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FATF Statement re AML Strategic Deficiencies:
Date: 16 February 2012
In June 2011, Tajikistan made a high-level political commitment to
work with the FATF and EAG to address its strategic AML/CFT
deficiencies. Since October 2011, Tajikistan has taken steps
towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by addressing
the concerns regarding its Voluntary Tax Compliance programme
expressed by the FATF in February 2011 and by improving the
functionality and operational independence of the FIU. However,
the FATF has determined that certain strategic AML/CFT
deficiencies remain. Tajikistan should continue to work on
implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies,
including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and
terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and Special
Recommendation II); (2) establishing and implementing adequate
procedures for the confiscation of funds related to money
laundering and identifying and freezing terrorist assets
(Recommendation 3 and Special Recommendation III); (3)
enhancing financial transparency (Recommendation 4); (4)
ensuring a fully operational, and effectively functioning Financial
Intelligence Unit and improving suspicious transaction reporting
requirements (Recommendation 13, Special Recommendation IV,
and Recommendation 26); and (5) improving and broadening
CDD measures (Recommendation 5). The FATF encourages
Tajikistan to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the
process of implementing its action plan.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Tajikistan operates largely on a cash economy and with
decentralized accounting systems, which makes money
laundering difficult to detect. Money laundering schemes are
relatively easy to perpetrate due to the absence of strict record
keeping laws for financial institutions.
Criminal proceeds laundered in Tajikistan are derived from both
foreign and domestic criminal activity related to the large amounts
of opium and heroin trafficked from Afghanistan to Russia via
Tajikistan. Corruption related to large scale industries, such as
aluminum production, also presents serious risks. The money
laundering proceeds are controlled by high level drug trafficking
networks, with some smaller actors involved. It is suspected high-
level corruption facilitates the drug trade and its associated
money laundering. Tajik authorities have reported that some
unlawfully derived proceeds are handled through offshore
accounts in the Middle East. Large scale smuggling of domestic
goods occurs in Tajikistan to avoid customs duties and local taxes.
In February 2010, Tajikistan introduced a Voluntary Tax
Compliance (VTC) program that is to remain in force until
December 2011 and that appears to conflict with international
AML/CFT standards. The VTC program applies to undeclared and
repatriated funds belonging to citizens and legal persons of
Tajikistan that are transferred from foreign banks to banks in
Tajikistan. Repatriated funds—including proceeds of certain
offenses that are money laundering predicates under the FATF
Recommendations--are exempted from criminal responsibility.
Moreover, the Tajik authorities are obliged to ensure
confidentiality of the funds transferred into banks in Tajikistan
under the program, establishing bank secrecy requirements that
undermine effective AML regulatory supervision and law
enforcement activities.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: NO civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: NO
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: NO
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/).
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks money remitters, insurance companies
and securities firms
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: NO
Covered entities: Not applicable
Number of STRs received and time frame: Not applicable
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: One since 2008
Convictions: None
Assets forfeited: criminally: None civilly: None
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Tajikistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating
Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), a Financial
Action Task Force-style regional body. Its most recent mutual
evaluation report can be found here: http://www.eurasiangroup.
org/files/MERs%20-%20ENG/tajikistan.pdf
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
The Government of Tajikistan (GOT) has customs information
exchange agreements with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan,
Iran, Turkey, China, Russia, and Belarus.
The GOT has not implemented many of its treaty obligations in
domestic law. UNSCR 1373 has been partially implemented, but
the freezing of terrorist assets is still not codified in the laws of
Tajikistan. The authorities can confiscate property belonging to
terrorist organizations under the Law on Combating Terrorism.
The proceeds from the financing of terrorism offenses can also be
confiscated under the Criminal Procedure Code. However, these
measures do not permit freezing of terrorist assets without delay,
and UNSCR 1267 has not been used for this purpose. Banks and
non-banking institutions report the lists of designated persons
under UNSCR 1267 have not been distributed. The Criminal Code
criminalizes terrorist financing, but it does not apply to individual
terrorists.
The absence of legally mandated customer due diligence
requirements makes it very difficult for authorities to detect
financial crime or money laundering. Article 262 of the Criminal
Code criminalizes money laundering, but does not meet
international standards. The Criminal Code states confiscation of
the offender’s belongings is possible in certain cases but also
specifies exceptions. In 2008, the Tajik Parliament adopted the
Law on Executive Proceedings that enables asset-seizure
mechanisms.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Tajikistan shares a long border with Afghanistan, where almost 90
percent of the world’s opium and heroin originates. As such, it is
on the front lines of the fight to stop the trafficking of opiates from
Afghanistan to Europe and beyond. Tajikistan is not a major
narcotics producer, but it is a favorite transit route for drug
traffickers due to its location between Afghanistan and Russia.
