_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2011 (introduction):
No report available
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 (introduction):
(Tier 3)
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is a source country for
women subjected to sex trafficking. FSM women have been recruited to
the United States and its territories with promises of well-paying jobs,
and forced into prostitution upon arrival. Pohnpei State Police received
reports that FSM women and children were prostituted to crew members
on Asian fishing vessels in Micronesia or in its territorial waters. Local
Micronesians reportedly facilitate trafficking by transporting girls to the
boats for the purpose of prostitution. Foreign and Micronesian women
and girls in prostitution and foreign men on fishing vessels in
Micronesian waters are particularly vulnerable to trafficking. Little data
on the scope of human trafficking in FSM is available, as the government
has not conducted any inquiries, investigations, studies, or surveys on
human trafficking.
The Government of the Federated States of Micronesia does not fully
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and
is not making significant efforts to do so. During the year, the
government did not investigate or prosecute any trafficking cases, made
no efforts to identify or assist victims of trafficking, and failed to make
efforts to prevent trafficking or increase the general public’s awareness
of trafficking during the year.
For full report click here
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2009
The Micronesian Criminal Code contains no counterterrorism statutes.
Should the government ever prosecute someone for terrorist activity it
would undoubtedly invoke its laws against murder, attempted murder,
and destruction of property. The country’s statutes do not outlaw
terrorist financing. Law enforcement efforts against terrorism, limited as
they are given the region’s lack of capacity, fell within the purview of the
Transnational Crime Unit (TCU). Reliant on American funding and
Australian supervision since its opening in April 2008, the TCU brought
officers from other Pacific island nations to Palikir, the Micronesian
capital, to share information on such issues as narcotics, human
trafficking, and terrorism. The TCU also exchanged information with the
FBI and the Australian Federal Police, making it the recipient of relevant
terrorist-related intelligence.
_________________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2011 (introduction):
No report available
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 (introduction):
(Tier 3)
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is a source country for
women subjected to sex trafficking. FSM women have been recruited to
the United States and its territories with promises of well-paying jobs,
and forced into prostitution upon arrival. Pohnpei State Police received
reports that FSM women and children were prostituted to crew members
on Asian fishing vessels in Micronesia or in its territorial waters. Local
Micronesians reportedly facilitate trafficking by transporting girls to the
boats for the purpose of prostitution. Foreign and Micronesian women
and girls in prostitution and foreign men on fishing vessels in
Micronesian waters are particularly vulnerable to trafficking. Little data
on the scope of human trafficking in FSM is available, as the government
has not conducted any inquiries, investigations, studies, or surveys on
human trafficking.
The Government of the Federated States of Micronesia does not fully
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and
is not making significant efforts to do so. During the year, the
government did not investigate or prosecute any trafficking cases, made
no efforts to identify or assist victims of trafficking, and failed to make
efforts to prevent trafficking or increase the general public’s awareness
of trafficking during the year.
For full report click here
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2009
The Micronesian Criminal Code contains no counterterrorism statutes.
Should the government ever prosecute someone for terrorist activity it
would undoubtedly invoke its laws against murder, attempted murder,
and destruction of property. The country’s statutes do not outlaw
terrorist financing. Law enforcement efforts against terrorism, limited as
they are given the region’s lack of capacity, fell within the purview of the
Transnational Crime Unit (TCU). Reliant on American funding and
Australian supervision since its opening in April 2008, the TCU brought
officers from other Pacific island nations to Palikir, the Micronesian
capital, to share information on such issues as narcotics, human
trafficking, and terrorism. The TCU also exchanged information with the
FBI and the Australian Federal Police, making it the recipient of relevant
terrorist-related intelligence.
_________________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
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Sanctions:
None applicable
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is not a regional or
offshore financial center, and has no free trade zones. Its
geographic isolation, small and relatively poor population, and
limited infrastructure make it a low risk for money laundering and
terrorist financing. Money laundering activity primarily originates in
public corruption, including bribery and misuse of public funds.
The extent of such corruption is unknown and prosecutions are
rare. Corruption extends to directing public contracts and
employment to unqualified companies or persons; there are no
estimates on the amount of money involved.
Both the legislative and executive branches of the government
have declined to allocate funds for FSM to join any information
sharing organization, which has stymied prosecution of cases with
international links. Should legislation authorizing the building of a
casino in Pohnpei, currently in committee in the state legislature,
be authorized and implemented, concerns for money laundering
would rise.
Local law enforcement suspect some smuggled goods are making
their way onshore, mostly cigarettes. The FSM’s isolation, small
and relatively poor population, and limited transportation links
make it an unlikely destination for large amounts of smuggled
goods.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: NO
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls.
crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Financial institutions and “cash dealers,”
including insurers, operators of bingo parlors, trustees, and
money transaction services
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: All banks and financial institutions
Number of STRs received and time frame: 13 (January 1 –
September 30, 2010)
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable.
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: None
Convictions: None
Assets forfeited: criminally: Zero civilly: Zero
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: NO
FSM is not a member of any Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-
style regional body.
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the National Police
receives suspicious transaction reports through the Department
of Justice (DOJ). The FIU consists of a single police officer. It has
no operational or budgetary independence, and relies entirely on
the DOJ for funding and the National Police for staff. The officer
has both criminal investigative and regulatory responsibilities.
Inadequate police training and lack of resources significantly
diminish the investigative abilities of both police and FIU staff.
There have been no arrests, prosecutions or convictions for
money laundering since the FSM criminalized the offense in 2001.
The FSM should give the FIU operational and budgetary
independence, and build its overall capacity.
The FSM ratified the UN Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism in 2001. However, the country has yet to
make terrorist financing, or even the commission of terrorist acts,
a specific crime. The FSM should make the criminalization of
terrorist acts and terrorist financing a priority, and establish an
effective implementation mechanism.
Money laundering statutes provide for the seizure of “tainted”
property, as well as any benefits derived from the commission of a
money laundering offense. However, no property has ever been
seized or confiscated under the money laundering statute. There
is no civil forfeiture. The FSM should support the investigation of
money laundering cases and the seizure and confiscation of
assets where appropriate.
Local institutions and personnel lack the training and capacity to
fully enforce the law and its attendant regulations. Although
legally obligated, only one of the two banks in FSM currently
reports STRs.
The FSM should become a party to the UN Convention against
Corruption.
None applicable
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is not a regional or
offshore financial center, and has no free trade zones. Its
geographic isolation, small and relatively poor population, and
limited infrastructure make it a low risk for money laundering and
terrorist financing. Money laundering activity primarily originates in
public corruption, including bribery and misuse of public funds.
The extent of such corruption is unknown and prosecutions are
rare. Corruption extends to directing public contracts and
employment to unqualified companies or persons; there are no
estimates on the amount of money involved.
Both the legislative and executive branches of the government
have declined to allocate funds for FSM to join any information
sharing organization, which has stymied prosecution of cases with
international links. Should legislation authorizing the building of a
casino in Pohnpei, currently in committee in the state legislature,
be authorized and implemented, concerns for money laundering
would rise.
Local law enforcement suspect some smuggled goods are making
their way onshore, mostly cigarettes. The FSM’s isolation, small
and relatively poor population, and limited transportation links
make it an unlikely destination for large amounts of smuggled
goods.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: NO
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls.
crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Financial institutions and “cash dealers,”
including insurers, operators of bingo parlors, trustees, and
money transaction services
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: All banks and financial institutions
Number of STRs received and time frame: 13 (January 1 –
September 30, 2010)
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable.
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: None
Convictions: None
Assets forfeited: criminally: Zero civilly: Zero
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: NO
FSM is not a member of any Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-
style regional body.
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the National Police
receives suspicious transaction reports through the Department
of Justice (DOJ). The FIU consists of a single police officer. It has
no operational or budgetary independence, and relies entirely on
the DOJ for funding and the National Police for staff. The officer
has both criminal investigative and regulatory responsibilities.
Inadequate police training and lack of resources significantly
diminish the investigative abilities of both police and FIU staff.
There have been no arrests, prosecutions or convictions for
money laundering since the FSM criminalized the offense in 2001.
The FSM should give the FIU operational and budgetary
independence, and build its overall capacity.
The FSM ratified the UN Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism in 2001. However, the country has yet to
make terrorist financing, or even the commission of terrorist acts,
a specific crime. The FSM should make the criminalization of
terrorist acts and terrorist financing a priority, and establish an
effective implementation mechanism.
Money laundering statutes provide for the seizure of “tainted”
property, as well as any benefits derived from the commission of a
money laundering offense. However, no property has ever been
seized or confiscated under the money laundering statute. There
is no civil forfeiture. The FSM should support the investigation of
money laundering cases and the seizure and confiscation of
assets where appropriate.
Local institutions and personnel lack the training and capacity to
fully enforce the law and its attendant regulations. Although
legally obligated, only one of the two banks in FSM currently
reports STRs.
The FSM should become a party to the UN Convention against
Corruption.
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| MICRONESIA |
| KnowYourCountry |
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| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |