|
|
Sanctions:
UN Sanctions were in force during the period of apartheid
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
South Africa’s position as the major financial center in the region,
its relatively sophisticated banking and financial sector, and its
large, cash-based market make it vulnerable to exploitation by
transnational and domestic crime syndicates. The largest source
of laundered funds in the country is proceeds from the narcotics
trade. Fraud, theft, racketeering, corruption, currency speculation,
poaching, theft of precious metals and minerals, small arms,
human trafficking, stolen cars, and smuggling are also sources of
laundered funds. Many criminal organizations are also involved in
legitimate business operations. There is a significant black market
for smuggled and stolen goods. In addition to criminal activity by
South African nationals, observers note criminal activity by
Nigerian, Pakistani, Andean and Indian drug traffickers, Chinese
triads, Taiwanese groups, Lebanese trading syndicates, and the
Russian mafia. There are few successful investigations and
prosecutions.
South Africa is not an offshore financial center, nor does it have
free trade zones. South Africa does operate Industrial
Development Zones (IDZs). Imports and exports related to
manufacturing or processing in the zones are duty free, provided
that the finished product is exported. IDZs are located in Port
Elizabeth, East London, Richards Bay, and Johannesburg
International Airport. The South African Revenue Service monitors
the customs control of these zones.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks, credit institutions, post office banks,
foreign exchange dealers, securities traders, entities that issue
travelers checks, real estate agents, gambling institutions, gold
dealers, attorneys, second hand car dealers, entities/people
registered with the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and money
lenders
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks, credit institutions, post office banks,
foreign exchange dealers, securities traders, entities that issue
travelers checks, real estate agents, gambling institutions, gold
dealers, attorneys, second hand car dealers, entities/people
registered with the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and money
lenders
Number of STRs received and time frame: 29,411 - April 2009
through March 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: Not available
Convictions: Not available
Assets forfeited: criminally: Not available civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
South Africa is a member of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money
Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a FATF-style regional body. Its
most recent mutual evaluation can be found here: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/infobycountry/0,3380,
en_32250379_32236963_1_70915_43383847_1_1,00.html
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
South Africa’s anti-money laundering regime has solid legislative
backing, and generally imposes an affirmative responsibility upon
financial institutions, businesses, and individuals to report
suspicious transactions. However, while South Africa’s banking
system is among the world’s most sophisticated, its relationship to
the South African economy as a whole remains problematic for
anti-money laundering purposes. There are gaps in enforcement
of the reporting requirements, due in part to South Africa’s large
informal economy and cash-oriented market. Law enforcement
capacity is also considered to be lacking.
While money laundering is a specific offense under the South
African penal code, it is not often charged as a stand-alone
offense. Instead, prosecutors typically include money laundering
as a secondary charge in conjunction with other offenses.
Accordingly, South Africa does not generally keep separate
statistics for money laundering-related prosecutions, convictions,
or forfeited assets.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
South African enforcement success during the FIFA World Cup
2010 was widely noted. The South African Police Service’s
(SAPS) Central Drug Authority (CDA) is planning to create a
national narcotics database as part of the 2012-2017 National
Master Plan on Drugs. South Africa continued to battle with
significant challenges involving drug trafficking, substance abuse,
and drug related crime.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
South Africa is a source, transit, and destination country for men,
women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.
Children are trafficked mainly within the country, from poor rural
areas to urban centers such as Johannesburg, Cape Town,
Durban, and Bloemfontein. Girls are subjected to sex trafficking
and domestic servitude; boys are forced to work in street vending,
food service, begging, criminal activities, and agriculture. The
tradition of ukuthwala, the forced marriage of girls as young as 12
to adult men, is still practiced in some remote villages in the
Eastern Cape and Western Cape, leaving these girls vulnerable to
forced labor and prostitution. Local criminal rings and street
gangs organize child prostitution in a number of South Africa’s
cities. To a lesser extent, syndicates recruit and transport South
African women to Europe and the Middle East, where they are
forced to labor in domestic service and forced into prostitution.
Nigerian syndicates dominate the commercial sex trade within the
country, and send South African women to the United States for
exploitation in domestic servitude. South African men recruited by
local employment agencies to drive taxis in Abu Dhabi are
subjected to forced labor subsequent to their arrival in the United
Arab Emirates. Traffickers control victims through intimidation and
threats, use of force, confiscation of travel documents, demands
to pay “debts,” and forced use of drugs and alcohol. During the
reporting period, South African trafficking victims were discovered
in Macau. Women and girls from Thailand, Cambodia, the Congo,
India, Russia, Ukraine, China, Taiwan, Mozambique, and
Zimbabwe are recruited for legitimate work in South Africa then
subjected to prostitution, domestic servitude, and forced labor in
the service sector. Some of these women also are transported to
Europe for forced prostitution.
Thai women are subjected to prostitution in South Africa’s illegal
brothels, while Eastern European organized crime units forced
some women from Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria into debt-
bonded prostitution in exclusive private men’s clubs. Chinese
traffickers bring victims from Lesotho, Mozambique, and
Swaziland to Johannesburg or other cities for prostitution. Migrant
men from China and Taiwan are forced to work in mobile
sweatshop factories in Chinese urban enclaves in South Africa,
which evade labor inspectors by moving in and out of Lesotho
and Swaziland. Young men and boys from Mozambique, Malawi,
and Zimbabwe voluntarily migrate to South Africa for farm work,
sometimes laboring for months in South Africa with little or no pay
and in conditions of involuntary servitude before unscrupulous
employers have them arrested and deported as illegal immigrants.
Taxi drivers or thugs at the border transport Zimbabwean
migrants, including children, into South Africa and may subject
them to sex or labor trafficking upon arrival.
The Government of South Africa does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated
increased efforts to address human trafficking, led by the National
Prosecuting Authority (NPA), through the conviction and
prosecution of an increased number of offenders and the
formation of new task forces. The government’s promised
comprehensive anti-trafficking bill – first drafted in 2003 – remained
under review, however, and was not passed or enacted. Although
the number of new trafficking investigations and prosecutions
under other legal provisions increased, few of these resulted in
convictions and many cases remained pending from previous
reporting periods. All those convicted received suspended
sentences or fines, which are inadequate penalties to deter the
commission of trafficking crimes. Despite its considerable
resources, the government did not dedicate specific funding to
combat human trafficking and instead relied on existing budgets
for stakeholder departments and foreign donors for its efforts
made. The government did not provide direct care or
accommodation to trafficking victims, and funding given to NGOs
for the care of trafficking victims remained insufficient. Although
South Africa is a major migrant destination country in Africa, the
government failed to identify and address forced labor among
migrant workers, as well as foreign and South African children.
Significant gaps remain in South Africa’s overall victim protection
process, specifically the lack of formal procedures for screening
for and identifying trafficking victims amongst vulnerable groups,
including illegal migrants and women in prostitution.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: In preparation for the 2010 World Cup, there was close
cooperation between South African and U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. South Africa took measures to address
border security vulnerability and document fraud, which had
hindered the government’s ability to pursue counterterrorism
initiatives. Under the leadership of Minister Dlamini-Zuma, the
Department of Home Affairs continued implementation of its
turnaround strategy to end corruption and accelerate
documentation of all bona fide South African citizens and
residents.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The South African Revenue
Service (SARS) has a Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Container Security Initiative team located in Durban. SARS is a
member of the World Customs Organization and worked closely
with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs and
Border Protection to develop the SARS Customs Border Control
Unit, which was modeled after the CBP Antiterrorism Contraband
Enforcement Team.
Countering Terrorist Finance: South Africa was a member of both
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and
Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group. South Africa
cooperated with the United States in exchanging terrorist
financing information. South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Center
(FIC) is a member of the Egmont Group. Amendments to the FIC
basic legislation came into effect on December 1, granting the FIC
authority to impose administrative sanctions such as monetary
penalties. In November, South Africa hosted a joint experts
meeting of FATF and the Egmont Group.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC)
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
UN Sanctions were in force during the period of apartheid
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
South Africa’s position as the major financial center in the region,
its relatively sophisticated banking and financial sector, and its
large, cash-based market make it vulnerable to exploitation by
transnational and domestic crime syndicates. The largest source
of laundered funds in the country is proceeds from the narcotics
trade. Fraud, theft, racketeering, corruption, currency speculation,
poaching, theft of precious metals and minerals, small arms,
human trafficking, stolen cars, and smuggling are also sources of
laundered funds. Many criminal organizations are also involved in
legitimate business operations. There is a significant black market
for smuggled and stolen goods. In addition to criminal activity by
South African nationals, observers note criminal activity by
Nigerian, Pakistani, Andean and Indian drug traffickers, Chinese
triads, Taiwanese groups, Lebanese trading syndicates, and the
Russian mafia. There are few successful investigations and
prosecutions.
South Africa is not an offshore financial center, nor does it have
free trade zones. South Africa does operate Industrial
Development Zones (IDZs). Imports and exports related to
manufacturing or processing in the zones are duty free, provided
that the finished product is exported. IDZs are located in Port
Elizabeth, East London, Richards Bay, and Johannesburg
International Airport. The South African Revenue Service monitors
the customs control of these zones.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks, credit institutions, post office banks,
foreign exchange dealers, securities traders, entities that issue
travelers checks, real estate agents, gambling institutions, gold
dealers, attorneys, second hand car dealers, entities/people
registered with the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and money
lenders
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks, credit institutions, post office banks,
foreign exchange dealers, securities traders, entities that issue
travelers checks, real estate agents, gambling institutions, gold
dealers, attorneys, second hand car dealers, entities/people
registered with the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and money
lenders
Number of STRs received and time frame: 29,411 - April 2009
through March 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: Not available
Convictions: Not available
Assets forfeited: criminally: Not available civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
South Africa is a member of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money
Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a FATF-style regional body. Its
most recent mutual evaluation can be found here: http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/infobycountry/0,3380,
en_32250379_32236963_1_70915_43383847_1_1,00.html
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
South Africa’s anti-money laundering regime has solid legislative
backing, and generally imposes an affirmative responsibility upon
financial institutions, businesses, and individuals to report
suspicious transactions. However, while South Africa’s banking
system is among the world’s most sophisticated, its relationship to
the South African economy as a whole remains problematic for
anti-money laundering purposes. There are gaps in enforcement
of the reporting requirements, due in part to South Africa’s large
informal economy and cash-oriented market. Law enforcement
capacity is also considered to be lacking.
While money laundering is a specific offense under the South
African penal code, it is not often charged as a stand-alone
offense. Instead, prosecutors typically include money laundering
as a secondary charge in conjunction with other offenses.
Accordingly, South Africa does not generally keep separate
statistics for money laundering-related prosecutions, convictions,
or forfeited assets.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
South African enforcement success during the FIFA World Cup
2010 was widely noted. The South African Police Service’s
(SAPS) Central Drug Authority (CDA) is planning to create a
national narcotics database as part of the 2012-2017 National
Master Plan on Drugs. South Africa continued to battle with
significant challenges involving drug trafficking, substance abuse,
and drug related crime.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
South Africa is a source, transit, and destination country for men,
women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.
Children are trafficked mainly within the country, from poor rural
areas to urban centers such as Johannesburg, Cape Town,
Durban, and Bloemfontein. Girls are subjected to sex trafficking
and domestic servitude; boys are forced to work in street vending,
food service, begging, criminal activities, and agriculture. The
tradition of ukuthwala, the forced marriage of girls as young as 12
to adult men, is still practiced in some remote villages in the
Eastern Cape and Western Cape, leaving these girls vulnerable to
forced labor and prostitution. Local criminal rings and street
gangs organize child prostitution in a number of South Africa’s
cities. To a lesser extent, syndicates recruit and transport South
African women to Europe and the Middle East, where they are
forced to labor in domestic service and forced into prostitution.
Nigerian syndicates dominate the commercial sex trade within the
country, and send South African women to the United States for
exploitation in domestic servitude. South African men recruited by
local employment agencies to drive taxis in Abu Dhabi are
subjected to forced labor subsequent to their arrival in the United
Arab Emirates. Traffickers control victims through intimidation and
threats, use of force, confiscation of travel documents, demands
to pay “debts,” and forced use of drugs and alcohol. During the
reporting period, South African trafficking victims were discovered
in Macau. Women and girls from Thailand, Cambodia, the Congo,
India, Russia, Ukraine, China, Taiwan, Mozambique, and
Zimbabwe are recruited for legitimate work in South Africa then
subjected to prostitution, domestic servitude, and forced labor in
the service sector. Some of these women also are transported to
Europe for forced prostitution.
Thai women are subjected to prostitution in South Africa’s illegal
brothels, while Eastern European organized crime units forced
some women from Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria into debt-
bonded prostitution in exclusive private men’s clubs. Chinese
traffickers bring victims from Lesotho, Mozambique, and
Swaziland to Johannesburg or other cities for prostitution. Migrant
men from China and Taiwan are forced to work in mobile
sweatshop factories in Chinese urban enclaves in South Africa,
which evade labor inspectors by moving in and out of Lesotho
and Swaziland. Young men and boys from Mozambique, Malawi,
and Zimbabwe voluntarily migrate to South Africa for farm work,
sometimes laboring for months in South Africa with little or no pay
and in conditions of involuntary servitude before unscrupulous
employers have them arrested and deported as illegal immigrants.
Taxi drivers or thugs at the border transport Zimbabwean
migrants, including children, into South Africa and may subject
them to sex or labor trafficking upon arrival.
The Government of South Africa does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated
increased efforts to address human trafficking, led by the National
Prosecuting Authority (NPA), through the conviction and
prosecution of an increased number of offenders and the
formation of new task forces. The government’s promised
comprehensive anti-trafficking bill – first drafted in 2003 – remained
under review, however, and was not passed or enacted. Although
the number of new trafficking investigations and prosecutions
under other legal provisions increased, few of these resulted in
convictions and many cases remained pending from previous
reporting periods. All those convicted received suspended
sentences or fines, which are inadequate penalties to deter the
commission of trafficking crimes. Despite its considerable
resources, the government did not dedicate specific funding to
combat human trafficking and instead relied on existing budgets
for stakeholder departments and foreign donors for its efforts
made. The government did not provide direct care or
accommodation to trafficking victims, and funding given to NGOs
for the care of trafficking victims remained insufficient. Although
South Africa is a major migrant destination country in Africa, the
government failed to identify and address forced labor among
migrant workers, as well as foreign and South African children.
Significant gaps remain in South Africa’s overall victim protection
process, specifically the lack of formal procedures for screening
for and identifying trafficking victims amongst vulnerable groups,
including illegal migrants and women in prostitution.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: In preparation for the 2010 World Cup, there was close
cooperation between South African and U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence agencies. South Africa took measures to address
border security vulnerability and document fraud, which had
hindered the government’s ability to pursue counterterrorism
initiatives. Under the leadership of Minister Dlamini-Zuma, the
Department of Home Affairs continued implementation of its
turnaround strategy to end corruption and accelerate
documentation of all bona fide South African citizens and
residents.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The South African Revenue
Service (SARS) has a Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Container Security Initiative team located in Durban. SARS is a
member of the World Customs Organization and worked closely
with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs and
Border Protection to develop the SARS Customs Border Control
Unit, which was modeled after the CBP Antiterrorism Contraband
Enforcement Team.
Countering Terrorist Finance: South Africa was a member of both
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and
Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group. South Africa
cooperated with the United States in exchanging terrorist
financing information. South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Center
(FIC) is a member of the Egmont Group. Amendments to the FIC
basic legislation came into effect on December 1, granting the FIC
authority to impose administrative sanctions such as monetary
penalties. In November, South Africa hosted a joint experts
meeting of FATF and the Egmont Group.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC)
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
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| Further Tables |
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
| SOUTH AFRICA |
| KnowYourCountry |
|
|
Key Findings from last Mutual Evaluation Report
South Africa has made good progress in developing its system for
combating money laundering (ML) and the financing of terrorism (FT)
since its last FATF mutual evaluation in 2003.
The money laundering offence is generally in line with the Vienna and
Palermo Conventions, although a lack of comprehensive statistics made
it difficult to assess effectiveness. Provisions criminalising the financing
of terrorism are comprehensive, although they are not yet tested in
practice.
The Financial Intelligence Centre (“the Centre”) is an effective financial
intelligence unit.
The confiscation scheme is comprehensive and utilises effective civil
forfeiture measures. Since 2003, South Africa has also adopted
mechanisms to freeze terrorist-related assets.
The FIC Act imposes customer due diligence, record keeping, and
suspicious transaction reporting and internal control requirements. It
should be noted that, after the FIC Act came into force, South Africa
implemented a program to re-identify all existing customers. The issue
of beneficial ownership has not yet been addressed, however, and
South Africa also needs to adopt measures dealing with politically
exposed persons (PEPs) and correspondent banking.
The FIC Act covers some designated non-financial businesses and
professions (DNFBPs); however, South Africa needs to broaden the
legislation to cover dealers in precious metals and stones, company
service providers, and more broadly cover accountants.
At the time of the on-site visit, there were not adequate powers to
supervise and enforce compliance with AML/CFT provisions; however,
amendments to FIC Act have been enacted, and when they enter into
force this year they will significantly enhance the compliance regime.
South African authorities have established effective mechanisms to co-
operate on operational matters to combat ML and FT. South Africa can
also provide a wide range of mutual legal assistance, including the
possibility to extradite its own nationals.
South Africa has made good progress in developing its system for
combating money laundering (ML) and the financing of terrorism (FT)
since its last FATF mutual evaluation in 2003.
The money laundering offence is generally in line with the Vienna and
Palermo Conventions, although a lack of comprehensive statistics made
it difficult to assess effectiveness. Provisions criminalising the financing
of terrorism are comprehensive, although they are not yet tested in
practice.
The Financial Intelligence Centre (“the Centre”) is an effective financial
intelligence unit.
The confiscation scheme is comprehensive and utilises effective civil
forfeiture measures. Since 2003, South Africa has also adopted
mechanisms to freeze terrorist-related assets.
The FIC Act imposes customer due diligence, record keeping, and
suspicious transaction reporting and internal control requirements. It
should be noted that, after the FIC Act came into force, South Africa
implemented a program to re-identify all existing customers. The issue
of beneficial ownership has not yet been addressed, however, and
South Africa also needs to adopt measures dealing with politically
exposed persons (PEPs) and correspondent banking.
The FIC Act covers some designated non-financial businesses and
professions (DNFBPs); however, South Africa needs to broaden the
legislation to cover dealers in precious metals and stones, company
service providers, and more broadly cover accountants.
At the time of the on-site visit, there were not adequate powers to
supervise and enforce compliance with AML/CFT provisions; however,
amendments to FIC Act have been enacted, and when they enter into
force this year they will significantly enhance the compliance regime.
South African authorities have established effective mechanisms to co-
operate on operational matters to combat ML and FT. South Africa can
also provide a wide range of mutual legal assistance, including the
possibility to extradite its own nationals.
| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |