Extracted from IMF Report: Republic of Mozambique: Staff
Report for the Third Review Under the Policy Support
Instrument and Request for Modification of Assessment Criteria
Fighting money laundering and terrorism financing
The authorities are further strengthening the AML/CFT framework. The
Financial Intelligence Unit (GIFIM) has begun its operations. It is now fully
staffed and has received a full budget allocation under the 2012 budget
law. However, the approval of the amended AML/CFT law is necessary to
make the new framework fully effective and allow other regulators such
as the BM to issue relevant guidelines in their respective areas. The draft
legislation will be submitted to Parliament in December 2011. The MoF
will establish, chair, and appoint the members of the high-level AML/CFT
National Task Force by end- December 2011. Concurrently, GIFIM will
prepare a national AML/CFT strategic plan to be approved by the
Council of Ministers in 2012. The strategic plan will aim to foster national,
regional, and international cooperation, strengthen the AML/CFT
institutional framework, and promote capacity building and outreach
efforts.
AML/CFT framework
Mozambique’s first AML/CFT Mutual Evaluation Report by the Eastern
and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) has
been formally adopted by ESAAMLG and should be published shortly.
Based on the deficiencies identified in the report, the Financial
Action Task Force’s (FATF) International Co-operation Review Group
(ICRG) maintains Mozambique in a pool of jurisdictions which may be
taken up for review. This process is designed to publicly identify high-
risk jurisdictions, and could ultimately result in a public statement by the
FATF to apply counter-measures. In order to improve compliance with the
FATF 40+9 Recommendations, the Financial Intelligence Unit (GIFIM)
has been staffed and has begun its operations. Once the AML/CFT law
is approved by Parliament, the BM intends to issue implementing
guidelines. In order to ensure a consistent application of the AML/CFT
framework across various regulators, the Government intends to
establish, and appoint the members of, the National AML Task Force by
end-November 2011.
Click here to read full report
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012:
Mozambique is not a significant producer of illegal drugs or chemical
precursors. It is, however, a transit point for drugs moving to consumer
markets in South Africa and Europe. Domestic drug consumption is
limited primarily to cannabis and is difficult to reduce because it is
engrained in rural, cultural practices. Designer drug abuse is not
prevalent in Mozambique and is not a major concern of Government of
the Republic of Mozambique (GRM) officials.
Mozambique is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and the UN
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three
protocols and the UN Convention Against Corruption.
Long porous borders, an extensive coastline, weak security
infrastructure, and inadequately trained and equipped law enforcement
personnel hamper Mozambique’s enforcement and interdiction efforts.
Mozambique’s coastline (1,550 miles) and international borders (2,800
miles, five countries) are extremely porous and poorly patrolled by the
GRM making drug trafficking easier. Drug production in Mozambique is
limited and mainly involves small scale production of marijuana and
hashish. Mozambique lacks the technical and industrial expertise
necessary for the large-scale production of synthetic drugs. There are
media reports of small scale mandrax production.
The Office to Combat and Prevent Drug Use (GCPCD) reported for all of
2010, the seizure of 10 kilos of hashish, 3,252 kilos of marijuana (up 24
percent from 2009), 3.8 kilos of cocaine, and 5 kilos of heroin.
Arrests at airports rose significantly in 2010 and continue to rise; the
exact number of arrests is unknown due to poor GRM recordkeeping.
Media regularly report on drug arrests at Maputo airport; most traffickers
arrive on Ethiopian Airlines flights. As examples, on October 17, 2011, a
South African with 13 kilos of cocaine, arriving on an Ethiopian Airlines
flight to Maputo, was arrested, and on December 25, two South Africans
and one Zimbabwean arriving on Ethiopian Airlines flights were arrested
with cocaine.
Despite the increase in seizures, corruption is a concern at the country’s
ports. On October 24, 2011 eight policemen and customs officials at
Maputo International Airport were immediately suspended for facilitating
the entry of illegal drugs into the country in exchange for bribes.
The GRM’s unified counternarcotics plan is weakly enforced and its
institutional human and financial resources are weak. However, the
GCPCD does annually report and analyze trends and
enforcement/treatment efforts of the GRM and civil society. GCPCD
domestic drug abuse statistics underestimate the actual number of drug
addicts; only about half as many addicts as exist in the capital area are
actually registered.
The GCPCD relies on civil society support to convey its anti-drug
message. In 2010, 35,523 anti-drug activists were trained. There were
3,721 anti-drug lectures given, mainly to school-age youth, reaching an
audience of 755,312. Mozambique lacks dedicated drug treatment
facilities; most drug addicts are treated at home by the family. Given the
correlation between HIV and drug use, some HIV clinics offer drug
dependency programs too, but lack sufficient resources.
Twelve Mozambican National Police attended drug interdiction-training
at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Botswana in 2011. U.
S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement will be providing a
comprehensive border security training program for immigration, police
investigators, customs officers, and prosecutors during 2012 and 2013.
Additional training programs are planed for customs, police and border
guards in FY2012. Further assistance to the Attorney General’s Office is
also under consideration. Coordination with other narcotics assistance
donors occurs during “Mini-Dublin” group meetings of appropriate
embassy officers. The Department of Defense (DoD) has supplied 17
rigid hull inflatable boats to the Mozambican Navy since 2006 and will
continue this engagement with operation and maintenance instruction.
DoD’s program to provide maritime radar and Automatic Marine
Identification Systems is ongoing and will improve maritime domain
awareness.
The Mozambican government does not as a matter of policy encourage
or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotics and in public
statements takes a strong anti-drug and anti-corruption stance. Despite
having strong laws in place, corruption remains widespread and some
government officials are widely suspected of facilitating or condoning
drug trafficking. The GRM is finalizing a new multi-year anti-drug
strategy, in a process led by the GCPCD, and overseen by the Office of
the Prime Minister.
In September 2011, the GRM completed its investigation of prominent
businessman, Mohamed Bachir Suleman, who was placed on the
Department of Treasury’s Drug Kingpin list in 2010. While the GRM
found insufficient evidence of drug trafficking to prosecute on that
charge, it found extensive tax, customs and foreign exchange violations,
and commenced administrative action against him for payment of back
taxes and fines.
Because of weak border controls, Mozambique remains a transit point
for drugs passing to more lucrative consumer markets. The GRM’s
counternarcotics fight is hampered by weak political will, high levels of
corruption and few resources. The U.S. government will continue to work
with those elements of the GRM committed to combating illegal narcotics.
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 (introduction):
(Tier 2)
Mozambique is a source, transit, and, to a lesser extent, destination
country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex
trafficking. The use of forced child laborers is common in agriculture,
including on tobacco farms, and in commercial activities in rural areas of
the country, often with the complicity of family members. Women and
girls from rural areas, lured to cities in Mozambique or South Africa with
promises of employment or education, are exploited in forced domestic
service and the sex trade. Young Mozambican men and boys are
subjected to conditions of forced labor in South African farms and mines,
where they often labor for months without pay and under coercive
conditions before being turned over to police for deportation as illegal
migrants. Mozambican adults are subjected to forced labor and forced
prostitution in Portugal. Women and girls from Zimbabwe and Malawi
who voluntarily migrate to Mozambique are subsequently subjected to
sex trafficking or domestic servitude. In early 2010, police discovered a
network trafficking 30 to 40 African, Asian, and Eastern European
women and girls each month through Mozambique to South Africa;
Chinese women trafficked as part of this ring arrived in Mozambique on
container ships and were later sold for $1,000. Mozambican or South
African trafficking networks are typically informal; larger Chinese and
Nigerian trafficking syndicates are reportedly also active in Mozambique.
In addition, South Asian alien smugglers who move undocumented South
Asian migrants throughout Africa reportedly also transport trafficking
victims through Mozambique. Recent reports indicate that South Asian
citizens and companies in Mozambique pay the initial travel costs of
illegal Bangladeshi and Pakistani migrants, whom they later maintain in
bonded labor.
The Government of Mozambique does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making
significant efforts to do so. The government prosecuted and convicted
trafficking offenders for the first time under its 2008 anti-trafficking law.
The government reported the arrests of 21 suspected trafficking
offenders and 32 others on kidnapping and possible trafficking charges.
The government increased prevention efforts, placing billboards in high-
visibility locations, distributing 8,000 posters, and training local officials
about legal remedies provided under the anti-trafficking law in the
provinces of Sofala and Nampula. Despite these efforts, the government
made minimal efforts to address official complicity in human trafficking
and protect trafficking victims.
For full report click here
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2009
No report available
_________________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Bilateral exchange of information Agreements in place?
|
|
|
|
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Mozambique is not a regional financial center. Money laundering
is believed to be fairly common and is linked principally to customs
fraud and narcotics trafficking, although there may be links to
terrorist groups as well. Most narcotics are destined for South
African and European markets; Mozambique is not a significant
consumption destination and is rarely a transshipment point to the
United States. Local organized crime controls narcotics trafficking
operations in the country, with significant involvement by Pakistani
and Indian immigrants. While money laundering in the banking
sector is considered to be a serious problem, foreign currency
exchange houses, cash couriers, and the hawala remittance
system play more significant roles in financial crimes and money
laundering. Much of the laundering is believed to be happening at
foreign currency exchange houses. The number of exchange
houses operating in Mozambique surpasses the number required
for normal business. Authorities believe the proceeds from illicit
activities also have helped finance commercial real estate
developments, particularly in the capital. Black markets for
smuggled goods and informal financial services are widespread,
dwarfing the formal retail and banking sectors in most parts of the
country.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: List approach
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: NO
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: NO
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks and credit companies; securities
companies and exchanges; debt collectors, leasing and rental
companies; gaming facilities; capital/asset management concerns;
payment and currency exchange operators; insurance brokers;
and overseas subsidiaries or branches of Mozambican financial
institutions
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks and credit companies; securities
companies and exchanges; debt collectors, leasing and rental
companies; gaming facilities; capital/asset management concerns;
payment and currency exchange operators; insurance brokers;
and overseas subsidiaries or branches of Mozambican financial
institutions
Number of STRs received and time frame: Not available
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: Not available
Convictions: Not available
Assets forfeited: criminally: Not available civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Mozambique is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-
Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a Financial Action Task
Force (FATF)-style regional body. It has not yet had a mutual
evaluation.
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
Limited resources and high levels of corruption hamper the
government of Mozambique’s ability to fight money laundering
and terrorist financing and enforce anti-money laundering
regulations. Drug traffickers use U.S. dollars as their primary
currency when moving proceeds through local financial
institutions; however, local institutions lack the funding, training,
and personnel necessary to investigate money laundering
activities and enforce the law. Porous borders and a lack of
effective customs enforcement facilitate smuggling, trade-based
money laundering, and informal value transfer systems.
Authorities acknowledge that alternative remittance systems are
common in Mozambique, many of which operate in exchange
houses that, on paper, are heavily regulated but in fact can easily
avoid reporting requirements. There are no serious legislative,
judicial, regulatory, or enforcement measures being considered to
address this problem.
The law to establish the Financial Intelligence Office, Mozambique’
s FIU, was approved by the Parliament in July 2007. The Director
General of the Financial Intelligence Office was appointed in
September 2008, and in 2010, the Office hired the initial staff.
Since October 2010, the staff has been located in new FIU
premises, although the offices are not fully operational.
Financial institutions do not have direct access to the names of
persons or entities included on the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee’
s consolidated list; this list is distributed only to the Central Bank,
the Attorney General, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
|
Are there Sanctions in force against it? (UN/EU/US)
|
|
|
|
Is it on FATF list of non-cooperative countries?
|
|
|
|
Is it on OECD list of uncooperative Tax Havens?
|
|
|
|
OECD - Implementation status of Tax Standard
|
|
|
|
Is it on EU 'white' list of equivalent jurisdictions?
|
|
|
|
Offshore Finance Center (Original IMF List)?
|
|
|
|
Is it on the US Secretary of Treasury list of jurisdictions of Primary Money Laundering concern?
|
|
|
|
Is it on the US Secretary of State list of jurisdictions identified to be supporters of International Terrorism?
|
|
|
|
Is it on US Department of State International Narcotics Control Majors List?
|
|
|
|
US Dept of State Money Laundering assessment (INCSR)
|
|
|
|
Government Actions (For further info see INCRS below):
|
|
|
|
- Criminalized Drug Money Laundering?
|
|
|
|
- Criminalized Beyond Drugs?
|
|
|
|
- Record Large Transactions?
|
|
|
|
- Maintain Records Over Time?
|
|
|
|
- Report Suspicious Transactions?(NMP)?
|
|
|
|
- Egmont Financial Intelligence Units?
|
|
|
|
- System for Identifying/Forfeiting Assets?
|
|
|
|
- Arrangements for Asset Sharing?
|
|
|
|
- Cooperates with International Law Enforcement?
|
|
|
|
- International Transportation of Currency?
|
|
|
|
- Ability to Freeze Terrorist Assets w/o delay?
|
|
|
|
- Disclosure Protection "Safe Harbor"?
|
|
|
|
- Criminalized Financing of Terrorism?
|
|
|
|
- States Party to 1988 UN Convention?
|
|
|
|
- International Terrorism Financing Convention?
|
|
|
|
|
Compliance with FATF 40 + 9 recommendations
|
|
% Fully or Largely Compliant
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Corruption (Transparency International)
|
|
|
|
|
Ease of doing business (World Bank)
|
|
|
|
|
|
- Know Your Customer Provisions
|
|
|
- Criminalized Tipping Off?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- State Party to United Nations TOC?
|
|
|
|
- State Party to United Nations CAC?
|
|
|
|
|
Local AML News / Sanctions
|
|
|
|
|
Last Updated: 16 April 2012
|