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FATF Statement re AML Strategic Deficiencies:
Date: 16 February 2012
Nigeria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime,
including by enacting AML/CFT legislation and commencing
supervision across all sectors. However, despite Nigeria’s high-
level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to
address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, further engagement
with Nigeria is needed to clarify whether these deficiencies have
been addressed, including: (1) adequately criminalising money
laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and
Special Recommendation II); and (2) implementing adequate
procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special
Recommendation III). The FATF encourages Nigeria to address its
remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing
its action plan.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
As a recognised offshore finance jurisdiction this country may fall
under various country offshore jurisdiction blacklists.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:
Nigeria remains a major drug trans-shipment point and a
significant center for criminal financial activity. Individuals and
criminal and terrorist organizations take advantage of the
country's location, porous borders, weak laws, corruption, lack of
enforcement, and poor socio-economic conditions to launder the
proceeds of crime. The proceeds of illicit drugs in Nigeria derive
largely from foreign criminal activity rather than domestic
activities. One of the schemes used by drug traffickers to
repatriate and launder their proceeds involves the importation of
various commodities, predominantly luxury cars and other items
such as textiles, computers, and mobile telephone units. Drug
traffickers reportedly also use Nigerian financial institutions for
currency transactions involving U.S. dollars derived from illicit
drugs.
Proceeds from drug trafficking, illegal oil bunkering, bribery and
embezzlement, contraband smuggling, theft, and financial crimes,
such as bank fraud, real estate fraud, and identity theft, constitute
major sources of illicit proceeds in Nigeria. Advance fee fraud,
also known as “419 fraud” in reference to the fraud section in
Nigeria’s criminal code, remains a lucrative financial crime that
generates hundreds of millions of illicit dollars annually. Money
laundering in Nigeria takes many forms, including: investment in
real estate; wire transfers to offshore banks; political party
financing; deposits in foreign bank accounts; use of professional
services, such as lawyers, accountants, and investment advisers;
and cash smuggling. Nigerian criminal enterprises adeptly devise
ways to subvert international and domestic law enforcement
efforts and evade detection.
Nigeria’s AML/CFT progress in 2011 relative to its action plan was
not considered sufficient by the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), which highlighted Nigeria’s lack of adequate progress by
adding Nigeria to its October 2011 Public Statement.
For additional information focusing on terrorist financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: YES
Criminalization of Money Laundering:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: List approach
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
KYC covered entities: Banks, investment and securities
dealers/brokers, and discount houses; insurance institutions; debt
factorization and conversion firms, bureau de change, and
finance companies; money brokerage firms whose principal
business includes factoring, project financing, equipment leasing,
debt administration, fund management, private ledger service,
investment management, local purchase order financing, export
finance, project consultancy, financial consultancy, or pension
funds management; dealers in jewelry, cars and luxury goods;
chartered accountants, audit firms, and tax consultants; clearing
and settlement companies and legal practitioners; hotels, casinos,
and supermarkets
Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:
Number of STRs received and time frame: 2,306 from October 1,
2010 – September 30, 2011
Number of CTRs received and time frame: 11,580,836 from
October 1, 2010 – September 30, 2011
STR covered entities: Banks, investment and securities
dealers/brokers, and discount houses; insurance institutions; debt
factorization and conversion firms, bureau de change, and
finance companies; money brokerage firms whose principal
business includes factoring, project financing, equipment leasing,
debt administration, fund management, private ledger service,
investment management, local purchase order financing, export
finance, project consultancy, financial consultancy, or pension
funds management; dealers in jewelry, cars and luxury goods;
chartered accountants, audit firms, and tax consultants; clearing
and settlement companies and legal practitioners; hotels, casinos,
and supermarkets
Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:
Prosecutions: 639 from October 1, 2010 – September 30, 2011
Convictions: 73 from October 1, 2010 – September 30, 2011
Records exchange mechanism:
With U.S.: MLAT: YES Other mechanism: YES
With other governments/jurisdiction: YES
Nigeria is a member of the Inter Governmental Action Group
against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a FATF-style
regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found
here: http://www.giaba.org/index.php?
type=c&id=49&mod=2&men=2
Enforcement and implementation issues and comments:
Nigerian authorities should work toward full implementation of a
regime capable of thwarting money laundering and terrorist
financing. In 2011, Nigeria enacted a new Money Laundering
(Prohibition) Act (MLPA), which introduces the concept of
corporate criminal liability (“offenses of a body corporate”), and a
new Terrorism (Prevention) Act (TPA), which includes some new
provisions on terrorist financing and the freezing and seizure of
assets. The Government of Nigeria (GON) should ensure its anti-
money laundering legislation comports with international
standards and covers all the recommended predicate offenses,
including terrorist financing. Currently, terrorist financing is not
listed as a predicate offense for money laundering. The new TPA
represents progress toward criminalizing terrorist financing, but it
may not do so consistent with international standards. The GON
should amend the law as needed to bring it into compliance.
Weak law enforcement and justice sector issues have hindered
the progress of and thwarted many prosecutions and
investigations. The GON should ensure the autonomy and
independence of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC) and the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) from
political pressures. The GON also should strengthen its
supervision of designated non-financial businesses and
professions. Moreover, the GON should ensure the range of
agencies that pursue money laundering cases, including the
EFCC, Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency, Independent
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission,
Nigerian Agency for the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons, and
National Police Force have the capacity to function as
investigative partners in financial crimes cases, as well as work to
eradicate any corruption existing within law enforcement bodies.
The National Assembly should amend the 2011 MLPA to provide
for increased autonomy of the NFIU and adopt safe harbor
provisions to protect STR reporting entities. The GON should
consider developing a cadre of specially trained judges with
dedicated portfolios in order to handle financial crime cases
effectively, and the National Assembly also should adopt a non-
conviction based asset forfeiture bill.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Nigeria remains a transit country for heroin and cocaine destined
for Europe, and to a lesser degree, for the United States. The
Nigerian Drug and Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) frequently
arrests drug couriers at Murtala Mohammed International Airport
(MMIA) in Lagos, but drug traffickers have begun using other
ports of entry, such as seaports and land borders, to avoid the
tighter controls at Lagos’ airport. The Embassy's International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Office donated
digital body scanners for Nigeria’s four international airports in
2008, which continue to play a key role in NDLEA’s detection of
drug couriers. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) also donated
drug detection kits for use at all points of entry, including land
borders, to enhance the NDLEA’s drug detection capacity on site.
Still, Nigerian organized criminal networks remain a major factor in
moving cocaine and heroin worldwide, recently adding
methamphetamine to and around Southeast Asia. In addition to
drug trafficking, some of these organizations also engage in
advance-fee fraud, and other forms of fraud targeting U.S.
citizens and businesses. Widespread corruption in Nigeria
facilitates criminal activity. These factors and Nigeria’s central
location along major trafficking routes provide incentives and
mechanisms for criminal groups to flourish and for Nigeria to
serve as an important trafficking hub.
The only drug cultivated in significant amounts domestically is
cannabis sativa (marijuana). Nigerian-grown marijuana is the most
commonly abused drug in the country. It is also exported to
neighboring countries through Nigeria’s vast, porous borders and
then shipped on to Europe. However, marijuana is not shipped in
significant quantities to the United States. Nigeria is a party to the
1988 UN Drug Convention.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 1)
Nigeria is a source, transit, and destination country for women
and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.
Trafficked Nigerian women and children are recruited from rural,
and to a lesser extent urban, areas within the country’s borders −
women and girls for domestic servitude and sex trafficking, and
boys for forced labor in street vending, domestic servitude,
mining, stone quarries, agriculture, and begging. Nigerian women
and children are taken from Nigeria to other West and Central
African countries, including Gabon, Cameroon, Ghana, Chad,
Benin, Togo, Niger, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic,
and The Gambia, as well as South Africa, for the same purposes.
During the year, reports indicated significant numbers of Nigerian
women are living in situations of forced prostitution in Mali and
Cote d’Ivoire. Children from West African countries, primarily
Benin, Togo, and Ghana, are forced to work in Nigeria, and many
are subjected to hazardous labor in Nigeria’s granite mines.
Nigerian women and girls, primarily from Benin City in Edo State,
are taken to Italy for forced prostitution, and others are taken to
Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Ireland, Greece, and
Russia for the same purposes. Nigerian women and children are
recruited and transported to destinations in North Africa and the
Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco, where they are held captive
in the sex trade or situations of forced labor. During the reporting
period, traffickers decreasingly relied on air travel to transport
trafficking victims, and more often utilized land and sea routes, for
example by forcing victims to cross the desert on foot to reach
Europe.
The Government of Nigeria fully complies with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking. Over the last year, the
Nigerian government sustained a modest number of trafficking
prosecutions as well as the provision of assistance to several
hundred trafficking victims, but did not demonstrate an increase in
its anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. Although the
government claimed to have increased its budget allocation to the
National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and
Other Related Matters (NAPTIP), which was forecasted to receive
an estimated $7 million last year, the government did not disclose
actual disbursements to NAPTIP. An apparent increase in
referrals to NAPTIP of cases involving non-trafficking crimes
against children – such as pedophilia and baby selling – appears
to have burdened the organization. Longstanding plans to
relocate NAPTIP’s flagship shelter for victims – in a Lagos building
abandoned by the national security service – were not fulfilled.
Other victims’ shelters operated below their full capacity, offered
limited reintegration services, and were not always well
maintained. Despite the documented magnitude of the problem of
Nigerian trafficking victims in countries around the world, the
government inconsistently employed measures to provide
services to repatriated victims, and did not make public the
number of victims it repatriated during the year. In September
2010, senior NAPTIP officials traveled to Mali where they
investigated reports that 20,000 to 40,000 Nigerian women were
being held there in forced prostitution; despite identifying a
considerable number of such victims, officials took no apparent
action to engage Malian government counterparts to rescue
victims or arrest traffickers in the subsequent six months before
the close of the reporting period. It is of concern that senior
NAPTIP officials’ regular travel abroad during the year did not
yield discernible results in terms of arrests of traffickers or
rescues of victims.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: The Nigerian government took actions to improve
coordination, communication, and cooperation among its various
government agencies and internationally on counterterrorism
matters. In the wake of the December 25, 2009, unsuccessful
attempt by a Nigerian national to detonate an explosive aboard a
U.S.-flagged air carrier over Detroit, Nigeria cooperated closely
with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration, and the International Civil Aviation
Organization to strengthen its safety and security systems at four
major international airports. Other than ad hoc high-level security
meetings after the October 1 car bombings in Abuja, the National
Focal Point on Terrorism (an interagency task force formed in
2007 including the State Security Service, Nigerian Customs
Service, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Immigration) did not
actively operate in 2010.
Nigeria faced threats from Delta-based militants who claimed to
be seeking better government services but who commonly
resorted to violence, and from northern-Nigeria based militants
known as Boko Haram who have attacked the Nigerian
government with an aim to establish a government in the north
functioning under a strict interpretation of Sharia law.
After the July 2009 confrontations between Boko Haram and
Nigerian security forces, in which several hundred persons died,
many Boko Haram members had reportedly dispersed to
neighboring countries to regroup, recruit, and train. The Nigerian
military deployed a brigade of troops to the Borno state in July
2010 in anticipation of a violent retaliation by members of Boko
Haram on the one-year anniversary of the death of their leader
Mohammed Yusuf, who was killed by the police, but no attacks
occurred on that date.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: On September 7, 2010, Boko Haram
members stormed a prison in Bauchi State, freeing over 700
prisoners including about 100 sect members, and killed seven
guards and bystanders. For the rest of 2010, Boko Haram
members in Borno and Bauchi states attacked police, military,
state officials, and anyone perceived as assisting the Nigerian
government in efforts to bring Boko Haram members to justice.
Approximately 50 individuals were killed and scores were
wounded. Police and military personnel have since arrested over
150 Boko Haram members. On October 21, Boko Haram placed
posters at key road intersections in northern Nigeria warning the
local public against assisting police in apprehending members of
the sect. Each poster bore the signature of al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and warned that "any Muslim that goes against
the establishment of Sharia law will be attacked and killed." It has
not been established whether AQIM and Boko Haram have
operational links. In late December, violent extremists detonated
explosives in Jos, Plateau State, killing at least 32 persons and
wounding many others.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: Revised counterterrorism
legislation has been stalled since 2008. After the October 1
bombings in Abuja, the executive branch announced plans to
forward additional language to strengthen the bill, and leaders in
both the Senate and the House publicly indicated that they would
accelerate passage of the legislation. As of late December,
however, the National Assembly had yet to conduct the final
reading and approve the bill.
Corruption and lack of capacity hindered the ability of the National
Police Force to respond to security and terrorist threats within
Nigeria's borders. While senior police officers were well-educated
and able to articulate the fundamentals of police organization
theory and practices, most of the rank-and-file police personnel
lacked skills, training, and equipment. Nigerian police conducted
limited border security operations but lacked communications,
surveillance, and vehicle support to detect and apprehend
terrorists and criminals transiting the country's borders. The
Nigerian Navy remained unable to patrol its coastal waters
effectively, thereby making the Niger Delta region and offshore
sites more vulnerable to attacks by criminals and extremists.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Nigeria has some laws that
addressed terrorist financing, but they did not comply with
international standards. Nigeria’s laws for money laundering were
more extensive. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
Act covers the provision or collection of funds used to carry out
terrorist acts, but does not cover provision or collection of funds
used by terrorist organizations or individual terrorists. The Act
does not reference terrorist financing as a predicate offense for
money laundering.
Regional and International Cooperation: The Nigerian government
participated in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.
Nigeria signed the Beijing Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation and the
Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft at the conclusion of an International Civil
Aviation Organization diplomatic conference in September.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU)
Date: 16 February 2012
Nigeria has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime,
including by enacting AML/CFT legislation and commencing
supervision across all sectors. However, despite Nigeria’s high-
level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to
address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, further engagement
with Nigeria is needed to clarify whether these deficiencies have
been addressed, including: (1) adequately criminalising money
laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and
Special Recommendation II); and (2) implementing adequate
procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special
Recommendation III). The FATF encourages Nigeria to address its
remaining deficiencies and continue the process of implementing
its action plan.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
As a recognised offshore finance jurisdiction this country may fall
under various country offshore jurisdiction blacklists.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:
Nigeria remains a major drug trans-shipment point and a
significant center for criminal financial activity. Individuals and
criminal and terrorist organizations take advantage of the
country's location, porous borders, weak laws, corruption, lack of
enforcement, and poor socio-economic conditions to launder the
proceeds of crime. The proceeds of illicit drugs in Nigeria derive
largely from foreign criminal activity rather than domestic
activities. One of the schemes used by drug traffickers to
repatriate and launder their proceeds involves the importation of
various commodities, predominantly luxury cars and other items
such as textiles, computers, and mobile telephone units. Drug
traffickers reportedly also use Nigerian financial institutions for
currency transactions involving U.S. dollars derived from illicit
drugs.
Proceeds from drug trafficking, illegal oil bunkering, bribery and
embezzlement, contraband smuggling, theft, and financial crimes,
such as bank fraud, real estate fraud, and identity theft, constitute
major sources of illicit proceeds in Nigeria. Advance fee fraud,
also known as “419 fraud” in reference to the fraud section in
Nigeria’s criminal code, remains a lucrative financial crime that
generates hundreds of millions of illicit dollars annually. Money
laundering in Nigeria takes many forms, including: investment in
real estate; wire transfers to offshore banks; political party
financing; deposits in foreign bank accounts; use of professional
services, such as lawyers, accountants, and investment advisers;
and cash smuggling. Nigerian criminal enterprises adeptly devise
ways to subvert international and domestic law enforcement
efforts and evade detection.
Nigeria’s AML/CFT progress in 2011 relative to its action plan was
not considered sufficient by the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), which highlighted Nigeria’s lack of adequate progress by
adding Nigeria to its October 2011 Public Statement.
For additional information focusing on terrorist financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: YES
Criminalization of Money Laundering:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: List approach
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
KYC covered entities: Banks, investment and securities
dealers/brokers, and discount houses; insurance institutions; debt
factorization and conversion firms, bureau de change, and
finance companies; money brokerage firms whose principal
business includes factoring, project financing, equipment leasing,
debt administration, fund management, private ledger service,
investment management, local purchase order financing, export
finance, project consultancy, financial consultancy, or pension
funds management; dealers in jewelry, cars and luxury goods;
chartered accountants, audit firms, and tax consultants; clearing
and settlement companies and legal practitioners; hotels, casinos,
and supermarkets
Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:
Number of STRs received and time frame: 2,306 from October 1,
2010 – September 30, 2011
Number of CTRs received and time frame: 11,580,836 from
October 1, 2010 – September 30, 2011
STR covered entities: Banks, investment and securities
dealers/brokers, and discount houses; insurance institutions; debt
factorization and conversion firms, bureau de change, and
finance companies; money brokerage firms whose principal
business includes factoring, project financing, equipment leasing,
debt administration, fund management, private ledger service,
investment management, local purchase order financing, export
finance, project consultancy, financial consultancy, or pension
funds management; dealers in jewelry, cars and luxury goods;
chartered accountants, audit firms, and tax consultants; clearing
and settlement companies and legal practitioners; hotels, casinos,
and supermarkets
Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:
Prosecutions: 639 from October 1, 2010 – September 30, 2011
Convictions: 73 from October 1, 2010 – September 30, 2011
Records exchange mechanism:
With U.S.: MLAT: YES Other mechanism: YES
With other governments/jurisdiction: YES
Nigeria is a member of the Inter Governmental Action Group
against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a FATF-style
regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found
here: http://www.giaba.org/index.php?
type=c&id=49&mod=2&men=2
Enforcement and implementation issues and comments:
Nigerian authorities should work toward full implementation of a
regime capable of thwarting money laundering and terrorist
financing. In 2011, Nigeria enacted a new Money Laundering
(Prohibition) Act (MLPA), which introduces the concept of
corporate criminal liability (“offenses of a body corporate”), and a
new Terrorism (Prevention) Act (TPA), which includes some new
provisions on terrorist financing and the freezing and seizure of
assets. The Government of Nigeria (GON) should ensure its anti-
money laundering legislation comports with international
standards and covers all the recommended predicate offenses,
including terrorist financing. Currently, terrorist financing is not
listed as a predicate offense for money laundering. The new TPA
represents progress toward criminalizing terrorist financing, but it
may not do so consistent with international standards. The GON
should amend the law as needed to bring it into compliance.
Weak law enforcement and justice sector issues have hindered
the progress of and thwarted many prosecutions and
investigations. The GON should ensure the autonomy and
independence of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC) and the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) from
political pressures. The GON also should strengthen its
supervision of designated non-financial businesses and
professions. Moreover, the GON should ensure the range of
agencies that pursue money laundering cases, including the
EFCC, Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency, Independent
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission,
Nigerian Agency for the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons, and
National Police Force have the capacity to function as
investigative partners in financial crimes cases, as well as work to
eradicate any corruption existing within law enforcement bodies.
The National Assembly should amend the 2011 MLPA to provide
for increased autonomy of the NFIU and adopt safe harbor
provisions to protect STR reporting entities. The GON should
consider developing a cadre of specially trained judges with
dedicated portfolios in order to handle financial crime cases
effectively, and the National Assembly also should adopt a non-
conviction based asset forfeiture bill.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Nigeria remains a transit country for heroin and cocaine destined
for Europe, and to a lesser degree, for the United States. The
Nigerian Drug and Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) frequently
arrests drug couriers at Murtala Mohammed International Airport
(MMIA) in Lagos, but drug traffickers have begun using other
ports of entry, such as seaports and land borders, to avoid the
tighter controls at Lagos’ airport. The Embassy's International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Office donated
digital body scanners for Nigeria’s four international airports in
2008, which continue to play a key role in NDLEA’s detection of
drug couriers. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) also donated
drug detection kits for use at all points of entry, including land
borders, to enhance the NDLEA’s drug detection capacity on site.
Still, Nigerian organized criminal networks remain a major factor in
moving cocaine and heroin worldwide, recently adding
methamphetamine to and around Southeast Asia. In addition to
drug trafficking, some of these organizations also engage in
advance-fee fraud, and other forms of fraud targeting U.S.
citizens and businesses. Widespread corruption in Nigeria
facilitates criminal activity. These factors and Nigeria’s central
location along major trafficking routes provide incentives and
mechanisms for criminal groups to flourish and for Nigeria to
serve as an important trafficking hub.
The only drug cultivated in significant amounts domestically is
cannabis sativa (marijuana). Nigerian-grown marijuana is the most
commonly abused drug in the country. It is also exported to
neighboring countries through Nigeria’s vast, porous borders and
then shipped on to Europe. However, marijuana is not shipped in
significant quantities to the United States. Nigeria is a party to the
1988 UN Drug Convention.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 1)
Nigeria is a source, transit, and destination country for women
and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.
Trafficked Nigerian women and children are recruited from rural,
and to a lesser extent urban, areas within the country’s borders −
women and girls for domestic servitude and sex trafficking, and
boys for forced labor in street vending, domestic servitude,
mining, stone quarries, agriculture, and begging. Nigerian women
and children are taken from Nigeria to other West and Central
African countries, including Gabon, Cameroon, Ghana, Chad,
Benin, Togo, Niger, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic,
and The Gambia, as well as South Africa, for the same purposes.
During the year, reports indicated significant numbers of Nigerian
women are living in situations of forced prostitution in Mali and
Cote d’Ivoire. Children from West African countries, primarily
Benin, Togo, and Ghana, are forced to work in Nigeria, and many
are subjected to hazardous labor in Nigeria’s granite mines.
Nigerian women and girls, primarily from Benin City in Edo State,
are taken to Italy for forced prostitution, and others are taken to
Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Ireland, Greece, and
Russia for the same purposes. Nigerian women and children are
recruited and transported to destinations in North Africa and the
Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco, where they are held captive
in the sex trade or situations of forced labor. During the reporting
period, traffickers decreasingly relied on air travel to transport
trafficking victims, and more often utilized land and sea routes, for
example by forcing victims to cross the desert on foot to reach
Europe.
The Government of Nigeria fully complies with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking. Over the last year, the
Nigerian government sustained a modest number of trafficking
prosecutions as well as the provision of assistance to several
hundred trafficking victims, but did not demonstrate an increase in
its anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. Although the
government claimed to have increased its budget allocation to the
National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and
Other Related Matters (NAPTIP), which was forecasted to receive
an estimated $7 million last year, the government did not disclose
actual disbursements to NAPTIP. An apparent increase in
referrals to NAPTIP of cases involving non-trafficking crimes
against children – such as pedophilia and baby selling – appears
to have burdened the organization. Longstanding plans to
relocate NAPTIP’s flagship shelter for victims – in a Lagos building
abandoned by the national security service – were not fulfilled.
Other victims’ shelters operated below their full capacity, offered
limited reintegration services, and were not always well
maintained. Despite the documented magnitude of the problem of
Nigerian trafficking victims in countries around the world, the
government inconsistently employed measures to provide
services to repatriated victims, and did not make public the
number of victims it repatriated during the year. In September
2010, senior NAPTIP officials traveled to Mali where they
investigated reports that 20,000 to 40,000 Nigerian women were
being held there in forced prostitution; despite identifying a
considerable number of such victims, officials took no apparent
action to engage Malian government counterparts to rescue
victims or arrest traffickers in the subsequent six months before
the close of the reporting period. It is of concern that senior
NAPTIP officials’ regular travel abroad during the year did not
yield discernible results in terms of arrests of traffickers or
rescues of victims.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: The Nigerian government took actions to improve
coordination, communication, and cooperation among its various
government agencies and internationally on counterterrorism
matters. In the wake of the December 25, 2009, unsuccessful
attempt by a Nigerian national to detonate an explosive aboard a
U.S.-flagged air carrier over Detroit, Nigeria cooperated closely
with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration, and the International Civil Aviation
Organization to strengthen its safety and security systems at four
major international airports. Other than ad hoc high-level security
meetings after the October 1 car bombings in Abuja, the National
Focal Point on Terrorism (an interagency task force formed in
2007 including the State Security Service, Nigerian Customs
Service, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Immigration) did not
actively operate in 2010.
Nigeria faced threats from Delta-based militants who claimed to
be seeking better government services but who commonly
resorted to violence, and from northern-Nigeria based militants
known as Boko Haram who have attacked the Nigerian
government with an aim to establish a government in the north
functioning under a strict interpretation of Sharia law.
After the July 2009 confrontations between Boko Haram and
Nigerian security forces, in which several hundred persons died,
many Boko Haram members had reportedly dispersed to
neighboring countries to regroup, recruit, and train. The Nigerian
military deployed a brigade of troops to the Borno state in July
2010 in anticipation of a violent retaliation by members of Boko
Haram on the one-year anniversary of the death of their leader
Mohammed Yusuf, who was killed by the police, but no attacks
occurred on that date.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: On September 7, 2010, Boko Haram
members stormed a prison in Bauchi State, freeing over 700
prisoners including about 100 sect members, and killed seven
guards and bystanders. For the rest of 2010, Boko Haram
members in Borno and Bauchi states attacked police, military,
state officials, and anyone perceived as assisting the Nigerian
government in efforts to bring Boko Haram members to justice.
Approximately 50 individuals were killed and scores were
wounded. Police and military personnel have since arrested over
150 Boko Haram members. On October 21, Boko Haram placed
posters at key road intersections in northern Nigeria warning the
local public against assisting police in apprehending members of
the sect. Each poster bore the signature of al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and warned that "any Muslim that goes against
the establishment of Sharia law will be attacked and killed." It has
not been established whether AQIM and Boko Haram have
operational links. In late December, violent extremists detonated
explosives in Jos, Plateau State, killing at least 32 persons and
wounding many others.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: Revised counterterrorism
legislation has been stalled since 2008. After the October 1
bombings in Abuja, the executive branch announced plans to
forward additional language to strengthen the bill, and leaders in
both the Senate and the House publicly indicated that they would
accelerate passage of the legislation. As of late December,
however, the National Assembly had yet to conduct the final
reading and approve the bill.
Corruption and lack of capacity hindered the ability of the National
Police Force to respond to security and terrorist threats within
Nigeria's borders. While senior police officers were well-educated
and able to articulate the fundamentals of police organization
theory and practices, most of the rank-and-file police personnel
lacked skills, training, and equipment. Nigerian police conducted
limited border security operations but lacked communications,
surveillance, and vehicle support to detect and apprehend
terrorists and criminals transiting the country's borders. The
Nigerian Navy remained unable to patrol its coastal waters
effectively, thereby making the Niger Delta region and offshore
sites more vulnerable to attacks by criminals and extremists.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Nigeria has some laws that
addressed terrorist financing, but they did not comply with
international standards. Nigeria’s laws for money laundering were
more extensive. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
Act covers the provision or collection of funds used to carry out
terrorist acts, but does not cover provision or collection of funds
used by terrorist organizations or individual terrorists. The Act
does not reference terrorist financing as a predicate offense for
money laundering.
Regional and International Cooperation: The Nigerian government
participated in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.
Nigeria signed the Beijing Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation and the
Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft at the conclusion of an International Civil
Aviation Organization diplomatic conference in September.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU)
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
| NIGERIA |
| KnowYourCountry |
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| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |