Higher Risk
 
Medium Risk
 
Info n/a
 
Lower Risk
Sanctions:

None applicable

____________________________________________________

Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:

Information unavailable.

____________________________________________________

US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:

Japan is a regional financial center. It has one free-trade zone,
the Okinawa Special Free Trade Zone, established in 1999 in
Naha, to promote industry and trade in Okinawa. The zone is
regulated by the Department of Okinawa Affairs in the Cabinet
Office. Japan also has two free ports, Nagasaki and Niigata.
Customs authorities allow the bonding of warehousing and
processing facilities adjacent to these ports on a case-by-case
basis. It is not an offshore financial center.

Japan continues to face substantial risk of money laundering by
organized crime (including Boryokudan, Japan’s organized crime
groups, and Iranian drug trafficking organizations), extremist
religious groups, and other domestic and international criminal
elements. The major sources of money laundering proceeds
include drug trafficking, fraud, loan-sharking (illegal money
lending), remittance frauds, the black market economy,
prostitution, and illicit gambling. In the past year, there has been
an increase in financial crimes by citizens of West African
countries, such as Nigeria and Ghana, who are resident in Japan.
There is not a significant black market for smuggled goods, and
the existence of alternative remittance systems is believed to be
very limited in Japan.

For additional information focusing on terrorism financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/

Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: NO

Criminalization of Money Laundering:

“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes

Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES

Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:

Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO

KYC covered entities: Financial institutions, real estate agents and
professionals, precious metals and stones dealers, antique
dealers, postal service providers, lawyers, judicial scriveners,
certified administrative procedures specialists, certified public
accountants, certified public tax accountants, trust companies

Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:

Number of STRs received and time frame: 337,341 in 2011

Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable

STR covered entities: Financial institutions, real estate agents
and professionals, precious metals and stones dealers

Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:

Prosecutions: 191 in 2010

Convictions: Not available

Records exchange mechanism:

With U.S.: MLAT: YES Other mechanism: YES

With other governments/jurisdictions: YES

Japan is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and
the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), a FATF-style
regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found
here:

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/61/0,3746,
en_32250379_32236963_41684733_1_1_1_1,00.html

Enforcement and implementation issues and comments:

Although the Japanese government continues to strengthen legal
institutions to permit more effective enforcement of anti-money
laundering/counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) laws,

Japan’s compliance with international standards specific to
financial institutions is notably deficient. In April 2011, Japan
amended its basic AML law, the Criminal Proceeds Act, to improve
customer due diligence (CDD) requirements, including by
requiring financial institutions to identify the customer’s name,
address, and date of birth, and to verify the purpose of
transaction, business activities and beneficial owners. However,
while the government is in the process of formulating the
subordinate decrees, these requirements do not come into effect
until April 28, 2013.

The Government of Japan (GOJ) has not implemented a risk-
based approach to AML/CFT, and there is currently no mandate
for enhanced due diligence for higher-risk customers, business
relationships, and transactions. While the April 2011 amendments
to the Criminal Proceeds Act call for financial institutions to verify
a customer’s assets and income in certain higher risk situations,
they delineate those situations as those where it is suspected that
false identity is being used, rather than by increased risks
presented by such factors as business type, customer location, or
type of transaction. The current regulations also do not authorize
simplified due diligence, though there are exemptions to the
identification obligation on the grounds that the customer or
transaction poses no or little risk of money laundering or terrorist
financing. Japan should implement a risk-based approach to its
AML/CFT regime.

The GOJ’s number of investigations, prosecutions, and
convictions for money laundering in relation to the number of drug
and other predicate offenses is low, despite the GOJ’s many legal
tools and programs to combat these crimes. The National Police
Agency (NPA) provides limited cooperation with other GOJ
agencies, and most foreign governments, on nearly all criminal,
terrorism, or counter-intelligence-related matters. The GOJ
should develop a robust program to investigate and prosecute
money laundering offenses, and require enhanced cooperation
by the NPA with its counterparts in the GOJ and foreign missions.

The GOJ’s system does not allow the freezing of terrorist assets
without delay, and in practice the Ministry of Finance has frozen
terrorist assets in only a few cases. Japan’s system does not
cover assets raised by a non-terrorist for use by a terrorist or
terrorist organization, and reaches only funds, not other kinds of
assets. The GOJ should enact legislation to allow terrorist assets
to be frozen without delay, and to expand the scope of assets to
include non-financial holdings.

Japan should provide more training and investigatory resources
for AML/CFT law enforcement authorities. As Japan is a major
trading power, the GOJ should take steps to identify and combat
trade-based money laundering.

Japan should become a party to the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Convention against
Corruption, and should fully implement the freezing obligations for
terrorist funds, according to the UN Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
____________________________________________________

US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):

Drug control in Japan is primarily a problem of domestic drug
consumption; illicit narcotics do not transit Japan, nor are they
generally manufactured in Japan for markets abroad. Powder
methamphetamine and stimulant abuse remains the biggest
challenge to Japanese counternarcotics efforts; over 80 percent
of all drug arrests in Japan involve methamphetamine or
amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS). Marijuana continues to be
popular and other drugs such as MDMA (ecstasy) and heroin are
available, but much less prevalent. Cocaine use is increasing.
According to Japanese authorities, almost all illegal drugs
consumed in Japan are imported from overseas, usually by
Japanese and/or foreign organized crime organizations.

Japan is one of the largest and most lucrative markets in Asia for
methamphetamine. Methamphetamine is smuggled primarily by
way of Central and South America, the Middle East, Southeast
Asia, and Africa. There were several seizures of liquid
methamphetamine solution at some of Japan’s international
airports and seaports during 2010, and two clandestine
laboratories were found in the Tokyo area, indicating that refining
of methamphetamine is also occurring in Japan. Cocaine
smuggling in Japan is on the rise, as demonstrated by several
seizures of cocaine from couriers at Japanese airports this year.
Methamphetamine and cocaine shipments from Central and South
America pose an emerging threat, comprising an increasing
proportion of the methamphetamine and cocaine seized in Japan.
Eight American citizens were arrested for attempted
methamphetamine smuggling through October, more than in all of
2010.

From January to October 2011, Japanese law enforcement
agencies seized 431.6 kilograms of methamphetamine; 51.6
kilograms of marijuana; 25.7 kilograms of cocaine 23.1 kilograms
of hashish; 892 dosage units of MDMA; 3.4 kilograms of heroin;
and 11.6 kilograms of opium.

While Japanese law enforcement officers are well-trained and
equipped, proactive law enforcement efforts are at times hindered
by customary practices and bureaucratic obstacles. Despite these
problems, authorities continue to conduct complex drug
investigations both independently and in cooperation with United
States counterparts such as the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and other U.S.
federal law enforcement agencies.

Japan Customs has been effective in identifying inbound drug
shipments and made numerous significant seizures at
international airports and seaports. Japan Customs has been very
receptive to and acted on investigative leads provided by the
international law enforcement community. In addition, the Ministry
of Health, Labor and Welfare’s Narcotics Control Department has
taken a proactive approach to drug law enforcement and is
conducting longer-term and more complex drug investigations.
Japanese authorities have recently coordinated enforcement
operations with international liaison officers in Japan on several
investigations resulting in large methamphetamine seizures. This
level of coordination and cooperation is an emerging trend, but
unfortunately still remains rare. In some instances, past inaction
by Japanese law enforcement in response to U.S.-provided
intelligence on drug-trafficking and money-laundering activities
may have contributed to criminal organizations’ ability to establish
a strong presence in Japan.

There were no reported cases of Japanese officials being
involved in drug-related corruption in Japan in 2010. The
government does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production
or distribution of drugs, or the laundering of illicit proceeds.

Drug treatment in Japan is currently handled mostly by small,
privately-run programs which operate without nationwide
treatment criteria. While the government provides support
services for addicts at prefectural consultation centers, it does not
directly operate treatment or rehabilitation programs except within
correctional institutions. More than 5,000 prisoners participated in
prison-based programs in 2010. Government-funded drug
education campaigns for schoolchildren continued to increase in
2010, reaching nearly 80 percent of middle and high school
students and more than 60 percent of elementary school students
in the country.

Japan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972
Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic
Substances, and has signed, but not yet ratified, the UN
Convention against Corruption. Japan has also signed the UN
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and
its three protocols but, as it lacks an anti-conspiracy law, cannot
ratify the UNTOC. An extradition treaty and a mutual legal
assistance treaty are in force between the United States and
Japan.

For Full report, click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):

(Tier 2)

Japan is a destination, source, and transit country for men,
women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.
Male and female migrant workers from China, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Vietnam, and other Asian countries are sometimes
subject to conditions of forced labor. Some women and children
from East Asia, Southeast Asia, and in previous years, Eastern
Europe, Russia, South America, and Latin America who travel to
Japan for employment or fraudulent marriage are forced into
prostitution. During the reporting period, there was a growth in
trafficking of Japanese nationals, including foreign-born children
of Japanese citizens who acquired nationality. In addition,
traffickers continued to use fraudulent marriages between foreign
women and Japanese men to facilitate the entry of these women
into Japan for forced prostitution. Government and NGO sources
report that there was an increase in the number of children
identified as victims of trafficking. Japanese organized crime
syndicates (the Yakuza) are believed to play a significant role in
trafficking in Japan, both directly and indirectly. Traffickers strictly
control the movements of victims, using debt bondage, threats of
violence or deportation, blackmail, and other coercive
psychological methods to control victims. Victims of forced
prostitution sometimes face debts upon commencement of their
contracts as high as $50,000 and most are required to pay
employers additional fees for living expenses, medical care, and
other necessities, leaving them predisposed to debt bondage.
“Fines” for misbehavior added to their original debt, and the
process that brothel operators used to calculate these debts was
not transparent. Some of the victims identified during the
reporting period were forced to work in exploitative conditions in
strip clubs and hostess bars, but were reportedly not forced to
have sex with clients. Japan is also a transit country for persons
trafficked from East Asia to North America. Japanese men
continue to be a significant source of demand for child sex tourism
in Southeast Asia.

Although the Government of Japan has not officially recognized
the existence of forced labor within the Industrial Trainee and
Technical Internship Program (the “foreign trainee program”), the
media and NGOs continue to report abuses including debt
bondage, restrictions on movement, unpaid wages and overtime,
fraud, and contracting workers out to different employers –
elements which contribute to situations of trafficking. The majority
of trainees are Chinese nationals who pay fees of more than
$1,400 to Chinese brokers to apply for the program and deposits –
which are now illegal – of up to $4,000 and a lien on their home.
An NGO survey of Chinese trainees in Japan, conducted in late
2010, found that workers’ deposits are regularly seized by the
brokers if they report mistreatment or attempt to leave the
program. Some trainees also reported having their passports and
other travel documents taken from them and their movements
controlled to prevent escape or communication.

The Government of Japan does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making
significant efforts to do so. Although Japan provided a modest
grant to IOM for the repatriation of foreign victims identified in
Japan, the government’s resources dedicated specifically to
assist victims of trafficking were low, particularly relative to Japan’
s wealth and the size of its trafficking problem. During the year,
the government published a manual for law enforcement and
judicial officers on identifying trafficking victims and developed a
Public Awareness Roadmap to increase prevention of trafficking
in Japan. The government also reported some efforts to punish
and prevent trafficking of women for forced prostitution.
Nonetheless, the government made inadequate efforts to address
abuses in the foreign trainee program despite credible reports of
mistreatment of foreign workers. Although the government took
some steps to reduce practices that increase the vulnerability of
these workers to forced labor, the government reported poor law
enforcement against forced labor crimes and did not identify or
provide protection to any victims of forced labor. In addition,
Japan’s victim protection structure for forced prostitution remains
weak given the lack of services dedicated specifically to victims of
trafficking.

For full report click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010

Overview: Japan continued to take active measures to prevent
the spread of terrorism through stringent border security
enforcement, counterterrorism capacity building assistance, and
legislation aimed at stemming the flow of terrorist financing. In
coordination with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security-
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), several Japanese
agencies have strengthened immigration procedures as well as
port and shipping security.

Legislation and Law Enforcement: Japan's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Japan’s Immigration Bureau, the National Police Agency
(NPA), and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Tourism coordinated with the CBP’s Immigration Advisory Program
on preventing terrorists and other high-risk travelers from
boarding commercial aircraft bound for the United States.

Under the Container Security Initiative (CSI), Japanese Customs
authorities worked with CBP Officers at four Japanese seaports to
review ship manifests and to screen suspicious containers bound
for the United States. Under a reciprocal bilateral agreement,
Japanese Customs also deploys officers to work with CBP at the
Port of Long Beach, California to screen U.S. export shipments
bound for Japan.

The NPA and the Public Security Intelligence Agency continued to
monitor the activities of Aum Shinrikyo, renamed Aleph, and
splinter group Hikari no Wa, or "Circle of Light."

Regional and International Cooperation: Japan continued to assist
counterterrorism capacity building in neighboring countries
through dialogue, seminars, workshops, and training. The
Japanese Coast Guard, for example, provided capacity building
services and training seminars to authorities from states that
border the Straits of Malacca. In March, Japan decided to extend
Counterterrorism and Security Enhancement grant aid to
Uzbekistan. In June, Japan extended similar grant aid to
Indonesia.

In March, the Japanese hosted an Aviation Security Ministerial
Conference, attended by U.S. Homeland Security Secretary
Napolitano, for top officials from the Asia/Pacific region and the
International Civil Aviation Organization to discuss ways to bolster
global aviation security. Also in March, the Japan-Singapore Joint
APEC Seminar on Securing Maritime Trade through
Counterterrorism Efforts was held in Tokyo. In June, Japanese
officials took part in the Fourth Japan-Republic of Korea (South
Korea) Counterterrorism Consultations. The same month, Japan
co-chaired the Fifth Japan-ASEAN Counterterrorism Dialogue in
Bali, Indonesia. In December, Japan participated in the sixth
annual U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
Counterterrorism Consultations in Melbourne, Australia.

Countering Terrorist Finance: The Diet (Japanese Parliament)
amended Customs Act secondary legislation, which addressed in
part a Financial Action Task Force recommendation pertaining to
cross-border currency declaration and disclosure.


Links:

Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)

Japan Financial Intelligence Center (JAFIC)
Tables & Rankings
Are there Sanctions in force against it? (UN/EU/US)
N
?
Is it on FATF list of non-cooperative countries?
N
?
Is it on OECD list of uncooperative Tax Havens?
N
?
OECD - Implementation status of Tax Standard
White
?
Is it on EU 'white' list of equivalent jurisdictions?
Y
?
Offshore Finance Center?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of Treasury list of jurisdictions of
Primary Money Laundering concern?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of State list of jurisdictions
identified to be supporters of International Terrorism?
N
?
Is it on US Department of State International Narcotics
Control Majors List?
N
?
US Dept of State Money Laundering assessment (INCSR)
PC
?
Government Actions (For further info see INCRS below):
 
?
-  Criminalized Drug Money Laundering?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Beyond Drugs?
Y
 
-  Record Large Transactions?
Y
 
-  Maintain Records Over Time?
Y
 
-  Report Suspicious Transactions?(NMP)?
Y
 
-  Egmont Financial Intelligence Units?
Y
 
-  System for Identifying/Forfeiting Assets?
Y
 
-  Arrangements for Asset Sharing?
N
 
-  Cooperates with International Law Enforcement?
Y
 
-  International Transportation of Currency?
Y
 
-  Ability to Free Terrorist Assets w/o Delay?
N
 
-  Disclosure Protection "Safe Harbor"?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Financing of Terrorism?
Y
 
-  States Party to 1988 UN Convention?
Y
 
-  International Terrorism Financing Convention?
Y
 
 
Ranking
2011
Ranking
2010
 
Corruption (Transparency International)
14 (out of
183)
17 (out of
178)
?
Ease of doing business (World Bank)
20 (out of
183)
18 (out of
183)
?
Further Tables
FATF 40 + 9 recommendations
Mutual Evaluation Report: 2008
C
L
P
N
N/A
    C  -  Fully Compliant ,   
    L  -  Largely Compliant,    
    P  -  Partially Compliant    
    N  -  Non-Compliant
4
19
15
10
1
Legal Systems
 
1. Money Laundering Offence
L
 
14. Protection & no tipping-off
L
2. ML offence – mental element and
corporate liability
L
 
15. Internal controls,
compliance & audit
N
3. Confiscation and provisional
measures
L
 
16. DNFBP – R.13-15 & 21
P
4. Secrecy laws consistent with the
Recommendations
C
 
17. Sanctions
L
5. Customer due diligence
N
 
18. Shell banks
P
6. Politically exposed persons
N
 
19. Other forms of reporting
C
7. Correspondent banking
N
 
20. Other NFBP & secure
transaction techniques
C
8. New technologies & non
face-to-face business
P
 
21. Special attention for
higher risk countries
N
9. Third parties and introducers
N/A
 
22. Foreign branches &
subsidiaries
N
10. Record keeping
L
 
23. Regulation, supervision
and monitoring
L
11. Unusual transactions
P
 
24. DNFBP - regulation,
supervision and monitoring
P
12. Designated Non-Financial
Businesses and Professions – R.5,
6, 8-11
N
 
25. Guidelines & Feedback
L
13. Suspicious transaction reporting
L
     
Institutional and other
measures
 
26. The FIU
L
 
31. National co-operation
L
27. Law enforcement authorities
L
 
32. Statistics
L
28. Powers of competent authorities
C
 
33. Legal persons –
beneficial owners
N
29. Supervisors
L
 
34. Legal arrangements –
beneficial owners
N
30. Resources, integrity and training
L
 
 
 
International Co-operation
 
35. Conventions
P
 
38. MLA on confiscation and
freezing
L
36. Mutual legal assistance (MLA)
P
 
39. Extradition
P
37. Dual criminality
P
 
40. Other forms of
co-operation
L
Nine Special
Recommendations
 
SR.I Implement UN instruments
P
 
SR VI AML requirements for
money/value transfer services
P
SR.II Criminalise terrorist financing
P
 
SR VII Wire transfer rules
L
SR.III Freeze and confiscate terrorist
assets
P
 
SR.VIII Non profit
organisations
P
SR.IV Suspicious transaction
reporting
L
 
SR.IX Cross Border
Declaration & Disclosure
N
SR.V International co-operation
P
 
 
 
*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.

For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -        

R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV

Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
JAPAN
KnowYourCountry
-  Know Your Customer Provisions
N
 
-  Criminalized Tipping Off?
Y
 
-  Report Suspected Terrorist Financing?
Y
 
-  State Party to United Nations TOC?
N
 
-  State Party to United Nations CAC?
N
 
Local AML News / Sanctions
Tax Information
Business Information
Last Updated:   16 April 2012