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Sanctions:
November 28, 2011 - The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab
member states), of which this country is a member, has approved
imposing sanctions on Syria. These include: -
* Cutting off transactions with the Syrian central bank
* Halting funding by Arab governments for projects in Syria
* A ban on senior Syrian officials travelling to other Arab countries
* A freeze on assets related to President Bashar al-Assad's
government
The declaration also calls on Arab central banks to monitor
transfers to Syria, with the exception of remittances from Syrians
abroad.
For further information, click here
The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab member states), of which
this country is a member, has boycotted Israel in a systematic
effort to isolate Israel economically in support of the Palestinians,
however, the implementation of the boycott has varied over time
among member states..
There are three tiers to the boycott. The primary boycott prohibits
the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting
countries. The secondary boycott prohibits individuals, as well as
private and public sector firms and organizations, in member
countries from engaging in business with any entity that does
business in Israel. The Arab League maintains a blacklist of such
firms. The tertiary boycott prohibits any
entity in a member country from doing business with a company or
individual that has business dealings with U.S. or other firms on
the Arab League blacklist.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Although Jordan is not a regional or offshore financial center, it
has a well-developed financial sector with significant banking
relationships in the Middle East. Jordan’s long and remote desert
borders and nexus to Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the West Bank
make it susceptible to the smuggling of bulk cash, fuel, narcotics,
cigarettes, counterfeit goods and contraband. Jordan boasts a
thriving “import-export” community of brokers, traders, and
entrepreneurs who regionally are involved with value transfer via
trade and customs fraud. There are anecdotal indications of the
use of Jordan for money laundering of illicit funds derived from
narcotics and other criminal activity in the U.S., and possibly
Europe, via bulk cash smuggling for criminal elements involving
Jordanians in those areas. However, it is thought the major
sources of illicit funds in Jordan are most likely to be related to
commercial fraud, customs fraud, tax fraud and intellectual
property rights (IPR) violations. In 2010, Jordan made significant
strides to bring its anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist
financing (AML/CFT) regime into fuller compliance with
international standards and to raise the profile of AML/CFT
stakeholders.
There are six public free trade zones (FTZ) in Jordan: the Zarqa
Free Zone, the Sahab Free Zone, the Queen Alia International
Airport Free Zone, the Al-Karak Free Zone, the Al-Karama Free
Zone, and the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ). With the
exception of Aqaba, these FTZs list their activities merely as
trade. There are 36 private free trade zones, a number of which
are related to the aviation industry, with five more being
established. Some of these FTZs list their activities as industrial,
agricultural, pharmaceutical, training of human capital, and multi-
purpose. With the exception of ASEZ, all free trade zones are
regulated by the Jordan Free Zones Corporation in the Ministry of
Finance. The Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA), a
ministerial level authority, controls all of the port city of Aqaba.
ASEZA has its own customs authority, which operates separately
from Jordan Customs and processes all merchandise and
commodities destined for businesses in the zone and all
passengers entering the zone. Jordan Customs processes all
shipments of goods in transit to areas outside the zone.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks, exchange companies and money
transfer companies; securities brokers and investment and asset
managers; credit and financial leasing companies; insurance
companies, brokers and intermediaries; entities providing credit,
leasing services, financial management companies, postal
services, real estate and development, and traders of precious
metals and stones
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks, exchange and money transfer
companies, securities brokers and investment and asset
managers; credit and financial leasing companies; insurance
companies, brokers and intermediaries; entities providing credit,
leasing services, financial management companies, postal
services, real estate and development, and traders of precious
metals and stones
Number of STRs received and time frame: 510 -- July 2007 -
December 14, 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: Two in 2010
Convictions: One in 2010
Assets forfeited: criminally: $2.05 million -- July 2007 - December
14, 2010 civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Jordan is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial
Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force
(FATF)-style regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can
be found here: http://www.menafatf.
org/images/UploadFiles/MER_Hashemite_Kingdom_of_Jordan.pdf
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
In February 2010, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
identified Jordan as a jurisdiction with significant AML/CFT
vulnerabilities. The Government of Jordan has been actively
engaged to alleviate the noted deficiencies. By late 2010, Jordan
had addressed successfully all noted areas of non-compliance
with key international standards.
During 2010, the Government of Jordan (GOJ) remedied several
deficiencies in its AML/CFT legal framework. Those changes
include: (a) extension of the range of predicate offenses to
include all offenses (both misdemeanors and felonies) which are
crimes in Jordan, whether committed in Jordan or abroad; (b)
clarification that a conviction of an underlying predicate offense is
not a prerequisite for criminal indictment for money laundering; (c)
extension of the scope of the terrorist financing offense to include
provision to, or collection of funds by terrorist organizations or
individual terrorists, including in situations where there is no proof
that the funds were going to be directed to the commission of a
terrorist act; (d) inclusion of an adequate definition of what
constitutes “funds” under terrorist financing provisions; (e)
inclusion of general measures to provide for the freezing, seizing
and confiscation of funds related to money laundering and
terrorist financing; (f) extension of the mandate of the FIU to
receive STRs related to terrorist financing; and, (g) establishment
of effective procedures for implementing terrorist financing-related
obligations under UNSCRs 1267 and 1373.
In addition to changes in the legal framework, other operational
developments in 2010 impacting the AML/CFT regime in Jordan
include expansion of the FIU staff and preparations to move to an
independent office space. In addition, the Prime Minister issued a
directive confirming the primacy of the role of the FIU in the
AML/CFT regime. Lastly, a cross-border customs declaration form
was issued to implement existing declaration requirements related
to currency transport in excess of 15,000 Jordanian dinars
(approximately $21,150).
The first two indictments for money laundering in Jordan occurred
in 2010. In both cases, the predicates were committed outside of
Jordan. One conviction has been achieved to date, involving two
defendants and resulting in a sentence of three years’ hard labor,
a fine of 10,000 Jordanian dinars (approximately $14,100), and
confiscation of the proceeds.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012:
Jordan’s geographical location in a region of drug producing and
drug consuming countries continues to make it a transit point for
illicit drugs. There are currently no indications that Jordan will
move from a predominantly drug transit country to a drug
producing country. Statistics produced by Jordan’s Public Security
Directorate (PSD) confirm this assessment, and show that almost
all major drug seizures were from foreign nationals with shipments
bound for other countries. Jordan’s vast desert borders make it
vulnerable to illicit drug smuggling operations. Jordanian
authorities do not believe that internal drug distribution is
substantial; they estimate that 85 percent of drugs entering
Jordan are moving to markets elsewhere. Jordan is a party to the
1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN Convention against Corruption
and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
Jordan remains primarily a narcotics transit country. The narcotics
transiting Jordan are not believed to be destined for the United
States. Jordan’s main challenge in stemming the flow of illicit
drugs through the country remains its vast and open desert
borders, which are difficult to effectively patrol because the
stationary posts along them lack the equipment and infrastructure
to fully monitor traffic. While law enforcement contacts confirm
continued excellent cooperation with Jordan’s neighbors, the
desolate border regions and various tribes, with their centuries-
old traditions of smuggling as a principal source of income, make
interdiction outside of the ports of entry difficult.
Drugs moving through Jordan include: cannabis, perhaps
Lebanese or Afghan in origin, entering from Lebanon, Syria, and
Iraq; Afghan heroin entering through Syria on its way to Israel;
and captagon tablets from Bulgaria and Turkey entering through
Syria on the way to the Gulf. “Captagon” is an amphetamine-type
stimulus that is popular in Gulf countries. The majority of Jordan’s
drug seizures take place at the Jaber border crossing point
between Jordan and Syria. Cooperative efforts between the PSD
and the Israeli National Police have led to heroin seizures along
the Israeli border.
Historically, Jordanians do not consume significant quantities of
illegal drugs. Recently, there have been anecdotal reports
suggesting possible increases in drug use in Jordan. According to
PSD statistics, the number of people involved in drug cases and
the number of abusers both rose by over 10 percent between
2010 and 2011. The PSD attributes the higher volume of drug
cases in Jordan to more effective border interdiction operations,
better intelligence gathering, and stronger cooperation between
Jordan and neighboring countries.
The drugs of choice among users arrested for drug possession in
Jordan continue to be cannabis and heroin, and to a lesser
degree, captagon. People arrested for drug-related crimes in
Jordan are mostly between 18 and 35 years old and are
predominantly foreign nationals. While the PSD continues to see
increased drug trafficking across Jordan’s land borders,
especially its borders with Iraq and Syria, there is a continuing
decrease in drugs transiting Queen Alia International Airport.
During the first nine months of 2011, there was an annualized 40
percent decrease in the amount of cocaine seized by the PSD
compared to 2010, with only 1.4kg seized. During the same
period, there was a similar decrease in the amount of heroin
seized. Captagon seizures, however, rose significantly over the
first nine months of 2011, with annualized totals doubling from
those of past years. Sixteen million tablets were seized. PSD
reports show that interdicted captagon tablets were predominantly
bound for Saudi Arabia. When compared to historical figures for
the past five years, drug enforcement apprehensions continue to
rise. Nevertheless, the increase should not be considered a
notable trend in trafficking through Jordan, but rather the result of
better enforcement.
Jordan’s PSD maintains an active counternarcotics bureau and
has excellent relations with the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration’s Nicosia Country Office (CO) in Cyprus. It also has
increasingly productive relations with narcotics enforcement
officials from neighboring countries. As a result of these ties, the
PSD conducted 12 international controlled deliveries with law
enforcement counterparts in Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Israel
during the first nine months of 2011. According to the PSD, there
are no known illicit production operations in the country.
The DEA Nicosia CO, Regional Security Office Amman, and the U.
S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office in Amman have
excellent working relationships with the PSD. In January 2011, the
DEA Office of Training provided a one week Drug Unit
Commander Course to two Jordanian Police Anti-Narcotics Unit
Officials in Cairo, Egypt. In addition, two PSD officials attended the
2011 International Drug Enforcement Conference in Cancun,
Mexico. Members of the DEA Nicosia CO visited Jordan six times
during the first nine months of 2011 in furtherance of ongoing
criminal drug investigations and continue to enjoy a professional
rapport and cordial working relationship with the PSD.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
Jordan is a destination and transit country for adults and children
subjected to forced labor and, to a lesser extent, sex trafficking.
Small numbers of Jordanian adults are reportedly subjected to
forced labor as low-skilled workers in Qatar and Kuwait, while
Jordanian children employed within the country as mechanics,
agricultural laborers, and beggars may be exploited in situations
of forced labor. Jordan’s sponsorship system binds foreign
workers to their designated employers without adequate access to
legal recourse when they face abuse and without the ability to
switch employers, thereby placing a significant amount of power in
the hands of employers and recruitment agencies. Migrant
workers are further rendered vulnerable to forced labor due to
indebtedness to recruiters, negative societal attitudes toward
foreign workers, and legal requirements that foreign workers rely
on employers to renew their work and residency permits. Women
from Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines voluntarily migrate
to Jordan for employment as domestic workers; some are
subjected to conditions of forced labor after arrival, including
through such practices as unlawful withholding of passports,
restrictions on movement, nonpayment of wages, threats of
imprisonment, and physical or sexual abuse. Approximately 480
Filipina, Indonesian, and Sri Lankan domestic workers, most of
who had fled conditions indicative of forced labor, were sheltered
at their respective embassies in Amman at the conclusion of the
reporting period. In March 2011, the Government of Jordan
announced it would allow the legal recruitment of domestic
workers from Vietnam in light of continued bans imposed by the
Indonesian and Philippine governments against the employment
of their nationals in Jordan. The Aqaba Special Economic Zone
Authority, governed under separate labor regulations, allows the
recruitment of domestic workers from Ethiopia, Nepal, Kenya, and
Ghana.
Chinese, Bangladeshi, Indian, Sri Lankan, Nepali, and Indonesian
men and women encounter conditions indicative of forced labor in
a few of the Jordanian garment sector’s factories, including
unlawful withholding of passports, delayed payment of wages,
forced overtime, and, to a lesser extent, verbal and physical
abuse. Observers noted a decrease in the holding of factory
workers’ passports by factory managers during the year, possibly
due to increased awareness of criminal prohibition of this practice.
While garment sector employees may enjoy greater freedom of
movement as a result, continued bureaucratic difficulties in
accessing legal remedies to complaints of abuse and in legally
transferring from one employer to another may contribute to this
group’s vulnerability by encouraging illegal employment. In 2010,
the garment workers’ union received 450 individual complaints
from workers of labor abuses, compared to 1,444 filed in 2009, a
sharp decrease that may indicate some improvements in labor
conditions in the garment sector. During the year, NGOs and the
media reported that unlawful practices in Jordan’s agricultural
sector – such as passport confiscation, nonpayment or
underpayment of wages, forced overtime, and possibly debt
bondage – led to conditions of forced labor for some Egyptian
and, to a lesser extent, Syrian workers. Egyptian migrant workers
may also experience forced labor in the construction and building
maintenance sectors. Moroccan, Tunisian, and Eastern European
women are reportedly subjected to forced prostitution after
migrating to Jordan to work in restaurants and night clubs. Jordan’
s airports may be transit points for South and Southeast Asian
men and women en route to employment opportunities in other
Middle Eastern countries, where some experience labor
exploitation after arrival.
The Government of Jordan does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. During the year, it
demonstrated progress in enforcing regulations restricting
garment sector employers from withholding their workers’
passports, responding to labor complaints made by factory
workers, waiving migrant domestic workers’ accumulated overstay
fines, and punishing a small number of individuals for crimes of
forced labor against domestic workers. Despite these efforts, the
government demonstrated overall decreased commitment to
combat human trafficking, as once effective structures became
moribund. Several government reshuffles, limited capacity in key
ministries, and a general lack of inter-ministerial coordination and
cooperation prevented Jordan from capitalizing upon the solid
anti-trafficking legal and strategic framework established in the
previous reporting period. The government accomplished little to
implement its national anti-trafficking action plan in 2010, and did
not finalize guidelines for establishing and operating a facility to
provide shelter and other forms of assistance to trafficking victims.
It failed to enforce its bylaws that provide standards for employing
domestic workers and operating recruitment agencies, and did not
launch an anti-trafficking public awareness campaign. To the
extent the government worked to combat forced labor, it is almost
exclusive emphasis on conditions in garment factories left abused
workers in other sectors – particularly domestic service and
agriculture – without viable means of recourse or assistance.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: The Jordanian Government responded effectively to
several terrorist incidents within the country, and its security
forces detected and thwarted several others. Jordan remained
committed to a just and durable settlement of the Israel-Palestine
dispute and strongly backed President Obama's peace initiatives.
In addition to its diplomatic and political assistance to the peace
process, Jordan supported the Palestinian Authority and the
development of state institutions through its law enforcement
training programs at the Jordan International Police Training
Center. Jordan was an important voice against violent extremism
throughout the region.
2010 Terrorist Incidents:
* On January 14, an Israeli diplomatic vehicle movement was
struck by an apparent improvised explosive device (IED) en route
to the King Hussein Bridge from Amman. There were no deaths or
injuries in the attack.
* On April 22, several rockets were fired at the Red Sea port city
of Aqaba. The rockets were allegedly fired from the Sinai
Peninsula and may have been targeting the neighboring Israeli
city of Eilat. There were no deaths or injuries.
* On August 2, Aqaba again came under rocket attack from the
Sinai. Several rockets hit both Eilat and Aqaba, causing one
Jordanian fatality and injuring four others.
Local and international media also announced the deaths or
arrests of several Jordanian nationals participating in terrorist
activities overseas:
* In January, Jordanian al-Qa’ida militant Mahmoud Abu Zeidan
was killed in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
* In June, media outlets also reported that two Jordanian violent
extremists had been killed in operations against Russian forces in
Chechnya.
* In November, local media outlets reported that al-Qa’ida in Iraq
(AQI) had confirmed the deaths of four Jordanian terrorists in Iraq
in July.
* In December, a Jordanian national was arrested in Yemen in
connection with a grenade attack against a U.S. embassy vehicle.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The first phase of the Joint
Border Security Program was completed in September, including
the installation of a suite of monitoring and communications
equipment along a 50km stretch of Jordan's border with Syria.
This border area has historically presented the highest risk of
illicit infiltration and smuggling across Jordan's border and it
accounted for the greatest number of interdictions by Jordanian
law enforcement.
In addition, Jordanian security services remained alert to potential
terrorist threats within the country and responded swiftly and
effectively to counter identified plots. As a result of their vigilance,
several planned attacks were disrupted prior to execution.
The State Security Court (SSC) has primary jurisdiction for
terrorism cases and it maintained a substantial caseload during
the year. For example:
* In March, three men were sentenced to terms ranging from three
years to life for plotting to attack Jordanian security service
facilities.
* In March, the SSC convicted six men (including one in absentia)
of conspiring to attack Israeli targets during the in 2008-09 Israeli
military incursion into the Gaza Strip. The five in custody received
sentences of five to 15 years.
* In September, two brothers were arrested and charged with
plotting to attack foreign officials in Jordan. According to
Jordanian officials, the two had already illegally acquired weapons
and attempted to conduct surveillance for their planned assault.
* In October, the SSC convicted 10 men on charges of plotting to
attack U.S. individuals and facilities and planning to attack U.S.
convoys engaged in resupplying multinational forces in Iraq. One
plotter was sentenced to life imprisonment and the other nine
received 15-year prison terms.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Jordan remedied a number of
significant deficiencies identified by the Middle East and North
Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) in its mutual
evaluation of Jordan, and, by November, had effectively rectified
the areas of non- or partial compliance with Financial Action Task
Force’s core and key recommendations. Jordan implemented
these improvements through royal decrees, which were binding
and carried the weight of parliamentary legislation. Although the
new parliament has the power to pass legislation, the decrees are
permanent regardless of parliamentary action. Jordan additionally
strengthened its capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorist
finance cases. Enhanced legal authorities were matched by
improved staffing levels and better physical infrastructure for
Jordan's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The Jordanian
government participated in several U.S. government-funded
training courses, workshops, and technical assistance visits, and
hosted a regional anti-money laundering/countering terrorist
finance (AML/CTF) seminar aimed at strengthening operational
cooperation between regional FIUs. These efforts resulted in
significant operational improvements in 2010. The first two
indictments for money laundering were brought in Jordan in
January and April. In both, the predicate offenses were committed
outside of Jordan. One conviction has been achieved to date,
involving two defendants and resulting in a sentence of three
years' hard labor, a fine of 10,000 Jordanian Dinars
(approximately US$ 14,000), and confiscation of the criminal
proceeds. In December, Jordan initiated its first domestic
prosecution under its strengthened CTF legal regime.
Regional and International Cooperation: Jordan continued to play
a constructive role in the process of stabilizing Iraq and
integrating it back into the Arab region. Jordan is a member of the
Friends of Yemen Working Group, and worked carefully with its
international partners and Yemeni counterparts to reform the
country's legal and judicial framework. As co-chair of the Rule of
Law working group, Jordan hosted a meeting in Amman in July.
Countering Violent Extremism: The Jordanian Government
remained firmly committed to combating not just terrorist
organizations, but to countering the violent ideology that
motivates terrorism. The Royal Aal al-Beit Institute for Islamic
Thought, under the patronage of Prince Ghazi bin-Mohammad,
continued its sponsorship of ecumenical events promoting
interfaith dialogue. Known collectively as "The Common Word"
series (after the missive written by Prince Ghazi to Pope Benedict
XVI and signed by hundreds of Islamic scholars and Imams),
these events sought to promote interreligious and cross-cultural
understanding. In a September 25 speech at the UN General
Assembly, King Abdullah II successfully proposed UN recognition
of "World Interfaith Harmony Week. These interfaith outreach
efforts build upon the 2005 Amman Message.
Recognizing the key role that incarceration has played in the
radicalization of many terrorists, Jordanian authorities continued
their program of theological engagement with suspected radical
inmates. This program employed carefully selected and vetted
religious scholars and jurists to introduce or reinforce more
balanced views, based upon established Islamic jurisprudence
and teachings. Jordan segregated extremist prisoners in order to
deny them the opportunity to spread their violent ideology among
the general inmate population.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
November 28, 2011 - The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab
member states), of which this country is a member, has approved
imposing sanctions on Syria. These include: -
* Cutting off transactions with the Syrian central bank
* Halting funding by Arab governments for projects in Syria
* A ban on senior Syrian officials travelling to other Arab countries
* A freeze on assets related to President Bashar al-Assad's
government
The declaration also calls on Arab central banks to monitor
transfers to Syria, with the exception of remittances from Syrians
abroad.
For further information, click here
The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab member states), of which
this country is a member, has boycotted Israel in a systematic
effort to isolate Israel economically in support of the Palestinians,
however, the implementation of the boycott has varied over time
among member states..
There are three tiers to the boycott. The primary boycott prohibits
the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting
countries. The secondary boycott prohibits individuals, as well as
private and public sector firms and organizations, in member
countries from engaging in business with any entity that does
business in Israel. The Arab League maintains a blacklist of such
firms. The tertiary boycott prohibits any
entity in a member country from doing business with a company or
individual that has business dealings with U.S. or other firms on
the Arab League blacklist.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Although Jordan is not a regional or offshore financial center, it
has a well-developed financial sector with significant banking
relationships in the Middle East. Jordan’s long and remote desert
borders and nexus to Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the West Bank
make it susceptible to the smuggling of bulk cash, fuel, narcotics,
cigarettes, counterfeit goods and contraband. Jordan boasts a
thriving “import-export” community of brokers, traders, and
entrepreneurs who regionally are involved with value transfer via
trade and customs fraud. There are anecdotal indications of the
use of Jordan for money laundering of illicit funds derived from
narcotics and other criminal activity in the U.S., and possibly
Europe, via bulk cash smuggling for criminal elements involving
Jordanians in those areas. However, it is thought the major
sources of illicit funds in Jordan are most likely to be related to
commercial fraud, customs fraud, tax fraud and intellectual
property rights (IPR) violations. In 2010, Jordan made significant
strides to bring its anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist
financing (AML/CFT) regime into fuller compliance with
international standards and to raise the profile of AML/CFT
stakeholders.
There are six public free trade zones (FTZ) in Jordan: the Zarqa
Free Zone, the Sahab Free Zone, the Queen Alia International
Airport Free Zone, the Al-Karak Free Zone, the Al-Karama Free
Zone, and the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ). With the
exception of Aqaba, these FTZs list their activities merely as
trade. There are 36 private free trade zones, a number of which
are related to the aviation industry, with five more being
established. Some of these FTZs list their activities as industrial,
agricultural, pharmaceutical, training of human capital, and multi-
purpose. With the exception of ASEZ, all free trade zones are
regulated by the Jordan Free Zones Corporation in the Ministry of
Finance. The Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA), a
ministerial level authority, controls all of the port city of Aqaba.
ASEZA has its own customs authority, which operates separately
from Jordan Customs and processes all merchandise and
commodities destined for businesses in the zone and all
passengers entering the zone. Jordan Customs processes all
shipments of goods in transit to areas outside the zone.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks, exchange companies and money
transfer companies; securities brokers and investment and asset
managers; credit and financial leasing companies; insurance
companies, brokers and intermediaries; entities providing credit,
leasing services, financial management companies, postal
services, real estate and development, and traders of precious
metals and stones
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks, exchange and money transfer
companies, securities brokers and investment and asset
managers; credit and financial leasing companies; insurance
companies, brokers and intermediaries; entities providing credit,
leasing services, financial management companies, postal
services, real estate and development, and traders of precious
metals and stones
Number of STRs received and time frame: 510 -- July 2007 -
December 14, 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: Two in 2010
Convictions: One in 2010
Assets forfeited: criminally: $2.05 million -- July 2007 - December
14, 2010 civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Jordan is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial
Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force
(FATF)-style regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can
be found here: http://www.menafatf.
org/images/UploadFiles/MER_Hashemite_Kingdom_of_Jordan.pdf
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
In February 2010, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
identified Jordan as a jurisdiction with significant AML/CFT
vulnerabilities. The Government of Jordan has been actively
engaged to alleviate the noted deficiencies. By late 2010, Jordan
had addressed successfully all noted areas of non-compliance
with key international standards.
During 2010, the Government of Jordan (GOJ) remedied several
deficiencies in its AML/CFT legal framework. Those changes
include: (a) extension of the range of predicate offenses to
include all offenses (both misdemeanors and felonies) which are
crimes in Jordan, whether committed in Jordan or abroad; (b)
clarification that a conviction of an underlying predicate offense is
not a prerequisite for criminal indictment for money laundering; (c)
extension of the scope of the terrorist financing offense to include
provision to, or collection of funds by terrorist organizations or
individual terrorists, including in situations where there is no proof
that the funds were going to be directed to the commission of a
terrorist act; (d) inclusion of an adequate definition of what
constitutes “funds” under terrorist financing provisions; (e)
inclusion of general measures to provide for the freezing, seizing
and confiscation of funds related to money laundering and
terrorist financing; (f) extension of the mandate of the FIU to
receive STRs related to terrorist financing; and, (g) establishment
of effective procedures for implementing terrorist financing-related
obligations under UNSCRs 1267 and 1373.
In addition to changes in the legal framework, other operational
developments in 2010 impacting the AML/CFT regime in Jordan
include expansion of the FIU staff and preparations to move to an
independent office space. In addition, the Prime Minister issued a
directive confirming the primacy of the role of the FIU in the
AML/CFT regime. Lastly, a cross-border customs declaration form
was issued to implement existing declaration requirements related
to currency transport in excess of 15,000 Jordanian dinars
(approximately $21,150).
The first two indictments for money laundering in Jordan occurred
in 2010. In both cases, the predicates were committed outside of
Jordan. One conviction has been achieved to date, involving two
defendants and resulting in a sentence of three years’ hard labor,
a fine of 10,000 Jordanian dinars (approximately $14,100), and
confiscation of the proceeds.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012:
Jordan’s geographical location in a region of drug producing and
drug consuming countries continues to make it a transit point for
illicit drugs. There are currently no indications that Jordan will
move from a predominantly drug transit country to a drug
producing country. Statistics produced by Jordan’s Public Security
Directorate (PSD) confirm this assessment, and show that almost
all major drug seizures were from foreign nationals with shipments
bound for other countries. Jordan’s vast desert borders make it
vulnerable to illicit drug smuggling operations. Jordanian
authorities do not believe that internal drug distribution is
substantial; they estimate that 85 percent of drugs entering
Jordan are moving to markets elsewhere. Jordan is a party to the
1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN Convention against Corruption
and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
Jordan remains primarily a narcotics transit country. The narcotics
transiting Jordan are not believed to be destined for the United
States. Jordan’s main challenge in stemming the flow of illicit
drugs through the country remains its vast and open desert
borders, which are difficult to effectively patrol because the
stationary posts along them lack the equipment and infrastructure
to fully monitor traffic. While law enforcement contacts confirm
continued excellent cooperation with Jordan’s neighbors, the
desolate border regions and various tribes, with their centuries-
old traditions of smuggling as a principal source of income, make
interdiction outside of the ports of entry difficult.
Drugs moving through Jordan include: cannabis, perhaps
Lebanese or Afghan in origin, entering from Lebanon, Syria, and
Iraq; Afghan heroin entering through Syria on its way to Israel;
and captagon tablets from Bulgaria and Turkey entering through
Syria on the way to the Gulf. “Captagon” is an amphetamine-type
stimulus that is popular in Gulf countries. The majority of Jordan’s
drug seizures take place at the Jaber border crossing point
between Jordan and Syria. Cooperative efforts between the PSD
and the Israeli National Police have led to heroin seizures along
the Israeli border.
Historically, Jordanians do not consume significant quantities of
illegal drugs. Recently, there have been anecdotal reports
suggesting possible increases in drug use in Jordan. According to
PSD statistics, the number of people involved in drug cases and
the number of abusers both rose by over 10 percent between
2010 and 2011. The PSD attributes the higher volume of drug
cases in Jordan to more effective border interdiction operations,
better intelligence gathering, and stronger cooperation between
Jordan and neighboring countries.
The drugs of choice among users arrested for drug possession in
Jordan continue to be cannabis and heroin, and to a lesser
degree, captagon. People arrested for drug-related crimes in
Jordan are mostly between 18 and 35 years old and are
predominantly foreign nationals. While the PSD continues to see
increased drug trafficking across Jordan’s land borders,
especially its borders with Iraq and Syria, there is a continuing
decrease in drugs transiting Queen Alia International Airport.
During the first nine months of 2011, there was an annualized 40
percent decrease in the amount of cocaine seized by the PSD
compared to 2010, with only 1.4kg seized. During the same
period, there was a similar decrease in the amount of heroin
seized. Captagon seizures, however, rose significantly over the
first nine months of 2011, with annualized totals doubling from
those of past years. Sixteen million tablets were seized. PSD
reports show that interdicted captagon tablets were predominantly
bound for Saudi Arabia. When compared to historical figures for
the past five years, drug enforcement apprehensions continue to
rise. Nevertheless, the increase should not be considered a
notable trend in trafficking through Jordan, but rather the result of
better enforcement.
Jordan’s PSD maintains an active counternarcotics bureau and
has excellent relations with the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration’s Nicosia Country Office (CO) in Cyprus. It also has
increasingly productive relations with narcotics enforcement
officials from neighboring countries. As a result of these ties, the
PSD conducted 12 international controlled deliveries with law
enforcement counterparts in Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Israel
during the first nine months of 2011. According to the PSD, there
are no known illicit production operations in the country.
The DEA Nicosia CO, Regional Security Office Amman, and the U.
S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office in Amman have
excellent working relationships with the PSD. In January 2011, the
DEA Office of Training provided a one week Drug Unit
Commander Course to two Jordanian Police Anti-Narcotics Unit
Officials in Cairo, Egypt. In addition, two PSD officials attended the
2011 International Drug Enforcement Conference in Cancun,
Mexico. Members of the DEA Nicosia CO visited Jordan six times
during the first nine months of 2011 in furtherance of ongoing
criminal drug investigations and continue to enjoy a professional
rapport and cordial working relationship with the PSD.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
Jordan is a destination and transit country for adults and children
subjected to forced labor and, to a lesser extent, sex trafficking.
Small numbers of Jordanian adults are reportedly subjected to
forced labor as low-skilled workers in Qatar and Kuwait, while
Jordanian children employed within the country as mechanics,
agricultural laborers, and beggars may be exploited in situations
of forced labor. Jordan’s sponsorship system binds foreign
workers to their designated employers without adequate access to
legal recourse when they face abuse and without the ability to
switch employers, thereby placing a significant amount of power in
the hands of employers and recruitment agencies. Migrant
workers are further rendered vulnerable to forced labor due to
indebtedness to recruiters, negative societal attitudes toward
foreign workers, and legal requirements that foreign workers rely
on employers to renew their work and residency permits. Women
from Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines voluntarily migrate
to Jordan for employment as domestic workers; some are
subjected to conditions of forced labor after arrival, including
through such practices as unlawful withholding of passports,
restrictions on movement, nonpayment of wages, threats of
imprisonment, and physical or sexual abuse. Approximately 480
Filipina, Indonesian, and Sri Lankan domestic workers, most of
who had fled conditions indicative of forced labor, were sheltered
at their respective embassies in Amman at the conclusion of the
reporting period. In March 2011, the Government of Jordan
announced it would allow the legal recruitment of domestic
workers from Vietnam in light of continued bans imposed by the
Indonesian and Philippine governments against the employment
of their nationals in Jordan. The Aqaba Special Economic Zone
Authority, governed under separate labor regulations, allows the
recruitment of domestic workers from Ethiopia, Nepal, Kenya, and
Ghana.
Chinese, Bangladeshi, Indian, Sri Lankan, Nepali, and Indonesian
men and women encounter conditions indicative of forced labor in
a few of the Jordanian garment sector’s factories, including
unlawful withholding of passports, delayed payment of wages,
forced overtime, and, to a lesser extent, verbal and physical
abuse. Observers noted a decrease in the holding of factory
workers’ passports by factory managers during the year, possibly
due to increased awareness of criminal prohibition of this practice.
While garment sector employees may enjoy greater freedom of
movement as a result, continued bureaucratic difficulties in
accessing legal remedies to complaints of abuse and in legally
transferring from one employer to another may contribute to this
group’s vulnerability by encouraging illegal employment. In 2010,
the garment workers’ union received 450 individual complaints
from workers of labor abuses, compared to 1,444 filed in 2009, a
sharp decrease that may indicate some improvements in labor
conditions in the garment sector. During the year, NGOs and the
media reported that unlawful practices in Jordan’s agricultural
sector – such as passport confiscation, nonpayment or
underpayment of wages, forced overtime, and possibly debt
bondage – led to conditions of forced labor for some Egyptian
and, to a lesser extent, Syrian workers. Egyptian migrant workers
may also experience forced labor in the construction and building
maintenance sectors. Moroccan, Tunisian, and Eastern European
women are reportedly subjected to forced prostitution after
migrating to Jordan to work in restaurants and night clubs. Jordan’
s airports may be transit points for South and Southeast Asian
men and women en route to employment opportunities in other
Middle Eastern countries, where some experience labor
exploitation after arrival.
The Government of Jordan does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. During the year, it
demonstrated progress in enforcing regulations restricting
garment sector employers from withholding their workers’
passports, responding to labor complaints made by factory
workers, waiving migrant domestic workers’ accumulated overstay
fines, and punishing a small number of individuals for crimes of
forced labor against domestic workers. Despite these efforts, the
government demonstrated overall decreased commitment to
combat human trafficking, as once effective structures became
moribund. Several government reshuffles, limited capacity in key
ministries, and a general lack of inter-ministerial coordination and
cooperation prevented Jordan from capitalizing upon the solid
anti-trafficking legal and strategic framework established in the
previous reporting period. The government accomplished little to
implement its national anti-trafficking action plan in 2010, and did
not finalize guidelines for establishing and operating a facility to
provide shelter and other forms of assistance to trafficking victims.
It failed to enforce its bylaws that provide standards for employing
domestic workers and operating recruitment agencies, and did not
launch an anti-trafficking public awareness campaign. To the
extent the government worked to combat forced labor, it is almost
exclusive emphasis on conditions in garment factories left abused
workers in other sectors – particularly domestic service and
agriculture – without viable means of recourse or assistance.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: The Jordanian Government responded effectively to
several terrorist incidents within the country, and its security
forces detected and thwarted several others. Jordan remained
committed to a just and durable settlement of the Israel-Palestine
dispute and strongly backed President Obama's peace initiatives.
In addition to its diplomatic and political assistance to the peace
process, Jordan supported the Palestinian Authority and the
development of state institutions through its law enforcement
training programs at the Jordan International Police Training
Center. Jordan was an important voice against violent extremism
throughout the region.
2010 Terrorist Incidents:
* On January 14, an Israeli diplomatic vehicle movement was
struck by an apparent improvised explosive device (IED) en route
to the King Hussein Bridge from Amman. There were no deaths or
injuries in the attack.
* On April 22, several rockets were fired at the Red Sea port city
of Aqaba. The rockets were allegedly fired from the Sinai
Peninsula and may have been targeting the neighboring Israeli
city of Eilat. There were no deaths or injuries.
* On August 2, Aqaba again came under rocket attack from the
Sinai. Several rockets hit both Eilat and Aqaba, causing one
Jordanian fatality and injuring four others.
Local and international media also announced the deaths or
arrests of several Jordanian nationals participating in terrorist
activities overseas:
* In January, Jordanian al-Qa’ida militant Mahmoud Abu Zeidan
was killed in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
* In June, media outlets also reported that two Jordanian violent
extremists had been killed in operations against Russian forces in
Chechnya.
* In November, local media outlets reported that al-Qa’ida in Iraq
(AQI) had confirmed the deaths of four Jordanian terrorists in Iraq
in July.
* In December, a Jordanian national was arrested in Yemen in
connection with a grenade attack against a U.S. embassy vehicle.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The first phase of the Joint
Border Security Program was completed in September, including
the installation of a suite of monitoring and communications
equipment along a 50km stretch of Jordan's border with Syria.
This border area has historically presented the highest risk of
illicit infiltration and smuggling across Jordan's border and it
accounted for the greatest number of interdictions by Jordanian
law enforcement.
In addition, Jordanian security services remained alert to potential
terrorist threats within the country and responded swiftly and
effectively to counter identified plots. As a result of their vigilance,
several planned attacks were disrupted prior to execution.
The State Security Court (SSC) has primary jurisdiction for
terrorism cases and it maintained a substantial caseload during
the year. For example:
* In March, three men were sentenced to terms ranging from three
years to life for plotting to attack Jordanian security service
facilities.
* In March, the SSC convicted six men (including one in absentia)
of conspiring to attack Israeli targets during the in 2008-09 Israeli
military incursion into the Gaza Strip. The five in custody received
sentences of five to 15 years.
* In September, two brothers were arrested and charged with
plotting to attack foreign officials in Jordan. According to
Jordanian officials, the two had already illegally acquired weapons
and attempted to conduct surveillance for their planned assault.
* In October, the SSC convicted 10 men on charges of plotting to
attack U.S. individuals and facilities and planning to attack U.S.
convoys engaged in resupplying multinational forces in Iraq. One
plotter was sentenced to life imprisonment and the other nine
received 15-year prison terms.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Jordan remedied a number of
significant deficiencies identified by the Middle East and North
Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) in its mutual
evaluation of Jordan, and, by November, had effectively rectified
the areas of non- or partial compliance with Financial Action Task
Force’s core and key recommendations. Jordan implemented
these improvements through royal decrees, which were binding
and carried the weight of parliamentary legislation. Although the
new parliament has the power to pass legislation, the decrees are
permanent regardless of parliamentary action. Jordan additionally
strengthened its capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorist
finance cases. Enhanced legal authorities were matched by
improved staffing levels and better physical infrastructure for
Jordan's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The Jordanian
government participated in several U.S. government-funded
training courses, workshops, and technical assistance visits, and
hosted a regional anti-money laundering/countering terrorist
finance (AML/CTF) seminar aimed at strengthening operational
cooperation between regional FIUs. These efforts resulted in
significant operational improvements in 2010. The first two
indictments for money laundering were brought in Jordan in
January and April. In both, the predicate offenses were committed
outside of Jordan. One conviction has been achieved to date,
involving two defendants and resulting in a sentence of three
years' hard labor, a fine of 10,000 Jordanian Dinars
(approximately US$ 14,000), and confiscation of the criminal
proceeds. In December, Jordan initiated its first domestic
prosecution under its strengthened CTF legal regime.
Regional and International Cooperation: Jordan continued to play
a constructive role in the process of stabilizing Iraq and
integrating it back into the Arab region. Jordan is a member of the
Friends of Yemen Working Group, and worked carefully with its
international partners and Yemeni counterparts to reform the
country's legal and judicial framework. As co-chair of the Rule of
Law working group, Jordan hosted a meeting in Amman in July.
Countering Violent Extremism: The Jordanian Government
remained firmly committed to combating not just terrorist
organizations, but to countering the violent ideology that
motivates terrorism. The Royal Aal al-Beit Institute for Islamic
Thought, under the patronage of Prince Ghazi bin-Mohammad,
continued its sponsorship of ecumenical events promoting
interfaith dialogue. Known collectively as "The Common Word"
series (after the missive written by Prince Ghazi to Pope Benedict
XVI and signed by hundreds of Islamic scholars and Imams),
these events sought to promote interreligious and cross-cultural
understanding. In a September 25 speech at the UN General
Assembly, King Abdullah II successfully proposed UN recognition
of "World Interfaith Harmony Week. These interfaith outreach
efforts build upon the 2005 Amman Message.
Recognizing the key role that incarceration has played in the
radicalization of many terrorists, Jordanian authorities continued
their program of theological engagement with suspected radical
inmates. This program employed carefully selected and vetted
religious scholars and jurists to introduce or reinforce more
balanced views, based upon established Islamic jurisprudence
and teachings. Jordan segregated extremist prisoners in order to
deny them the opportunity to spread their violent ideology among
the general inmate population.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
Background Information
Jordan is considered one of the advanced and stable economic
systems in the Middle East, especially in the banking sector. The
banking sector is characterized by a noticeable overall progress and
the presence of a good level of awareness about the AML/CFT
requirements. Crime rate is relatively low, even with existing
activities of trafficking drugs and smuggling of antiques from Iraq.
Jordan’s economy is remarkably open to the international
investment markets. These factors altogether create a degree of
AML risk. As to the possibility of the presence of the financing of
terrorism, some risks related to terrorism have existed, such as
the formation of terrorist groups that feed terrorist activities in the
region, in addition to the execution of some terrorist operations.
In general, and with some exceptions, Jordan has a legislative and
supervisory framework that covers most of the sectors concerned with
AML. The Jordanian AML system is among the new ones in the
region, with the AML law issued in July 2007. The subject law
has covered basic aspects of the legal framework
needed for establishing a good AML system in Jordan. Regarding
CFT, Jordan has criminalized this act in the Terrorism Prevention
Law (TPL), regarded as a terrorist act. However, Jordan has
not covered a sizeable number of obligations necessary to complete
the combating system, including the inclusion of CFT within the
jurisdiction of the AML Unit. In addition, it has failed to notice the
obligations that should be imposed on financial and other institutions
in this respect.
Moreover, one of the main remarks that can be highlighted in the
Jordanian AML system is the non-issuance of all the legal
instruments necessary for the completion of the legislative
structure and sufficient basis for this system. To the date of the
onsite visit and immediately thereafter, regulations that represent
secondary legislations needed for complying with basic
requirements mentioned in the 40+9 Recommendations for
AML/CFT have not been issued. In terms of regulation and
supervision, a number of instructions for the various financial sectors
addressing a reasonable part of the international requirements and
standards have been issued. However, Jordan needs to increase the
human and technical resources at many competent authorities that
play a major role in the combating system, as the lack of such
resources negatively affects the effectiveness of this system. On
the other hand, the DNFBPs present in Jordan lack sufficient
regulation in relation to AML/CFT. They also lack the necessary
awareness of ML and TF risks on one side and of the possibility of
being exploited for performing illicit transactions on the other side.
Click here to view full Mutual Evaluation Report
Jordan is considered one of the advanced and stable economic
systems in the Middle East, especially in the banking sector. The
banking sector is characterized by a noticeable overall progress and
the presence of a good level of awareness about the AML/CFT
requirements. Crime rate is relatively low, even with existing
activities of trafficking drugs and smuggling of antiques from Iraq.
Jordan’s economy is remarkably open to the international
investment markets. These factors altogether create a degree of
AML risk. As to the possibility of the presence of the financing of
terrorism, some risks related to terrorism have existed, such as
the formation of terrorist groups that feed terrorist activities in the
region, in addition to the execution of some terrorist operations.
In general, and with some exceptions, Jordan has a legislative and
supervisory framework that covers most of the sectors concerned with
AML. The Jordanian AML system is among the new ones in the
region, with the AML law issued in July 2007. The subject law
has covered basic aspects of the legal framework
needed for establishing a good AML system in Jordan. Regarding
CFT, Jordan has criminalized this act in the Terrorism Prevention
Law (TPL), regarded as a terrorist act. However, Jordan has
not covered a sizeable number of obligations necessary to complete
the combating system, including the inclusion of CFT within the
jurisdiction of the AML Unit. In addition, it has failed to notice the
obligations that should be imposed on financial and other institutions
in this respect.
Moreover, one of the main remarks that can be highlighted in the
Jordanian AML system is the non-issuance of all the legal
instruments necessary for the completion of the legislative
structure and sufficient basis for this system. To the date of the
onsite visit and immediately thereafter, regulations that represent
secondary legislations needed for complying with basic
requirements mentioned in the 40+9 Recommendations for
AML/CFT have not been issued. In terms of regulation and
supervision, a number of instructions for the various financial sectors
addressing a reasonable part of the international requirements and
standards have been issued. However, Jordan needs to increase the
human and technical resources at many competent authorities that
play a major role in the combating system, as the lack of such
resources negatively affects the effectiveness of this system. On
the other hand, the DNFBPs present in Jordan lack sufficient
regulation in relation to AML/CFT. They also lack the necessary
awareness of ML and TF risks on one side and of the possibility of
being exploited for performing illicit transactions on the other side.
Click here to view full Mutual Evaluation Report
| Further Tables |
| Last Updated: 23 May 2012 |
AML News / Updates
Extracted from IMF Report: Jordan Article IV Consultation
(May 2012)
The authorities are to be commended for their ongoing efforts to
strengthen Jordan’s Anti Money Laundering (AML)/Combating
Financing of Terrorism (CFT) framework. In November 2010, Jordan
was recognized as the first MENA country to be in compliance with the
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) targeted
review of its AML/CFT regime. The AML/CFT supervision of Jordanian
financial transactions has been subsequently further strengthened,
following amendments to the AML/CFT Law and the adoption of revised
AML/CFT instructions covering banks, insurance companies, securities
activities, and money exchangers. The Jordanian AML/CFT Unit has
also requested technical assistance from the IMF in undertaking an
assessment of their AML/CFT regime, with an eye to further enhancing
its effectiveness.
Read Full Report
Extracted from IMF Report: Jordan Article IV Consultation
(May 2012)
The authorities are to be commended for their ongoing efforts to
strengthen Jordan’s Anti Money Laundering (AML)/Combating
Financing of Terrorism (CFT) framework. In November 2010, Jordan
was recognized as the first MENA country to be in compliance with the
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) targeted
review of its AML/CFT regime. The AML/CFT supervision of Jordanian
financial transactions has been subsequently further strengthened,
following amendments to the AML/CFT Law and the adoption of revised
AML/CFT instructions covering banks, insurance companies, securities
activities, and money exchangers. The Jordanian AML/CFT Unit has
also requested technical assistance from the IMF in undertaking an
assessment of their AML/CFT regime, with an eye to further enhancing
its effectiveness.
Read Full Report