_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012:
In Iraq, drug production, trafficking, and use are negligible by
international standards. Little more than anecdotal evidence exists of
drug production or cultivation. Iraq is more of a transit country than a
destination for drugs. Abuse of licit prescription drugs is the only
significant abuse problem, although several studies from the last two to
five years note a rise in illicit drug abuse. The Government of Iraq (GOI)
does not devote significant resources to counternarcotics efforts, and
only a few dedicated drug rehabilitation facilities exist. State-INL has
funded a “Center of Excellence” at the Baghdad Medical City hospital,
the only facility that addresses drug abuse comprehensively. Iraq is a
party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
Iraq’s role in illicit drug production appears minor. However, there have
been increased attempts to divert precursor chemicals for drug
production in Afghanistan. In Iraq, it is illegal to traffic in and sell illicit
drugs as well as to use them. The GOI maintains that the country has no
drug problem, but some Iraqis abuse opiate products, hashish (mostly
limited to areas near trafficking routes), and prescription drugs. Laws
restricting their use are rarely enforced. Prescription drugs are available
in Iraqi pharmacies without prescription. Much drug abuse results from
living in a society wracked by instability. Steroid use is not illegal or
controlled, and has risen among bodybuilders and athletes. There are
concerns that insurgents use steroids to enhance combat capabilities.
Reports indicate that among police personnel, steroids are the most
widely abused drug, but drug and alcohol abuse have increased in the
last two years, particularly among the army and police engaged in high
stress deployments.
More drugs transit Iraq than remain in the country. Amphetamines
(Captagon) move from Syria through Iraq to Saudi Arabia. Hashish
moves from Iran to Kuwait, and Afghan-origin heroin shipped from Iran
destined for Turkey or Syria passes through the Kurdish region of Iraq.
Drugs moving from Iran to Saudi Arabia also transit Iraq. In September,
Saudi Arabian officials discovered a glider near the Iraqi border with
700,000 Captagon tablets. Terrorists, militias, and large criminal gangs
generate revenue from drug trafficking activities.
Iraq has not invested adequately in the counternarcotics control
personnel and capacity required to effectively control drug trafficking.
Iraqi forces in charge of border control and interdiction face serious
challenges detecting contraband due to limited training, manpower, and
equipment. State-INL’s Police Development Program (PDP) includes a
counter-narcotics advisor. In addition, PDP advisors from Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and the
Coast Guard work with the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement to
improve border controls and consult with the Iraqi Coastal Border Guard
on patrolling the coastline and enforcing laws along the maritime border
areas. The DHS advisors also work with the Iraqi Navy, which enforces
the majority of Iraq’s maritime sovereignty regimes.
Drug policing falls under various local law enforcement jurisdictions. No
central authority specifically targets drugs. Borders are porous with little
or no communication among the agencies involved. Corruption
frequently undermines border enforcement efforts and a high rate of
illiteracy among border enforcement personnel further limits their
effectiveness. As a matter of government policy, Iraq does not
encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or
psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of
proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Iraq is a party to the UN
Convention against Corruption and is also a party to the UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime.
Iraq’s drug laws are in need of reform. The vast majority of laws dates
from the 1960s, and they often include overly severe, impractical
penalties. Personal use can carry sentences from three to 15 years
incarceration and trafficking can draw a life sentence or the death
penalty. One trafficker arrested and convicted in Mosul in May for
growing and selling marijuana received a sentence of 150 years in
prison.
Extradition between the United States and Iraq is governed by the 1934
U.S.-Iraq Extradition Treaty, which remains in force. Although there is no
mutual legal assistance treaty in force between the United States and
Iraq, mutual legal assistance is provided on a reciprocal basis through
letters of request.
No functioning full-spectrum drug rehabilitation programs exist in Iraq.
The Iraqi Ministry of Health is working with the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration to establish a Center of Excellence on Substance Abuse
Services at Baghdad’s Medical City. This project can help Iraq develop a
baseline against which it can measure and model future progress.
For Full report, click here
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 (introduction):
(Tier 2 Watch List)
Iraq is a source and destination country for men, women, and children
subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor. Iraqi women and girls are
subjected to conditions of trafficking within the country and in Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran,
Yemen, and Saudi Arabia for forced prostitution and sexual exploitation
within households. Women are lured into forced prostitution through
false promises of work. Women are also subjected to involuntary
servitude through forced marriages, often as payment of a debt, and
women who flee such marriages are often more vulnerable to being
subjected to further forced labor or sexual servitude. One NGO reports
that recruiters rape women and girls on film and blackmail them into
prostitution or recruit them in prisons by posting bail and then holding
them in situations of debt bondage in prostitution. Some women and
children are forced by family members into prostitution to escape
desperate economic circumstances, to pay debts, or to resolve disputes
between families. NGOs report that these women are often prostituted in
private residences, brothels, restaurants, and places of entertainment.
Some women and girls are trafficked within Iraq for the purpose of sexual
exploitation through the use of temporary marriages (muta’a), by which
the family of the girl receives money in the form of a dowry in exchange
for permission to marry the girl for a limited period of time. Some Iraqi
parents have reportedly collaborated with traffickers to leave children at
the Iraqi side of the border with Syria with the expectation that traffickers
will arrange for them forged documents to enter Syria and employment in
a nightclub. The large population of internally displaced persons and
refugees moving within Iraq and across its borders are particularly at risk
of being trafficked. Women from Iran, China, and the Philippines
reportedly may be trafficked to or through Iraq for commercial sexual
exploitation.
Iraq is also a destination country for men and women who migrate from
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, Pakistan, Georgia, Jordan, and Uganda and are subsequently
subjected to involuntary servitude as construction workers, security
guards, cleaners, handymen, and domestic workers. Such men and
women face practices such as confiscation of passports and official
documents, nonpayment of wages, long working hours, threats of
deportation, and physical and sexual abuse as a means to keep them in
a situation of forced labor. Some of these foreign migrants were
recruited for work in other countries such as Jordan or the Gulf States,
but were forced, coerced, or deceived into traveling to Iraq, where their
passports were confiscated and their wages withheld, ostensibly to repay
labor brokers for the costs of recruitment, transport, and food and
lodging. Other foreign migrants were aware they were destined for Iraq,
but once in-country, found the terms of employment were not what they
expected or the jobs they were promised did not exist, and they faced
coercion and serious harm, financial or otherwise, if they attempted to
leave. In addition, some Iraqi boys from poor families are reportedly
subjected to forced street begging and other nonconsensual labor
exploitation and commercial sexual exploitation. Some women from
Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nepal, and the Philippines who migrated to the area
under the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
experienced conditions of domestic servitude after being recruited with
offers of different jobs. An Iraqi official revealed networks of women have
been involved in the trafficking and sale of male and female children for
the purposes of sex trafficking.
The Government of Iraq does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant
efforts to do so. The government did not demonstrate evidence of
significant efforts to punish traffickers or proactively identify victims;
therefore, Iraq is placed on Tier 2 Watch List for a third consecutive
year. Iraq was not placed on Tier 3 per Section 107 of the 2008
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, however, as the
government has a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute
making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is devoting sufficient
resources to implement that plan. Nonetheless, the government did not
enact its draft anti-trafficking legislation and has reported no other
efforts to prosecute or punish traffickers. The Government of Iraq
continues to lack proactive victim identification procedures, persists in
punishing victims of forced prostitution, and provides no systematic
protection services to victims of trafficking.
For full report click here
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: Iraqi and U.S. security forces worked together and continued
to make progress combating al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), affiliated Sunni
terrorist organizations, and Shia insurgents. Terrorist attacks primarily
targeted Iraqi and U.S. security forces and government officials, but they
were also aimed at stirring ethnic tensions among Iraqi sectarian groups
and minorities.
AQI adapted to changing conditions and remained capable of large-
scale and coordinated attacks. However, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
also improved its capabilities in combating terrorist networks with better
targeting and capture and detention of terrorists. AQI operated primarily
in regions with majority Sunni Arab populations, particularly focusing its
efforts in and around Baghdad and Ninewa. The group targeted the ISF,
government infrastructure, and sectarian groups in an effort to induce
them to emigrate and to erode Iraqi security and governance capabilities.
Sunni leaders in Iraq have overwhelmingly rejected AQI and its extremist
ideology. The Sons of Iraq (SOI) who cooperated with the security
authorities continued to be a valuable asset in countering AQI. Some of
AQI’s members have defected, and the group has lost support in key
mobilization areas, disrupting its infrastructure. On December 23, the ISF
arrested 93 suspects in a crackdown of AQI bases in Anbar province.
Iran continued to fund, train, and provide weapons and ammunition to
Shia extremist groups that carried out attacks against Iraqi and U.S.
forces. Although attacks by these groups have decreased, their Iranian-
supported networks continued to operate throughout Iraq's southern
provinces. The Iraqi government pressed senior Iranian leaders to end
support for Shia militias, and its national unity efforts to involve Iraqi Shia
groups with Iranian ties, such as Asaib ahl al Haq (League of
Righteousness), in the political process, have contributed to decreased
Shia-linked violence. The ISF also carried out operations throughout
southern Iraq and in Baghdad against extremists trained and equipped
by Iran, including the Promised Day Brigade and Kata'ib Hezbollah
(Brigades of the Party of God).
Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandiyah (JRTN), a Sunni nationalist
insurgent group with links to the former Ba'ath Party, also continued
attacks during the year. JRTN targeted Iraqi and U.S. forces, Iranians,
and Iraqi Shia groups whose members work with Iran.
Foreign fighters, though greatly diminished in number from previous
years, continued to enter Iraq, predominantly through Syria. AQI and the
group's Sunni extremist partners more often used Iraqi nationals,
including women, as suicide bombers. According to Iraqi Ministry of
Interior (MOI) security officials, however, four of the five terrorists who
attacked the Our Lady of Salvation Church on October 31 were
foreigners and 12 other terrorists, mostly foreign, have been implicated
in planning the church attack, as well as planning to attack the French
Embassy and the Ministry of Planning.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: The deadliest bomb attacks during the year
were against security forces, government buildings, and western targets,
and included:
* On January 25, suicide bombers struck in quick succession near three
Baghdad hotels frequented by Western journalists killing at least 38
people and wounding more than 100.
* On January 26, a suicide car bomber sheared off the front of the main
police crime lab in Baghdad, killing 21 and wounding 80.
* On April 4, at least 42 were killed and 249 injured as three bombs
struck the Iranian, Egyptian, Syrian, and German embassies.
* On June 13, gunmen and suicide bombers attacked the Central Bank
of Iraq, killing at least 18 and wounding dozens.
* On July 18, a suicide bomber killed 32 SOI fighters waiting for
paychecks at a center west of Baghdad and wounded 20.
* On August 17, a suicide bomber blew himself up among hundreds of
army recruits in Baghdad, killing 60 and wounding 128.
* On August 25, terrorists unleashed a wave of coordinated attacks in 13
towns and cities across Iraq, including hit-and-run shootings, improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle borne improvised explosive devices
(VBIEDs), killing 51.
Major attacks late in the year that also targeted religious and sectarian
groups included:
* On October 31, AQI members seized an Our Lady of Salvation Church
in Baghdad, killing 58 and wounding 70 with combined IEDs, suicide
vests, and small arms fire.
* On November 8, three VBIEDs detonated in the Shia holy cities of
Najaf and Karbala killing 19 people and injuring 75, including Iranian
pilgrims.
* On December 30, insurgents targeted Christian homes and
neighborhoods in Baghdad with IEDs, killing two.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The Government of Iraq took a
number of steps to improve border security. A Council of Ministers'
resolution called for a "unity of effort" among all government agencies at
all Iraqi ports of entry (POEs). In addition, the MOI and the Minister of
Interior for the Kurdistan Regional Government agreed to integrate all
POEs in the Iraqi Kurdistan region into the Iraqi government’s POE
structure. Also, the Iraqi Customs Police returned to duty at the port of
Umm Qasr after a two-year absence. Their presence has improved
control over imports into Iraq.
The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), an agency handling terrorist
cases, fostered a collaboration between investigators from Iraq and the
United States. The MCTF investigated terrorism, high-profile violent
crimes, and murders conducted by terrorists and members of organized
criminal enterprises. Iraqi partners conducted complex criminal and
counterterrorism investigations, which led to coordinated prosecution of
defendants in Iraqi criminal courts. Seventy-two percent of the cases
opened and assigned to the MCTF were capital cases involving terrorism.
Iraq continued to face significant challenges moving criminal cases from
arrest to trial. The Iraqi government carried out few investigations of
alleged sectarian-based crimes; arrests following a murder or other
crimes were rare. U.S. and third-country law enforcement officials have
trained Iraqi investigators and judges in investigative methodology and
forensic evidence collection during the year.
Judicial security was a challenge. Judges investigating and adjudicating
terrorism cases faced threats to their personal safety and that of their
families. It is likely that some terrorism cases were dismissed due to
actual or implied threats. To ameliorate this threat, the Chief Justice of
the Higher Judicial Council appointed a cadre of judges to hear terrorism
cases; these judges lived in secure apartment blocks. In addition, the
government moved several judges hearing terrorism cases from Mosul
to Baghdad to protect their safety.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Iraq is a member of the Middle East and
North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). The Central Bank
of Iraq (CBI) has a Financial Intelligence Unit called the Money
Laundering Reporting Office (MLRO), which is still in the early stages of
development. Iraq has not yet had a mutual evaluation, a compliance
test by the Financial Action Task Force-International Monetary Fund of
its anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing (AML/CTF) regime.
While the Director of the MLRO has undergone training on AML/CTF at
the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation in the United States, Iraq
appeared to have done little to enhance the MLRO to meet international
standards. Iraq's AML/CFT legislation neglects to adequately outlaw
money laundering and the financing of terrorism and conflicts with other
areas of Iraqi legislation. The AML/CFT law was written in 2004 and
requires amendment to bring it to international standards.
Regional and International Cooperation: In September, Iraq attended a
security meeting held in Bahrain with the interior ministers from Bahrain,
Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, as well as
the UN, the Organization of Islamic Countries, and the Arab League. The
participants issued a joint 20-point statement that stressed the
importance of Iraq's internal security to the region and recommended the
creation of "cooperative mechanisms" to further address regional
security issues. Iraq, Turkey, and the United States continued their
formal trilateral security dialogue as one element of ongoing cooperative
efforts to counter the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in the region.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Iraq's MOI initiated a
program to counter violent extremism and youth radicalization by making
documentaries about terrorists in detention and about victims of
terrorism. The Iraqi government also developed programs to counter
violent extremist propaganda and to provide local youth positive
examples and role models in society. These included USAID projects for
at-risk youths and 4H Clubs. The UN Children’s Fund in Iraq initiated a
project to provide reintegration services for children released from
pre/post trial detention. The United States supported a Government of
Iraq program to provide local support following the release of militants in
order to decrease recidivism and facilitate integration into local
communities.
_________________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012:
In Iraq, drug production, trafficking, and use are negligible by
international standards. Little more than anecdotal evidence exists of
drug production or cultivation. Iraq is more of a transit country than a
destination for drugs. Abuse of licit prescription drugs is the only
significant abuse problem, although several studies from the last two to
five years note a rise in illicit drug abuse. The Government of Iraq (GOI)
does not devote significant resources to counternarcotics efforts, and
only a few dedicated drug rehabilitation facilities exist. State-INL has
funded a “Center of Excellence” at the Baghdad Medical City hospital,
the only facility that addresses drug abuse comprehensively. Iraq is a
party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
Iraq’s role in illicit drug production appears minor. However, there have
been increased attempts to divert precursor chemicals for drug
production in Afghanistan. In Iraq, it is illegal to traffic in and sell illicit
drugs as well as to use them. The GOI maintains that the country has no
drug problem, but some Iraqis abuse opiate products, hashish (mostly
limited to areas near trafficking routes), and prescription drugs. Laws
restricting their use are rarely enforced. Prescription drugs are available
in Iraqi pharmacies without prescription. Much drug abuse results from
living in a society wracked by instability. Steroid use is not illegal or
controlled, and has risen among bodybuilders and athletes. There are
concerns that insurgents use steroids to enhance combat capabilities.
Reports indicate that among police personnel, steroids are the most
widely abused drug, but drug and alcohol abuse have increased in the
last two years, particularly among the army and police engaged in high
stress deployments.
More drugs transit Iraq than remain in the country. Amphetamines
(Captagon) move from Syria through Iraq to Saudi Arabia. Hashish
moves from Iran to Kuwait, and Afghan-origin heroin shipped from Iran
destined for Turkey or Syria passes through the Kurdish region of Iraq.
Drugs moving from Iran to Saudi Arabia also transit Iraq. In September,
Saudi Arabian officials discovered a glider near the Iraqi border with
700,000 Captagon tablets. Terrorists, militias, and large criminal gangs
generate revenue from drug trafficking activities.
Iraq has not invested adequately in the counternarcotics control
personnel and capacity required to effectively control drug trafficking.
Iraqi forces in charge of border control and interdiction face serious
challenges detecting contraband due to limited training, manpower, and
equipment. State-INL’s Police Development Program (PDP) includes a
counter-narcotics advisor. In addition, PDP advisors from Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and the
Coast Guard work with the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement to
improve border controls and consult with the Iraqi Coastal Border Guard
on patrolling the coastline and enforcing laws along the maritime border
areas. The DHS advisors also work with the Iraqi Navy, which enforces
the majority of Iraq’s maritime sovereignty regimes.
Drug policing falls under various local law enforcement jurisdictions. No
central authority specifically targets drugs. Borders are porous with little
or no communication among the agencies involved. Corruption
frequently undermines border enforcement efforts and a high rate of
illiteracy among border enforcement personnel further limits their
effectiveness. As a matter of government policy, Iraq does not
encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or
psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of
proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Iraq is a party to the UN
Convention against Corruption and is also a party to the UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime.
Iraq’s drug laws are in need of reform. The vast majority of laws dates
from the 1960s, and they often include overly severe, impractical
penalties. Personal use can carry sentences from three to 15 years
incarceration and trafficking can draw a life sentence or the death
penalty. One trafficker arrested and convicted in Mosul in May for
growing and selling marijuana received a sentence of 150 years in
prison.
Extradition between the United States and Iraq is governed by the 1934
U.S.-Iraq Extradition Treaty, which remains in force. Although there is no
mutual legal assistance treaty in force between the United States and
Iraq, mutual legal assistance is provided on a reciprocal basis through
letters of request.
No functioning full-spectrum drug rehabilitation programs exist in Iraq.
The Iraqi Ministry of Health is working with the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration to establish a Center of Excellence on Substance Abuse
Services at Baghdad’s Medical City. This project can help Iraq develop a
baseline against which it can measure and model future progress.
For Full report, click here
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 (introduction):
(Tier 2 Watch List)
Iraq is a source and destination country for men, women, and children
subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor. Iraqi women and girls are
subjected to conditions of trafficking within the country and in Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran,
Yemen, and Saudi Arabia for forced prostitution and sexual exploitation
within households. Women are lured into forced prostitution through
false promises of work. Women are also subjected to involuntary
servitude through forced marriages, often as payment of a debt, and
women who flee such marriages are often more vulnerable to being
subjected to further forced labor or sexual servitude. One NGO reports
that recruiters rape women and girls on film and blackmail them into
prostitution or recruit them in prisons by posting bail and then holding
them in situations of debt bondage in prostitution. Some women and
children are forced by family members into prostitution to escape
desperate economic circumstances, to pay debts, or to resolve disputes
between families. NGOs report that these women are often prostituted in
private residences, brothels, restaurants, and places of entertainment.
Some women and girls are trafficked within Iraq for the purpose of sexual
exploitation through the use of temporary marriages (muta’a), by which
the family of the girl receives money in the form of a dowry in exchange
for permission to marry the girl for a limited period of time. Some Iraqi
parents have reportedly collaborated with traffickers to leave children at
the Iraqi side of the border with Syria with the expectation that traffickers
will arrange for them forged documents to enter Syria and employment in
a nightclub. The large population of internally displaced persons and
refugees moving within Iraq and across its borders are particularly at risk
of being trafficked. Women from Iran, China, and the Philippines
reportedly may be trafficked to or through Iraq for commercial sexual
exploitation.
Iraq is also a destination country for men and women who migrate from
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, Pakistan, Georgia, Jordan, and Uganda and are subsequently
subjected to involuntary servitude as construction workers, security
guards, cleaners, handymen, and domestic workers. Such men and
women face practices such as confiscation of passports and official
documents, nonpayment of wages, long working hours, threats of
deportation, and physical and sexual abuse as a means to keep them in
a situation of forced labor. Some of these foreign migrants were
recruited for work in other countries such as Jordan or the Gulf States,
but were forced, coerced, or deceived into traveling to Iraq, where their
passports were confiscated and their wages withheld, ostensibly to repay
labor brokers for the costs of recruitment, transport, and food and
lodging. Other foreign migrants were aware they were destined for Iraq,
but once in-country, found the terms of employment were not what they
expected or the jobs they were promised did not exist, and they faced
coercion and serious harm, financial or otherwise, if they attempted to
leave. In addition, some Iraqi boys from poor families are reportedly
subjected to forced street begging and other nonconsensual labor
exploitation and commercial sexual exploitation. Some women from
Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nepal, and the Philippines who migrated to the area
under the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
experienced conditions of domestic servitude after being recruited with
offers of different jobs. An Iraqi official revealed networks of women have
been involved in the trafficking and sale of male and female children for
the purposes of sex trafficking.
The Government of Iraq does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant
efforts to do so. The government did not demonstrate evidence of
significant efforts to punish traffickers or proactively identify victims;
therefore, Iraq is placed on Tier 2 Watch List for a third consecutive
year. Iraq was not placed on Tier 3 per Section 107 of the 2008
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, however, as the
government has a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute
making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is devoting sufficient
resources to implement that plan. Nonetheless, the government did not
enact its draft anti-trafficking legislation and has reported no other
efforts to prosecute or punish traffickers. The Government of Iraq
continues to lack proactive victim identification procedures, persists in
punishing victims of forced prostitution, and provides no systematic
protection services to victims of trafficking.
For full report click here
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: Iraqi and U.S. security forces worked together and continued
to make progress combating al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), affiliated Sunni
terrorist organizations, and Shia insurgents. Terrorist attacks primarily
targeted Iraqi and U.S. security forces and government officials, but they
were also aimed at stirring ethnic tensions among Iraqi sectarian groups
and minorities.
AQI adapted to changing conditions and remained capable of large-
scale and coordinated attacks. However, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
also improved its capabilities in combating terrorist networks with better
targeting and capture and detention of terrorists. AQI operated primarily
in regions with majority Sunni Arab populations, particularly focusing its
efforts in and around Baghdad and Ninewa. The group targeted the ISF,
government infrastructure, and sectarian groups in an effort to induce
them to emigrate and to erode Iraqi security and governance capabilities.
Sunni leaders in Iraq have overwhelmingly rejected AQI and its extremist
ideology. The Sons of Iraq (SOI) who cooperated with the security
authorities continued to be a valuable asset in countering AQI. Some of
AQI’s members have defected, and the group has lost support in key
mobilization areas, disrupting its infrastructure. On December 23, the ISF
arrested 93 suspects in a crackdown of AQI bases in Anbar province.
Iran continued to fund, train, and provide weapons and ammunition to
Shia extremist groups that carried out attacks against Iraqi and U.S.
forces. Although attacks by these groups have decreased, their Iranian-
supported networks continued to operate throughout Iraq's southern
provinces. The Iraqi government pressed senior Iranian leaders to end
support for Shia militias, and its national unity efforts to involve Iraqi Shia
groups with Iranian ties, such as Asaib ahl al Haq (League of
Righteousness), in the political process, have contributed to decreased
Shia-linked violence. The ISF also carried out operations throughout
southern Iraq and in Baghdad against extremists trained and equipped
by Iran, including the Promised Day Brigade and Kata'ib Hezbollah
(Brigades of the Party of God).
Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandiyah (JRTN), a Sunni nationalist
insurgent group with links to the former Ba'ath Party, also continued
attacks during the year. JRTN targeted Iraqi and U.S. forces, Iranians,
and Iraqi Shia groups whose members work with Iran.
Foreign fighters, though greatly diminished in number from previous
years, continued to enter Iraq, predominantly through Syria. AQI and the
group's Sunni extremist partners more often used Iraqi nationals,
including women, as suicide bombers. According to Iraqi Ministry of
Interior (MOI) security officials, however, four of the five terrorists who
attacked the Our Lady of Salvation Church on October 31 were
foreigners and 12 other terrorists, mostly foreign, have been implicated
in planning the church attack, as well as planning to attack the French
Embassy and the Ministry of Planning.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: The deadliest bomb attacks during the year
were against security forces, government buildings, and western targets,
and included:
* On January 25, suicide bombers struck in quick succession near three
Baghdad hotels frequented by Western journalists killing at least 38
people and wounding more than 100.
* On January 26, a suicide car bomber sheared off the front of the main
police crime lab in Baghdad, killing 21 and wounding 80.
* On April 4, at least 42 were killed and 249 injured as three bombs
struck the Iranian, Egyptian, Syrian, and German embassies.
* On June 13, gunmen and suicide bombers attacked the Central Bank
of Iraq, killing at least 18 and wounding dozens.
* On July 18, a suicide bomber killed 32 SOI fighters waiting for
paychecks at a center west of Baghdad and wounded 20.
* On August 17, a suicide bomber blew himself up among hundreds of
army recruits in Baghdad, killing 60 and wounding 128.
* On August 25, terrorists unleashed a wave of coordinated attacks in 13
towns and cities across Iraq, including hit-and-run shootings, improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle borne improvised explosive devices
(VBIEDs), killing 51.
Major attacks late in the year that also targeted religious and sectarian
groups included:
* On October 31, AQI members seized an Our Lady of Salvation Church
in Baghdad, killing 58 and wounding 70 with combined IEDs, suicide
vests, and small arms fire.
* On November 8, three VBIEDs detonated in the Shia holy cities of
Najaf and Karbala killing 19 people and injuring 75, including Iranian
pilgrims.
* On December 30, insurgents targeted Christian homes and
neighborhoods in Baghdad with IEDs, killing two.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The Government of Iraq took a
number of steps to improve border security. A Council of Ministers'
resolution called for a "unity of effort" among all government agencies at
all Iraqi ports of entry (POEs). In addition, the MOI and the Minister of
Interior for the Kurdistan Regional Government agreed to integrate all
POEs in the Iraqi Kurdistan region into the Iraqi government’s POE
structure. Also, the Iraqi Customs Police returned to duty at the port of
Umm Qasr after a two-year absence. Their presence has improved
control over imports into Iraq.
The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), an agency handling terrorist
cases, fostered a collaboration between investigators from Iraq and the
United States. The MCTF investigated terrorism, high-profile violent
crimes, and murders conducted by terrorists and members of organized
criminal enterprises. Iraqi partners conducted complex criminal and
counterterrorism investigations, which led to coordinated prosecution of
defendants in Iraqi criminal courts. Seventy-two percent of the cases
opened and assigned to the MCTF were capital cases involving terrorism.
Iraq continued to face significant challenges moving criminal cases from
arrest to trial. The Iraqi government carried out few investigations of
alleged sectarian-based crimes; arrests following a murder or other
crimes were rare. U.S. and third-country law enforcement officials have
trained Iraqi investigators and judges in investigative methodology and
forensic evidence collection during the year.
Judicial security was a challenge. Judges investigating and adjudicating
terrorism cases faced threats to their personal safety and that of their
families. It is likely that some terrorism cases were dismissed due to
actual or implied threats. To ameliorate this threat, the Chief Justice of
the Higher Judicial Council appointed a cadre of judges to hear terrorism
cases; these judges lived in secure apartment blocks. In addition, the
government moved several judges hearing terrorism cases from Mosul
to Baghdad to protect their safety.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Iraq is a member of the Middle East and
North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). The Central Bank
of Iraq (CBI) has a Financial Intelligence Unit called the Money
Laundering Reporting Office (MLRO), which is still in the early stages of
development. Iraq has not yet had a mutual evaluation, a compliance
test by the Financial Action Task Force-International Monetary Fund of
its anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing (AML/CTF) regime.
While the Director of the MLRO has undergone training on AML/CTF at
the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation in the United States, Iraq
appeared to have done little to enhance the MLRO to meet international
standards. Iraq's AML/CFT legislation neglects to adequately outlaw
money laundering and the financing of terrorism and conflicts with other
areas of Iraqi legislation. The AML/CFT law was written in 2004 and
requires amendment to bring it to international standards.
Regional and International Cooperation: In September, Iraq attended a
security meeting held in Bahrain with the interior ministers from Bahrain,
Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, as well as
the UN, the Organization of Islamic Countries, and the Arab League. The
participants issued a joint 20-point statement that stressed the
importance of Iraq's internal security to the region and recommended the
creation of "cooperative mechanisms" to further address regional
security issues. Iraq, Turkey, and the United States continued their
formal trilateral security dialogue as one element of ongoing cooperative
efforts to counter the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in the region.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Iraq's MOI initiated a
program to counter violent extremism and youth radicalization by making
documentaries about terrorists in detention and about victims of
terrorism. The Iraqi government also developed programs to counter
violent extremist propaganda and to provide local youth positive
examples and role models in society. These included USAID projects for
at-risk youths and 4H Clubs. The UN Children’s Fund in Iraq initiated a
project to provide reintegration services for children released from
pre/post trial detention. The United States supported a Government of
Iraq program to provide local support following the release of militants in
order to decrease recidivism and facilitate integration into local
communities.
_________________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
|
|
Sanctions:
November 28, 2011 - The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab
member states), of which this country is a member, has approved
imposing sanctions on Syria. These include: -
* Cutting off transactions with the Syrian central bank
* Halting funding by Arab governments for projects in Syria
* A ban on senior Syrian officials travelling to other Arab countries
* A freeze on assets related to President Bashar al-Assad's
government
The declaration also calls on Arab central banks to monitor
transfers to Syria, with the exception of remittances from Syrians
abroad.
However, Iraq have advised that they will refuse to implement the
sanctions.
For further information, click here
The UN Security Council imposed sanctions against the Republic
of Iraq in August 1990 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003,
amongst other matters, lifted all trade sanctions against Iraq
except for the arms embargo; replaced the existing assets freeze
with a freeze targeted at all Government of Iraq funds and all
funds belonging to Saddam Hussein, senior members of his
regime and their immediate family members; and required that
such funds be transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq.
For further info:
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_sanctions_iraq.htm
For further information on US sanctions, please visit the following
link: -
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/pages/iraq.aspx
The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab member states), of which
this country is a member, has boycotted Israel in a systematic
effort to isolate Israel economically in support of the Palestinians,
however, the implementation of the boycott has varied over time
among member states..
There are three tiers to the boycott. The primary boycott prohibits
the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting
countries. The secondary boycott prohibits individuals, as well as
private and public sector firms and organizations, in member
countries from engaging in business with any entity that does
business in Israel. The Arab League maintains a blacklist of such
firms. The tertiary boycott prohibits any
entity in a member country from doing business with a company or
individual that has business dealings with U.S. or other firms on
the Arab League blacklist.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:
Iraq’s economy is primarily cash-based, and there is little data
available on the extent of money laundering in the country.
Smuggling is endemic, often involving consumer goods,
cigarettes, and petroleum products. Bulk cash smuggling,
counterfeit currency, trafficking in persons, and intellectual
property rights violations are major problems. Ransoms from
kidnappings and extortion are often used to finance terrorist
networks. Credible reports of counterfeiting abound. Trade-based
money laundering, customs fraud, and various means of value
transfer are found in the underground economy. Hawala
networks, both licensed and unlicensed, are widely used for
legitimate and illicit purposes. Corruption is a major challenge and
is exacerbated by weak financial controls in the banking sector
and weak links to the international law enforcement community. U.
S. dollars are widely accepted and are used for many payments
made by the U.S. government, as well as foreign assistance
agencies and their contractors.
Iraq has four free trade zones (FTZs): the Basra/Khor al-Zubair
seaport; Ninewa/Falafel area; Sulaymaniyah; and al-Qaim, located
in western Al Anbar province. Under the Free Trade Zone
Authority Law, goods imported or exported from the FTZs are
generally exempt from all taxes and duties, unless the goods are
to be imported for use in Iraq. Additionally, capital, profits, and
investment income from projects in the FTZs are exempt from
taxes and fees throughout the life of the project, including the
foundation and construction phases. Value transfer via trade
goods is a significant problem in Iraq and the surrounding region.
Iraq is investigating the application of a new customs tariff regime.
For additional information focusing on terrorist financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
Do Financial Institutions Engage In Currency Transactions
Related To International Narcotics Trafficking That Include
Significant Amounts Of Us Currency; Currency Derived From
Illegal Sales In The U.S.; Or That Otherwise Significantly Affect
the U.S.: YES
Criminalization of Money Laundering:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: NO
Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO
KYC covered entities: Banks; investment fund managers; life
insurance companies and those which offer or distribute shares in
investment funds; securities dealers; money transmitters,
hawaladars, and issuers or managers of credit cards and
travelers checks; foreign currency exchange houses; asset
managers, transfer agents, investment advisers, securities
dealers; and, dealers in precious metals and stones
Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:
Number of STRs received and time frame: 43 in 2011
Number of CTRs received and time frame: 1,320 in 2011
STR covered entities: Banks; investment fund managers; life
insurance companies and those which offer or distribute shares in
investment funds; securities dealers; money transmitters,
hawaladars, and issuers or managers of credit cards and
travelers checks; foreign currency exchange houses; asset
managers, transfer agents, investment advisers, securities
dealers; and, dealers in precious metals and stones
Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:
Prosecutions: None
Convictions: None
Records exchange mechanism:
With U.S.: MLAT: NO Other mechanism: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Iraq is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial
Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force
(FATF)-style regional body. Iraq’s first mutual evaluation is
scheduled for late 2012.
Enforcement and Implementation Issues and Comments:
Although the only anti-money laundering statute in Iraq, CPA Law
93, AML Act of 2004, is broad enough to reach even beyond
serious crime, the criminalization under CPA Law 93 is only that of
a misdemeanor. Iraq does not prosecute cases under this law
because the law does not effectively criminalize money laundering.
Iraq’s legal framework needs to be strengthened, either by
amendment or by drafting of new AML/CFT legislation. Iraqi
ministries need to support a viable AML/CFT regime with
cooperation across ministries. Investigators, prosecutors, and
judges all need support from their leadership to move more
aggressively in pursuing AML/CFT cases. Prosecutors and
investigators are frustrated when judges do not pursue their
cases; similarly, judges claim the cases they receive are of poor
quality and not prosecutable. Senior-level support and increased
capacity for all parties are necessary to ensure AML/CFT cases
can be successfully prosecuted in Iraq. In addition, the lack of
implementing legislation, weak compliance enforcement by the
Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), and the lack of support to the Money
Laundering Reporting Office (MLRO), Iraq’s financial intelligence
unit, undermine Iraq’s ability to counter terrorist financing and
money laundering.
The CBI generally does not support the MLRO. The MLRO has
adequate staffing but lacks training, computer equipment, and
software to receive, store, retrieve, and analyze data from the
reporting institutions. Without a database, the MLRO staff must
process the data received manually. The MLRO is empowered to
exchange information with other Iraqi and foreign government
agencies. Historically the MLRO received little support from Iraqi
law enforcement, but that changed in 2011 because the MLRO
has added value to many of their investigations. The Government
of Iraq should ensure the MLRO has the capacity, resources, and
authorities to serve as the central point for collection, analysis,
and dissemination of financial intelligence to law enforcement and
to serve as a platform for international cooperation.
Regulation and supervision of the formal and informal financial
sectors are still quite limited and enforcement is subject to political
constraints, resulting in weak private sector controls. In practice,
despite customer due diligence requirements, most banks open
accounts based on the referral of existing customers and/or
verification of a person’s employment. Actual application of the
rules varies widely across Iraq’s 45 state-owned and private
banks. Also, rather than file STRs in accordance with the law,
most banks either conduct internal investigations or contact the
MLRO, which executes an account review to resolve any
questionable transactions. In practice, very few STRs are filed.
Iraq should become a party to the UN Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
November 28, 2011 - The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab
member states), of which this country is a member, has approved
imposing sanctions on Syria. These include: -
* Cutting off transactions with the Syrian central bank
* Halting funding by Arab governments for projects in Syria
* A ban on senior Syrian officials travelling to other Arab countries
* A freeze on assets related to President Bashar al-Assad's
government
The declaration also calls on Arab central banks to monitor
transfers to Syria, with the exception of remittances from Syrians
abroad.
However, Iraq have advised that they will refuse to implement the
sanctions.
For further information, click here
The UN Security Council imposed sanctions against the Republic
of Iraq in August 1990 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003,
amongst other matters, lifted all trade sanctions against Iraq
except for the arms embargo; replaced the existing assets freeze
with a freeze targeted at all Government of Iraq funds and all
funds belonging to Saddam Hussein, senior members of his
regime and their immediate family members; and required that
such funds be transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq.
For further info:
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_sanctions_iraq.htm
For further information on US sanctions, please visit the following
link: -
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/pages/iraq.aspx
The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab member states), of which
this country is a member, has boycotted Israel in a systematic
effort to isolate Israel economically in support of the Palestinians,
however, the implementation of the boycott has varied over time
among member states..
There are three tiers to the boycott. The primary boycott prohibits
the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting
countries. The secondary boycott prohibits individuals, as well as
private and public sector firms and organizations, in member
countries from engaging in business with any entity that does
business in Israel. The Arab League maintains a blacklist of such
firms. The tertiary boycott prohibits any
entity in a member country from doing business with a company or
individual that has business dealings with U.S. or other firms on
the Arab League blacklist.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:
Iraq’s economy is primarily cash-based, and there is little data
available on the extent of money laundering in the country.
Smuggling is endemic, often involving consumer goods,
cigarettes, and petroleum products. Bulk cash smuggling,
counterfeit currency, trafficking in persons, and intellectual
property rights violations are major problems. Ransoms from
kidnappings and extortion are often used to finance terrorist
networks. Credible reports of counterfeiting abound. Trade-based
money laundering, customs fraud, and various means of value
transfer are found in the underground economy. Hawala
networks, both licensed and unlicensed, are widely used for
legitimate and illicit purposes. Corruption is a major challenge and
is exacerbated by weak financial controls in the banking sector
and weak links to the international law enforcement community. U.
S. dollars are widely accepted and are used for many payments
made by the U.S. government, as well as foreign assistance
agencies and their contractors.
Iraq has four free trade zones (FTZs): the Basra/Khor al-Zubair
seaport; Ninewa/Falafel area; Sulaymaniyah; and al-Qaim, located
in western Al Anbar province. Under the Free Trade Zone
Authority Law, goods imported or exported from the FTZs are
generally exempt from all taxes and duties, unless the goods are
to be imported for use in Iraq. Additionally, capital, profits, and
investment income from projects in the FTZs are exempt from
taxes and fees throughout the life of the project, including the
foundation and construction phases. Value transfer via trade
goods is a significant problem in Iraq and the surrounding region.
Iraq is investigating the application of a new customs tariff regime.
For additional information focusing on terrorist financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
Do Financial Institutions Engage In Currency Transactions
Related To International Narcotics Trafficking That Include
Significant Amounts Of Us Currency; Currency Derived From
Illegal Sales In The U.S.; Or That Otherwise Significantly Affect
the U.S.: YES
Criminalization of Money Laundering:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: NO
Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO
KYC covered entities: Banks; investment fund managers; life
insurance companies and those which offer or distribute shares in
investment funds; securities dealers; money transmitters,
hawaladars, and issuers or managers of credit cards and
travelers checks; foreign currency exchange houses; asset
managers, transfer agents, investment advisers, securities
dealers; and, dealers in precious metals and stones
Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:
Number of STRs received and time frame: 43 in 2011
Number of CTRs received and time frame: 1,320 in 2011
STR covered entities: Banks; investment fund managers; life
insurance companies and those which offer or distribute shares in
investment funds; securities dealers; money transmitters,
hawaladars, and issuers or managers of credit cards and
travelers checks; foreign currency exchange houses; asset
managers, transfer agents, investment advisers, securities
dealers; and, dealers in precious metals and stones
Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:
Prosecutions: None
Convictions: None
Records exchange mechanism:
With U.S.: MLAT: NO Other mechanism: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Iraq is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial
Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force
(FATF)-style regional body. Iraq’s first mutual evaluation is
scheduled for late 2012.
Enforcement and Implementation Issues and Comments:
Although the only anti-money laundering statute in Iraq, CPA Law
93, AML Act of 2004, is broad enough to reach even beyond
serious crime, the criminalization under CPA Law 93 is only that of
a misdemeanor. Iraq does not prosecute cases under this law
because the law does not effectively criminalize money laundering.
Iraq’s legal framework needs to be strengthened, either by
amendment or by drafting of new AML/CFT legislation. Iraqi
ministries need to support a viable AML/CFT regime with
cooperation across ministries. Investigators, prosecutors, and
judges all need support from their leadership to move more
aggressively in pursuing AML/CFT cases. Prosecutors and
investigators are frustrated when judges do not pursue their
cases; similarly, judges claim the cases they receive are of poor
quality and not prosecutable. Senior-level support and increased
capacity for all parties are necessary to ensure AML/CFT cases
can be successfully prosecuted in Iraq. In addition, the lack of
implementing legislation, weak compliance enforcement by the
Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), and the lack of support to the Money
Laundering Reporting Office (MLRO), Iraq’s financial intelligence
unit, undermine Iraq’s ability to counter terrorist financing and
money laundering.
The CBI generally does not support the MLRO. The MLRO has
adequate staffing but lacks training, computer equipment, and
software to receive, store, retrieve, and analyze data from the
reporting institutions. Without a database, the MLRO staff must
process the data received manually. The MLRO is empowered to
exchange information with other Iraqi and foreign government
agencies. Historically the MLRO received little support from Iraqi
law enforcement, but that changed in 2011 because the MLRO
has added value to many of their investigations. The Government
of Iraq should ensure the MLRO has the capacity, resources, and
authorities to serve as the central point for collection, analysis,
and dissemination of financial intelligence to law enforcement and
to serve as a platform for international cooperation.
Regulation and supervision of the formal and informal financial
sectors are still quite limited and enforcement is subject to political
constraints, resulting in weak private sector controls. In practice,
despite customer due diligence requirements, most banks open
accounts based on the referral of existing customers and/or
verification of a person’s employment. Actual application of the
rules varies widely across Iraq’s 45 state-owned and private
banks. Also, rather than file STRs in accordance with the law,
most banks either conduct internal investigations or contact the
MLRO, which executes an account review to resolve any
questionable transactions. In practice, very few STRs are filed.
Iraq should become a party to the UN Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
| IRAQ |
| KnowYourCountry |
|
|
| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |