|
|
Sanctions:
November 28, 2011 - The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab
member states), of which this country is a member, has approved
imposing sanctions on Syria. These include: -
* Cutting off transactions with the Syrian central bank
* Halting funding by Arab governments for projects in Syria
* A ban on senior Syrian officials travelling to other Arab countries
* A freeze on assets related to President Bashar al-Assad's
government
The declaration also calls on Arab central banks to monitor
transfers to Syria, with the exception of remittances from Syrians
abroad.
For further information, click here
The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab member states), of which
this country is a member, has boycotted Israel in a systematic
effort to isolate Israel economically in support of the Palestinians,
however, the implementation of the boycott has varied over time
among member states..
There are three tiers to the boycott. The primary boycott prohibits
the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting
countries. The secondary boycott prohibits individuals, as well as
private and public sector firms and organizations, in member
countries from engaging in business with any entity that does
business in Israel. The Arab League maintains a blacklist of such
firms. The tertiary boycott prohibits any
entity in a member country from doing business with a company or
individual that has business dealings with U.S. or other firms on
the Arab League blacklist.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Qatar has become an increasingly important Gulf banking and
financial services center. Despite the growth of the banking sector
and increasing options for financial services, Qatar still has a
largely cash economy. Qatar has had low rates of crime, although
crime rates have increased in recent years. There are several
trends which make Qatar increasingly vulnerable to money
laundering, including: a large number of expatriate laborers who
send remittances to their home countries; the growth in trade and
the financial sector’s expansion; liberalization and growth in the
real estate sector; uneven corporate oversight; and Iran’s efforts
to bypass sanctions through gulf economies.
The Government of Qatar (GOQ) signed a new AML/CFT law into
force on April 30, 2010. The law criminalizes money laundering
and terrorist financing in line with international standards. It also
introduces a suspicious transaction reporting regime and
requirements for customer due diligence and record-keeping.
Revised, consistent regulations have been issued by all three of
the main financial regulators in Qatar: the Qatar Central Bank, the
Qatar Financial Markets Authority, and the Qatar Financial Center
Regulatory Authority. All three regulators have begun to do onsite
inspections to check compliance with the new law and regulations.
However, significant work remains to fully implement new financial
regulations, and there remain deficiencies with regard to terrorist
financing.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
All serious crimes approach or list approach to predicate crimes:
List approach
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks, real estate brokers, dealers of precious
metals or stones, lawyers and notaries, trust funds and company
service providers, and charities
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks, real estate brokers, dealers of precious
metals or stones, lawyers and notaries, trust funds and company
service providers, and charities
Number of STRs received and time frame: 91 in 2009; 164
January – August 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: Two since May 2010
Convictions: None in 2010
Assets forfeited: criminally: None in 2010 civilly: Not applicable
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Qatar is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial
Action Task Force (MENAFATF) a FATF-style regional body. Its
most recent mutual evaluation can be found here: http://www.
menafatf.org/images/UploadFiles/QatarMER1.pdf
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
With the new AML/CFT law and accompanying regulations, Qatar
has demonstrated its commitment to improving its AML/CFT
regulatory regime. Despite the considerable efforts of Qatari
authorities, some weaknesses remain. There is currently no
threshold for reporting of bulk cash coming into or leaving Qatar.
Additionally, trafficking in persons is not a predicate offense for
money laundering. Significant work remains to implement the
regulations and procedures resulting from the new law, and
additional resources and training will be required to develop the
necessary institutional capacity. The 2010 AML/CFT law requires
financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and
professions to put in place appropriate risk management systems
to determine if a customer or a beneficial owner is a politically
exposed person (PEP), and if so, to obtain approval from senior
management before establishing a business relationship with the
customer; take all reasonable measures to establish the source of
wealth and funds; and conduct ongoing monitoring of business
relationships with PEPs. Each of the financial sector supervisors
has issued revised regulations to financial institutions to
complement the new AML/CFT Law.
The Qatar Financial Information Unit has issued new guidelines
on STR reporting obligations and, in 2010, engaged in outreach
and workshops with financial institutions. Despite these efforts,
the level of STR filings by banks and brokers remains largely the
same in the period 2008 – 2010, and there were no STRs
disseminated to the Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) in 2010. The
2010 AML/CFT Law establishes an office for seizure and
confiscation under the PPO; a department has now been
established for this purpose. The Qatari authorities determined
that confiscated assets would be sent to the general account of
the Ministry of Finance. The AML/CFT law also establishes a
framework for international cooperation, including provisions for
cooperation, mutual legal assistance and extradition for ML/TF
purposes. The GOQ exchanges information with the United States
on a case-by-case basis.
The AML/CFT law includes a provision which authorizes the
Terrorist Financing Committee, located in the Ministry of Interior,
to designate by resolution those who finance terrorism, terrorists
and terrorist organizations. No designations have yet been made
and no terrorist financing STRs have been filed as of yearend
2010. There is a lack of procedure to implement obligations
pursuant to UNSCR 1373. While the Public Prosecutor can issue
an immediate order freezing the funds of any individuals or
entities found on the UNSCR 1267 list, there is currently no
equivalent procedure for dealing with reporting obligations under
UNSCR 1373, although work is underway to address this.
Separately, under the AML/CFT law, the Governor of the Qatar
Central Bank may freeze funds, balances or accounts for a period
of ten business days where there is a suspicion they may be used
for terrorist financing. He must then notify the PPO who may then
extend the order. After conviction of a defendant for a predicate
offense, ML offense or TF offense, the Court will issue an order
for confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime,
and funds forming the object of the offense.
Regarding Iran-related terrorism and proliferation transactions,
the Central Bank ordered financial institutions to freeze any
assets of entities listed in UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803, and
prohibits them from carrying out any transactions with listed
entities. However, Iran’s Bank Saderat - an entity of concern in
UNSCR 1803 - was allowed to open a second branch in Doha in
June 2008. GOQ officials have communicated that no additional
branches or new correspondent relations will be permitted.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2011 (introduction):
No report available
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2 Watch List)
Qatar is a destination country for men and women subjected to
forced labor and, to a much lesser extent, forced prostitution. Men
and women from Nepal, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Sudan,
Thailand, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and China voluntarily migrate to
Qatar as low-skilled laborers and domestic servants, but some
subsequently face conditions indicative of involuntary servitude.
These conditions include: threats of serious physical or financial
harm; the withholding of pay; charging workers for benefits for
which the employer is responsible; restrictions on freedom of
movement, including the confiscation of passports and travel
documents and the withholding of exit permits; arbitrary detention;
threats of legal action and deportation; threats of filing false
charges against the worker; and physical, mental, and sexual
abuse. In some cases, arriving migrant workers have found that
the terms of employment in Qatar are different from those they
agreed to in their home countries. One NGO reported, however,
that the Qatari National Human Rights Committee handles
approximately 700-800 labor-related cases per year, most of
which indicate forced labor, but does not generally identify them
as such. Many migrant workers arriving for work in Qatar have
paid exorbitant fees to recruiters in their home countries – a
practice that makes workers highly vulnerable to forced labor
once in Qatar. Under the provisions of Qatar’s sponsorship law,
sponsors have the unilateral power to cancel workers’ residency
permits, deny workers’ ability to change employers, report a
worker as “absconded” to police authorities, and deny permission
to leave the country. As a result, sponsors may restrict workers’
movements and workers may be afraid to report abuses or claim
their rights, which contribute to their forced labor situation. In
addition, domestic servants are particularly vulnerable to
trafficking since they are isolated inside homes and are not
covered under the provisions of the labor law. Qatar is also a
destination for women who migrate for legitimate purposes and
subsequently become involved in prostitution, but the extent to
which these women are subjected to forced prostitution is
unknown. Some of these victims may be runaway domestic
workers who have fallen prey to forced prostitution by individuals
who exploit their illegal status.
The Government of Qatar does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government did
not demonstrate evidence of significant efforts to punish
traffickers or proactively identify victims; therefore, Qatar is placed
on Tier 2 Watch List for a third consecutive year. Qatar was not
placed on Tier 3 per Section 107 of the 2008 Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act, however, as the government has
a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute making
significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is devoting
sufficient resources to implement that plan. In March 2011, the
Qatari Cabinet approved an anti-trafficking law that has been
pending since 2006; at the end of the reporting period, this law
was awaiting approval by the Emir. The Qatari government also
published its “National Plan for Combating Human Trafficking for
2010-2015.” Nonetheless, the government has yet to take
increased action to investigate, prosecute, and punish trafficking
offenses for forced labor and forced prostitution. The Qatari
government also continues to inadequately protect victims of
trafficking, particularly by failing to proactively identify victims
among vulnerable populations, leading to their sometimes lengthy
detentions or other punishments.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: The United States continued to seek improved
counterterrorism cooperation and information sharing with the
Qatari government. Cooperation with U.S. authorities on
counterterrorist finance continued to develop and in April, Qatar
passed strong anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance
(AML/CTF) legislation. Still, Qatari efforts to counter terrorist
financing outside its borders by private individuals and charitable
associations often fell short of recognized international standards.
Qatar's leaders maintained political relations with top-ranking
Hamas and Hizballah leaders.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: Through a stringent visa and
sponsorship regime, Qatar regularly refused entry to and
deported foreign residents suspected of extremist sympathies,
and monitored extremism in its citizen population. Qatari
authorities have indicated that they will increase biometric
features on resident ID cards in the near future.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Qatar is a member of the Middle
East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF)
and undertook comprehensive MENAFATF assessments of its
banking/financial sector and regulatory and enforcement
framework in 2010. New AML/CTF legislation purported to meet
international legal norms, but no prosecutions for terrorist
financing occurred under the new law. Qatar made significant
progress on building a financial regulatory framework but did not
adequately enforce its laws and international standards to track
funds transfers to individuals and organizations (including
charities) associated with extremists and terrorist facilitators
outside Qatar. Qatar has an increasingly capable Financial
Information Unit (FIU) in its Central Bank. Local banks worked with
the Central Bank and the FIU on CTF and AML issues.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Government
authorities were recognized as regional leaders in improving
educational standards and curricula, which included civic
instruction that criticized violent extremist views. Qatar hosted well-
regarded international fora on interreligious dialogue.
November 28, 2011 - The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab
member states), of which this country is a member, has approved
imposing sanctions on Syria. These include: -
* Cutting off transactions with the Syrian central bank
* Halting funding by Arab governments for projects in Syria
* A ban on senior Syrian officials travelling to other Arab countries
* A freeze on assets related to President Bashar al-Assad's
government
The declaration also calls on Arab central banks to monitor
transfers to Syria, with the exception of remittances from Syrians
abroad.
For further information, click here
The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab member states), of which
this country is a member, has boycotted Israel in a systematic
effort to isolate Israel economically in support of the Palestinians,
however, the implementation of the boycott has varied over time
among member states..
There are three tiers to the boycott. The primary boycott prohibits
the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting
countries. The secondary boycott prohibits individuals, as well as
private and public sector firms and organizations, in member
countries from engaging in business with any entity that does
business in Israel. The Arab League maintains a blacklist of such
firms. The tertiary boycott prohibits any
entity in a member country from doing business with a company or
individual that has business dealings with U.S. or other firms on
the Arab League blacklist.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Qatar has become an increasingly important Gulf banking and
financial services center. Despite the growth of the banking sector
and increasing options for financial services, Qatar still has a
largely cash economy. Qatar has had low rates of crime, although
crime rates have increased in recent years. There are several
trends which make Qatar increasingly vulnerable to money
laundering, including: a large number of expatriate laborers who
send remittances to their home countries; the growth in trade and
the financial sector’s expansion; liberalization and growth in the
real estate sector; uneven corporate oversight; and Iran’s efforts
to bypass sanctions through gulf economies.
The Government of Qatar (GOQ) signed a new AML/CFT law into
force on April 30, 2010. The law criminalizes money laundering
and terrorist financing in line with international standards. It also
introduces a suspicious transaction reporting regime and
requirements for customer due diligence and record-keeping.
Revised, consistent regulations have been issued by all three of
the main financial regulators in Qatar: the Qatar Central Bank, the
Qatar Financial Markets Authority, and the Qatar Financial Center
Regulatory Authority. All three regulators have begun to do onsite
inspections to check compliance with the new law and regulations.
However, significant work remains to fully implement new financial
regulations, and there remain deficiencies with regard to terrorist
financing.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
All serious crimes approach or list approach to predicate crimes:
List approach
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks, real estate brokers, dealers of precious
metals or stones, lawyers and notaries, trust funds and company
service providers, and charities
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks, real estate brokers, dealers of precious
metals or stones, lawyers and notaries, trust funds and company
service providers, and charities
Number of STRs received and time frame: 91 in 2009; 164
January – August 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: Two since May 2010
Convictions: None in 2010
Assets forfeited: criminally: None in 2010 civilly: Not applicable
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Qatar is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial
Action Task Force (MENAFATF) a FATF-style regional body. Its
most recent mutual evaluation can be found here: http://www.
menafatf.org/images/UploadFiles/QatarMER1.pdf
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
With the new AML/CFT law and accompanying regulations, Qatar
has demonstrated its commitment to improving its AML/CFT
regulatory regime. Despite the considerable efforts of Qatari
authorities, some weaknesses remain. There is currently no
threshold for reporting of bulk cash coming into or leaving Qatar.
Additionally, trafficking in persons is not a predicate offense for
money laundering. Significant work remains to implement the
regulations and procedures resulting from the new law, and
additional resources and training will be required to develop the
necessary institutional capacity. The 2010 AML/CFT law requires
financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and
professions to put in place appropriate risk management systems
to determine if a customer or a beneficial owner is a politically
exposed person (PEP), and if so, to obtain approval from senior
management before establishing a business relationship with the
customer; take all reasonable measures to establish the source of
wealth and funds; and conduct ongoing monitoring of business
relationships with PEPs. Each of the financial sector supervisors
has issued revised regulations to financial institutions to
complement the new AML/CFT Law.
The Qatar Financial Information Unit has issued new guidelines
on STR reporting obligations and, in 2010, engaged in outreach
and workshops with financial institutions. Despite these efforts,
the level of STR filings by banks and brokers remains largely the
same in the period 2008 – 2010, and there were no STRs
disseminated to the Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) in 2010. The
2010 AML/CFT Law establishes an office for seizure and
confiscation under the PPO; a department has now been
established for this purpose. The Qatari authorities determined
that confiscated assets would be sent to the general account of
the Ministry of Finance. The AML/CFT law also establishes a
framework for international cooperation, including provisions for
cooperation, mutual legal assistance and extradition for ML/TF
purposes. The GOQ exchanges information with the United States
on a case-by-case basis.
The AML/CFT law includes a provision which authorizes the
Terrorist Financing Committee, located in the Ministry of Interior,
to designate by resolution those who finance terrorism, terrorists
and terrorist organizations. No designations have yet been made
and no terrorist financing STRs have been filed as of yearend
2010. There is a lack of procedure to implement obligations
pursuant to UNSCR 1373. While the Public Prosecutor can issue
an immediate order freezing the funds of any individuals or
entities found on the UNSCR 1267 list, there is currently no
equivalent procedure for dealing with reporting obligations under
UNSCR 1373, although work is underway to address this.
Separately, under the AML/CFT law, the Governor of the Qatar
Central Bank may freeze funds, balances or accounts for a period
of ten business days where there is a suspicion they may be used
for terrorist financing. He must then notify the PPO who may then
extend the order. After conviction of a defendant for a predicate
offense, ML offense or TF offense, the Court will issue an order
for confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime,
and funds forming the object of the offense.
Regarding Iran-related terrorism and proliferation transactions,
the Central Bank ordered financial institutions to freeze any
assets of entities listed in UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803, and
prohibits them from carrying out any transactions with listed
entities. However, Iran’s Bank Saderat - an entity of concern in
UNSCR 1803 - was allowed to open a second branch in Doha in
June 2008. GOQ officials have communicated that no additional
branches or new correspondent relations will be permitted.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2011 (introduction):
No report available
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2 Watch List)
Qatar is a destination country for men and women subjected to
forced labor and, to a much lesser extent, forced prostitution. Men
and women from Nepal, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Sudan,
Thailand, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and China voluntarily migrate to
Qatar as low-skilled laborers and domestic servants, but some
subsequently face conditions indicative of involuntary servitude.
These conditions include: threats of serious physical or financial
harm; the withholding of pay; charging workers for benefits for
which the employer is responsible; restrictions on freedom of
movement, including the confiscation of passports and travel
documents and the withholding of exit permits; arbitrary detention;
threats of legal action and deportation; threats of filing false
charges against the worker; and physical, mental, and sexual
abuse. In some cases, arriving migrant workers have found that
the terms of employment in Qatar are different from those they
agreed to in their home countries. One NGO reported, however,
that the Qatari National Human Rights Committee handles
approximately 700-800 labor-related cases per year, most of
which indicate forced labor, but does not generally identify them
as such. Many migrant workers arriving for work in Qatar have
paid exorbitant fees to recruiters in their home countries – a
practice that makes workers highly vulnerable to forced labor
once in Qatar. Under the provisions of Qatar’s sponsorship law,
sponsors have the unilateral power to cancel workers’ residency
permits, deny workers’ ability to change employers, report a
worker as “absconded” to police authorities, and deny permission
to leave the country. As a result, sponsors may restrict workers’
movements and workers may be afraid to report abuses or claim
their rights, which contribute to their forced labor situation. In
addition, domestic servants are particularly vulnerable to
trafficking since they are isolated inside homes and are not
covered under the provisions of the labor law. Qatar is also a
destination for women who migrate for legitimate purposes and
subsequently become involved in prostitution, but the extent to
which these women are subjected to forced prostitution is
unknown. Some of these victims may be runaway domestic
workers who have fallen prey to forced prostitution by individuals
who exploit their illegal status.
The Government of Qatar does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government did
not demonstrate evidence of significant efforts to punish
traffickers or proactively identify victims; therefore, Qatar is placed
on Tier 2 Watch List for a third consecutive year. Qatar was not
placed on Tier 3 per Section 107 of the 2008 Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act, however, as the government has
a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute making
significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is devoting
sufficient resources to implement that plan. In March 2011, the
Qatari Cabinet approved an anti-trafficking law that has been
pending since 2006; at the end of the reporting period, this law
was awaiting approval by the Emir. The Qatari government also
published its “National Plan for Combating Human Trafficking for
2010-2015.” Nonetheless, the government has yet to take
increased action to investigate, prosecute, and punish trafficking
offenses for forced labor and forced prostitution. The Qatari
government also continues to inadequately protect victims of
trafficking, particularly by failing to proactively identify victims
among vulnerable populations, leading to their sometimes lengthy
detentions or other punishments.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: The United States continued to seek improved
counterterrorism cooperation and information sharing with the
Qatari government. Cooperation with U.S. authorities on
counterterrorist finance continued to develop and in April, Qatar
passed strong anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance
(AML/CTF) legislation. Still, Qatari efforts to counter terrorist
financing outside its borders by private individuals and charitable
associations often fell short of recognized international standards.
Qatar's leaders maintained political relations with top-ranking
Hamas and Hizballah leaders.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: Through a stringent visa and
sponsorship regime, Qatar regularly refused entry to and
deported foreign residents suspected of extremist sympathies,
and monitored extremism in its citizen population. Qatari
authorities have indicated that they will increase biometric
features on resident ID cards in the near future.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Qatar is a member of the Middle
East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF)
and undertook comprehensive MENAFATF assessments of its
banking/financial sector and regulatory and enforcement
framework in 2010. New AML/CTF legislation purported to meet
international legal norms, but no prosecutions for terrorist
financing occurred under the new law. Qatar made significant
progress on building a financial regulatory framework but did not
adequately enforce its laws and international standards to track
funds transfers to individuals and organizations (including
charities) associated with extremists and terrorist facilitators
outside Qatar. Qatar has an increasingly capable Financial
Information Unit (FIU) in its Central Bank. Local banks worked with
the Central Bank and the FIU on CTF and AML issues.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Government
authorities were recognized as regional leaders in improving
educational standards and curricula, which included civic
instruction that criticized violent extremist views. Qatar hosted well-
regarded international fora on interreligious dialogue.
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if any
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated either
Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
|
| Further Tables |
| QATAR |
| KnowYourCountry |
|
________________________________________________________
AML News / Updates
February 5, 2012 - Banks in UAE and Qatar stop financing trade with
Iran
Read More (Reuters)
January 28, 2011 - Qatar placed on OECD implementation of Tax
Standard White list.
See list.........
October 10, 2010 - The Global Forum on Transparency and
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes has issued a phase one
peer review for Qatar
View Review.....
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Qatar Financial Information Unit (QFIU)
AML News / Updates
February 5, 2012 - Banks in UAE and Qatar stop financing trade with
Iran
Read More (Reuters)
January 28, 2011 - Qatar placed on OECD implementation of Tax
Standard White list.
See list.........
October 10, 2010 - The Global Forum on Transparency and
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes has issued a phase one
peer review for Qatar
View Review.....
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Qatar Financial Information Unit (QFIU)
|
Extracted from IMF Report - Qatar 2012 Article IV
Consultation (January 2012)
The mission commends the authorities on their ongoing efforts in
strengthening Qatar’s Anti Money Laundering (AML)/Combating
Financing of Terrorism (CFT) framework. The domestic financial
supervisory authorities’ legislation (Rules/Regulations) has been
developed by adopting a coordinated approach, which has resulted in
the legislation being consistent across each supervisory body. Following
the adoption of the new reviewed AML/CFT rules/regulations, financial
supervisory authorities have increased their offsite and onsite reviews of
AML/CFT compliance at financial institutions that are subject to their
supervision. Progress has also been achieved with regard to
implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolutions in the
areas of strengthening mechanisms for implementation and training of
supervisors.
Read full Report
Consultation (January 2012)
The mission commends the authorities on their ongoing efforts in
strengthening Qatar’s Anti Money Laundering (AML)/Combating
Financing of Terrorism (CFT) framework. The domestic financial
supervisory authorities’ legislation (Rules/Regulations) has been
developed by adopting a coordinated approach, which has resulted in
the legislation being consistent across each supervisory body. Following
the adoption of the new reviewed AML/CFT rules/regulations, financial
supervisory authorities have increased their offsite and onsite reviews of
AML/CFT compliance at financial institutions that are subject to their
supervision. Progress has also been achieved with regard to
implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolutions in the
areas of strengthening mechanisms for implementation and training of
supervisors.
Read full Report
| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |