_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012:
There is insufficient evidence to say that state-sponsored trafficking by
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has
stopped entirely in 2011. North Korean defectors have published an
increasing number of reports about the rise of drug use in North Korea.
Chinese and South Korean media also reported transactions between
DPRK traffickers and large-scale, organized Chinese criminal groups in
locations along the DPRK-PRC border such as Dandong (Liaoning
Province) and Yanji (Jilin Province ) and as far away as Changchun (Jilin
Provincial Capital). Although trafficking of methamphetamine (also known
as meth or “ice”) along the DPRK-PRC border and other criminal activity
involving the DPRK territory, such as the counterfeiting of cigarettes,
continued, the lack of public reports of drug trafficking with an official
DPRK connection suggests that high-profile state-sponsored drug
trafficking may have ceased or been sharply reduced.
The Chinese provinces bordering North Korea (Liaoning and Jilin) suffer
from a serious drug problem. In contrast to the majority of regions in
China, the drug of abuse in this region is overwhelmingly crystal
methamphetamine. There are regular press reports of Chinese police
enforcement targeting drugs entering China from the DPRK (e.g.
enhanced drug patrols, periodic apprehensions and drug seizures, etc.)
but the media rarely identifies the DPRK as the source.
While drug trafficking appears regular and widespread along the DPRK-
PRC border, there is no indication of an official connection or
involvement. The DPRK government does appear to coordinate with the
PRC government to try to stop the trafficking. However, enforcement in
the DPRK appears lax. It is likely that some official corruption in both
countries facilitates trafficking, as it does generally around the world, but
the drugs seem to be manufactured and trafficked by individual DPRK
criminal elements, not state-sponsored. While the reason for the wider
availability of meth in the DPRK is unclear, it is likely that the proximity
and availability of precursor chemicals from China is a main contributing
factor.
Despite efforts by China to more closely control pseudoephedrine and
other precursor chemicals that are necessary to produce meth, diversion
of these chemicals continues to be problematic. Since a relatively large
investment in precursor chemicals is necessary to produce
methamphetamine, it is not clear how individual criminals could make
that investment and arrange for sufficient meth production in the DPRK
to produce the drugs which they traffic. Therefore, DPRK official
involvement in drug production and trafficking cannot be ruled out
entirely.
From the mid-1990s through 2003, numerous instances of narcotics
trafficking involving DPRK persons and important state assets, such as
sea-going vessels and military patrol boats, were recorded in Taiwan
and Japan. Although there have been more media reports of drug
trafficking in 2011 than in recent years, there have been no confirmed
reports of large-scale drug trafficking involving the DPRK state or its
nationals in 2011. No large-scale DPRK-seizures have been reported
since 2004. This will be the ninth consecutive year that there were no
known instances of large-scale methamphetamine or heroin trafficking to
either Japan or Taiwan with direct DPRK state institution involvement.
The absence of any seizures linked directly to DPRK state institutions,
especially after a period in which seizures of very large quantities of
drugs regularly occurred, suggests that there may be considerably less
state-sponsored trafficking.
By contrast, press reports of continuing seizures of methamphetamine
trafficked to organized Chinese criminals from DPRK territory, and
reports of the use and availability of meth in the DPRK itself (e.g.,
reports of anti-drug posters in Pyongyang, interviews with travelers to
North Korea, DPRK refugees in China, etc.) indicate continuing
production of meth inside the DPRK and the sale of meth into China. For
these reasons, the Department of State has insufficient information to
confirm that the DPRK state is no longer involved in the manufacture
and trafficking of illicit drugs. If such activity persists, it is likely on a
smaller scale than in the past. The DPRK is a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention.
For Full report, click here
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 (introduction):
(Tier 3)
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is a
source country for men, women, and children who are subjected to
forced labor, forced marriage, and sex trafficking. North Korean women
and girls commonly migrate to China, often with the help of a facilitator,
seeking food, work, freedom, and better life prospects, but may then be
forced into marriage, prostitution, or labor. Trafficking networks of
Korean-Chinese and North Koreans (usually men) operate along the
China-North Korean border, reportedly working with Chinese and North
Korean border guards to recruit women for marriage or prostitution in
China. North Korean women often pass through many hands, with
multiple brokers involved in their trafficking. In some cases, friends,
neighbors, and village acquaintances transfer them to traffickers. Some
vulnerable North Korean women who make their own way to China are
lured, drugged, or kidnapped by traffickers upon arrival. Others are
offered jobs, but are subsequently trafficked into involuntary servitude,
through forced marriages to Chinese men, often of Korean ethnicity, into
forced prostitution in brothels, or the Internet sex industry. Some are
forced to serve as hostesses in nightclubs and karaoke bars. Many
victims are unable to speak Chinese and are held as prisoners by their
traffickers. If found by Chinese authorities, victims are deported back to
North Korea where they may face harsh punishment, and may be
subject to forced labor in DPRK labor camps.
NGOs and researchers estimate that thousands of undocumented North
Koreans currently live in northeast China, and as many as 70 percent of
them are women. There is no reliable information on how many of these
North Koreans have been trafficked, but their status in China as illegal
economic migrants who may be deported to North Korea makes them
particularly vulnerable to trafficking. Reports indicate corruption exists
involving North Korean border guards facilitating cross-border
movement, particularly involving traffickers and professional border
crossers.
Within North Korea, forced labor is part of an established system of
political repression. North Koreans do not have a choice in the work the
government assigns them and are not free to change jobs at will. The
North Korean government is directly involved in subjecting North
Koreans to forced labor in prison camps. An estimated 150,000 to
200,000 persons are held in political prison camps in remote areas of
the country; many of these prisoners were not duly convicted of a
criminal offense. In prison camps, all prisoners, including children, are
subject to forced labor, including logging, mining, and farming for long
hours under harsh conditions. Reports indicate that political prisoners
endure severe conditions, including little food or medical care, and brutal
punishments; many are not expected to survive. Many prisoners fell ill or
died, due to harsh labor conditions, inadequate food, beatings, lack of
medical care, and unhygienic conditions.
The North Korean government recruits workers for work abroad under
bilateral contracts with foreign governments, including in Russia;
countries in Africa; Central and Eastern Europe; and East and Southeast
Asia, including Mongolia; and the Middle East. There are credible
reports that many North Korean workers sent abroad by the government
under these contracts are subjected to forced labor, with their movement
and communications constantly under surveillance and restricted by
North Korean government “minders.” Credible reports state that they
face threats of government reprisals against them or their relatives in
North Korea if they attempt to escape or complain to outside parties.
Workers’ salaries are deposited into accounts controlled by the North
Korean government, which keeps most of the money, claiming fees for
various “voluntary” contributions to government endeavors. Workers
reportedly only receive a fraction of the money paid to the North Korean
government for their work. Tens of thousands of North Korean workers
are estimated to be employed in logging camps in Russia’s Far East,
where they reportedly have only two days of rest per year and face
punishments if they fail to meet production targets. Wages of some
North Korean workers employed in Russia reportedly were withheld until
the laborers returned home, in a coercive tactic by North Korean
authorities to compel their labor. North Korean workers at joint ventures
with foreign investors within the DPRK are employed under
arrangements similar to those that apply to overseas contract workers.
The North Korean government does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant
efforts to do so. The government has denied explicitly that human
trafficking is a problem. Authorities do not differentiate between
trafficking and illegal border crossing, and victims are punished for
violation of migration laws. The government contributes to the problem of
trafficking through its harsh restrictions on emigration, its poor economic
and food situation, and through its forced labor prison camps, where
North Koreans live in conditions of servitude, receiving little food and
little, if any, medical care.
For full report click here
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not
known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a
Korean Airlines flight in 1987. On October 11, 2008, the United States
rescinded the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in
accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that
the government of the DPRK had not provided any support for
international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the
provision by the DPRK of assurances that it will not support acts of
international terrorism in the future.
Four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a jet hijacking in
1970 continued to live in the DPRK. There also continues to be evidence
of North Korean involvement in weapons proliferation, in violation of UN
Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: In May, the United States re-certified
North Korea as “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts
under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. In
making the annual determination on “not fully cooperating,” we
undertake review of a country's overall level of cooperation in our efforts
to fight terrorism, taking into account our counterterrorism objectives with
that country and a realistic assessment of its capabilities.
Countering Terrorist Finance: The DPRK became a signatory to the
Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism and a party to
the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages in November 2001.
However, there was no indication the DPRK has taken steps to counter
money laundering and terrorist financing threats.
Regional and International Cooperation: The DPRK did not actively
participate bilaterally or multilaterally in counterterrorism efforts in 2010.
_________________________________________________________
AML News / Updates
19 December 2011, the EU Council decided to amend the list of
persons, entities and bodies to whom the freezing of funds and
economic resources should apply
Read regulation
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012:
There is insufficient evidence to say that state-sponsored trafficking by
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has
stopped entirely in 2011. North Korean defectors have published an
increasing number of reports about the rise of drug use in North Korea.
Chinese and South Korean media also reported transactions between
DPRK traffickers and large-scale, organized Chinese criminal groups in
locations along the DPRK-PRC border such as Dandong (Liaoning
Province) and Yanji (Jilin Province ) and as far away as Changchun (Jilin
Provincial Capital). Although trafficking of methamphetamine (also known
as meth or “ice”) along the DPRK-PRC border and other criminal activity
involving the DPRK territory, such as the counterfeiting of cigarettes,
continued, the lack of public reports of drug trafficking with an official
DPRK connection suggests that high-profile state-sponsored drug
trafficking may have ceased or been sharply reduced.
The Chinese provinces bordering North Korea (Liaoning and Jilin) suffer
from a serious drug problem. In contrast to the majority of regions in
China, the drug of abuse in this region is overwhelmingly crystal
methamphetamine. There are regular press reports of Chinese police
enforcement targeting drugs entering China from the DPRK (e.g.
enhanced drug patrols, periodic apprehensions and drug seizures, etc.)
but the media rarely identifies the DPRK as the source.
While drug trafficking appears regular and widespread along the DPRK-
PRC border, there is no indication of an official connection or
involvement. The DPRK government does appear to coordinate with the
PRC government to try to stop the trafficking. However, enforcement in
the DPRK appears lax. It is likely that some official corruption in both
countries facilitates trafficking, as it does generally around the world, but
the drugs seem to be manufactured and trafficked by individual DPRK
criminal elements, not state-sponsored. While the reason for the wider
availability of meth in the DPRK is unclear, it is likely that the proximity
and availability of precursor chemicals from China is a main contributing
factor.
Despite efforts by China to more closely control pseudoephedrine and
other precursor chemicals that are necessary to produce meth, diversion
of these chemicals continues to be problematic. Since a relatively large
investment in precursor chemicals is necessary to produce
methamphetamine, it is not clear how individual criminals could make
that investment and arrange for sufficient meth production in the DPRK
to produce the drugs which they traffic. Therefore, DPRK official
involvement in drug production and trafficking cannot be ruled out
entirely.
From the mid-1990s through 2003, numerous instances of narcotics
trafficking involving DPRK persons and important state assets, such as
sea-going vessels and military patrol boats, were recorded in Taiwan
and Japan. Although there have been more media reports of drug
trafficking in 2011 than in recent years, there have been no confirmed
reports of large-scale drug trafficking involving the DPRK state or its
nationals in 2011. No large-scale DPRK-seizures have been reported
since 2004. This will be the ninth consecutive year that there were no
known instances of large-scale methamphetamine or heroin trafficking to
either Japan or Taiwan with direct DPRK state institution involvement.
The absence of any seizures linked directly to DPRK state institutions,
especially after a period in which seizures of very large quantities of
drugs regularly occurred, suggests that there may be considerably less
state-sponsored trafficking.
By contrast, press reports of continuing seizures of methamphetamine
trafficked to organized Chinese criminals from DPRK territory, and
reports of the use and availability of meth in the DPRK itself (e.g.,
reports of anti-drug posters in Pyongyang, interviews with travelers to
North Korea, DPRK refugees in China, etc.) indicate continuing
production of meth inside the DPRK and the sale of meth into China. For
these reasons, the Department of State has insufficient information to
confirm that the DPRK state is no longer involved in the manufacture
and trafficking of illicit drugs. If such activity persists, it is likely on a
smaller scale than in the past. The DPRK is a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention.
For Full report, click here
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 (introduction):
(Tier 3)
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is a
source country for men, women, and children who are subjected to
forced labor, forced marriage, and sex trafficking. North Korean women
and girls commonly migrate to China, often with the help of a facilitator,
seeking food, work, freedom, and better life prospects, but may then be
forced into marriage, prostitution, or labor. Trafficking networks of
Korean-Chinese and North Koreans (usually men) operate along the
China-North Korean border, reportedly working with Chinese and North
Korean border guards to recruit women for marriage or prostitution in
China. North Korean women often pass through many hands, with
multiple brokers involved in their trafficking. In some cases, friends,
neighbors, and village acquaintances transfer them to traffickers. Some
vulnerable North Korean women who make their own way to China are
lured, drugged, or kidnapped by traffickers upon arrival. Others are
offered jobs, but are subsequently trafficked into involuntary servitude,
through forced marriages to Chinese men, often of Korean ethnicity, into
forced prostitution in brothels, or the Internet sex industry. Some are
forced to serve as hostesses in nightclubs and karaoke bars. Many
victims are unable to speak Chinese and are held as prisoners by their
traffickers. If found by Chinese authorities, victims are deported back to
North Korea where they may face harsh punishment, and may be
subject to forced labor in DPRK labor camps.
NGOs and researchers estimate that thousands of undocumented North
Koreans currently live in northeast China, and as many as 70 percent of
them are women. There is no reliable information on how many of these
North Koreans have been trafficked, but their status in China as illegal
economic migrants who may be deported to North Korea makes them
particularly vulnerable to trafficking. Reports indicate corruption exists
involving North Korean border guards facilitating cross-border
movement, particularly involving traffickers and professional border
crossers.
Within North Korea, forced labor is part of an established system of
political repression. North Koreans do not have a choice in the work the
government assigns them and are not free to change jobs at will. The
North Korean government is directly involved in subjecting North
Koreans to forced labor in prison camps. An estimated 150,000 to
200,000 persons are held in political prison camps in remote areas of
the country; many of these prisoners were not duly convicted of a
criminal offense. In prison camps, all prisoners, including children, are
subject to forced labor, including logging, mining, and farming for long
hours under harsh conditions. Reports indicate that political prisoners
endure severe conditions, including little food or medical care, and brutal
punishments; many are not expected to survive. Many prisoners fell ill or
died, due to harsh labor conditions, inadequate food, beatings, lack of
medical care, and unhygienic conditions.
The North Korean government recruits workers for work abroad under
bilateral contracts with foreign governments, including in Russia;
countries in Africa; Central and Eastern Europe; and East and Southeast
Asia, including Mongolia; and the Middle East. There are credible
reports that many North Korean workers sent abroad by the government
under these contracts are subjected to forced labor, with their movement
and communications constantly under surveillance and restricted by
North Korean government “minders.” Credible reports state that they
face threats of government reprisals against them or their relatives in
North Korea if they attempt to escape or complain to outside parties.
Workers’ salaries are deposited into accounts controlled by the North
Korean government, which keeps most of the money, claiming fees for
various “voluntary” contributions to government endeavors. Workers
reportedly only receive a fraction of the money paid to the North Korean
government for their work. Tens of thousands of North Korean workers
are estimated to be employed in logging camps in Russia’s Far East,
where they reportedly have only two days of rest per year and face
punishments if they fail to meet production targets. Wages of some
North Korean workers employed in Russia reportedly were withheld until
the laborers returned home, in a coercive tactic by North Korean
authorities to compel their labor. North Korean workers at joint ventures
with foreign investors within the DPRK are employed under
arrangements similar to those that apply to overseas contract workers.
The North Korean government does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant
efforts to do so. The government has denied explicitly that human
trafficking is a problem. Authorities do not differentiate between
trafficking and illegal border crossing, and victims are punished for
violation of migration laws. The government contributes to the problem of
trafficking through its harsh restrictions on emigration, its poor economic
and food situation, and through its forced labor prison camps, where
North Koreans live in conditions of servitude, receiving little food and
little, if any, medical care.
For full report click here
_________________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not
known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a
Korean Airlines flight in 1987. On October 11, 2008, the United States
rescinded the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in
accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that
the government of the DPRK had not provided any support for
international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the
provision by the DPRK of assurances that it will not support acts of
international terrorism in the future.
Four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a jet hijacking in
1970 continued to live in the DPRK. There also continues to be evidence
of North Korean involvement in weapons proliferation, in violation of UN
Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: In May, the United States re-certified
North Korea as “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts
under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. In
making the annual determination on “not fully cooperating,” we
undertake review of a country's overall level of cooperation in our efforts
to fight terrorism, taking into account our counterterrorism objectives with
that country and a realistic assessment of its capabilities.
Countering Terrorist Finance: The DPRK became a signatory to the
Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism and a party to
the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages in November 2001.
However, there was no indication the DPRK has taken steps to counter
money laundering and terrorist financing threats.
Regional and International Cooperation: The DPRK did not actively
participate bilaterally or multilaterally in counterterrorism efforts in 2010.
_________________________________________________________
AML News / Updates
19 December 2011, the EU Council decided to amend the list of
persons, entities and bodies to whom the freezing of funds and
economic resources should apply
Read regulation
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
|
|
FATF Statement re AML Strategic Deficiencies:
Date: 16 February 2012
The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s failure to address
the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and
combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the
serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international
financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and
meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies.
The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and
urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give
special attention to business relationships and transactions with
the DPRK, including DPRK companies and financial institutions. In
addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its
members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-
measures to protect their financial sectors from money laundering
and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks emanating from the
DPRK. Jurisdictions should also protect against correspondent
relationships being used to bypass or evade counter-measures
and risk mitigation practices, and take into account ML/FT risks
when considering requests by DPRK financial institutions to open
branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction.
The FATF acknowledges the latest outreach from DPRK to FATF
and remains prepared to engage directly in assisting the DPRK to
address its AML/CFT deficiencies.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
On 19 December 2011, the EU Council decided to amend the list
of persons, entities and bodies to whom the freezing of funds and
economic resources should apply thus Regulation (EU) No
1355/2011 was implemented of 20 December 2011
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 concerning
restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea
Read Regulation
By its resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), the Council
imposed certain measures relating to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK). These measures include:
* an arms embargo (which also encompasses a ban on related
financial transactions, technical training or services), with the
exception of the provision by States to the DPRK of small arms
and light weapons and their related materiel, on which States are
required to notify the Committee in advance;
* a nuclear, ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass
destruction programs-related embargo; (lists of the items
prohibited can be found here)
* a ban on the export of luxury goods to the DPRK; and
* individual targeted sanctions – namely, a travel ban and/or an
assets freeze on designated persons and entities.
For further information, please visit the following link: -
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/index.shtml
The EU has similar restrictive measures in force. For further
information, please visit the following link: -
http://ec.europa.
eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf
To view an overview of US sanctions in force, please visit the
following link (On 30 August 2010, US imposed new sanctions): -
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/pages/nkorea.aspx
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011
In recent years, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
citizens have been apprehended or implicated in international
investigations for narcotics trafficking and other criminal behavior,
such as producing and distributing counterfeit U.S. currency
(including $100 “supernotes”), and trading in counterfeit products
such as cigarettes. There is also evidence that North Korean
governmental entities and officials have been involved in
laundering the proceeds of illicit activities, including those related
to counterfeiting, through front companies. The illegal revenue
garnered from these sources provides desperately needed
foreign hard currency for the DPRK. The UN Security Council
passed additional multilateral sanctions against the DPRK in June
2009 (UNSCR 1874) making it even more difficult for the DPRK to
gain access to foreign hard currency.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: Not available
Legal persons covered: criminally: Not available civilly: Not
available
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: Not available
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: Not available
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Not available
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: Not
available Domestic: Not available
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Not available
Number of STRs received and time frame: Not available
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: Not available
Convictions: Not available
Assets forfeited: criminally: Not available civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: NO
The DPRK is not a participant in any Financial Action Task Force-
style regional body (FSRB).
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
On October 11, 2008, the United States Government formally
removed North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of
terrorism.
In response to concerns that North Korea had conducted nuclear
testing, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1718 on
October 14, 2006, which aimed to prevent a range of nuclear,
ballistic missile, and other weapons of mass destruction-related
equipment and technology from entering or leaving the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Resolution imposes
an asset freeze and travel ban on persons related to the nuclear
weapons program. Similar concerns gave rise to the adoption of
UNSCR 1874 on June 12, 2009, calling for member states to
prevent the provision of financial services or any financial or other
assets or resources that could contribute to North Korea’s
nuclear, ballistic missile, or other weapons of mass destruction-
related programs or activities. UNSCR 1874 also demands that
North Korea immediately comply with UNSCR 1718, which
includes a ban on the transfer of luxury goods to North Korea.
In addition, FinCEN issued an initial advisory on June 18, 2009
(amended December 18, 2009) on North Korea Government
Agencies’ and Front Companies’ Involvement in Illicit Financial
Activities. In light of the financial measures in UNSCRs 1718 and
1874, and the use of deceptive financial practices by North Korea
and North Korean entities, as well as individuals acting on their
behalf to hide illicit conduct, FinCEN advised all U.S. financial
institutions to take commensurate risk mitigation measures.
On August 30, 2010 the Department of Treasury announced
additional sanctions against North Korea aimed at freezing the
assets of individuals and entities engaging in or facilitating North
Korean trafficking in and manufacturing of arms and related
materiel; procurement of luxury goods; and illicit economic
activities, such as money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods
and currency, bulk cash smuggling, and narcotics trafficking. The
August 30, 2010 action supplements sanctions that target North
Korean proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their
supporters thereby isolating them from the US financial and
commercial systems.
The DPRK should develop a viable anti-money
laundering/counter-terrorist financing regime that comports with
international standards and participate in a FSRB. The DPRK also
should become a party to the UN Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism, the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Convention against
Corruption.
Date: 16 February 2012
The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s failure to address
the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and
combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the
serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international
financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and
meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies.
The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and
urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give
special attention to business relationships and transactions with
the DPRK, including DPRK companies and financial institutions. In
addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its
members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-
measures to protect their financial sectors from money laundering
and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks emanating from the
DPRK. Jurisdictions should also protect against correspondent
relationships being used to bypass or evade counter-measures
and risk mitigation practices, and take into account ML/FT risks
when considering requests by DPRK financial institutions to open
branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction.
The FATF acknowledges the latest outreach from DPRK to FATF
and remains prepared to engage directly in assisting the DPRK to
address its AML/CFT deficiencies.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
On 19 December 2011, the EU Council decided to amend the list
of persons, entities and bodies to whom the freezing of funds and
economic resources should apply thus Regulation (EU) No
1355/2011 was implemented of 20 December 2011
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 concerning
restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea
Read Regulation
By its resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), the Council
imposed certain measures relating to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK). These measures include:
* an arms embargo (which also encompasses a ban on related
financial transactions, technical training or services), with the
exception of the provision by States to the DPRK of small arms
and light weapons and their related materiel, on which States are
required to notify the Committee in advance;
* a nuclear, ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass
destruction programs-related embargo; (lists of the items
prohibited can be found here)
* a ban on the export of luxury goods to the DPRK; and
* individual targeted sanctions – namely, a travel ban and/or an
assets freeze on designated persons and entities.
For further information, please visit the following link: -
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/index.shtml
The EU has similar restrictive measures in force. For further
information, please visit the following link: -
http://ec.europa.
eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf
To view an overview of US sanctions in force, please visit the
following link (On 30 August 2010, US imposed new sanctions): -
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/pages/nkorea.aspx
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011
In recent years, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
citizens have been apprehended or implicated in international
investigations for narcotics trafficking and other criminal behavior,
such as producing and distributing counterfeit U.S. currency
(including $100 “supernotes”), and trading in counterfeit products
such as cigarettes. There is also evidence that North Korean
governmental entities and officials have been involved in
laundering the proceeds of illicit activities, including those related
to counterfeiting, through front companies. The illegal revenue
garnered from these sources provides desperately needed
foreign hard currency for the DPRK. The UN Security Council
passed additional multilateral sanctions against the DPRK in June
2009 (UNSCR 1874) making it even more difficult for the DPRK to
gain access to foreign hard currency.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: Not available
Legal persons covered: criminally: Not available civilly: Not
available
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: Not available
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: Not available
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Not available
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: Not
available Domestic: Not available
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Not available
Number of STRs received and time frame: Not available
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: Not available
Convictions: Not available
Assets forfeited: criminally: Not available civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: NO
The DPRK is not a participant in any Financial Action Task Force-
style regional body (FSRB).
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
On October 11, 2008, the United States Government formally
removed North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of
terrorism.
In response to concerns that North Korea had conducted nuclear
testing, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1718 on
October 14, 2006, which aimed to prevent a range of nuclear,
ballistic missile, and other weapons of mass destruction-related
equipment and technology from entering or leaving the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Resolution imposes
an asset freeze and travel ban on persons related to the nuclear
weapons program. Similar concerns gave rise to the adoption of
UNSCR 1874 on June 12, 2009, calling for member states to
prevent the provision of financial services or any financial or other
assets or resources that could contribute to North Korea’s
nuclear, ballistic missile, or other weapons of mass destruction-
related programs or activities. UNSCR 1874 also demands that
North Korea immediately comply with UNSCR 1718, which
includes a ban on the transfer of luxury goods to North Korea.
In addition, FinCEN issued an initial advisory on June 18, 2009
(amended December 18, 2009) on North Korea Government
Agencies’ and Front Companies’ Involvement in Illicit Financial
Activities. In light of the financial measures in UNSCRs 1718 and
1874, and the use of deceptive financial practices by North Korea
and North Korean entities, as well as individuals acting on their
behalf to hide illicit conduct, FinCEN advised all U.S. financial
institutions to take commensurate risk mitigation measures.
On August 30, 2010 the Department of Treasury announced
additional sanctions against North Korea aimed at freezing the
assets of individuals and entities engaging in or facilitating North
Korean trafficking in and manufacturing of arms and related
materiel; procurement of luxury goods; and illicit economic
activities, such as money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods
and currency, bulk cash smuggling, and narcotics trafficking. The
August 30, 2010 action supplements sanctions that target North
Korean proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their
supporters thereby isolating them from the US financial and
commercial systems.
The DPRK should develop a viable anti-money
laundering/counter-terrorist financing regime that comports with
international standards and participate in a FSRB. The DPRK also
should become a party to the UN Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism, the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Convention against
Corruption.
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| NORTH KOREA |
| KnowYourCountry |
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| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |