Higher Risk
 
Medium Risk
 
Info n/a
 
Lower Risk
Bilateral exchange of information
Agreements in place?
    Denmark, Faroes, Finland,
    Greenland, Iceland, Norway,
    Sweden
Sanctions:

None applicable

____________________________________________________

Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:

As a recognised offshore finance jurisdiction this country may fall
under various country offshore jurisdiction blacklists.  

____________________________________________________

US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:

Macau, a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s
Republic of China, is not a significant regional financial center.
However, with reported gaming revenues of $30.5 billion from
January to November 2011, Macau is the world’s largest gaming
market by revenue. Macau’s gaming industry relies heavily on
loosely-regulated gaming promoters, known as junket operators,
for the supply of gamblers mostly from nearby mainland China.
Increasingly popular among gamblers seeking inscrutability and
alternatives to China’s currency movement restrictions, junket
operators are also popular among casinos aiming to reduce credit
default risk and unable to legally collect gambling debts in China.
This inherent conflict of interest, together with the anonymity
gained through the use of the junket operator in the transfer and
commingling of funds, as well as the absence of currency and
exchange controls, present vulnerabilities for money laundering.
Primary sources of criminal proceeds in Macau, attributed to
criminal networks spanning across Macau’s boundary with
mainland China, are: gaming-related crimes, robbery offenses,
corruption, organized crime, and narcotics crimes.

For additional information focusing on terrorism financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/

Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: NO

Criminalization of Money Laundering:

“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes

Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: NO

Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:

Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES

KYC covered entities: Banks, credit and insurance entities,
casinos, gaming intermediaries, remittance agents and money
changers, cash couriers, trust and company service providers,
realty services, pawn shops, traders in high-value goods,
notaries, registrars, commercial offshore service institutions,
lawyers, auditors, accountants, and tax consultants

Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:

Number of STRs received and time frame: 1,190 from January to
September 2011

Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable

STR covered entities: All persons, irrespective of entity or amount
of transaction involved

Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:

Prosecutions: None from January to June 2011

Convictions: One from January to June 2011

Records exchange mechanism:

With U.S.: MLAT: NO Other mechanism: YES

With other governments/jurisdictions: YES

Macau is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money
Laundering (APG), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional
body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found here: http:
//www.apgml.org/documents/docs/17/Macao%20ME2%20-%
20FINAL.pdf

Enforcement and Implementation Issues and Comments:

Although Macau has no formal law enforcement cooperation
agreements with the United States, informal cooperation between
the two routinely takes place. U.S. government agencies work
closely with Macau counterparts in capacity building measures,
information exchange, and investigations. Macau’s financial
intelligence unit (FIU) has been an essential component in
coordinating AML/CFT efforts and collaborates with other FIUs.
The Government of Macau (GOM) established the FIU in 2006 as
a non-permanent government entity in order to avoid having to
seek legislative approval. The FIU’s current term expires in August
2012. The GOM should permanently institutionalize its FIU without
term limits given its crucial role in sustaining a long-term AML/CFT
infrastructure.

The AML law does not require currency transaction reporting
(CTR). However, gaming entities are subject to threshold
reporting (over MOP 500,000, approximately $62,450) under the
supplementary guidelines of the Gaming Inspection and
Coordination Bureau (DICJ). Currently, the DICJ only shares
statistical data on CTR filings with the FIU. To enhance the FIU’s
ability to detect and deter illicit activity, the FIU should have full
access to CTR reports collected by DICJ.

Under current regulatory guidelines, financial institutions are
obligated and do identify and freeze suspect bank accounts or
transactions. However, the GOM cannot provide mutual legal
assistance on AML/CFT under existing legislation. Macau should
enhance its ability to support international efforts by developing
its legal framework to facilitate the freezing and seizure of assets.
The GOM can provide mutual legal assistance on criminal
matters, even without a formal agreement, and cooperation
between the GOM and the United States routinely takes place.

Macau continues making considerable efforts to develop an
AML/CFT framework that meets international standards. It should
continue to strengthen interagency coordination to prevent money
laundering in the gaming industry, especially by introducing
robust oversight of junket operators. It also should implement
mandatory cross-border currency reporting requirements.

As a SAR of China, Macau cannot sign or ratify international
conventions in its own right. Rather, China is responsible for
Macau’s international affairs and may arrange for the ratification
of any convention to be extended to Macau. The 1988 Drug
Convention was extended to Macau in 1999. The UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime was extended to Macau in
2003. The UN Convention against Corruption and the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism were extended to Macau in 2006.

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Narcotics Report 2011 (introduction):

No report available

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):

(Tier 2)

The Macau Special Administrative Region (MSAR) of the People’s
Republic of China is primarily a destination and, to a much lesser
extent, a source territory for women and children subjected to sex
trafficking. Victims originate primarily from the Chinese mainland,
with many of them from inland Chinese provinces who travel to the
border province of Guangdong in search of better employment. In
the past there have also been victims from Mongolia, Vietnam,
Russia, and Southeast Asia. Many trafficking victims fall prey to
false advertisements for jobs in casinos and other legitimate
employment in Macau, but upon arrival, are forced into
prostitution. Foreign and mainland Chinese women are sometimes
passed to local organized crime groups upon arrival, held captive,
and forced into sexual servitude. Chinese, Russian, and Thai
criminal syndicates are believed to sometimes be involved in
recruiting women for Macau’s commercial sex industry. Victims are
sometimes confined in massage parlors and illegal brothels,
where they are closely monitored, forced to work long hours, have
their identity documents confiscated, and are threatened with
violence; all factors that make it particularly difficult for them to
seek help. Macau also has been a source territory for some
women and girls who are subjected to sex trafficking elsewhere in
Asia. In addition, new immigration regulations, which bar migrant
workers who have been fired or quit early from obtaining another
work permit for six months and impose fines on workers who
overstay cancelled work permits, as well as the lack of a minimum
wage for foreign workers in domestic service, could create
vulnerabilities for migrant labor in Macau to forced labor. In light of
these consequences for leaving employers, male and female
migrant workers may feel pressure to work for undesirable
employers to avoid deportation or fines of approximately $25 per
day.

The MSAR does not fully comply with the minimum standards for
the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant
efforts to do so. Macau’s government sustained law enforcement
efforts against human trafficking and efforts to protect trafficking
victims during the year. It also continued to train law enforcement
and other officials in identifying and investigating trafficking in
persons offenses. Nonetheless, Macau continues to lack sufficient
judicial resources to investigate and prosecute a significant
number of trafficking cases; as a result, many trafficking cases,
including instances of forced labor, may go undetected or fail to
be punished.

For full report click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010

Macau’s law enforcement and customs agencies participated in U.
S. government-sponsored training, including bulk cash smuggling
detection and investigations, terrorism investigations, and
complex financial investigations. Macau’s Police Tactical
Intervention Unit is responsible for protecting important
installations and dignitaries, and for conducting high-risk
missions, including the deactivation of improvised explosive
devices.

Terrorist financing is a criminal offense in Macau. Macau’s
financial regulatory authorities directed banks and other financial
institutions to continuously search for terrorist financing networks
and accounts using designations lists made by the U.S. under
relevant authorities, as well as the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee’
s consolidated lists. All entities and persons are legally required to
file suspicious transactions reports (STRs) irrespective of
transaction amounts involved. However, Macau does not have
reporting requirements for cross-border currency movements.

Macau is an active member of the APG, a FATF-style regional
body. Through its Financial Intelligence Office (FIO), Macau is
also an active member of the Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence Units.

____________________________________________________

Links:

Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)

Financial Intelligence Office
Tables & Rankings
Are there Sanctions in force against it? (UN/EU/US)
N
?
Is it on FATF list of non-cooperative countries?
N
?
Is it on OECD list of uncooperative Tax Havens?
N
?
OECD - Implementation status of Tax Standard
 
?
Is it on EU 'white' list of equivalent jurisdictions?
N
?
Offshore Finance Center (Original IMF List)?
Y
?
Is it on the US Secretary of Treasury list of jurisdictions of
Primary Money Laundering concern?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of State list of jurisdictions
identified to be supporters of International Terrorism?
N
?
Is it on US Department of State International Narcotics
Control Majors List?
N
?
US Dept of State Money Laundering assessment (INCSR)
PC
?
Government Actions (For further info see INCRS below):
 
?
-  Criminalized Drug Money Laundering?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Beyond Drugs?
Y
 
-  Record Large Transactions?
N
 
-  Maintain Records Over Time?
Y
 
-  Report Suspicious Transactions?(NMP)?
Y
 
-  Egmont Financial Intelligence Units?
Y
 
-  System for Identifying/Forfeiting Assets?
Y
 
-  Arrangements for Asset Sharing?
Y
 
-  Cooperates with International Law Enforcement?
Y
 
-  International Transportation of Currency?
N
 
-  Ability to Freeze Terrorist Assets w/o delay?
Y
 
-  Disclosure Protection "Safe Harbor"?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Financing of Terrorism?
Y
 
-  States Party to 1988 UN Convention?
Y
 
-  International Terrorism Financing Convention?
Y
 
 
Ranking
2011
Ranking
2010
 
Corruption (Transparency International)
46 (out of
183)
46 (out of
180)
?
Ease of doing business (World Bank)
N/A
N/A
?
Further Tables
FATF 40 + 9 recommendations
Mutual Evaluation Report: 2007
C
L
P
N
N/A
    C  -  Fully Compliant ,   
    L  -  Largely Compliant,    
    P  -  Partially Compliant    
    N  -  Non-Compliant
7
19
22
1
0
Legal Systems
 
1. Money Laundering Offence
L
 
14. Protection & no tipping-off
C
2. ML offence – mental element and
corporate liability
L
 
15. Internal controls,
compliance & audit
L
3. Confiscation and provisional
measures
P
 
16. DNFBP – R.13-15 & 21
L
4. Secrecy laws consistent with the
Recommendations
C
 
17. Sanctions
L
5. Customer due diligence
P
 
18. Shell banks
C
6. Politically exposed persons
L
 
19. Other forms of reporting
C
7. Correspondent banking
C
 
20. Other NFBP & secure
transaction techniques
C
8. New technologies & non
face-to-face business
P
 
21. Special attention for
higher risk countries
P
9. Third parties and introducers
L
 
22. Foreign branches &
subsidiaries
P
10. Record keeping
L
 
23. Regulation, supervision
and monitoring
L
11. Unusual transactions
P
 
24. DNFBP - regulation,
supervision and monitoring
P
12. Designated Non-Financial
Businesses and Professions – R.5,
6, 8-11
P
 
25. Guidelines & Feedback
P
13. Suspicious transaction reporting
L
     
Institutional and other
measures
 
26. The FIU
L
 
31. National co-operation
L
27. Law enforcement authorities
P
 
32. Statistics
P
28. Powers of competent authorities
L
 
33. Legal persons – beneficial
owners
P
29. Supervisors
C
 
34. Legal arrangements –
beneficial owners
L
30. Resources, integrity and training
P
 
 
 
International Co-operation
 
35. Conventions
L
 
38. MLA on confiscation and
freezing
P
36. Mutual legal assistance (MLA)
P
 
39. Extradition
P
37. Dual criminality
P
 
40. Other forms of
co-operation
P
Nine Special
Recommendations
 
SR.I Implement UN instruments
L
 
SR VI AML requirements for
money/value transfer services
L
SR.II Criminalise terrorist financing
L
 
SR VII Wire transfer rules
P
SR.III Freeze and confiscate terrorist
assets
P
 
SR.VIII Non profit
organisations
P
SR.IV Suspicious transaction
reporting
L
 
SR.IX Cross Border
Declaration & Disclosure
N
SR.V International co-operation
P
 
 
 
*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.

For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -        

R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV

Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
MACAU
KnowYourCountry
-  Know Your Customer Provisions
Y
 
-  Criminalized Tipping Off?
Y
 
-  KYC Provisions?
Y
 
-  State Party to United Nations TOC?
Y
 
-  State Party to United Nations CAC?
Y
 
Local AML News / Sanctions
Tax Information
Business Information
Extracted from IMF Report  -  Macao:  Financial Sector
Stability Assessment (Aug 2011)

A Mutual Evaluation of Macao SAR’s AML/CFT framework was
conducted against the FATF 40+9 Recommendations in December
2006. The evaluation was carried by the Asia Pacific Group on Money
Laundering (APG; the FATF style regional body of which Macao SAR is
a member) and the Office Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS), using
the 2004 methodology. The final ME report was adopted and published
by the APG in July 2007. It indicates that, since it was last evaluated in
2001, Macao SAR has taken a number of steps to enhance the
effectiveness of its AML/CFT framework, especially in 2006, by
amending the existing legal framework and issuing AML/CFT
Regulations for all the relevant sectors. Guidelines for the financial
institutions were also issued by the AMCM in light of the new
regulations.  

Overall, the evaluators found that the AML/CFT measures in place were
sound but lacked the necessary level of detail to comply fully with the
40+9 Recommendations. They noted in particular that existing customer
due diligence obligations should be strengthened notably by requiring
financial institutions to verify the identity of persons on whose behalf a
customer is acting, to understand the ownership and control structure
of legal arrangements and to perform ongoing due diligence. The
evaluators also found that the supervisory and oversight system of the
AMCM was good, especially with respect to banks. A ROSC prepared by
the APG Secretariat on the basis of the ME report and reviewed by the
Fund’s Legal Department will be circulated separately to the Executive
Board for information.

As part of the BCP assessment, the mission found that the AML/CFT
regulatory and supervisory framework governing banking was
compliant—in line with the findings of the APG ME report.  

Click here to view full report
Last Updated:   16 April 2012