__________________________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
|
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FATF Statement re AML Strategic Deficiencies:
Date: 16 February 2012
In February 2010, Sudan made a high-level political commitment
to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic
AML/CFT deficiencies. Since October 2011, Sudan has taken
steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by
introducing an inspection programme for banks. However, the
FATF has determined that certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies
remain. Sudan should continue to work on implementing its action
plan to address these deficiencies, including by: (1) implementing
adequate procedures for identifying and freezing terrorist assets
(Special Recommendation III); (2) ensuring a fully operational and
effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit
(Recommendation 26); and (3) ensuring an effective supervisory
programme for AML/CFT compliance (Recommendation 23). The
FATF encourages Sudan to address its remaining deficiencies
and continue the process of implementing its action plan.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
The European Union adopted Council Regulation (EC) No
131/2004 of 26 January 2004 which implemented measures in the
EU prohibiting the supply of technical, financial and other
assistance related to military activities, with exemptions, directly or
indirectly to any person, entity or body in, or for use in Sudan.
By the adoption of UNSCR 1591 (2005) on 29 March 2005, the
United Nations imposed travel restrictions, with exemptions, and
an assets freeze on designated individuals. A Committee was
established to designate targets of the travel restrictions and
assets freeze. Designated targets were those deemed by the
Committee to be impeding the peace process, constituting a
threat to stability in Darfur and the region, committing human
rights violations and violating measures set out in previous
resolutions (primarily related to an arms embargo). For further
information:
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_sanctions_sudan.htm
For further info on current US sanctions:
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/pages/sudan.aspx
November 28, 2011 - The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab
member states), of which this country is a member, has approved
imposing sanctions on Syria. These include: -
* Cutting off transactions with the Syrian central bank
* Halting funding by Arab governments for projects in Syria
* A ban on senior Syrian officials travelling to other Arab countries
* A freeze on assets related to President Bashar al-Assad's
government
The declaration also calls on Arab central banks to monitor
transfers to Syria, with the exception of remittances from Syrians
abroad.
For further information, click here
The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab member states), of which
this country is a member, has boycotted Israel in a systematic
effort to isolate Israel economically in support of the Palestinians,
however, the implementation of the boycott has varied over time
among member states..
There are three tiers to the boycott. The primary boycott prohibits
the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting
countries. The secondary boycott prohibits individuals, as well as
private and public sector firms and organizations, in member
countries from engaging in business with any entity that does
business in Israel. The Arab League maintains a blacklist of such
firms. The tertiary boycott prohibits any
entity in a member country from doing business with a company or
individual that has business dealings with U.S. or other firms on
the Arab League blacklist.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Sudan is the largest country in Africa. The Darfur conflict, the
aftermath of two decades of civil war in the south, the lack of basic
infrastructure in large areas, and a reliance by much of the
population on subsistence agriculture ensure much of the
population will remain at or below the poverty level for years.
Sudan currently has limited access to international financial
markets and institutions because of comprehensive U.S.
economic sanctions. Traders and other legitimate business
persons often carry large sums of bank notes because the
electronic transfer of money outside of Sudan is not always
possible. These large amounts of cash can complicate
enforcement efforts.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Commercial banks, exchange and brokerage
shops, securities firms, insurance companies, gambling clubs,
estate brokerages, mineral and gem traders, attorneys, and
accountants
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Commercial banks, exchange and brokerage
shops, securities firms, insurance companies, gambling clubs,
estate brokerages, mineral and gem traders, attorneys, and
accountants
Number of STRs received and time frame: 34 in 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: None in 2010
Convictions: Not Applicable
Assets forfeited: criminally: Not applicable civilly: Not applicable
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Sudan is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial
Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force
(FATF)-style regional body. A MENAFATF mutual evaluation on-
site visit is scheduled for February 2011.
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
Sudan’s Islamist links with international terrorist organizations led
to Sudan's 1993 designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. In
October 1997, the U.S. imposed comprehensive economic, trade,
and financial sanctions against Sudan. In response to the
Government of Sudan’s (GOS) continued complicity in violence
occurring in Darfur, new economic sanctions were imposed in May
2007. The sanctions blocked assets of Sudanese citizens
implicated in Darfur violence and sanctioned additional companies
owned or controlled by the GOS.
In 2010, Sudan made strides in bringing the legislative basis for
its anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing regime in line
with international standards through passage of “The Money
Laundering and Terrorism Financing Act of 2010” (MLFTA). It is
unclear whether the implementing regulations for the MLFTA are
enforceable. Going forward, Sudan must focus on full
implementation of the new law and establishing and empowering
effective enforcement institutions, particularly the financial
intelligence unit. Sudan has been working to address its
shortcomings, including (1) developing adequate procedures for
identifying and freezing terrorist assets; (2) working toward a fully
operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit,
including applying to the Egmont Group for membership; (3)
ensuring financial institutions are aware of and comply with their
obligations to file suspicious transaction reports in relation to
money laundering and terrorist financing and (4) beginning to
implement a supervisory program for the regulators to ensure
compliance with the provisions of the new law and regulations.
In two recent cases, individuals were detained on suspicion of
money laundering after a large amount of currency was
discovered in their luggage. Both were able to prove that the
funds came from legitimate sources, although one case was
turned over to the tax authorities and the other to customs for
further investigation.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2011:
Sudan is not an important illicit drug-producing or drug-transit
country. However, because of vast arable land, areas of
lawlessness, ineffective border controls, impoverished conditions,
and a vulnerability to corruption, the potential exists for Sudan to
cultivate and traffic illegal drugs on a far greater scale.
In Sudan, the central government unit responsible for liaison and
coordination of national drug control policy is the Drug Combat
Administration. The Ministry of Health is the competent authority
for the issuance of authorizations and certificates for the import
and export of licit narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
Sudan is party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
Sudan has signed cooperative agreements with Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Turkey for fighting drug trafficking. Sudan's Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, passed in 1994, is
designed to fulfill that country's treaty obligations under these
conventions. Sudan is also a party to the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime.
Sudan has a government-controlled licensing system for the
manufacture, trade, and distribution of licit narcotics-based
pharmaceuticals. There is a prescription requirement for supply or
dispensation of preparations containing narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances. The law does not require warnings on
packages or accompanying leaflet information to safeguard the
users of preparations containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances.
Cannabis is the most prevalent illegal drug in Sudan. Other drugs
abused include barbiturates, heroin and cocaine. No data relating
to prevalence or use is available according to the United Nations.
Cannabis is cultivated in commercial quantities in the southern
areas of Darfur (the largest producing area in Sudan), southern
part of Blue Nile State, in Gedaref State and in the Upper Nile and
Bahr El-Ghazal regions. According to the Drug Combat
Administration, Sudanese authorities in 2009 seized over 17
metric tons of cannabis and arrested over 8000 individuals on
drug-related charges. The arrests were a two percent increase
over 2008; seizures were down 73 percent from the 63 metric
tons confiscated in 2008. Authorities from the Drug Combat
Administration maintain that the increase in arrests and decrease
in seizures reflects the effectiveness of a targeted campaign in
certain areas of the country including the States of Khartoum,
Northern Kordofan, Gedaref, El-Geziraa, Red Sea, River Nile and
Southern Darfur.
Accusations by Sudanese government officials that rebels groups
in the country are using the sale of narcotics drugs to finance
their operations have not been substantiated. Sudan does not
officially encourage or sanction drug trafficking, and there is no
evidence that senior officials are engaged in such activities.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 3)
Sudan is a source, transit, and destination country for men,
women, and children who are subjected to forced labor and sex
trafficking. Sudanese women and girls, particularly those from
rural areas or who are internally displaced, are vulnerable to
forced labor as domestic workers in homes throughout the
country; most are believed to be working without contracts or
government-enforced labor protections. Some of these women
and girls are subsequently sexually abused by male occupants of
the household or forced to engage in commercial sex acts.
Sudanese girls engage in prostitution within the country –
including in restaurants and brothels – at times with the assistance
of third parties, including law enforcement officials. Khartoum,
Juba, Nyala, and Port Sudan have reportedly seen a significant
rise in child prostitution in recent years, as well as in numbers of
street children and child laborers – two groups which are highly
vulnerable to labor and sexual exploitation. During the year,
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) forces in Lul Payam
(Upper Nile State) reportedly forced men and women to perform
heavy manual labor without remuneration, while subjecting them
to physical abuse.
Sudanese women and girls are subjected to domestic servitude in
Middle Eastern countries, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and
Qatar, and to forced sex trafficking in European countries. Some
Sudanese men who voluntarily migrate to the Middle East as low-
skilled laborers face conditions indicative of forced labor.
Sudanese children transit Yemen en route to Saudi Arabia, where
they are used in forced begging and street vending, and
reportedly work in exploitative labor situations for Sudanese
traders in the Central African Republic. Sudanese gang members
reportedly coerce other young Sudanese refugees into
prostitution in nightclubs in Egypt. Sudanese refugees in Israel
reported being brutalized by Rashaida smugglers operating in the
Sinai, including being chained together, whipped and beaten
regularly, deprived of food, and forced to do construction work at
gunpoint at smugglers’ personal homes.
Sudan is a transit and destination country for Ethiopian and
Eritrean women subjected to domestic servitude in Sudan and
Middle Eastern countries. Filipina migrant domestic workers may
also be victimized by situations of forced labor in Khartoum.
Sudan is a destination for Ethiopian, Somali, and possibly Thai
women subjected to forced prostitution. Agents recruit young
women from Ethiopia’s Oromia region with promises of high-
paying employment as domestic workers in Sudan, only to collect
their salaries or force them into prostitution in brothels in
Khartoum or near Sudan’s oil fields and mining camps. Some
Ugandan girls in Juba’s prostitution trade may be controlled by a
third party.
Thousands of Dinka women and children, and a lesser number of
children from the Nuba tribe, were abducted and subsequently
enslaved by members of the Missiriya and Rizeigat tribes during
the concluded north-south civil war. Some of those enslaved
remain with their captors. While there have been no known new
abductions of Dinka by members of Baggara tribes in a number of
years, inter-tribal abductions continue between tribes in southern
Sudan, especially in Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria States.
Hundreds of children were abducted in 2010 during cattle raids
and conflicts between rival tribes, some of whom were
subsequently subjected to conditions of domestic servitude or
animal herding. As part of the Darfur conflict, government-
supported militia, like the Janjaweed and the Popular Defense
Forces (PDFs), and elements of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)
abducted civilians between 2003 and 2007, mostly from the Fur,
Massalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups. Abducted women and girls
are subjected to sexual exploitation and forced domestic and
agricultural labor, while men and boys are subjected to forced
labor in agriculture, herding, portering goods, and domestic
servitude; some of these individuals likely remained captive at the
end of the reporting period.
Forcible recruitment of adults and particularly children, by virtually
all armed groups, including government forces involved in Sudan’
s concluded north-south civil war was previously commonplace.
Since the war formally ended with the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, the Government of
Southern Sudan’s army, the SPLA, committed to releasing all
children from its ranks, including through the signing of an action
plan with the UN in November 2009. During the year, UN
personnel continued to observe children wearing SPLA uniforms,
carrying weapons, and serving at SPLA checkpoints or as
bodyguards for senior commanders. For example, in October
2010, UN personnel near Abeyi town witnessed two children ages
10 to 12 years atop a truck wearing SPLA uniforms and carrying
AK-47 rifles. In late 2010, there were confirmed reports of unlawful
SPLA recruitment of five street children from the SPLA
guesthouse in Kadugli town (South Kordofan State), after which
they were sent for military training at the SPLA barracks in White
Lake/Jaw area. An unknown number of children remained with the
SPLA at the end of 2010. Unlike the previous reporting period,
the UN Mission to Sudan (UNMIS) reported demobilized child
soldiers are no longer being re-recruited in Blue Nile State.
In Darfur, Sudanese children were conscripted, at times through
abduction, and used by armed groups during the reporting
period, including the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Minni Minawi,
SLA/Abdul Wahid, SLA Historical Leadership, Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM), government-supported Janjaweed militia, and
Chadian opposition forces. Elsewhere in northern Sudan,
government security forces used child soldiers; at least two
children were verified as being associated with the Border
Intelligence Forces and seven with the PDF during the year.
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continued to abduct Sudanese
children and harbor enslaved Sudanese, Congolese, Central
African, and Ugandan children in southern Sudan’s Western
Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal States for use as cooks,
porters, concubines, and combatants; some of these children are
also taken back and forth across borders into Central African
Republic or the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The Government of National Unity (GNU) of Sudan does not fully
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so. While the
government took some steps to identify, demobilize, and
reintegrate child soldiers during the reporting period, combating
human trafficking through law enforcement, protection, or
prevention measures was not a priority. The GNU did not
acknowledge that forced labor, forced prostitution, or child
prostitution exists within the country, and did not publish data
regarding its efforts to combat human trafficking during the year
nor respond to requests to provide information for this report.
Though the Government of Southern Sudan’s ability to monitor
human trafficking in its jurisdiction or to provide accurate or
comprehensive information regarding its limited anti-trafficking
efforts remained weak, it demonstrated some willingness to
engage on and work with the international community to address
such issues – particularly those related to child soldiering – during
the reporting period.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2009
The Sudanese government continued to pursue counterterrorism
operations directly involving threats to U.S. interests and
personnel in Sudan. Sudanese officials have indicated that they
view their continued cooperation with the U.S. government as
important and recognize the potential benefits of U.S. training and
information-sharing. While the bilateral counterterrorism
relationship remains solid, hard-line Sudanese officials continued
to express resentment and distrust over actions by the United
States and questioned the benefits of continued counterterrorism
cooperation. Their assessment reflected disappointment that
Sudan’s cooperation has not resulted in its removal from the list of
State Sponsors of Terrorism. Despite this, there was no indication
that the Sudanese government will curtail its current level of
counterterrorism cooperation despite bumps in the overall
bilateral relationship.
Al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorist elements as well as elements of the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS, remained in Sudan in
2009. In the early hours of January 1, 2008, attackers in
Khartoum sympathetic to al-Qa’ida, calling themselves al-Qa’ida in
the Land Between the Two Niles, shot and fatally wounded two U.
S. Embassy staff members -- one American and one Sudanese
employee, both of whom worked for the U.S. Agency for
International Development. Sudanese authorities cooperated
closely with agencies of the U.S. government in the investigation.
The five alleged conspirators were arrested in February 2008 and
put on trial for murder on August 31, 2008. On June 24, 2009 four
men were sentenced to death by hanging for the killings. A fifth
man received a two-year prison term for providing the weapons
used in the attack. At least three other men allegedly involved in
planning the attack were detained but have not been charged.
With the exception of HAMAS, whose members the Sudanese
government considers “freedom fighters,” the government does
not openly support the presence of extremist elements in this
country. For example, Sudanese officials have welcomed HAMAS
members as representatives of the Palestinian Authority, but have
limited their activities to fundraising. The Sudanese government
has also worked hard to disrupt foreign fighters from using Sudan
as a logistics base and transit point for terrorists going to Iraq.
However, gaps remain in the Sudanese government’s knowledge
of these individuals and its ability to identify and capture them.
There was some evidence to suggest that individuals who were
active participants in the Iraqi insurgency have returned to Sudan
and are in a position to use their expertise to conduct attacks
within Sudan or to pass on their knowledge to local Sudanese
extremists. There was also evidence that Sudanese extremists
participated in terrorist activities in Somalia.
The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony continued
to operate in southern Sudan. Following Kony’s repeated failure
to sign a draft of the Final Peace Agreement, on December 14,
2008, the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF), with
cooperation from the Government of Southern Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), launched Operation
Lighting Thunder, attacking LRA bases along the border of
Southern Sudan and the DRC. This operation destroyed the main
LRA base camp and forcing LRA members to relocate elsewhere
in the DRC, Southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic.
The UPDF started withdrawing from the operation in mid-March,
handing control over operations in DRC to the Armed Forces of
the DRC. The operation was declared a success and was said to
have significantly weakened the LRA’s command structure.
However, the official objectives -- to make Kony sign the Final
Peace Agreement, or to destroy the LRA -- were only partially
achieved, and it is unclear how much the LRA’s central command
has been hurt. Few senior LRA figures were captured and Kony’s
whereabouts were unknown at year’s end. The UPDF continued
to pursue the LRA in Central African Republic, and in southern
Sudan, it received assistance from the Sudan Peoples Liberation
Army. There was no reliable information to corroborate long-
standing allegations that the Government of Sudan was
supporting the LRA in 2009.
Date: 16 February 2012
In February 2010, Sudan made a high-level political commitment
to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic
AML/CFT deficiencies. Since October 2011, Sudan has taken
steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by
introducing an inspection programme for banks. However, the
FATF has determined that certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies
remain. Sudan should continue to work on implementing its action
plan to address these deficiencies, including by: (1) implementing
adequate procedures for identifying and freezing terrorist assets
(Special Recommendation III); (2) ensuring a fully operational and
effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit
(Recommendation 26); and (3) ensuring an effective supervisory
programme for AML/CFT compliance (Recommendation 23). The
FATF encourages Sudan to address its remaining deficiencies
and continue the process of implementing its action plan.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
The European Union adopted Council Regulation (EC) No
131/2004 of 26 January 2004 which implemented measures in the
EU prohibiting the supply of technical, financial and other
assistance related to military activities, with exemptions, directly or
indirectly to any person, entity or body in, or for use in Sudan.
By the adoption of UNSCR 1591 (2005) on 29 March 2005, the
United Nations imposed travel restrictions, with exemptions, and
an assets freeze on designated individuals. A Committee was
established to designate targets of the travel restrictions and
assets freeze. Designated targets were those deemed by the
Committee to be impeding the peace process, constituting a
threat to stability in Darfur and the region, committing human
rights violations and violating measures set out in previous
resolutions (primarily related to an arms embargo). For further
information:
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_sanctions_sudan.htm
For further info on current US sanctions:
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/pages/sudan.aspx
November 28, 2011 - The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab
member states), of which this country is a member, has approved
imposing sanctions on Syria. These include: -
* Cutting off transactions with the Syrian central bank
* Halting funding by Arab governments for projects in Syria
* A ban on senior Syrian officials travelling to other Arab countries
* A freeze on assets related to President Bashar al-Assad's
government
The declaration also calls on Arab central banks to monitor
transfers to Syria, with the exception of remittances from Syrians
abroad.
For further information, click here
The Arab League (comprising 22 Arab member states), of which
this country is a member, has boycotted Israel in a systematic
effort to isolate Israel economically in support of the Palestinians,
however, the implementation of the boycott has varied over time
among member states..
There are three tiers to the boycott. The primary boycott prohibits
the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting
countries. The secondary boycott prohibits individuals, as well as
private and public sector firms and organizations, in member
countries from engaging in business with any entity that does
business in Israel. The Arab League maintains a blacklist of such
firms. The tertiary boycott prohibits any
entity in a member country from doing business with a company or
individual that has business dealings with U.S. or other firms on
the Arab League blacklist.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Sudan is the largest country in Africa. The Darfur conflict, the
aftermath of two decades of civil war in the south, the lack of basic
infrastructure in large areas, and a reliance by much of the
population on subsistence agriculture ensure much of the
population will remain at or below the poverty level for years.
Sudan currently has limited access to international financial
markets and institutions because of comprehensive U.S.
economic sanctions. Traders and other legitimate business
persons often carry large sums of bank notes because the
electronic transfer of money outside of Sudan is not always
possible. These large amounts of cash can complicate
enforcement efforts.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Commercial banks, exchange and brokerage
shops, securities firms, insurance companies, gambling clubs,
estate brokerages, mineral and gem traders, attorneys, and
accountants
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Commercial banks, exchange and brokerage
shops, securities firms, insurance companies, gambling clubs,
estate brokerages, mineral and gem traders, attorneys, and
accountants
Number of STRs received and time frame: 34 in 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: None in 2010
Convictions: Not Applicable
Assets forfeited: criminally: Not applicable civilly: Not applicable
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Sudan is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial
Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force
(FATF)-style regional body. A MENAFATF mutual evaluation on-
site visit is scheduled for February 2011.
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
Sudan’s Islamist links with international terrorist organizations led
to Sudan's 1993 designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. In
October 1997, the U.S. imposed comprehensive economic, trade,
and financial sanctions against Sudan. In response to the
Government of Sudan’s (GOS) continued complicity in violence
occurring in Darfur, new economic sanctions were imposed in May
2007. The sanctions blocked assets of Sudanese citizens
implicated in Darfur violence and sanctioned additional companies
owned or controlled by the GOS.
In 2010, Sudan made strides in bringing the legislative basis for
its anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing regime in line
with international standards through passage of “The Money
Laundering and Terrorism Financing Act of 2010” (MLFTA). It is
unclear whether the implementing regulations for the MLFTA are
enforceable. Going forward, Sudan must focus on full
implementation of the new law and establishing and empowering
effective enforcement institutions, particularly the financial
intelligence unit. Sudan has been working to address its
shortcomings, including (1) developing adequate procedures for
identifying and freezing terrorist assets; (2) working toward a fully
operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit,
including applying to the Egmont Group for membership; (3)
ensuring financial institutions are aware of and comply with their
obligations to file suspicious transaction reports in relation to
money laundering and terrorist financing and (4) beginning to
implement a supervisory program for the regulators to ensure
compliance with the provisions of the new law and regulations.
In two recent cases, individuals were detained on suspicion of
money laundering after a large amount of currency was
discovered in their luggage. Both were able to prove that the
funds came from legitimate sources, although one case was
turned over to the tax authorities and the other to customs for
further investigation.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2011:
Sudan is not an important illicit drug-producing or drug-transit
country. However, because of vast arable land, areas of
lawlessness, ineffective border controls, impoverished conditions,
and a vulnerability to corruption, the potential exists for Sudan to
cultivate and traffic illegal drugs on a far greater scale.
In Sudan, the central government unit responsible for liaison and
coordination of national drug control policy is the Drug Combat
Administration. The Ministry of Health is the competent authority
for the issuance of authorizations and certificates for the import
and export of licit narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
Sudan is party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
Sudan has signed cooperative agreements with Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Turkey for fighting drug trafficking. Sudan's Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, passed in 1994, is
designed to fulfill that country's treaty obligations under these
conventions. Sudan is also a party to the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime.
Sudan has a government-controlled licensing system for the
manufacture, trade, and distribution of licit narcotics-based
pharmaceuticals. There is a prescription requirement for supply or
dispensation of preparations containing narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances. The law does not require warnings on
packages or accompanying leaflet information to safeguard the
users of preparations containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances.
Cannabis is the most prevalent illegal drug in Sudan. Other drugs
abused include barbiturates, heroin and cocaine. No data relating
to prevalence or use is available according to the United Nations.
Cannabis is cultivated in commercial quantities in the southern
areas of Darfur (the largest producing area in Sudan), southern
part of Blue Nile State, in Gedaref State and in the Upper Nile and
Bahr El-Ghazal regions. According to the Drug Combat
Administration, Sudanese authorities in 2009 seized over 17
metric tons of cannabis and arrested over 8000 individuals on
drug-related charges. The arrests were a two percent increase
over 2008; seizures were down 73 percent from the 63 metric
tons confiscated in 2008. Authorities from the Drug Combat
Administration maintain that the increase in arrests and decrease
in seizures reflects the effectiveness of a targeted campaign in
certain areas of the country including the States of Khartoum,
Northern Kordofan, Gedaref, El-Geziraa, Red Sea, River Nile and
Southern Darfur.
Accusations by Sudanese government officials that rebels groups
in the country are using the sale of narcotics drugs to finance
their operations have not been substantiated. Sudan does not
officially encourage or sanction drug trafficking, and there is no
evidence that senior officials are engaged in such activities.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 3)
Sudan is a source, transit, and destination country for men,
women, and children who are subjected to forced labor and sex
trafficking. Sudanese women and girls, particularly those from
rural areas or who are internally displaced, are vulnerable to
forced labor as domestic workers in homes throughout the
country; most are believed to be working without contracts or
government-enforced labor protections. Some of these women
and girls are subsequently sexually abused by male occupants of
the household or forced to engage in commercial sex acts.
Sudanese girls engage in prostitution within the country –
including in restaurants and brothels – at times with the assistance
of third parties, including law enforcement officials. Khartoum,
Juba, Nyala, and Port Sudan have reportedly seen a significant
rise in child prostitution in recent years, as well as in numbers of
street children and child laborers – two groups which are highly
vulnerable to labor and sexual exploitation. During the year,
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) forces in Lul Payam
(Upper Nile State) reportedly forced men and women to perform
heavy manual labor without remuneration, while subjecting them
to physical abuse.
Sudanese women and girls are subjected to domestic servitude in
Middle Eastern countries, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and
Qatar, and to forced sex trafficking in European countries. Some
Sudanese men who voluntarily migrate to the Middle East as low-
skilled laborers face conditions indicative of forced labor.
Sudanese children transit Yemen en route to Saudi Arabia, where
they are used in forced begging and street vending, and
reportedly work in exploitative labor situations for Sudanese
traders in the Central African Republic. Sudanese gang members
reportedly coerce other young Sudanese refugees into
prostitution in nightclubs in Egypt. Sudanese refugees in Israel
reported being brutalized by Rashaida smugglers operating in the
Sinai, including being chained together, whipped and beaten
regularly, deprived of food, and forced to do construction work at
gunpoint at smugglers’ personal homes.
Sudan is a transit and destination country for Ethiopian and
Eritrean women subjected to domestic servitude in Sudan and
Middle Eastern countries. Filipina migrant domestic workers may
also be victimized by situations of forced labor in Khartoum.
Sudan is a destination for Ethiopian, Somali, and possibly Thai
women subjected to forced prostitution. Agents recruit young
women from Ethiopia’s Oromia region with promises of high-
paying employment as domestic workers in Sudan, only to collect
their salaries or force them into prostitution in brothels in
Khartoum or near Sudan’s oil fields and mining camps. Some
Ugandan girls in Juba’s prostitution trade may be controlled by a
third party.
Thousands of Dinka women and children, and a lesser number of
children from the Nuba tribe, were abducted and subsequently
enslaved by members of the Missiriya and Rizeigat tribes during
the concluded north-south civil war. Some of those enslaved
remain with their captors. While there have been no known new
abductions of Dinka by members of Baggara tribes in a number of
years, inter-tribal abductions continue between tribes in southern
Sudan, especially in Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria States.
Hundreds of children were abducted in 2010 during cattle raids
and conflicts between rival tribes, some of whom were
subsequently subjected to conditions of domestic servitude or
animal herding. As part of the Darfur conflict, government-
supported militia, like the Janjaweed and the Popular Defense
Forces (PDFs), and elements of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)
abducted civilians between 2003 and 2007, mostly from the Fur,
Massalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups. Abducted women and girls
are subjected to sexual exploitation and forced domestic and
agricultural labor, while men and boys are subjected to forced
labor in agriculture, herding, portering goods, and domestic
servitude; some of these individuals likely remained captive at the
end of the reporting period.
Forcible recruitment of adults and particularly children, by virtually
all armed groups, including government forces involved in Sudan’
s concluded north-south civil war was previously commonplace.
Since the war formally ended with the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, the Government of
Southern Sudan’s army, the SPLA, committed to releasing all
children from its ranks, including through the signing of an action
plan with the UN in November 2009. During the year, UN
personnel continued to observe children wearing SPLA uniforms,
carrying weapons, and serving at SPLA checkpoints or as
bodyguards for senior commanders. For example, in October
2010, UN personnel near Abeyi town witnessed two children ages
10 to 12 years atop a truck wearing SPLA uniforms and carrying
AK-47 rifles. In late 2010, there were confirmed reports of unlawful
SPLA recruitment of five street children from the SPLA
guesthouse in Kadugli town (South Kordofan State), after which
they were sent for military training at the SPLA barracks in White
Lake/Jaw area. An unknown number of children remained with the
SPLA at the end of 2010. Unlike the previous reporting period,
the UN Mission to Sudan (UNMIS) reported demobilized child
soldiers are no longer being re-recruited in Blue Nile State.
In Darfur, Sudanese children were conscripted, at times through
abduction, and used by armed groups during the reporting
period, including the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Minni Minawi,
SLA/Abdul Wahid, SLA Historical Leadership, Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM), government-supported Janjaweed militia, and
Chadian opposition forces. Elsewhere in northern Sudan,
government security forces used child soldiers; at least two
children were verified as being associated with the Border
Intelligence Forces and seven with the PDF during the year.
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continued to abduct Sudanese
children and harbor enslaved Sudanese, Congolese, Central
African, and Ugandan children in southern Sudan’s Western
Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal States for use as cooks,
porters, concubines, and combatants; some of these children are
also taken back and forth across borders into Central African
Republic or the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The Government of National Unity (GNU) of Sudan does not fully
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so. While the
government took some steps to identify, demobilize, and
reintegrate child soldiers during the reporting period, combating
human trafficking through law enforcement, protection, or
prevention measures was not a priority. The GNU did not
acknowledge that forced labor, forced prostitution, or child
prostitution exists within the country, and did not publish data
regarding its efforts to combat human trafficking during the year
nor respond to requests to provide information for this report.
Though the Government of Southern Sudan’s ability to monitor
human trafficking in its jurisdiction or to provide accurate or
comprehensive information regarding its limited anti-trafficking
efforts remained weak, it demonstrated some willingness to
engage on and work with the international community to address
such issues – particularly those related to child soldiering – during
the reporting period.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2009
The Sudanese government continued to pursue counterterrorism
operations directly involving threats to U.S. interests and
personnel in Sudan. Sudanese officials have indicated that they
view their continued cooperation with the U.S. government as
important and recognize the potential benefits of U.S. training and
information-sharing. While the bilateral counterterrorism
relationship remains solid, hard-line Sudanese officials continued
to express resentment and distrust over actions by the United
States and questioned the benefits of continued counterterrorism
cooperation. Their assessment reflected disappointment that
Sudan’s cooperation has not resulted in its removal from the list of
State Sponsors of Terrorism. Despite this, there was no indication
that the Sudanese government will curtail its current level of
counterterrorism cooperation despite bumps in the overall
bilateral relationship.
Al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorist elements as well as elements of the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS, remained in Sudan in
2009. In the early hours of January 1, 2008, attackers in
Khartoum sympathetic to al-Qa’ida, calling themselves al-Qa’ida in
the Land Between the Two Niles, shot and fatally wounded two U.
S. Embassy staff members -- one American and one Sudanese
employee, both of whom worked for the U.S. Agency for
International Development. Sudanese authorities cooperated
closely with agencies of the U.S. government in the investigation.
The five alleged conspirators were arrested in February 2008 and
put on trial for murder on August 31, 2008. On June 24, 2009 four
men were sentenced to death by hanging for the killings. A fifth
man received a two-year prison term for providing the weapons
used in the attack. At least three other men allegedly involved in
planning the attack were detained but have not been charged.
With the exception of HAMAS, whose members the Sudanese
government considers “freedom fighters,” the government does
not openly support the presence of extremist elements in this
country. For example, Sudanese officials have welcomed HAMAS
members as representatives of the Palestinian Authority, but have
limited their activities to fundraising. The Sudanese government
has also worked hard to disrupt foreign fighters from using Sudan
as a logistics base and transit point for terrorists going to Iraq.
However, gaps remain in the Sudanese government’s knowledge
of these individuals and its ability to identify and capture them.
There was some evidence to suggest that individuals who were
active participants in the Iraqi insurgency have returned to Sudan
and are in a position to use their expertise to conduct attacks
within Sudan or to pass on their knowledge to local Sudanese
extremists. There was also evidence that Sudanese extremists
participated in terrorist activities in Somalia.
The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony continued
to operate in southern Sudan. Following Kony’s repeated failure
to sign a draft of the Final Peace Agreement, on December 14,
2008, the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF), with
cooperation from the Government of Southern Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), launched Operation
Lighting Thunder, attacking LRA bases along the border of
Southern Sudan and the DRC. This operation destroyed the main
LRA base camp and forcing LRA members to relocate elsewhere
in the DRC, Southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic.
The UPDF started withdrawing from the operation in mid-March,
handing control over operations in DRC to the Armed Forces of
the DRC. The operation was declared a success and was said to
have significantly weakened the LRA’s command structure.
However, the official objectives -- to make Kony sign the Final
Peace Agreement, or to destroy the LRA -- were only partially
achieved, and it is unclear how much the LRA’s central command
has been hurt. Few senior LRA figures were captured and Kony’s
whereabouts were unknown at year’s end. The UPDF continued
to pursue the LRA in Central African Republic, and in southern
Sudan, it received assistance from the Sudan Peoples Liberation
Army. There was no reliable information to corroborate long-
standing allegations that the Government of Sudan was
supporting the LRA in 2009.
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
| SUDAN |
| KnowYourCountry |
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| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |