Higher Risk
 
Medium Risk
 
Info n/a
 
Lower Risk
Bilateral exchange of
information
Agreements in place?
Andorra, Bahamas, Bahrain (changed protocol of
original Double Taxation Agreement), Belize,
Bermuda, B.V.I., Cayman Islands, Cook Islands,
Guernsey, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein,
Liberia Luxembourg, San Marino, St Vincent &
Grenadines, Uruguay, Vanuatu
Sanctions:

As a member of the EU, the country is party to all EU Sanctions
as well as UN sanctions.

____________________________________________________

Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:

In February 2010, France adopted its own “black list” of countries
deemed “uncooperative” in tax matters, and aims to tax at 50%
dividends, interest and royalties paid to entities based in these
jurisdictions. There are 18 countries currently on the list - these
are: -  Anguilla, Belize, Brunei, Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada,
Guatemala, Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Liberia, Montserrat,
Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

Since then, France has entered into Tax Exchange of Information
agreements with Belize, Cook Islands, Liberia and Saint Vincent &
the Grenadines and it is presumed that these countries have now
been removed from the list.

____________________________________________________

US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:

France remains an attractive venue for money laundering
because of its sizable economy, political stability, and
sophisticated financial system. Narcotics and human trafficking,
smuggling, and other crimes associated with organized crime are
among its vulnerabilities.

France can designate portions of its customs territory as free
trade zones and free warehouses in return for commitments in
favor of employment. France has taken advantage of these
regulations in several specific instances. The French Customs
Service administers these zones.

For additional information focusing on terrorist financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/

Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: NO

Criminalization of Money Laundering:

“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes

Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES

Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:

Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES

KYC covered entities: Banks, credit institutions, money-issuing
institutions, investment firms, money exchangers, investment
management companies, mutual insurers and benefit institutions,
insurance brokers and intermediaries, notaries, receivers and
trustees in bankruptcy, financial investment advisors, real estate
brokers, chartered accountants, auditors, dealers in high-value
goods, auctioneers and auction houses, bailiffs, lawyers,
participants in stock exchange settlement and delivery,
commercial registered office providers, gaming centers, and
companies involved in sports bets and horse-racing tips

Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:

Number of STRs received and time frame: 20,252 in 2010

Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available

STR covered entities: Banks, credit institutions, money-issuing
institutions, investment firms, money exchangers, investment
management companies, mutual insurers and benefit institutions,
insurance brokers and intermediaries, notaries, receivers and
trustees in bankruptcy, financial investment advisors, real estate
brokers, chartered accountants, auditors, dealers in high-value
goods, auctioneers and auction houses, bailiffs, lawyers,
participants in stock exchange settlement and delivery,
commercial registered office providers, gaming centers, and
companies involved in sports bets and horse-racing tips

Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:

Prosecutions: 276 in 2010

Convictions: 35 in 2010

Records exchange mechanism:

With U.S.: MLAT: YES Other mechanism: YES

With other governments/jurisdictions: YES

France is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
France is also a Cooperating and Supporting Nation to the
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), a FATF-style
regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found
here: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/3/18/47221568.pdf

Enforcement and implementation issues and comments:

The French government has a comprehensive anti-money
laundering/counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime and is an
active partner in international efforts to control money laundering
and terrorist financing. France maintains the ability to designate
individuals or entities under French domestic authorities in
addition to those designated by European Union (EU) regulations.
France and the Unites States have exchanged large amounts of
data in connection with money laundering and terrorist financing.
France still does not have the capacity to share forfeited assets
with other jurisdictions.

France applies the 2006/70/CE European Union directive by
which politically exposed persons from the EU states may benefit
from simplified vigilance procedures, but only in a limited number
of cases.

In September 2011 the Prudential Control Authority (ACP) took
several measures to improve its ability to fight money laundering
and terrorism financing. The ACP has provided guidelines to help
financial institutions define and research “the effective
beneficiary” of money laundering or terrorism financing. The ACP
also has defined new reporting obligations for money exchangers.

France should continue its active participation in international
organizations and its outreach to lower-capacity recipient
countries to combat the domestic and global threats of money
laundering and terrorist financing.

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Narcotics Report 2011 (introduction):

France continues to be a major transshipment point for drugs
moving through Europe. Given France’s shared borders with
trafficking conduits such as Spain, Italy, and Belgium, France is a
natural distribution point for drugs moving toward North America
from Europe and the Middle East. France’s overseas territories’
presence in the Caribbean, its proximity to North Africa, and its
participation in the Schengen open border system, contribute to
its desirability as a transit point for drugs, including drugs
originating in South America. France’s own large domestic market
of cannabis users is attractive to traffickers as well. Specifically, in
descending order, cannabis/hashish originating in Morocco,
cocaine from South America, heroin originating in Afghanistan
and transiting through Turkey, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and
ecstasy (MDMA) originating in the Netherlands and Germany, all
find their way to France.

Most of the illicit drugs in France are produced in other areas of
the world. The vast majority of cannabis products in France
originates in Morocco, and cocaine available in France is
produced in, and trafficked to France from South American
countries. The majority of the heroin entering France is produced
in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Almost all illicit drugs abused in the United States are also abused
in France, with the exception of methamphetamine, which is
almost completely nonexistent in France. Spain is believed to be
the main entry point for cannabis and cocaine in Europe, although
to a lesser extent the Netherlands is a point of entry for cocaine.
French narcotics agencies are effective, technically capable and
make heavy use of electronic surveillance capabilities. In France,
the counterpart to the DEA is the Office Centrale pour la
Repression du Traffic Illicite des Stupefiants (OCRTIS), also
referred to as the Central Narcotics Office (CNO). Penalties for
drug trafficking can include up to life imprisonment. France is a
party to the1988 UN Drug Convention.

For Full report, click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):

(Tier 1)

France is a destination and transit country for men, women, and
children from Eastern Europe, West Africa, and Asia, as well as
the Caribbean and Brazil, subjected to sex trafficking and forced
labor. France is also a limited source country for French citizens
subjected to forced labor and forced prostitution. Sex trafficking
networks controlled by Bulgarians, Romanians, Nigerians, and
French citizens force women into prostitution through debt
bondage, physical force, and psychological coercion, including
the invocation of voodoo. Women and children, many from Africa,
continued to be subjected to forced domestic service. Many of
these cases were reportedly inter-familial, in which families
exploited family members brought from Africa to work in their
households in France. Other cases involve a limited number of
diplomats or members of Middle Eastern royal families. The
Government of France estimates that the majority of the 20,000
people in France’s commercial sex trade, about 80 percent of
whom are foreigners, are likely forced into prostitution. There are
also reports that a significant number of children, primarily from
Romania, West Africa, and North Africa, are victims of sex
trafficking in France. Romani and other unaccompanied minors in
France continued to be vulnerable to forced begging and forced
theft.

Women and children from Brazil were subjected to forced labor
and sex trafficking in the French overseas territory of French
Guiana. There were also reports that Chinese laborers may have
been forced to work in French Guiana.

The Government of France fully complies with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government
published the first study on its own anti-trafficking policies and put
structures in place for more robust national coordination. The
government offered victim assistance to trafficking victims
throughout the country, though almost always with conditions of
the victims’ participation in law enforcement investigations and
sometimes at the victims’ financial expense. The government did
not officially collect victim referral data. The government
increased the number of cases investigated and prosecuted
under the trafficking statute, although the numbers still remained
low. NGOs and government officials reported that first responders
needed to strengthen their proactive victim identification.

For full report click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010

Overview: Several public announcements by al-Qa’ida (AQ) and
other groups reiterated that French interests remained key
targets. In September, concerns about the threat of al-Qa’ida in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) prompted the Government of France
to raise the color-coded alert system to the second highest
security posture. Several false alerts occurred in the latter part of
2010 resulting in evacuations of the Eiffel Tower (on two
occasions), two Paris train stations, an airport in Martinique, and
the Notre Dame de Lourdes shrine. The French have responded
by becoming more involved in the Sahel and the Maghreb,
working closely with the United States to build the capacity of
African nations to counter terrorist groups in Africa before they
can attack in France itself. French authorities made multiple
arrests throughout the year and claimed to have prevented two
planned attacks in 2010. France has shown both a robust
capability to track and prevent internal threats as well as a
readiness to engage in regional dialogue, training, and capacity
building to minimize the risk of terrorist events.

2010 Terrorist Incidents: Traditionally, local Corsican separatists,
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) members, and ultra-left
anarchist factions have been responsible for the majority of
attacks and arrests classified as terrorism in France. In 2010,
there were no attacks related to the ultra left or violent extremists
on French soil; there were however more than 80 persons
arrested in cases related to terrorism.

Corsica: While there were a larger number of attacks by Corsican
separatists in 2010 than in 2009, there were fewer fatal attacks by
Corsican separatists in 2010.

ETA: Arrests and weapons seizures in 2010, combined with the
cumulative effect of years of joint French-Spanish
counterterrorism operations, effectively decapitated ETA's
leadership and neutralized its capacity to sustain a prolonged
operational campaign.

Kidnapping: Kidnapping for ransom has become a major concern
for the French government. In 2010, 10 French citizens were
taken hostage by AQ affiliates. AQIM claimed responsibility for
eight hostages, five were taken on September 16 in Niger and
three were taken on September 22 in Nigeria. The Taliban
claimed responsibility for two hostages taken in Kabul on
November 3. In addition, one French intelligence officer who was
kidnapped in 2009 in Somalia remained in captivity. French
hostage Michel Germaneau was killed in July by AQIM.

Legislation and Law Enforcement: In the first half of the year, 62
suspected ETA members were arrested in France. In February,
police arrested the group's top leader in France in a joint Spanish-
French pre-dawn raid. In March, the shooting of a French police
officer near Paris during a bungled getaway was ETA's last fatal
attack and believed to be the first murder of a French police
officer by that organization. In April 2009, the French government
formed a joint security committee with Spain to fight terrorism and
drug trafficking. The group, which is an expansion of existing
police cooperation targeted at ETA, created a joint general staff
headquarters on security to lead the fight on terrorism. Less than
18 months later on September 5, ETA called for a halt to all
armed attacks and is actively seeking talks with the Spanish
government.

The following high profile arrests took place in 2010:

* On February 28, French police arrested Ibon Gogeaskoetxea
Arronategui, suspected military chief of ETA.
* On October 3, a French citizen suspected of being an AQ
operative was arrested in Naples, Italy for possession of bomb
making materials.
* On October 5, 12 individuals were arrested in the South of
France and accused of running a foreign fighter pipeline to
Afghanistan.
* On November 26, a 27-year-old French citizen was arrested and
prosecuted under suspicion of having been involved in a terrorist
cell. He is accused of participating in terrorist activities in the
Afghan/Pakistan border region.

Countering Terrorist Finance: The French government has a
comprehensive anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing
(AML/CTF) regime and is an active partner in international efforts
to control money laundering and terrorist financing, including its
prominent role as a founding member of the Financial Action Task
Force. France actively participated in UN 1267 and 1373
Committee sessions. France maintains the ability to designate
individuals or entities under French domestic authorities in
addition to those designated by EU regulations.

Regional and International Cooperation: France was actively
engaged with the UNSC Counterterrorism Committee, the G8’s
Counterterrorism Action Group, the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions
Committee (for the Taliban and AQ), and the European Council’s
Antiterrorism Strategy action plan. The French government
undertook counterterrorism operations with other countries
including the UK, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: France
continued implementing programs to address radicalization and
extremism using social and economic incentives to reduce the
susceptibility of at-risk populations. Of particular note, the French
government went to great efforts to train police personnel to be
aware of the signs of radicalization. In 2010, the French
government began to consider ways to address radicalization
through after school programs for at-risk youth, greater access to
higher education, and increased economic mobility. In addition,
the French government offered imams a professional training
program run by mainstream Muslim leaders.
Tables & Rankings
Are there Sanctions in force against it? (UN/EU/US)
N
?
Is it on FATF list of non-cooperative countries?
N
?
Is it on OECD list of uncooperative Tax Havens?
N
?
OECD - Implementation status of Tax Standard
White
?
Is it on EU 'white' list of equivalent jurisdictions?
EU
?
Offshore Finance Center (Original IMF List)?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of Treasury list of jurisdictions of
Primary Money Laundering concern?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of State list of jurisdictions
identified to be supporters of International Terrorism?
N
?
Is it on US Department of State International Narcotics
Control Majors List?
N
?
US Dept of State Money Laundering assessment (INCSR)
PC
?
Government Actions (For further info see INCRS below):
 
?
-  Criminalized Drug Money Laundering?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Beyond Drugs?
Y
 
-  Record Large Transactions?
Y
 
-  Maintain Records Over Time?
Y
 
-  Report Suspicious Transactions?(NMP)?
Y
 
-  Egmont Financial Intelligence Units?
Y
 
-  System for Identifying/Forfeiting Assets?
Y
 
-  Arrangements for Asset Sharing?
N
 
-  Cooperates with International Law Enforcement?
Y
 
-  International Transportation of Currency?
Y
 
-  Ability to Freeze Terrorist Assets w/o Delay?
Y
 
-  Disclosure Protection "Safe Harbor"?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Financing of Terrorism?
Y
 
-  States Party to 1988 UN Convention?
Y
 
-  International Terrorism Financing Convention?
Y
 
 
Ranking
2011
Ranking
2010
 
Corruption (Transparency International)
25 (out of
183)
25 (out of
178)
?
Ease of doing business (World Bank)
29 (out of
183)
26 (out of
183)
?
C
L
P
N
N/A
    C  -  Fully Compliant ,   
    L  -  Largely Compliant,    
    P  -  Partially Compliant    
    N  -  Non-Compliant
9
29
10
1
0
Legal Systems
 
1. Money Laundering Offence
L
 
14. Protection & no tipping-off
C
2. ML offence – mental element and
corporate liability
L
 
15. Internal controls,
compliance & audit
L
3. Confiscation and provisional
measures
P
 
16. DNFBP – R.13-15 & 21
P
4. Secrecy laws consistent with the
Recommendations
C
 
17. Sanctions
L
5. Customer due diligence
L
 
18. Shell banks
C
6. Politically exposed persons
P
 
19. Other forms of reporting
C
7. Correspondent banking
P
 
20. Other NFBP & secure
transaction techniques
C
8. New technologies & non
face-to-face business
L
 
21. Special attention for
higher risk countries
L
9. Third parties and introducers
P
 
22. Foreign branches &
subsidiaries
L
10. Record keeping
L
 
23. Regulation, supervision
and monitoring
L
11. Unusual transactions
L
 
24. DNFBP - regulation,
supervision and monitoring
N
12. Designated Non-Financial
Businesses and Professions – R.5,
6, 8-11
P
 
25. Guidelines & Feedback
P
13. Suspicious transaction reporting
L
     
Institutional and other
measures
 
26. The FIU
L
 
31. National co-operation
L
27. Law enforcement authorities
L
 
32. Statistics
P
28. Powers of competent authorities
C
 
33. Legal persons – beneficial
owners
L
29. Supervisors
L
 
34. Legal arrangements –
beneficial owners
L
30. Resources, integrity and training
P
 
 
 
International Co-operation
 
35. Conventions
L
 
38. MLA on confiscation and
freezing
L
36. Mutual legal assistance (MLA)
L
 
39. Extradition
L
37. Dual criminality
C
 
40. Other forms of
co-operation
L
Nine Special
Recommendations
 
SR.I Implement UN instruments
L
 
SR VI AML requirements for
money/value transfer services
L
SR.II Criminalise terrorist financing
C
 
SR VII Wire transfer rules
C
SR.III Freeze and confiscate terrorist
assets
P
 
SR.VIII Non profit
organisations
L
SR.IV Suspicious transaction
reporting
L
 
SR.IX Cross Border
Declaration & Disclosure
L
SR.V International co-operation
L
 
 
 
*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.

For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -        

R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV

Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
FATF 40 + 9 recommendations
Mutual Evaluation Report: 2011
Further Tables
FRANCE
KnowYourCountry
-  Know Your Customer Provisions
Y
 
-  Criminalized Tipping Off?
Y
 
-  Report Suspected Terrorist Financing?
Y
 
-  State Party to United Nations TOC?
Y
 
-  State Party to United Nations CAC?
Y
 
_________________________________________________________

AML News / Relevant Info

June 26, 2011  -  New report by the Global Forum on Transparency and
Exchange of Information to evaluate the country's legal and regulatory
frameworks and implementation re exchange of information is made
available.

Read Report


Links:

Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)

Traitement du renseignement et action contre les circuits financiers
clandestins (TRACFIN)

Unit for Intelligence Processing and Action Against Illicit Financial
Networks
Local AML News / Sanctions
Tax Information
Business Information
Key Findings from last Mutual Evaluation Report

This was the FATF's third mutual evaluation of France. The
implementation of the transposition into French law of the Third
European Directive, 2005/60/EC, on the prevention of the use of  the
financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist
financing by the Ordonnance No. 2009-104 of 30 January 2009 and the
subsequent implementing decrees are the latest step in strengthening its
preventive regime.  Among some of the main new measures introduced
in 2009 include:  (1) increasing the number of sectors covered by
AML/CFT provisions to include in particular domiciliation companies ; (2)
submitting all covered institutions/professions to an AML/CFT oversight
and sanction system; (3) adopting a risk-based approach to due
diligence measures; (4)  extending the obligation to report suspicious
transactions to all offences under “ordinary law”, including tax fraud, and
increasing the powers of the financial intelligence unit (Tracfin);  (5)
introducing a licensing system for the money changing profession to
replace the previous simple registration requirement and (6) broadening
the prohibition from making payments in cash.

In addition to the creation of an AML/CFT advisory committee, which is
intended to strengthen the co-ordination of the effort of the relevant
state authorities and the supervisors of the institutions/professions
covered by AML/CFT obligations, one major recent institutional
innovation (March 2010) has been the grouping of the licensing and
supervision responsibilities regarding banks, payment institutions,
investment firm (with the exception of portfolio-management firms) and
money changers together with insurance companies, mutual insurance,
provident insurance institutions under one independent government
agency called the Prudential Supervision Authority (Autorité de contrôle
prudentiel – ACP).

Ordonnance No. 2009-104 of 30 January 2009 and its implementing
decrees revised and supplemented customer due diligence obligations.
These new obligations, which apply to both financial institutions and non-
financial professions, together with record-keeping and suspicious
transaction reporting (STR) obligations, are very comprehensive and
largely compliant with FATF requirements. The level of compliance of
non-financial professions with their AML/CFT obligations, however, is not
completely satisfactory. The authorities will therefore need to make a
considerable effort in this area.

The French prudential supervision authorities have sufficient powers to
carry out their inspections (whether specifically AML/CFT-related or not)
and exercise them conscientiously. The oversight system revolves
around co-ordinated use of ongoing off-site inspections and on-site
inspections to make the supervisory system effective and efficient. In
addition, all relevant authorities have the power to take sanctions in
AML/CFT matters, and they have, in most cases, made effective,
proportionate and dissuasive use of them.

In terms of the number of convictions, fraud and drug trafficking are the
most common predicate offences for money laundering in France. The
money laundering offence, which is largely in compliance with
international law, is being progressively appropriated into case law and
by the Cour de cassation. The assessors noted as well that France
introduced in 2005 the offence of non-justification of resources which
enables “laundering by association” (blanchiment de proximité) to be
targeted in that the offence aims to penalise individuals for whom the
evidence of participation in an act of money laundering cannot be
proven even though circumstantial elements appear to show the
contrary.  Despite a continuous increase in the number of convictions for
money laundering, the assessors observed quite a strong tendency
among courts to prosecute on the charge of the predicate offence. They
thus recommend enhancing the judicial resources made available for
investigations and, more generally, for law enforcement measures
against economic and financial crime. France has a very comprehensive
array of legal tools for criminalising terrorist financing; likewise, law
enforcement authorities have the investigative techniques and powers
for combating terrorist financing and money laundering, which are
compliance with FATF requirements.

France is able to offer extensive mutual legal assistance for
investigations and prosecutions relating to money laundering and
terrorist financing. Available measures relating to extradition are also
satisfactory, even if the lack of adequate statistics makes it very difficult
to determine exactly how effective the current system is.

This mutual evaluation of France considered the matter of the local
government authorities (collectivités territoriales) located overseas to
determine their role and contribution regarding the country's AML/CFT
policy. It is important to note that despite their differences in status,
these territories are an integral part of the French Republic and, as
such, are governed by the same AML/CFT rules as those in force in
metropolitan France (apart from a few highly specific sector-based or
geographical characteristics referred to in the report ). The report
therefore focuses mainly on how the AML/CFT standard is implemented
in these territories and on how effective it is, taking into account the
financial weight that these territories represent.  The assessment team
particularly targeted some of these regions because of their exposure to
certain risks relating to AML/CFT and other phenomena that lead to
crime . This detailed analysis shows that while the strong financial
connection with metropolitan France facilitates the implementation of
AML/CFT legislation in these territories, it is also true that the
geographical remoteness of these territories lessens the impact of the
authorities’ communication and awareness efforts regarding the covered
professions. Although the legislation in force is, apart from a few minor
exceptions, the same throughout France, the assessors highlighted in
the report several situations that raise doubts as to how effectively
AML/CFT measures are implemented in overseas France. Thus, there
remain serious doubts as to the full implementation of the STR obligation
in certain territories situated overseas (this point applies to both the
financial and non financial professions).  In this regard, it should be
noted that no resources – or almost none – are devoted by Tracfin in
territories located overseas to dialogue and exchanges and, more
particularly to awareness raising on STR obligations among covered
professions. At the level of AML/CFT compliance inspections for financial
professionals, the evaluation report notes the virtual absence of on-site
inspections by the AMF in these territories and the necessity for the ACP
to increase its inspection activity.  Regarding the non-financial
professions, the assessors learned through interviews with a sampling of
professions carrying out such activity overseas that they are confronting
significant challenges in implementing their AML/CFT obligations, in
particular when they do not have a professional organisation in a
position to guide and assist them in their efforts in this area.  The
absence of government authorities clearly identified for dealing with
AML/CFT matters in these territories is especially viewed as a difficulty.  
French authorities should rectify these shortcomings and, more broadly,
improve knowledge of the risks of money laundering and terrorist
financing in every region of the country.
Last Updated:   16 April 2012