Higher Risk
 
Medium Risk
 
Info n/a
 
Lower Risk
Bilateral exchange of information
Agreements in place?
    No
FATF Statement re AML Strategic Deficiencies:

Date:  16 February 2012

The Philippines has made efforts to improve its AML/CFT system
with two bills in the Senate on money laundering and terrorist
financing certified urgent by the President which are awaiting
passage. Despite the Philippines’ high-level political commitment
to work with the FATF and APG to address its strategic AML/CFT
deficiencies, the FATF is not yet satisfied that the Philippines has
made sufficient progress in implementing its action plan, and
certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. The Philippines
should work on implementing its action plan to address these
deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money
laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and
Special Recommendation II); (2) implementing adequate
procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets and confiscate
funds related to money laundering (Special Recommendation III
and Recommendation 3); (3) enhancing financial transparency
(Recommendation 4); and (4) extending coverage of reporting
entities (Recommendation 12 and Recommendation 16). The
FATF encourages the Philippines to address its remaining
deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action
plan. In particular, the FATF strongly encourages the Philippines
to enact the pending legislative amendments to its AML/CFT
regime.

____________________________________________________

Sanctions:

None applicable

____________________________________________________

Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:

As a recognised offshore finance jurisdiction this country may fall
under various country offshore jurisdiction blacklists.

____________________________________________________

US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:

The Republic of the Philippines is not a regional financial center.
The Philippines continues to experience an increase in foreign
organized criminal activity from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
Insurgency groups operating in the Philippines partially fund their
activities through local crime, kidnapping for ransom and the
trafficking of narcotics and arms, and engage in money
laundering through ties to organized crime. The proceeds of
corruption are also a source of laundered funds. Smuggling,
including bulk cash smuggling, continues to be a major problem.
The Philippines has a large expatriate community, and
remittances are also channels for money laundering. There are
free trade zones and four offshore banking units (OBUs). The
Central Bank exercises regulatory supervision over OBUs and
requires them to meet reporting provisions and other banking
rules and regulations.

For additional information focusing on terrorism financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/

Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: No

Criminalization of Money Laundering:

“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: List approach

Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES

Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:

Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO

KYC covered entities: Banks, non-bank institutions acting as quasi
banks, and trust entities; insurance companies and pre-need
companies; securities dealers, brokers/sales representatives,
investment houses, mutual funds, and other entities managing
securities as agent/consultant; foreign exchange dealers, money
changers, remittance/transfer agents; pawnshops and entities
dealing in valuable objects, currency, financial derivatives, cash
substitutes, and similar monetary instruments

Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:

Number of STRs received and time frame: 38,478 as of August
31, 2011

Number of CTRs received and time frame: 253,583,611 as of
August 31, 2011

STR covered entities: Banks, non-bank institutions acting as
quasi banks, trust entities; insurance companies and pre-need
companies; securities dealers, brokers/sales representatives,
investment houses, mutual funds, and other entities managing
securities as agent/consultant; foreign exchange dealers, money
changers, remittance/transfer agents; entities dealing in valuable
objects, currency, financial derivatives, cash substitutes, and
similar monetary instruments

Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:

Prosecutions: 50 as of August 31, 2011

Convictions: One as of August 31, 2011

Records exchange mechanism:

With U.S.: MLAT: YES Other mechanism: YES

With other governments/jurisdictions: YES

The Philippines is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money
Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional
body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found here: http:
//www.apgml.org/documents/docs/17/The%20Philippines%
20DAR%20-%20Final%20%20210809.pdf

Enforcement and implementation issues and comments:

Investigations by the financial intelligence unit (FIU) continue to be
constrained by limited authority to access bank information.
Except in instances of serious offenses such as kidnapping for
ransom, drugs and terrorism-related activities, the FIU is required
to secure a court order to examine bank deposit accounts related
to unlawful activities enumerated in the Anti-Money Laundering
Act. In addition, a Supreme Court ruling prevents ex parte inquiry
into bank accounts. The FIU can, however, seek an ex parte
freeze order from the Court of Appeals before seeking
authorization to inquire into bank deposits. The FIU also must
obtain a court order to freeze assets, including those of terrorists
and terrorist organizations placed on the UN 1267 Sanctions
Committee’s consolidated list and the lists of foreign governments.
This requirement is inconsistent with the international standard,
which calls for the preventative freezing of terrorist assets “without
delay” from the time of designation. The Government of the
Philippines (GOP) should enhance the FIU’s access to financial
records, and ensure it can rapidly freeze terrorist assets. The
Philippines has a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement with US
Customs.

Terrorist financing is not a stand-alone offense under Philippine
law and therefore not a predicate crime under the Anti-Money
Laundering Act. A person who finances the commission of
terrorism may be prosecuted as a terrorist either as a principal by
inducement pursuant to Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code or
as an accomplice pursuant to Section 5 of the Human Security
Act. However, this approach requires a terrorist act to have
occurred and does not encompass general financial support to
terrorist entities for other purposes (recruiting, training, social
welfare projects, etc.). Limited human and financial resources also
constrain tighter monitoring and enforcement. The GOP should
criminalize terrorist financing as a stand-alone offense.

The Philippines has developed an action plan to address its
strategic anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing
(AML/CFT) deficiencies. The strategic deficiencies that The
Philippines has committed to address include adequately
criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing;
implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist
assets; enhancing financial transparency; and extending
suspicious activity reporting requirements to additional entities.
Legislation pending in the Philippine Congress would address
cited deficiencies. The Philippine Government committed to pass
this legislation that would address the deficiencies with respect to
terrorist financing, freezing of terrorist assets and bank secrecy
by December 2011.

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):

Domestic consumption of methamphetamine and marijuana
continued to be the main drug threats in the Philippines. The
2011 United Nations World Drug Report identified the Philippines
as having the highest methamphetamine abuse rate in East Asia
at 2.1 % of the adult population ages 16 to 64.

In 2011, the issue of Philippine citizens being used as drug
couriers by transnational drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)
gained nationalattention when two Philippine citizens were
executed in China for drug trafficking. Philippine citizens have also
been arrested in other countries while attempting to smuggle
cocaine from South America to Asia as well as methamphetamine
within Southeast Asia.

Philippine authorities made several large methamphetamine
seizures in metro Manila during the year. In addition, prior efforts
to eliminate large-scale labs seemed to have been effective as no
major new labs were identified by law enforcement. The scale of
the trafficking abuse problem in the Philippines continues to pose
a major to challenge in prosecution: the Supreme Court Office of
the Court Administrator reported that in the National Capital
Region, as of December 2010 almost 30% of pending regional
trial court cases were drug-related.

The Aquino administration made a special effort to increase
cooperation among Philippine agencies involved in drug
enforcement. This cooperation resulted in a 45% increase in
counter-drug operations. Funding for drug law enforcement
agencies, however, remained limited. The Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the lead anti-drug law enforcement
agency, had to request support from other law enforcement and
military drug units to carry out missions. Many of those units, such
as the Philippine National Police (PNP’s) Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Force (AIDSOTF), were task forces and
therefore lacked dedicated budgets or permanent status.

The Philippines also continued to face the daunting task of
tackling transnational drug trafficking organizations without strong
legal tools such as provision for judicially authorized interception
of criminal communications, plea bargaining, and an efficient drug
asset forfeiture process. Without these important tools,
enforcement’s ability to gather evidence against high-level drug
traffickers remained limited.

For Full report, click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):

(Tier 2)

The Philippines is a source country and, to a much lesser extent,
a destination and transit country for men, women, and children
who are subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor. A significant
number of Filipino men and women who migrate abroad for work
are subjected to conditions of involuntary servitude worldwide.
Men, women, and children are subjected to conditions of forced
labor in factories, at construction sites, on fishing vessels, on
agricultural plantations, and as domestic workers in Asia and
increasingly throughout the Middle East. A significant number of
women in domestic servitude abroad also face rape and violent
physical and sexual abuse. Skilled Filipino migrant workers, such
as engineers and nurses, are also subjected to conditions of
forced labor abroad. Women were subjected to sex trafficking in
countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea,
and Japan and in various Middle Eastern countries. Internal
trafficking of men, women, and children also remains a significant
problem in the Philippines. People are trafficked from rural areas
to urban centers including Manila, Cebu, the city of Angeles, and
increasingly to cities in Mindanao, as well as within urban areas.
Men are subjected to forced labor and debt bondage in the
agriculture, fishing, and maritime industries. Women and children
were trafficked within the country for forced labor as domestic
workers and small-scale factory workers, for forced begging, and
for exploitation in the commercial sex industry. Hundreds of
victims are subjected to forced prostitution each day in well-known
and highly visible business establishments that cater to both
domestic and foreign demand for commercial sex acts. Filipino
migrant workers, both domestically and abroad, who became
trafficking victims were often subject to violence, threats,
inhumane living conditions, nonpayment of salaries, and
withholding of travel and identity documents.

Traffickers, in partnership with organized crime syndicates and
complicit law enforcement officers, regularly operate through local
recruiters sent to villages and urban neighborhoods to recruit
family and friends, often masquerading as representatives of
government-registered employment agencies. Fraudulent
recruitment practices and the institutionalized practice of paying
recruitment fees often left workers vulnerable to forced labor, debt
bondage, and commercial sexual exploitation. There were reports
that illicit recruiters increased their use of student, intern, and
exchange program visas to circumvent the Philippines
government and receiving countries’ regulatory frameworks for
foreign workers. Recruiters took on new methods in attempts to
get potential victims past immigration officers at airports and
seaports. Traffickers utilized budget airlines, inter-island ferries
and barges, buses, and even chartered flights to transport their
victims domestically and internationally. Child sex tourism
remained a serious problem in the Philippines, with sex tourists
coming from Northeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, Europe, and
North America to engage in the commercial sexual exploitation of
children. One NGO estimated that there are over 900,000
undocumented Filipinos in the country, mostly based in Mindanao;
the lack of official documentation is widely recognized as
contributing to a population’s vulnerability to trafficking. The Moro
Islamic Liberation Front, a separatist group, and the New People’s
Army (NPA) were identified by the United Nations as among the
world’s persistent perpetrators of violations against children in
armed conflict, including forcing children into service. During the
year, there were continued reports to the United Nations that the
Abu Sayyaf Group targeted children for conscription as both
combatants and noncombatants.

The Government of the Philippines does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. During the year, the Philippine
Department of Justice and Supreme Court issued directives to
expedite the disposition of backlogged trafficking cases. The
government convicted 25 trafficking offenders – an increase from
nine convictions in the previous year – including two convictions in
cases involving forced labor, the Philippines’ first-ever labor
trafficking convictions. Additionally, authorities made notable
efforts to address trafficking-related corruption, and several
criminal cases against Philippine officials were initiated and
remain ongoing. The government enacted numerous measures
and policies to improve institutional responses to human
trafficking for this year and in future years, such as increased
training of judicial, law enforcement, and diplomatic officials on
trafficking issues; the creation and funding of anti-trafficking task
forces in airports, seaports, regions, and localities; and an
increase in dedicated staff to combating trafficking. Nevertheless,
the government needs to further its efforts to address significant
obstacles to anti-trafficking progress, including the remaining
substantial backlog in trafficking cases pending in Philippine
courts; the lack of vigorous efforts to pursue criminal prosecution
of labor traffickers, including labor recruitment companies
involved in the trafficking of migrant workers abroad; rampant
corruption at all levels that enables traffickers and undermines
efforts to combat trafficking; and uneven and insufficient efforts to
identify and adequately protect victims of trafficking – particularly
those who are assisting with prosecutions.

For full report click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010

Overview: The ability of terrorist groups, such as Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), and the New People’s Army,
to conduct terrorist activities inside the Philippines continued to
decline. The Philippine government, with U.S. support, has kept
constant pressure on terrorist groups, even as their security
services were stretched thin by other demands, such as carrying
out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and providing
security for the national election in May. The election of President
Benigno Simeon “Noynoy” Aquino III did not result in major
changes to counterterrorism policy, and his new administration
has continued strong counterterrorism cooperation with the
United States.

2010 Terrorist Incidents: Capturing the true picture of terrorist
incidents in the Philippines is difficult – kidnappings, grenade
attacks, and other acts of violence often seem indiscriminate and
most remain unsolved. In addition, during the periods before the
nationwide elections in May and the village elections in October,
there was an upsurge in violence by terrorist groups against
political candidates and the general populace to influence the
elections. Notable 2010 terrorist incidents included:

* On February 27, an attack in Basilan killed 13 civilians and a
paramilitary member, and injured 13 more civilians; allegedly
perpetrated by ASG in revenge for the February 21 killing of six
ASG militants, including commander, Albader Parad.
* On April 13, ASG members led by Puruji Indama conducted a
multiple improvised explosive device (IED) attack in Isabela City,
Basilan. The armed assailants wore Philippine National Police
(PNP) uniforms, detonated an IED outside a church, shot at
fleeing civilians, and ambushed responding Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) marines and police officers. Five civilians, three
marines, and one police officer were killed in the attack. The
assailants had planned a more significant attack, but a second
vehicle carrying explosives exploded in an unpopulated area
before the attack, killing three ASG members including Indama’s
brother. A third IED planted in front of a judge’s house failed to
explode and was later disabled by police. Two ASG members
were killed during the fighting that ensued and two more were
captured.
* On August 4, a bomb blast at Zamboanga airport injured 24
people, including Sulu provincial governor Sakur Tan and a U.S.
citizen, and killed two people, including the bomber. PNP believed
that Tan’s political rivals targeted him, likely with some assistance
from ASG.

Legislation and Law Enforcement: Philippines law enforcement
personnel continued vigorous efforts to arrest terrorists and
eliminate safe havens and closely coordinated efforts with U.S.
law enforcement officers. The Philippine Department of Justice
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court in Basilan for the
proscription of the ASG as a terrorist group and 202 identified
associates as terrorists. The petition was pending at year’s end.

JI associate Zulkipli bin Abdul Hir, aka Marwan, and ASG
commander Isnilon Hapilon appeared on the FBI’s Most Wanted
Terrorist list at numbers 29 and 17, respectively, and were
believed to be in the Philippines along with other wanted ASG
members. The Philippine National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
PNP, and AFP were each cognizant of the high-profile terrorist
fugitives in the Philippines and provided reasonable and
consistent attempts to locate and apprehend them.

Significant law enforcement actions and the Philippine judiciary
response included:

* On May 21, a Regional Trial Court issued 26 arrest warrants for
individuals allegedly involved in the construction or deployment of
a large IED at Kagay, Jolo on September 29, 2009, which resulted
in the deaths of two U.S. servicemen and one Philippine Marine.
The FBI provided investigative assistance.
* On December 17, Madhatta Haipe was sentenced in U.S. District
Court, Washington, D.C., to 23 years incarceration for his role in a
1995 hostage taking incident in Mindanao involving U.S. and
Philippine citizens. He was apprehended by the NBI in May 2009,
pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant and extradited to the
United States on August 27, 2009 by the NBI and FBI. This
investigation was conducted by the FBI with direct participation by
the PNP and NBI.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Legislation amending the anti-
money laundering law to criminalize terrorist finance as a stand-
alone offense was pending in the Philippine Congress at year’s
end. The Philippines is a member of the Asia Pacific Group on
Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style
regional body. The Philippines is likewise a member of the Egmont
Group of financial intelligence units (FIUs). The Philippines’ FIU
must obtain a court order to freeze assets, including those of
terrorists and terrorist organizations placed on the UN 1267
Sanctions Committee’s consolidated list and the lists of foreign
governments. This requirement was inconsistent with the
international standard, which calls for the preventative freezing of
terrorist assets “without delay” from the time of designation.

Regional and International Cooperation: In 2010, the Philippines
ratified the 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism. The
Philippines hosted the Third U.S.-ASEAN Senior Official’s
Dialogue on Transnational Crime in October.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: In 2010, the
Philippine government launched a counter-radicalization program
called Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan or PAMANA (Resilient
Communities in Conflict Affected Communities). This was
President Aquino’s flagship program on peace-building,
reconstruction, and development in more than 5,000 conflict-
affected areas in the country. Activities included addressing the
needs of internally displaced people, reintegrating former
combatants, and development programs. Additionally, the AFP
developed and adopted a Civil Relations Doctrine that is the first
of its kind. The AFP conducted operations to counter violent
extremism, including through radio programs, public service
announcements, a “junior hero program,” and publication of a
comic book with anti-extremist themes. The PNP also sought to
expand its Community Relations Group to address at-risk groups
prone to radicalization.
Tables & Rankings
Are there Sanctions in force against it? (UN/EU/US)
N
?
Is it on FATF list of non-cooperative countries/  AML/CFT
deficient?
Y
?
Is it on OECD list of uncooperative Tax Havens?
N
?
OECD - Implementation status of Tax Standard
White
?
Is it on EU 'white' list of equivalent jurisdictions?
N
?
Offshore Finance Center (Original IMF List)?
Y
?
Is it on the US Secretary of Treasury list of jurisdictions of
Primary Money Laundering concern?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of State list of jurisdictions
identified to be supporters of International Terrorism /
Terrorist Safe Haven?
S.H.
?
Is it on US Department of State International Narcotics
Control Majors List?
N
?
US Dept of State Money Laundering assessment (INCSR)
PC
?
Government Actions (For further info see INCRS below):
 
?
-  Criminalized Drug Money Laundering?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Beyond Drugs?
Y
 
-  Record Large Transactions?
Y
 
-  Maintain Records Over Time?
Y
 
-  Report Suspicious Transactions?(NMP)?
Y
 
-  Egmont Financial Intelligence Units?
Y
 
-  System for Identifying/Forfeiting Assets?
Y
 
-  Arrangements for Asset Sharing?
N
 
-  Cooperates with International Law Enforcement?
Y
 
-  International Transportation of Currency?
Y
 
-  Ability to Freeze Terrorist Assets w/o Delay?
N
 
-  Disclosure Protection "Safe Harbor"?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Financing of Terrorism?
N
 
-  States Party to 1988 UN Convention?
Y
 
-  International Terrorism Financing Convention?
Y
 
 
Ranking
2011
Ranking
2010
 
Corruption (Transparency International)
129 (out of
183)
134 (out
of 178)
?
Ease of doing business (World Bank)
136 (out of
183)
148 (out
of 183)
?
FATF 40 + 9 recommendations
Mutual Evaluation Report: 2009
Further Tables
C
L
P
N
N/A
    C  -  Fully Compliant ,   
    L  -  Largely Compliant,    
    P  -  Partially Compliant    
    N  -  Non-Compliant
4
11
28
6
0
Legal Systems
 
1. Money Laundering Offence
P
 
14. Protection & no tipping-off
L
2. ML offence – mental element and
corporate liability
L
 
15. Internal controls,
compliance & audit
C
3. Confiscation and provisional
measures
P
 
16. DNFBP – R.13-15 & 21
N
4. Secrecy laws consistent with the
Recommendations
P
 
17. Sanctions
P
5. Customer due diligence
P
 
18. Shell banks
C
6. Politically exposed persons
P
 
19. Other forms of reporting
C
7. Correspondent banking
L
 
20. Other NFBP & secure
transaction techniques
L
8. New technologies & non
face-to-face business
P
 
21. Special attention for
higher risk countries
P
9. Third parties and introducers
P
 
22. Foreign branches &
subsidiaries
P
10. Record keeping
L
 
23. Regulation, supervision
and monitoring
P
11. Unusual transactions
P
 
24. DNFBP - regulation,
supervision and monitoring
N
12. Designated Non-Financial
Businesses and Professions – R.5,
6, 8-11
N
 
25. Guidelines & Feedback
P
13. Suspicious transaction reporting
P
     
Institutional and other
measures
 
26. The FIU
P
 
31. National co-operation
P
27. Law enforcement authorities
P
 
32. Statistics
L
28. Powers of competent authorities
P
 
33. Legal persons – beneficial
owners
P
29. Supervisors
L
 
34. Legal arrangements –
beneficial owners
L
30. Resources, integrity and training
P
 
 
 
International Co-operation
 
35. Conventions
P
 
38. MLA on confiscation and
freezing
L
36. Mutual legal assistance (MLA)
L
 
39. Extradition
P
37. Dual criminality
C
 
40. Other forms of
co-operation
L
Nine Special
Recommendations
 
SR.I Implement UN instruments
N
 
SR VI AML requirements for
money/value transfer services
P
SR.II Criminalise terrorist financing
N
 
SR VII Wire transfer rules
P
SR.III Freeze and confiscate terrorist
assets
P
 
SR.VIII Non profit
organisations
P
SR.IV Suspicious transaction
reporting
N
 
SR.IX Cross Border
Declaration & Disclosure
P
SR.V International co-operation
P
 
 
 
*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.

For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -        

R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV

Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
PHILIPPINES
KnowYourCountry
-  Know Your Customer Provisions
Y
 
-  Criminalized Tipping Off?
Y
 
-  Report Suspected Terrorist Financing?
Y
 
-  State Party to United Nations TOC?
Y
 
-  State Party to United Nations CAC?
Y
 
_________________________________________________________

AML News / Updates

June 26, 2011  -  New report by the Global Forum on Transparency and
Exchange of Information to evaluate the country's legal and regulatory
frameworks re exchange of information is made available.

Read Report


Links:

Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Local AML News / Sanctions
Tax Information
Business Information
Last Updated:   16 April 2012