreed to place
China on the regular follow-up process, whereby it would provide the
FATF Plenary with annual progress reports.
China has now taken additional action to address the deficiencies in its
AML/CFT regime and has therefore been taken off the regular follow-up
process. Henceforth, China will report back to the Plenary on any
further improvements to its AML/CFT regime on a biennial basis.
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
Follow-up Report China (February 2102)
The FATF has approved and published the follow-up report for China.
The first mutual evaluation report of China was adopted in June 2007
when China became a full member of the FATF.
China was placed on an enhanced follow-up process as a result of
partially compliant and non-compliant ratings in certain of the Core and
Key Recommendations in its mutual evaluation report. China reported
back at each FATF Plenary on the progress it had made in addressing
the deficiencies identified in the mutual evaluation report. China made
significant progress and in October 2008, the Plenary agreed to place
China on the regular follow-up process, whereby it would provide the
FATF Plenary with annual progress reports.
China has now taken additional action to address the deficiencies in its
AML/CFT regime and has therefore been taken off the regular follow-up
process. Henceforth, China will report back to the Plenary on any
further improvements to its AML/CFT regime on a biennial basis.
| CHINA |
| KnowYourCountry |
| KnowYourCountry |
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April 6, 2012 - People’s Republic of China: Detailed Assessment
Report: Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
Read Report
Report: Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
Read Report
| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |