|
|
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Yes, but no further information currently available.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Peru is not a major regional financial center, nor is it an offshore
financial center. Peru ranks as the world’s second largest
producer of cocaine. Peru’s financial intelligence unit (FIU)
estimates approximately $3 billion in illicit proceeds moves
through the Peruvian financial sector each year, accounting for
approximately two percent of Peru’s gross domestic product.
Eighty-four percent of this amount relates to drug trafficking, drug
operations and businesses, and the remaining relates to fiscal
fraud, corruption, and illegal gun dealing. As a result, to integrate
these illegal proceeds into the Peruvian economy, money
laundering occurs on a significant scale. As the Peruvian
economy has grown, financial crimes have also increased. The
most common methods of money laundering in Peru involve real
estate sales, casinos, business investments, high interest loans,
construction, export businesses, hotels, and restaurants. Other
factors which facilitate money laundering include Peru’s cash-
based and heavily dollarized economy, large informal sector,
pervasive corruption, and deficient regulatory supervision of
designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs),
such as the informal money exchange and wire transfer services.
There is a significant black market for pirated and smuggled
goods in which cash transactions are the norm. Corruption
remains an issue of serious concern in Peru. The Government of
Peru estimates the public budget loses 15% per year due to
corruption.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: NO
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks, financial institutions, insurance
companies, stock funds and brokers, stock and commodities
exchanges, credit and debit card companies, money exchange
houses, mail and courier services, travel and tourism agencies,
hotels and restaurants, notaries, the customs agency, casinos,
auto dealers, construction or real estate firms, notaries, and
dealers in precious stones and metals
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Financial institutions; casinos; investment
houses; dealers of arms, antiques, precious metals and stones;
warehouses, construction and real estate firms; financial and
insurance companies; travel agents; vehicle dealerships, import
and export agents; credit card companies, courier and postal
services, money lenders, and money exchanges; customs; mining
companies; individuals and enterprises that manufacture and
commercialize explosives or chemical components used in drugs
and explosives; and public entities that receive funds from other
than the national treasury
Number of STRs received and time frame: 2,337 in 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: 2.5 million in 2010
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: Not available
Convictions: None
Assets forfeited: criminally: Not available civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Peru is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for
South America (GAFISUD), a FATF-style regional body. Its most
recent mutual evaluation can be found at: http://www.gafisud.
info/actividades.asp?offset=-1
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
In July 2010, the Government of Peru (GOP) announced a
National Action Plan to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing.
Peru’s bank secrecy laws remain primary obstacles to effective
investigation and enforcement. A number of bills under review in
the Peruvian Congress would, if enacted, lift bank secrecy
provisions and allow the FIU to access all financial transactions in
a timely fashion. In addition, Peru would benefit from expanded
supervision and regulation of financial institutions and DNFBPs.
Two specialized prosecutors are responsible for dealing with
money laundering cases within the counternarcotics section of the
Public Ministry. However, to date, there has not been a money
laundering conviction in Peru largely because the Banking
Secrecy and Tax Secrecy Law limits the FIU’s ability to properly
investigate crimes. Moreover, problems at all steps of the
prosecutorial system – including investigations, presenting
investigative results to prosecutors, the language of investigative
results, and the capacity of prosecutors themselves – also
contribute to the lack of convictions. Prosecutors claim they
cannot understand the format or language of many of the FIU’s
investigative results, and the 120-day time frame for prosecutors
to investigate results is insufficient. Compounding the problem,
many judges do not understand money laundering cases, and
banks often delay providing information to judges and
prosecutors. Convictions tend to be for lesser offenses such as
tax evasion, which is an easier offense to prosecute successfully.
Informal remittance businesses remain unsupervised and
vulnerable to money laundering. These businesses include travel
agencies and small wire transfer businesses. The Gaming Sector
is also highly vulnerable to money laundering. Sixty percent of the
casino sector is considered informal. There are no restrictions on
cash-to-cash, cash-to-check, or cash-to-wire transfer type
transactions in casinos. Currently 700 establishments are licensed
and 70,000 slot machines operate in Peru.
The GOP has not yet specifically and fully established terrorist
financing as a crime under Peruvian legislation in a manner that
would conform to international standards. However, under Decree
Law 25.475, any form of collaboration with terrorism, including
economic collaboration, is criminalized. It is not unusual for the
FIU to observe an enterprise believed to be related to an
international terrorist entity attempt to transfer money from
Europe through Peru and then on to other destinations. There
are several bills pending in the Peruvian Congress concerning the
definition of the crime of terrorist financing.
In November 2010, Peru signed a memorandum of understanding
between its FIU and the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network concerning cooperation in the exchange of information
related to money laundering and terrorist financing.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
According to U.S. Government (USG) statistics, Peru has the
world’s highest potential production of pure cocaine and the
second highest potential production of export quality cocaine.
Peru is the world’s second largest cultivator of coca, with an
estimated 53,000 hectares (ha) of coca under cultivation in 2010.
Cocaine is transported to Europe, East Asia, Mexico, the
Caribbean, and the United States via land and maritime
conveyances, and commercial air flights. Peru is also a major
importer of precursor chemicals used for cocaine production.
Domestic consumption of illicit drugs is a growing problem and the
number of treatment and rehabilitation centers falls short of what
is needed to treat the estimated 150,000 addicts nationwide.
There is also growing concern about the impact of drug trafficking
and drug abuse on the nation’s youth, as well as the damage illicit
drug production causes to the environment.
Peru has a national counternarcotics strategy but does not
devote sufficient resources towards its implementation, in part
because cultivation and drug production occur far from densely
populated urban centers. Eradication remains controversial in
coca-growing areas, and some growers resort to violence to resist
it. In mid-September, for example, coca growers temporarily
blocked the main highway of the Ucayali Region. The
administration of newly inaugurated (July 2011) President Ollanta
Humala’s briefly suspended eradication in mid-August, citing
security concerns, but resumed eradication operations within
three days. Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path) factions in
the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) and in the Apurimac and Ene
River Valley (VRAE) rely on cocaine production and trafficking for
funding, and have attacked and killed police and military
personnel engaged in counternarcotics operations.
Peru is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
Peru is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women,
and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Several
thousand persons are estimated to be subjected to conditions of
forced labor within Peru, mainly in mining, logging, agriculture,
brick making, and domestic service. Peruvian women and girls are
recruited and coerced into prostitution in nightclubs, bars, and
brothels in Peru’s urban areas and mining centers, often through
false employment offers or promises of education. The Madre de
Dios province, as well as the cities of Cuzco and Lima, were
identified as some of the main destinations for Peruvian sex
trafficking victims. Indigenous persons are particularly vulnerable
to debt bondage. Forced child labor remains a problem,
particularly in informal gold mines, among begging rings in urban
areas, and in cocaine production and transportation. There are
reports that the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso, or Shining
Path, recruited children to serve as combatants and in the illicit
narcotics trade. There were also reports that a smaller number of
adolescents were serving in the Peruvian Armed Forces: however,
while there were 150 complaints to the Human Rights
Ombudsman about underage soldiers, authorities reported only
20 such complaints made in 2010. Most trafficking is carried out
internally, but Peruvian women are also, to a lesser extent,
subjected to forced prostitution in Ecuador, Spain, Italy, Japan,
and the United States, and forced labor in Argentina, Chile,
Ecuador, and Brazil. Peru also is a destination country for some
Ecuadorian, Bolivian, and Chinese women and girls subjected to
sex trafficking, and some Bolivian nationals in conditions of forced
labor. Child sex tourism is present in areas such as Cuzco and
Lima. Traffickers reportedly operate with impunity in certain
regions where there is little or no government presence.
The Government of Peru does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making
significant efforts to do so. Authorities sustained law enforcement
efforts against sex trafficking and maintained strong public
awareness efforts, including launching the first national anti-
trafficking campaign. However, the government again failed to
make sufficient efforts to address the high incidence of forced
labor in the country and has never reported successfully
prosecuting a forced labor offense. Furthermore, authorities did
not provide adequate victim services for victims of all forms of
trafficking, and a draft national plan to combat trafficking created
in 2006 has yet to be formalized.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: Peru’s primary counterterrorism concern remained
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL), a U.S.-designated
Foreign Terrorist Organization that wreaked havoc on the country
in the 1980s and 1990s in a conflict that claimed more than
69,000 lives. SL elements in the Upper Huallaga River Valley
(UHV) sought to regroup and replenish their ranks following
significant setbacks in recent years. Separately, the rival SL
faction in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE) maintained
its influence in that area. Implementation of the government’s Plan
VRAE, which in its security component called for 2,000 troops and
19 counterterrorism bases under a central command, was still
evolving in 2010. Plans for new health, education, and
infrastructure investment in these isolated communities were not
fully implemented, but authorities made some improvements to
roadways and rural electrification.
Although Peru nearly eliminated SL in the 1990s, the
organization, now entwined with narcotics trafficking, remained a
threat. Because of the nature of the threat and SL’s close ties to
narcotics trafficking, counterterrorism efforts are often, but not
always, intrinsically tied to counter-narcotics; some analysts refer
to SL as “narco-terrorists.” In 2010, the U.S. State Department
added the leaders of both SL factions to its Narcotics Rewards
Program, and offered up to US$5 million each for information
leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Florindo Eleuterio Flores-
Hala (aka “Artemio,” of the UHV) and Victor Quispe Palomino (aka
“Jose,” of the VRAE).
SL forcibly recruited young children. Digital cameras found at an
SL camp in the VRAE raided by Peruvian authorities in October
contained numerous photos of about 50 children of ages 5 to 16,
many of them carrying automatic weapons or reading Maoist
literature. The children apparently formed part of a group led by
“Alipio,” a high ranking leader known for leading some of the
bloodiest ambushes in the VRAE. Some of the children were
thought to have been kidnapped from local towns or indigenous
communities, while others may be the children of SL members.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continued
to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to
regroup and make arms purchases. Peruvian government experts
believed the FARC continued to fund coca cultivation and cocaine
production among the Peruvian population in border areas.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: The two factions of the SL (UHV and
VRAE) together carried out 136 terrorist acts that killed police and
civilians (mostly individuals perceived by SL in the UHV as police
informants or collaborators), and members of the military in 2010.
The Peruvian Army’s 2008 offensive in the Vizcatan region, called
“Operation Excellence 777,” continued haltingly, with the military
maintaining a number of small provisional bases in the area.
Confrontations generally consisted of SL members attacking
Peruvian patrols or incoming supply helicopters, but in several
cases SL attacked a military base.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: Government efforts to improve
interagency cooperation, especially in intelligence, and to
strengthen prosecutorial capacity were somewhat successful.
Police units specializing in counterterrorism and counternarcotics
conducted some joint operations with the Peruvian Army in the
UHV, where police captured two high-ranking SL terrorists. Peru
has counterterrorism legislation and applied it consistently to
arrest and convict terrorists. No new counterterrorism legislation
was passed in 2010, and there was no movement on President
Garcia’s 2006 proposal calling for the death penalty for those
convicted of acts of terrorism.
Police detained over 121 suspected terrorists during the year,
including Edgar Mejia Ascencio (aka “Izula”), believed to be the
UHV faction’s number two leader, and later Mario Antonio
Sifuentes Sandoval (aka “Sergio), who had succeeded Mejia as
number two. In November, police arrested 43 people during a raid
in the UHV as part of its “Operation Eclipse.” The detainees,
several of whom were prominent coca farmer leaders and local
elected officials, faced drug trafficking, terrorism, falsification of
documents, homicide, money laundering, and other charges.
Some of the detainees had been filmed meeting with Artemio in
April, demonstrating an alliance between coca growers and SL.
Authorities also killed five SL members in clashes with SL
columns, including Victor Raul Vasquez Santa Cruz (aka
“Ruben”), who was reputed to have assassinated political leaders
in the UHV and to be in Artemio’s inner circle. SL founder and
leader Abimael Guzman and key accomplices remained in prison
serving life sentences on charges stemming from crimes
committed during the 1980s and 1990s. Many others have been
released in recent years, having completed their sentences or
been released on parole for good behavior.
Peruvian authorities installed body scanners for drug detection at
the border crossings with Chile and two international airports.
Authorities collected no biometrics information, and citizens of
neighboring countries were allowed to travel to Peru by land using
national identification cards alone. There is no visa requirement
for citizens of most countries in Western, Central, and Eastern
Europe.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Peru is a member of the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) Against Money Laundering in South
America (GAFISUD), which held its XXI Plenary Session in Lima in
July. Peru’s Superintendent of Banks served as Chair of GAFISUD
during 2010. Peru was ranked as ‘partially compliant’ in the
GAFISUD 3rd Evaluation Report (2008) on the Ratification and
Implementation of UN Instruments and the Special
Recommendation Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist Assets. As
a result, the Superintendent of Banking issued a resolution in
September establishing guidelines for financial and insurance
entities to implement the UN resolutions to prevent and suppress
the financing of terrorism.
Regional and International Cooperation: Peru is an active member
of the OAS, the Union of South American Nations, and the
Andean Community. On October 21, senior military commanders
from Colombia, Peru, and Brazil met in Leticia, Colombia to
discuss joint actions, including aircraft monitoring against drug
trafficking and guerrillas along their common tri-border area in the
Amazon jungle. Previously, the countries had conducted bilateral
operations; this will mark the first tripartite effort to address drug
trafficking and terrorism.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: While the
Government of Peru does not have a systematic program to
counter radicalization and violent extremism, aspects of Plan
VRAE (improvements in education, infrastructure, health, and
security) are designed to increase the state’s presence and
improve governance. The official position of the National
Penitentiary Institute is that prison is meant to rehabilitate and
reintegrate prisoners, especially terrorists, and therefore a
psychological assessment that indicates such change has taken
place is required before a terrorist can be granted parole. This
benefit is also meant to encourage prisoners to change, rather
than to continue in conflict with the state. Many observers have
expressed concern that convicted terrorists are not, in fact,
rehabilitated, and many return to SL after they complete
sentences and are released. Comrade “Sergio,” for example,
completed a 12-year prison sentence for terrorism charges in
2004, and promptly returned to SL to become Artemio’s number
two leader in 2010 before being re-arrested in December.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera del Peru (UIF)
Financial Intelligence Unit of Peru
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Yes, but no further information currently available.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Peru is not a major regional financial center, nor is it an offshore
financial center. Peru ranks as the world’s second largest
producer of cocaine. Peru’s financial intelligence unit (FIU)
estimates approximately $3 billion in illicit proceeds moves
through the Peruvian financial sector each year, accounting for
approximately two percent of Peru’s gross domestic product.
Eighty-four percent of this amount relates to drug trafficking, drug
operations and businesses, and the remaining relates to fiscal
fraud, corruption, and illegal gun dealing. As a result, to integrate
these illegal proceeds into the Peruvian economy, money
laundering occurs on a significant scale. As the Peruvian
economy has grown, financial crimes have also increased. The
most common methods of money laundering in Peru involve real
estate sales, casinos, business investments, high interest loans,
construction, export businesses, hotels, and restaurants. Other
factors which facilitate money laundering include Peru’s cash-
based and heavily dollarized economy, large informal sector,
pervasive corruption, and deficient regulatory supervision of
designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs),
such as the informal money exchange and wire transfer services.
There is a significant black market for pirated and smuggled
goods in which cash transactions are the norm. Corruption
remains an issue of serious concern in Peru. The Government of
Peru estimates the public budget loses 15% per year due to
corruption.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: NO
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks, financial institutions, insurance
companies, stock funds and brokers, stock and commodities
exchanges, credit and debit card companies, money exchange
houses, mail and courier services, travel and tourism agencies,
hotels and restaurants, notaries, the customs agency, casinos,
auto dealers, construction or real estate firms, notaries, and
dealers in precious stones and metals
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Financial institutions; casinos; investment
houses; dealers of arms, antiques, precious metals and stones;
warehouses, construction and real estate firms; financial and
insurance companies; travel agents; vehicle dealerships, import
and export agents; credit card companies, courier and postal
services, money lenders, and money exchanges; customs; mining
companies; individuals and enterprises that manufacture and
commercialize explosives or chemical components used in drugs
and explosives; and public entities that receive funds from other
than the national treasury
Number of STRs received and time frame: 2,337 in 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: 2.5 million in 2010
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: Not available
Convictions: None
Assets forfeited: criminally: Not available civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Peru is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for
South America (GAFISUD), a FATF-style regional body. Its most
recent mutual evaluation can be found at: http://www.gafisud.
info/actividades.asp?offset=-1
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
In July 2010, the Government of Peru (GOP) announced a
National Action Plan to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing.
Peru’s bank secrecy laws remain primary obstacles to effective
investigation and enforcement. A number of bills under review in
the Peruvian Congress would, if enacted, lift bank secrecy
provisions and allow the FIU to access all financial transactions in
a timely fashion. In addition, Peru would benefit from expanded
supervision and regulation of financial institutions and DNFBPs.
Two specialized prosecutors are responsible for dealing with
money laundering cases within the counternarcotics section of the
Public Ministry. However, to date, there has not been a money
laundering conviction in Peru largely because the Banking
Secrecy and Tax Secrecy Law limits the FIU’s ability to properly
investigate crimes. Moreover, problems at all steps of the
prosecutorial system – including investigations, presenting
investigative results to prosecutors, the language of investigative
results, and the capacity of prosecutors themselves – also
contribute to the lack of convictions. Prosecutors claim they
cannot understand the format or language of many of the FIU’s
investigative results, and the 120-day time frame for prosecutors
to investigate results is insufficient. Compounding the problem,
many judges do not understand money laundering cases, and
banks often delay providing information to judges and
prosecutors. Convictions tend to be for lesser offenses such as
tax evasion, which is an easier offense to prosecute successfully.
Informal remittance businesses remain unsupervised and
vulnerable to money laundering. These businesses include travel
agencies and small wire transfer businesses. The Gaming Sector
is also highly vulnerable to money laundering. Sixty percent of the
casino sector is considered informal. There are no restrictions on
cash-to-cash, cash-to-check, or cash-to-wire transfer type
transactions in casinos. Currently 700 establishments are licensed
and 70,000 slot machines operate in Peru.
The GOP has not yet specifically and fully established terrorist
financing as a crime under Peruvian legislation in a manner that
would conform to international standards. However, under Decree
Law 25.475, any form of collaboration with terrorism, including
economic collaboration, is criminalized. It is not unusual for the
FIU to observe an enterprise believed to be related to an
international terrorist entity attempt to transfer money from
Europe through Peru and then on to other destinations. There
are several bills pending in the Peruvian Congress concerning the
definition of the crime of terrorist financing.
In November 2010, Peru signed a memorandum of understanding
between its FIU and the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network concerning cooperation in the exchange of information
related to money laundering and terrorist financing.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
According to U.S. Government (USG) statistics, Peru has the
world’s highest potential production of pure cocaine and the
second highest potential production of export quality cocaine.
Peru is the world’s second largest cultivator of coca, with an
estimated 53,000 hectares (ha) of coca under cultivation in 2010.
Cocaine is transported to Europe, East Asia, Mexico, the
Caribbean, and the United States via land and maritime
conveyances, and commercial air flights. Peru is also a major
importer of precursor chemicals used for cocaine production.
Domestic consumption of illicit drugs is a growing problem and the
number of treatment and rehabilitation centers falls short of what
is needed to treat the estimated 150,000 addicts nationwide.
There is also growing concern about the impact of drug trafficking
and drug abuse on the nation’s youth, as well as the damage illicit
drug production causes to the environment.
Peru has a national counternarcotics strategy but does not
devote sufficient resources towards its implementation, in part
because cultivation and drug production occur far from densely
populated urban centers. Eradication remains controversial in
coca-growing areas, and some growers resort to violence to resist
it. In mid-September, for example, coca growers temporarily
blocked the main highway of the Ucayali Region. The
administration of newly inaugurated (July 2011) President Ollanta
Humala’s briefly suspended eradication in mid-August, citing
security concerns, but resumed eradication operations within
three days. Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path) factions in
the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) and in the Apurimac and Ene
River Valley (VRAE) rely on cocaine production and trafficking for
funding, and have attacked and killed police and military
personnel engaged in counternarcotics operations.
Peru is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
Peru is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women,
and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Several
thousand persons are estimated to be subjected to conditions of
forced labor within Peru, mainly in mining, logging, agriculture,
brick making, and domestic service. Peruvian women and girls are
recruited and coerced into prostitution in nightclubs, bars, and
brothels in Peru’s urban areas and mining centers, often through
false employment offers or promises of education. The Madre de
Dios province, as well as the cities of Cuzco and Lima, were
identified as some of the main destinations for Peruvian sex
trafficking victims. Indigenous persons are particularly vulnerable
to debt bondage. Forced child labor remains a problem,
particularly in informal gold mines, among begging rings in urban
areas, and in cocaine production and transportation. There are
reports that the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso, or Shining
Path, recruited children to serve as combatants and in the illicit
narcotics trade. There were also reports that a smaller number of
adolescents were serving in the Peruvian Armed Forces: however,
while there were 150 complaints to the Human Rights
Ombudsman about underage soldiers, authorities reported only
20 such complaints made in 2010. Most trafficking is carried out
internally, but Peruvian women are also, to a lesser extent,
subjected to forced prostitution in Ecuador, Spain, Italy, Japan,
and the United States, and forced labor in Argentina, Chile,
Ecuador, and Brazil. Peru also is a destination country for some
Ecuadorian, Bolivian, and Chinese women and girls subjected to
sex trafficking, and some Bolivian nationals in conditions of forced
labor. Child sex tourism is present in areas such as Cuzco and
Lima. Traffickers reportedly operate with impunity in certain
regions where there is little or no government presence.
The Government of Peru does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making
significant efforts to do so. Authorities sustained law enforcement
efforts against sex trafficking and maintained strong public
awareness efforts, including launching the first national anti-
trafficking campaign. However, the government again failed to
make sufficient efforts to address the high incidence of forced
labor in the country and has never reported successfully
prosecuting a forced labor offense. Furthermore, authorities did
not provide adequate victim services for victims of all forms of
trafficking, and a draft national plan to combat trafficking created
in 2006 has yet to be formalized.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: Peru’s primary counterterrorism concern remained
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL), a U.S.-designated
Foreign Terrorist Organization that wreaked havoc on the country
in the 1980s and 1990s in a conflict that claimed more than
69,000 lives. SL elements in the Upper Huallaga River Valley
(UHV) sought to regroup and replenish their ranks following
significant setbacks in recent years. Separately, the rival SL
faction in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE) maintained
its influence in that area. Implementation of the government’s Plan
VRAE, which in its security component called for 2,000 troops and
19 counterterrorism bases under a central command, was still
evolving in 2010. Plans for new health, education, and
infrastructure investment in these isolated communities were not
fully implemented, but authorities made some improvements to
roadways and rural electrification.
Although Peru nearly eliminated SL in the 1990s, the
organization, now entwined with narcotics trafficking, remained a
threat. Because of the nature of the threat and SL’s close ties to
narcotics trafficking, counterterrorism efforts are often, but not
always, intrinsically tied to counter-narcotics; some analysts refer
to SL as “narco-terrorists.” In 2010, the U.S. State Department
added the leaders of both SL factions to its Narcotics Rewards
Program, and offered up to US$5 million each for information
leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Florindo Eleuterio Flores-
Hala (aka “Artemio,” of the UHV) and Victor Quispe Palomino (aka
“Jose,” of the VRAE).
SL forcibly recruited young children. Digital cameras found at an
SL camp in the VRAE raided by Peruvian authorities in October
contained numerous photos of about 50 children of ages 5 to 16,
many of them carrying automatic weapons or reading Maoist
literature. The children apparently formed part of a group led by
“Alipio,” a high ranking leader known for leading some of the
bloodiest ambushes in the VRAE. Some of the children were
thought to have been kidnapped from local towns or indigenous
communities, while others may be the children of SL members.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continued
to use remote areas along the Colombian-Peruvian border to
regroup and make arms purchases. Peruvian government experts
believed the FARC continued to fund coca cultivation and cocaine
production among the Peruvian population in border areas.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: The two factions of the SL (UHV and
VRAE) together carried out 136 terrorist acts that killed police and
civilians (mostly individuals perceived by SL in the UHV as police
informants or collaborators), and members of the military in 2010.
The Peruvian Army’s 2008 offensive in the Vizcatan region, called
“Operation Excellence 777,” continued haltingly, with the military
maintaining a number of small provisional bases in the area.
Confrontations generally consisted of SL members attacking
Peruvian patrols or incoming supply helicopters, but in several
cases SL attacked a military base.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: Government efforts to improve
interagency cooperation, especially in intelligence, and to
strengthen prosecutorial capacity were somewhat successful.
Police units specializing in counterterrorism and counternarcotics
conducted some joint operations with the Peruvian Army in the
UHV, where police captured two high-ranking SL terrorists. Peru
has counterterrorism legislation and applied it consistently to
arrest and convict terrorists. No new counterterrorism legislation
was passed in 2010, and there was no movement on President
Garcia’s 2006 proposal calling for the death penalty for those
convicted of acts of terrorism.
Police detained over 121 suspected terrorists during the year,
including Edgar Mejia Ascencio (aka “Izula”), believed to be the
UHV faction’s number two leader, and later Mario Antonio
Sifuentes Sandoval (aka “Sergio), who had succeeded Mejia as
number two. In November, police arrested 43 people during a raid
in the UHV as part of its “Operation Eclipse.” The detainees,
several of whom were prominent coca farmer leaders and local
elected officials, faced drug trafficking, terrorism, falsification of
documents, homicide, money laundering, and other charges.
Some of the detainees had been filmed meeting with Artemio in
April, demonstrating an alliance between coca growers and SL.
Authorities also killed five SL members in clashes with SL
columns, including Victor Raul Vasquez Santa Cruz (aka
“Ruben”), who was reputed to have assassinated political leaders
in the UHV and to be in Artemio’s inner circle. SL founder and
leader Abimael Guzman and key accomplices remained in prison
serving life sentences on charges stemming from crimes
committed during the 1980s and 1990s. Many others have been
released in recent years, having completed their sentences or
been released on parole for good behavior.
Peruvian authorities installed body scanners for drug detection at
the border crossings with Chile and two international airports.
Authorities collected no biometrics information, and citizens of
neighboring countries were allowed to travel to Peru by land using
national identification cards alone. There is no visa requirement
for citizens of most countries in Western, Central, and Eastern
Europe.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Peru is a member of the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) Against Money Laundering in South
America (GAFISUD), which held its XXI Plenary Session in Lima in
July. Peru’s Superintendent of Banks served as Chair of GAFISUD
during 2010. Peru was ranked as ‘partially compliant’ in the
GAFISUD 3rd Evaluation Report (2008) on the Ratification and
Implementation of UN Instruments and the Special
Recommendation Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist Assets. As
a result, the Superintendent of Banking issued a resolution in
September establishing guidelines for financial and insurance
entities to implement the UN resolutions to prevent and suppress
the financing of terrorism.
Regional and International Cooperation: Peru is an active member
of the OAS, the Union of South American Nations, and the
Andean Community. On October 21, senior military commanders
from Colombia, Peru, and Brazil met in Leticia, Colombia to
discuss joint actions, including aircraft monitoring against drug
trafficking and guerrillas along their common tri-border area in the
Amazon jungle. Previously, the countries had conducted bilateral
operations; this will mark the first tripartite effort to address drug
trafficking and terrorism.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: While the
Government of Peru does not have a systematic program to
counter radicalization and violent extremism, aspects of Plan
VRAE (improvements in education, infrastructure, health, and
security) are designed to increase the state’s presence and
improve governance. The official position of the National
Penitentiary Institute is that prison is meant to rehabilitate and
reintegrate prisoners, especially terrorists, and therefore a
psychological assessment that indicates such change has taken
place is required before a terrorist can be granted parole. This
benefit is also meant to encourage prisoners to change, rather
than to continue in conflict with the state. Many observers have
expressed concern that convicted terrorists are not, in fact,
rehabilitated, and many return to SL after they complete
sentences and are released. Comrade “Sergio,” for example,
completed a 12-year prison sentence for terrorism charges in
2004, and promptly returned to SL to become Artemio’s number
two leader in 2010 before being re-arrested in December.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera del Peru (UIF)
Financial Intelligence Unit of Peru
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
| PERU |
| KnowYourCountry |
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| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |