Higher Risk
 
Medium Risk
 
Info n/a
 
Lower Risk
Bilateral exchange of information
Agreements in place?
    No
FATF Statement re AML Strategic Deficiencies:

Date:  16 February 2012

In June 2011, Nicaragua made a high-level political commitment
to work with the FATF and CFATF to address its strategic
AML/CFT deficiencies. Since then, Nicaragua has taken steps
towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by entering into
force legislation to regulate the microfinance industry. However,
the FATF has determined that certain strategic AML/CFT
deficiencies remain. Nicaragua should continue to work on
implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies,
including by: (1) establishing effective CDD measures and record-
keeping requirements, in particular entities not currently regulated
by the supervisory authority (Recommendation 5 and
Recommendation 10); (2) establishing adequate STR reporting
obligations for ML and FT (Recommendation 13 and Special
Recommendation IV); (3) implementing an adequate AML/CFT
supervisory programme for all financial sectors (Recommendation
23); (4) ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning
Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); and (5)
establishing adequate procedures for identifying and freezing
terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III). The FATF
encourages Nicaragua to address its remaining deficiencies and
continue the process of implementing its action plan.

____________________________________________________

Sanctions:

None applicable

____________________________________________________

Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:

Information unavailable.

____________________________________________________

US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:

The Republic of Nicaragua is not considered a regional financial
center. It continues to be a transshipment route for South
American cocaine and heroin destined for the United States and
cash returning to South America. Open source reports suggest
the narcotics trade is increasingly linked to arms trafficking.
Money laundering is primarily related to proceeds from illegal
narcotics and political corruption. There is no indication that
money laundering is being used to fund terrorist activities. There
is no significant evidence to believe a market for smuggled goods
exists in Nicaragua.

Nicaragua’s geographic location makes it an ideal haven for
transnational organized crime groups, including human and drug
trafficking organizations. The Central America Four Agreement
between El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua
allows for free movement of the citizens of these countries across
their respective borders without passing through immigration or
customs inspection. As such, the agreement represents a
vulnerability to each country for the cross-border movement of
contraband and illicit proceeds of crime. Furthermore, corruption
and the politicization of the judicial system, the Supreme Court in
particular, continue to seriously impede anti-money laundering law
enforcement efforts in Nicaragua.

Nicaragua is not considered an offshore financial center. The
Nicaraguan Government reports that, as of December 15, 2010,
there are 125 companies operating in free trade zones (FTZs)
throughout Nicaragua and a total of 49 industrial parks, directly
employing approximately 75,000 workers, up from 72,000 workers
as of June 2009. Most FTZs are located in Managua and
approximately 78% belong to the textile and apparel sector. The
National Free Trade Zone Commission, a government agency,
regulates all FTZs and the companies operating in them. The
Nicaraguan Customs Agency monitors all FTZ imports and
exports. It is suspected that money laundering occurs via
“traditional” mechanisms such as legal businesses; however,
there have been no convictions for money laundering in either
sector. There are no reported hawala or other similar alternative
remittance systems operating in Nicaragua, however, some
evidence exists that there are informal “cash and carry” networks
for delivering remittances from abroad that may be vulnerable to,
or indicative of, money laundering.

DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO

CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:

“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: List approach

Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES

CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:

Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: NO

UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES

(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)

KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:

Covered entities: Banks, financial institutions, credit institutions,
stock exchange systems, savings and loan cooperatives,
brokerage firms, money exchangers, casinos, and pawn shops

Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES

SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:

Covered entities: Banks, financial institutions, credit institutions,
stock exchange systems, savings and loan cooperatives,
brokerage firms, money exchangers, casinos, and pawn shops

Number of STRs received and time frame: 360 - January through
November 2010

Number of CTRs received and time frame: N/A

MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:

Prosecutions: Eight - January to October 2010

Convictions: Seven - January to October 2010

Assets forfeited: criminally: $1,742,700 - January 2010 to
November 2010 civilly: N/A

RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:

With U.S.: YES

With other governments/jurisdictions: YES

Nicaragua is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force (CFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style
regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found
here: http://www.cfatf-gafic.
org/downloadables/mer/Nicaragua_3rd_Round_MER_%28Final%
29_English.pdf

ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:

Statutes enacted to criminalize money laundering and terrorist
financing lack sufficient enforcement due to weak enforcement
mechanisms and a corrupt judicial system. There were at least
two money laundering/drug trafficking cases in which convicted
drug traffickers’ sentences were reduced or dismissed by
appellate judges under suspicious circumstances.

The law against organized crime has many enforcement
deficiencies including not requiring mandatory reporting of
suspicious transactions or customers to authorities. The
Government has enacted institutional regulations to address
some deficiencies but the regulations are weak and lack
enforcement capacity grounded in Nicaraguan law. While the law
grants the Financial Analysis Commission the ability to monitor
other financial institutions it lacks the resources or the power to
enforce regulations. Nicaragua does not have a financial
intelligence unit. STRs are filed with the National Police
Directorate.

Nicaragua did not identify, freeze, seize, and/or forfeit assets in
2010. Asset forfeiture provisions do not include the ability to
freeze terrorist assets without delay.

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):

Nicaragua continued to be a major drug transshipment point for
South American cocaine flowing to the United States in 2011.
Nicaragua’s limited law enforcement capabilities and sparsely
populated regions provide an enabling environment for drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) to move drugs, weapons and
cash, and establish clandestine labs and warehouse facilities.
DTOs were increasingly reliant on local populations for logistical
support, including refueling and security, and used women and
children as “mules” to transport contraband. Nicaragua is a
producer of crack cocaine, methamphetamines and marijuana.
There was no reliable data on the size of the export market for
these illicit drugs or on the quantities consumed domestically.
Indications existed, however, that domestic use of these drugs
was rising, particularly on the Caribbean coast. Over the past year
the police targeted smaller gangs and DTOs operating in and
around the capital of Managua.

Despite difficult conditions and limited resources, in 2011
Nicaragua’s civilian and military law enforcement units disrupted
18 DTO operations throughout the country, including operations
in the strategically important autonomous regions of the
Caribbean coast. Security forces dismantled DTO logistical
structures; seized drugs, currency and small arms; destroyed
clandestine airstrips; and confiscated vehicles, aircraft, vessels
and livestock. Nicaragua protected its territory as best it could
with limited resources and while able to deter some DTOs from
Nicaraguan littoral waters, many continue to use these maritime
routes.

The Government of Nicaragua routinely announced its
commitment to fight illicit drug trafficking and organized crime,
including efforts to coordinate with other Central American
countries to combat the drug trade. In April 2011, a delegation
from Costa Rica and Nicaragua met on their common border to
coordinate efforts to counter DTOs operating in the porous
border area. The Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) enhanced
their efforts by participating in regional law enforcement forums;
the Nicaragua National Police (NNP) Chief represented the
government at several Central American Integration System
(SICA) meetings. Nicaragua is a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention.

For Full report, click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):

(Tier 2)

Nicaragua is principally a source and transit country for men,
women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor.
Nicaraguan women and children are subjected to sex trafficking
within the country as well as in neighboring countries, most often
to Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, and
the United States. Trafficking victims are recruited in rural areas
for work in urban centers, particularly Managua, Granada, and
San Juan del Sur, and subsequently coerced into prostitution. To
a lesser extent, adults and children are subjected to conditions of
forced labor in agriculture and domestic servitude within the
country and in Costa Rica, Panama, and other countries in the
region. Nicaragua is a destination country for a limited number of
women and children recruited from neighboring countries for sex
trafficking. Managua, Granada, Esteli, and San Juan del Sur are
destinations for foreign child sex tourists from the United States,
Canada, and Western Europe, and some travel agencies are
reportedly complicit in promoting child sex tourism. Nicaragua is a
transit country for migrants from Africa and East Asia migrating to
the United States; some may fall victim to human trafficking.

The Government of Nicaragua does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. Over the last year the
government increased its anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts,
specifically through increased prosecutions, five convictions of
trafficking offenders, and the establishment of dedicated anti-
trafficking police units. The anti-trafficking coalition increased its
training and prevention efforts and began to establish working
groups at the regional level. While officials identified a location for
a future shelter for trafficking victims, the Government of
Nicaragua provided no specialized victim services and relied on
civil society organizations to provide most victim care.

For full report click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Terrorism Report 2009

Nicaragua made no substantive progress towards establishing a
Financial Intelligence Unit or passing the counterterrorism bill first
proposed in 2004. Nicaragua’s judiciary remained highly
politicized, corrupt, and prone to manipulation by political elites
and organized crime and therefore remained a vulnerability that
could be exploited by international terrorist groups. President
Daniel Ortega’s 2007 decision to grant Iranian and Libyan
nationals visa-free entry into Nicaragua remained in effect.

President Ortega maintained close relations with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). He also
continued to provide safe haven to Doris Torres Bohórquez and
Martha Perez Gutiérrez, two suspected FARC associates and
survivors of the March 2008 Colombian military operation against
the FARC. Both were granted asylum in Nicaragua and welcomed
by President Ortega as survivors of “state-sponsored terrorism by
Colombia.” On October 12, Nicaragua refused Ecuador’s request
to extradite Torres and Perez on the grounds that doing so would
violate their human rights. Senior FARC official Nubia Calderon de
Trujillo continued to have humanitarian asylum in Nicaragua.[1]

There was no new information in the case of Alberto Bermudez
(aka Rene Alberto Gutierrez Pastran, or “Cojo”), the FARC
emissary granted a false Nicaraguan identity by Nicaragua’s
Supreme Electoral Council (CSE). However, in December, local
media reported that the CSE provided official Nicaraguan identity
documents for false identities to several suspected drug
traffickers, including Amauri Paul (alias Alberto Ruiz Cano), a
Colombian criminal who was involved in an attack against
Nicaraguan counter-narcotics forces that killed two Nicaraguan
Navy personnel.

No known terrorist groups operated openly in Nicaragua;
however, both the FARC and the ETA (Basque Fatherland and
Liberty) have retired or inactive members residing in Nicaragua.

During 2009, the U.S. Embassy had increasing difficulty obtaining
information from or access to civilian officials of the government.
In one instance, the government failed to comply with a routine
evidence transfer request related to an arms-for-drugs case
involving the FARC. Despite this, there were several U.S.-
Nicaragua military-to-military counterterrorism-related exchanges
during the year.
Tables & Rankings
Are there Sanctions in force against it? (UN/EU/US)
N
?
Is it on FATF list of non-cooperative countries?
Y
?
Is it on OECD list of uncooperative Tax Havens?
N
?
OECD - Implementation status of Tax Standard
 
?
Is it on EU 'white' list of equivalent jurisdictions?
N
?
Offshore Finance Center (Original IMF List)?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of Treasury list of jurisdictions of
Primary Money Laundering concern?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of State list of jurisdictions
identified to be supporters of International Terrorism?
N
?
Is it on US Department of State International Narcotics
Control Majors List?
Y
?
US Dept of State Money Laundering assessment (INCSR)
C
?
Government Actions (For further info see INCRS below):
 
?
-  Criminalized Drug Money Laundering?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Beyond Drugs?
Y
 
-  Record Large Transactions?
Y
 
-  Maintain Records Over Time?
Y
 
-  Report Suspicious Transactions?(NMP)?
Y
 
-  Egmont Financial Intelligence Units?
N
 
-  System for Identifying/Forfeiting Assets?
Y
 
-  Arrangements for Asset Sharing?
Y
 
-  Cooperates with International Law Enforcement?
Y
 
-  International Transportation of Currency?
Y
 
-  Ability to Freeze Terrorist Assets w/o Delay?
Y
 
-  Disclosure Protection "Safe Harbor"?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Financing of Terrorism?
N
 
-  States Party to 1988 UN Convention?
Y
 
-  International Terrorism Financing Convention?
Y
 
 
Ranking
2011
Ranking
2010
 
Corruption (Transparency International)
134 (out of
183)
127 (out of
178)
?
Ease of doing business (World Bank)
118 (out of
183)
117 (out of
183)
?
FATF 40 + 9 recommendations
Mutual Evaluation Report: 2009
Further Tables
C
L
P
N
N/A
    C  -  Fully Compliant ,   
    L  -  Largely Compliant,    
    P  -  Partially Compliant    
    N  -  Non-Compliant
4
7
30
7
1
Legal Systems
 
1. Money Laundering Offence
L
 
14. Protection & no tipping-off
P
2. ML offence – mental element and
corporate liability
P
 
15. Internal controls,
compliance & audit
P
3. Confiscation and provisional
measures
L
 
16. DNFBP – R.13-15 & 21
N
4. Secrecy laws consistent with the
Recommendations
L
 
17. Sanctions
P
5. Customer due diligence
P
 
18. Shell banks
C
6. Politically exposed persons
P
 
19. Other forms of reporting
C
7. Correspondent banking
P
 
20. Other NFBP & secure
transaction techniques
L
8. New technologies & non
face-to-face business
P
 
21. Special attention for
higher risk countries
P
9. Third parties and introducers
P
 
22. Foreign branches &
subsidiaries
P
10. Record keeping
P
 
23. Regulation, supervision
and monitoring
P
11. Unusual transactions
P
 
24. DNFBP - regulation,
supervision and monitoring
N
12. Designated Non-Financial
Businesses and Professions – R.5,
6, 8-11
N
 
25. Guidelines & Feedback
P
13. Suspicious transaction reporting
P
     
Institutional and other
measures
 
26. The FIU
N
 
31. National co-operation
P
27. Law enforcement authorities
P
 
32. Statistics
P
28. Powers of competent authorities
P
 
33. Legal persons – beneficial
owners
N
29. Supervisors
P
 
34. Legal arrangements –
beneficial owners
N/A
30. Resources, integrity and training
P
 
 
 
International Co-operation
 
35. Conventions
L
 
38. MLA on confiscation and
freezing
P
36. Mutual legal assistance (MLA)
L
 
39. Extradition
C
37. Dual criminality
C
 
40. Other forms of
co-operation
P
Nine Special
Recommendations
 
SR.I Implement UN instruments
P
 
SR VI AML requirements for
money/value transfer services
N
SR.II Criminalise terrorist financing
L
 
SR VII Wire transfer rules
P
SR.III Freeze and confiscate terrorist
assets
N
 
SR.VIII Non profit
organisations
P
SR.IV Suspicious transaction
reporting
P
 
SR.IX Cross Border
Declaration & Disclosure
P
SR.V International co-operation
P
 
 
 
*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.

For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -        

R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV

Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
NICARAGUA
KnowYourCountry
-  Know Your Customer Provisions
Y
 
-  Criminalized Tipping Off?
Y
 
-  Report Suspected Terrorist Financing?
Y
 
-  State Party to United Nations TOC?
Y
 
-  State Party to United Nations CAC?
Y
 
_________________________________________________________

AML News / Relevant information

June 15, 2011  -  Letter to IMF giving overview of economic conditions in
Nicaragua extracted from 2011 IMF Report

Read Letter (internal link)

Links:

Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Local AML News / Sanctions
Tax Information
Business Information
Last Updated:   16 April 2012