Higher Risk
 
Medium Risk
 
Info n/a
 
Lower Risk
Bilateral exchange of information
Agreements in place?
    No
FATF Statement re AML Strategic Deficiencies:

Date:  16 February 2012

Ecuador has taken steps to improve its AML/CFT regime,
including by tabling draft amendments to its CFT legislation.
Despite Ecuador’s high-level political commitment to work with the
FATF and GAFISUD to address its strategic AML/CFT
deficiencies, the FATF is not yet satisfied that Ecuador has made
sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and certain
strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Ecuador should work with
the FATF and GAFISUD on implementing its action plan to
address these deficiencies, including by: (1) ensuring adequate
criminalisation of terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II);
(2) establishing and implementing adequate procedures to
identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III);
(3) implementing adequate procedures for the confiscation of
funds related to money laundering (Recommendation 3); and (4)
reinforcing and improving co-ordination of financial sector
supervision (Recommendation 23). The FATF encourages
Ecuador to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the
process of implementing its action plan and encourages Ecuador
to pass its recently tabled CFT legislation.

____________________________________________________

Sanctions:

None applicable

____________________________________________________

Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:

In February 2008, Ecuador published a list of about 90 deemed
low-tax jurisdictions. Ecuadorian companies dealing with listed
countries must file separate transfer pricing reports. Dividends
paid to recipients in listed countries may be subject to a new 0.5%
capital flight tax charge.

As a recognised offshore finance jurisdiction this country may fall
under various country offshore jurisdiction blacklists.

____________________________________________________

US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:

Ecuador is a major drug transit country. With a dollarized
economy and geographic location between two major drug
producing countries, Ecuador is highly vulnerable to money
laundering. Corruption is a significant problem in Ecuador and
facilitates money laundering. Because only major banks have
active money laundering controls in place, and because a large
number of transactions take place through unregulated money
exchange and remittance companies, there is no reliable way to
judge the magnitude of such activity in the country. There is
evidence that money laundering is taking place through trade and
commercial activity, as well as through cash couriers. Large
amounts of unexplained currency entering and leaving Ecuador
indicate that transit of illicit cash is a significant activity. Weakly
regulated casinos and deficient financial supervision serve as
additional vulnerabilities for money laundering.

On February 18, 2010, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
issued a Public Statement identifying Ecuador as having strategic
Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT)
deficiencies and as not having delivered a clear high-level political
commitment to address these deficiencies. In June 2010, after the
Ecuadorian government provided a written high-level political
commitment to address the identified deficiencies, including by
tabling a revised AML/CFT law, FATF upgraded Ecuador to a list
of countries that have strategic AML/CFT deficiencies for which
they have developed a corrective action plan.

DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: YES

CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:

“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: List approach

Legal persons covered: criminally: NO civilly: YES

CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:

Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: NO

UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: Unknown

(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)

KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:

Covered entities: Financial institutions, insurance providers
(including private insurance), cooperatives, trust and fund
managers, money transfer companies and parallel couriers,
brokerages, casinos and gaming halls

Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO

SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:

Covered entities: Banks, savings and credit institutions;
investment companies, stock exchanges, and mutual funds;
exchange houses; credit card administrators; money transmitters;
mortgage companies; insurance and reinsurance companies
trusts; fund managers; sellers of vehicles, aircraft, and watercraft;
brokerages; couriers; real estate agents; casinos and other
gambling enterprises; dealers of precious metals and stones

Number of STRs received and time frame: 36 in 2010

Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available

MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:

Prosecutions: Not available

Convictions: Not available

Assets forfeited: criminally: Not available civilly: Not available

RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:

With U.S.: YES

With other governments/jurisdictions: YES

Ecuador is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
for South America (GAFISUD), a FATF-style regional body. Its
most recent mutual evaluation can be found here: http://www.
gafisud.info/home.htm

ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:

On December 30, 2010, Law 2010-352, reforming existing anti-
money laundering legislation and the Penal Code, entered into
force. The law contains a number of provisions aimed at
strengthening the criminalization of money laundering and
terrorist financing, and also strengthening Ecuador's financial
intelligence unit (FIU) (renamed the Financial Analysis Unit). In
addition to strengthening border controls on cash movements at
air and seaports, the new legislation expands penalties, removes
the $5,000 minimum threshold for money laundering, and includes
crimes committed outside of Ecuador. The law also appears to
strengthen the mandate of Ecuador's FIU and expands the role of
the National Anti-Money Laundering Council, which oversees the
FIU. Although, on balance, the legal reform strengthens Ecuador's
legislation with regard to financial crimes, the law includes new
language that could potentially complicate seizures of illicit funds,
either as part of money laundering investigations or bulk cash
transfers. For example, the new language states the Attorney
General is responsible for demonstrating the illicit origin of seized
funds. Explicitly placing the burden of proof on the Government of
Ecuador (GOE) could make it easier for plaintiffs in money
laundering or smuggled cash cases to avoid conviction.

Law 2010-352 also includes provisions that seek to criminalize
terrorist financing, by creating an autonomous offense of the
financing of crimes (including terrorism, acts of terrorism, and
organized terrorism) listed in the Penal Code. The new law adds a
new article to the Penal Code to criminalize the financing of any of
the acts listed in the Penal Code's section under "Crimes of
Sabotage and Terrorism." The new law does not contain an
explicit reference to "terrorist financing," does not define “funds”
or “assets,” does not appear to cover attempts to commit the
offense, and appears to require a connection to an act of
terrorism. As such, Ecuador's strengthened AML/CFT legal regime
does not yet fully meet international standards.

The GOE should continue to work to ensure its AML/CFT
legislation, and especially the criminalization of the financing of
terrorism, adheres to international standards. The GOE should
harmonize its legislation to eliminate conflicts that hinder
successful money laundering investigations and prosecutions.
The GOE should ensure the FIU becomes fully functional and
meets international standards, and should also ensure that
reporting requirements – covering an expanded group of obligated
parties -- are enforced. The GOE should make a dedicated effort
to train judges, prosecutors and investigators so they understand
the country's applicable AML/CFT legislation and regulations. It is
important for the GOE to take all necessary steps to comply fully
with international AML/CFT standards to which it has formally
committed through its membership in the UN, the OAS, and
GAFISUD.

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):

Situated between two of the world’s largest illicit drug producing
countries, Ecuador is a major transit country for illegal narcotics.
Cocaine and heroin from Colombia and Peru are trafficked
through sparsely populated, porous land borders and via maritime
routes to Ecuador where weak internal controls allow for
international distribution via air and sea routes to the United
States and Europe. Ecuador is also a major transit country for
chemical precursors to process illegal narcotics. Ecuador is
vulnerable to organized crime due to weak public institutions,
porous borders, and corruption. The Ecuadorian National Police
(ENP), military forces, and the judiciary do not have sufficient
resources to confront the transnational criminal challenges they
face. The increasing problems of domestic drug consumption and
the associated rise in crime is a growing concern. Ecuador is a
party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

For Full report, click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):

(Tier 2 Watch List)

Ecuador is a source, transit, and destination country for men,
women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor.
The majority of trafficking victims are believed to be women and
children trafficked within the country from border and central
highland areas to urban centers for nonconsensual commercial
sexual exploitation, as well as for domestic servitude, forced
begging, and forced labor in mines and other hazardous work.
Some families reportedly allowed traffickers to temporarily take
their children in order to earn money both within the country and
in neighboring countries; these children are forced to work as
domestic servants, street vendors, and beggars. There also have
been reports of Ecuadorian children being forced to engage in
criminal activity, such as drug trafficking and robbery, and
Ecuadorian children have been recruited by a Colombian terrorist
group along the northern border. Ecuadorian women are
subjected to forced prostitution in Colombia, Peru, and Western
Europe. Ecuador is a destination country for Colombian, Peruvian,
and to a lesser extent, Chinese women and girls subjected to sex
trafficking. Indigenous Ecuadorians are vulnerable to forced labor
in domestic service. Colombian refugees and migrants are
subjected to forced labor in palm oil plantations. A trafficking ring
brought Peruvian children to Ecuador and forced them to work as
street vendors, or in restaurants and nightclubs. Child sex tourism
occurs mostly in urban areas and in tourist destinations, such as
Tena and the Galapagos Islands. Ecuador is a transit country for
Chinese nationals and other extra-continental migrants smuggled
to destinations elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, some of
whom may be trafficked.

The Government of Ecuador does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. Despite these efforts, the
government did not show evidence of increasing efforts to
address forced labor and sex trafficking crimes involving adults, or
trafficking-related complicity of local government officials, and
government protections for adult victims remained inadequate;
therefore, Ecuador is placed on Tier Two Watch List. The
government did, however, sustain modest law enforcement
measures against child sex trafficking offenders, and continued to
work with civil society and the private sector to raise awareness
on the forced labor and sex trafficking of children.

For full report click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010

Overview: Ecuador's greatest counterterrorism and security
challenge remained the presence of Colombian narcotics and
criminal and terrorist groups in the extremely difficult terrain along
its porous 450-mile border with Colombia. Ecuador continued its
response to this threat, although it faced resource constraints and
limited capabilities. The Correa Administration, while still
maintaining that the Colombian conflict was mainly Colombia’s
responsibility, repeated its opposition to encroachments by armed
groups across its borders and increased its military presence in
the north to discourage incursions by these groups. Ecuador’s
security forces continued operations against Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) training and logistical resupply camps
along the northern border.

2010 Terrorist Incidents: On November 22, an undetonated bomb
was found in the office of the rector at the University of Guayaquil.
The Popular Combatants Group (PCG), which had been dormant
for the last few years, claimed responsibility for the bomb. The
PCG said that it had placed the device in support of the leftist
student movement University Students of Daniel Cuellar to
influence the upcoming elections for the national Federation of
University Students of Ecuador. The Daniel Cuellar movement
disavowed the action and said it had no ties with the PCG. Other
fragments of the PCG claimed the device was placed by “rightist”
police forces to discredit the organization.

Legislation and Law Enforcement: Until September 7, 2010,
Ecuadorean immigration officials allowed almost all travelers to
enter the country for 90 days without a visa, including travelers
from countries of concern for terrorism, drug smuggling, and
illegal immigration, based on a visa-free travel policy enacted in
June 2008. On September 7, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
revised this policy to require that citizens from nine countries –
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal,
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Somalia – obtain visas prior to entering the
country. Active smuggling rings in Ecuador that focused on
moving aliens continued to raise concerns about the transit of
individuals with terrorism connections.

Ecuador’s judicial institutions remained weak, susceptible to
corruption, and heavily backlogged with pending cases. While the
military and police made numerous arrests, the judicial system
had a poor record of achieving convictions in all types of criminal
cases.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Ecuador is a member of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of South America (GAFISUD).
In February, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) included
Ecuador on the list of countries that pose a high-risk to the
international financial system due to strategic anti-money
laundering and counterterrorism finance deficiencies. Following
Ecuador's demonstration of a high level political commitment to
work with FATF and GAFISUD to address these deficiencies in
June, FATF moved Ecuador to the ongoing review list of countries
that have developed a FATF action plan. On November 5,
Ecuador's National Assembly voted to approve a bill reforming the
existing anti-money laundering (AML) law. Ecuador's new AML law
is the "Law of Prevention, Detection, and Eradication of the Crime
of Money Laundering and the Financing of Crimes." The bill
added an article to the Penal Code criminalizing the financing of
any of the acts listed in the Penal Code's section under "Crimes of
Sabotage and Terrorism." Ecuador is not yet a member of the
Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence units, as terrorist finance
legislation is a requirement for Egmont membership.

The Ecuadorean government sought to strengthen controls over
money laundering through the Financial Intelligence Unit,
established under a 2005 Money Laundering Law and further
strengthened in the AML passed in November. This unit, which
under the new law is now called the Financial Analysis Unit,
continued to improve cooperation with the Anti-Narcotics Police
Directorate’s Financial Crimes Unit, the Superintendent of Banks,
the Attorney General, the courts, and the private banker
association to identify suspicious transactions and develop
information for the prosecution of cases.

Regional and International Cooperation: Ecuador restored
diplomatic relations with Colombia in December 2010, which it had
broken in March 2008 following a Colombian military attack
against a FARC camp inside Ecuadorean territory. Restoration of
these ties permitted closer security and political cooperation on
northern border issues.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The
Government of Ecuador is working to improve access to
government services and economic development in the northern
border region to reduce the incentive to work with or for illegal
armed groups.

____________________________________________________

Links:

Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Tables & Rankings
Are there Sanctions in force against it? (UN/EU/US)
N
?
Is it on FATF list of non-cooperative countries?
Y
?
Is it on OECD list of uncooperative Tax Havens?
N
?
OECD - Implementation status of Tax Standard
 
?
Is it on EU 'white' list of equivalent jurisdictions?
N
?
Offshore Finance Center?
Y
?
Is it on the US Secretary of Treasury list of jurisdictions of
Primary Money Laundering concern?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of State list of jurisdictions
identified to be supporters of International Terrorism?
N
?
Is it on US Department of State International Narcotics
Control Majors List?
Y
?
US Dept of State Money Laundering assessment (INCSR)
C
?
Government Actions (For further info see INCRS below):
 
?
-  Criminalized Drug Money Laundering?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Beyond Drugs?
Y
 
-  Record Large Transactions?
Y
 
-  Maintain Records Over Time?
Y
 
-  Report Suspicious Transactions?(NMP)?
Y
 
-  Financial Intelligence Unit?
Y
 
-  System for Identifying/Forfeiting Assets?
Y
 
-  Arrangements for Asset Sharing?
Y
 
-  Cooperates with International Law Enforcement?
Y
 
-  International Transportation of Currency?
Y
 
-  Ability to Freeze Terrorist Assets w/o Delay?
Y
 
-  Disclosure Protection "Safe Harbor"?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Financing of Terrorism?
Y
 
-  States Party to 1988 UN Convention?
Y
 
-  International Terrorism Financing Convention?
Y
 
 
Ranking
2011
Ranking
2010
 
Corruption (Transparency International)
120 (out of
183)
127 (out
of 178)
?
Ease of doing business (World Bank)
130 (out of
183)
130 (out
of 183)
?
FATF 40 + 9 recommendations
Mutual Evaluation Report: 2007
Further Tables
C
L
P
N
N/A
    C  -  Fully Compliant ,   
    L  -  Largely Compliant,    
    P  -  Partially Compliant    
    N  -  Non-Compliant
1
1
19
28
0
Legal Systems
 
1. Money Laundering Offence
P
 
14. Protection & no tipping-off
P
2. ML offence – mental element and
corporate liability
P
 
15. Internal controls,
compliance & audit
P
3. Confiscation and provisional
measures
P
 
16. DNFBP – R.13-15 & 21
N
4. Secrecy laws consistent with the
Recommendations
P
 
17. Sanctions
N
5. Customer due diligence
N
 
18. Shell banks
N
6. Politically exposed persons
N
 
19. Other forms of reporting
C
7. Correspondent banking
N
 
20. Other NFBP & secure
transaction techniques
N
8. New technologies & non
face-to-face business
N
 
21. Special attention for
higher risk countries
N
9. Third parties and introducers
N
 
22. Foreign branches &
subsidiaries
N
10. Record keeping
P
 
23. Regulation, supervision
and monitoring
N
11. Unusual transactions
N
 
24. DNFBP - regulation,
supervision and monitoring
N
12. Designated Non-Financial
Businesses and Professions – R.5,
6, 8-11
N
 
25. Guidelines & Feedback
N
13. Suspicious transaction reporting
N
     
Institutional and other
measures
 
26. The FIU
P
 
31. National co-operation
P
27. Law enforcement authorities
P
 
32. Statistics
N
28. Powers of competent authorities
L
 
33. Legal persons –
beneficial owners
P
29. Supervisors
P
 
34. Legal arrangements –
beneficial owners
P
30. Resources, integrity and training
P
 
 
 
International Co-operation
 
35. Conventions
P
 
38. MLA on confiscation and
freezing
N
36. Mutual legal assistance (MLA)
P
 
39. Extradition
P
37. Dual criminality
P
 
40. Other forms of
co-operation
P
Nine Special
Recommendations
 
SR.I Implement UN instruments
N
 
SR VI AML requirements for
money/value transfer services
N
SR.II Criminalise terrorist financing
N
 
SR VII Wire transfer rules
N
SR.III Freeze and confiscate terrorist
assets
N
 
SR.VIII Non profit
organisations
N
SR.IV Suspicious transaction
reporting
N
 
SR.IX Cross Border
Declaration & Disclosure
N
SR.V International co-operation
N
 
 
 
*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.

For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -        

R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV

Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
ECUADOR
KnowYourCountry
-  Know Your Customer Provisions
Y
 
-  Criminalized Tipping Off?
Y
 
-  Report Suspected Terrorist Financing?
Y
 
-  State Party to United Nations TOC?
Y
 
-  State Party to United Nations CAC?
Y
 
Local AML News / Sanctions
Tax Information
Business Information
Last Updated:   16 April 2012