The drug trade is a serious threat to stability and good
governance in Tajikistan, and a terrorist financing concern. Drug
trafficking has reinforced serious corruption throughout all levels
of the Tajik government.
Tajikistan’s 1,344 kilometer border with Afghanistan is mostly
demarcated by the Panj River, which can be easily crossed on
foot in some areas. Russian border guards helped secure
Tajikistan’s southern border until 2005, when Tajik authorities
assumed control. Since then, the number of border guards
stationed on the border has fallen, as have drug seizures.
UNODC estimates that about 15 percent of the opium and 20
percent of the heroin produced in Afghanistan are smuggled
through Central Asia en route to consumers in Russia, Europe,
and China. The majority of these drugs pass through Tajikistan.
Up to 100 tons of Afghan heroin are smuggled through Tajikistan
every year. Based on this figure, Tajik law enforcement annually
seizes about 2 percent of heroin transiting Tajikistan.
Domestic consumption of drugs in Tajikistan is relatively low, with
most transited narcotics consumed in Russia and Eastern Europe.
While there are only about 8,000 registered addicts in Tajikistan,
the UNODC and the International Red Cross Society estimate that
about 70,000 persons regularly use opiates in the country. These
estimates suggest that about 1 percent of the population is
addicted to opium or heroin. Tajikistan is party to the 1988 UN
Drug Convention and major multilateral conventions for legal
assistance and law enforcement cooperation. The United States
does not have an extradition treaty with Tajikistan.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
Tajikistan is a source country for women and children subjected to
forced prostitution and for men, women, and children subjected to
conditions of forced labor. Women from Tajikistan are subjected
to forced prostitution in the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Kazakhstan, and within Tajikistan. These women often
transit through Russia and Kyrgyzstan en route to their
destination country. IOM estimates that a significant percentage of
Tajikistan’s estimated one million labor migrants are victims of
forced labor, sometimes after voluntarily migrating to Russia in
search of work. Men from Tajikistan are subjected to conditions of
forced labor in Russia’s agricultural and construction sectors and,
to a lesser extent, the same sectors in Kazakhstan and
Afghanistan. Tajik children have been subjected to sex trafficking
and forced labor, including forced begging, within Tajikistan.
There were limited reports that Tajik children were exploited within
Tajikistan during the annual cotton harvest; NGOs report a
significant reduction of this practice compared to previous years.
The Government of Tajikistan does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. The government made
important progress over the past year in addressing the use of
forced labor in the annual cotton harvest. During the fall 2010
cotton harvest, the government disseminated a directive that
ordered enforcement of existing prohibitions against forced labor.
The government also accredited and assisted NGOs to monitor
the cotton harvest. Government officials, with IOM and Tajik NGO
representatives, met with local government and school officials to
reiterate the government’s prohibition against forced child labor.
The government prosecuted and convicted trafficking offenders
for the first time under its anti-trafficking statute and protected
victims threatened by traffickers during criminal proceedings. The
government also instituted quarterly meetings to coordinate anti-
trafficking activities with government partners.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: Severe weaknesses were exposed in Tajikistan’s
counterterrorism strategy and its ability to conduct effective
counterterrorism operations. Events in the Rasht Valley
demonstrated that Tajikistan was vulnerable to an organized
insurgency by well-trained and motivated terrorists, both foreign
and domestic. The inability of the Government of Tajikistan to
police its border with Afghanistan and deal decisively with attacks
against government forces emboldened its domestic and foreign
enemies. Terrorists, criminals, and fighters of varied allegiances
effectively exploited Tajikistan’s mountainous terrain and domestic
political rivalries.
Tajikistan’s counterterrorism policies were focused mainly on
controlling Islam in society and increasing the capacity of
Tajikistan’s military and law enforcement community to conduct
tactical operations. The latter was undertaken with support from
bilateral assistance programs with the international community.
While the government maintained a list of banned groups it
considers "extremist", the list included several religious groups –
including Jehovah's Witnesses; Tablighi Jamaat, an Islamic
missionary organization; and the Salafiya sect – that the
government banned despite a lack of any evidence that members
engaged in violent extremist activities.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: On September 22, 23 soldiers were
killed when militants in the Kamarob Valley (an opposition
stronghold just outside of Gharm in the Rasht Valley) ambushed a
military convoy. The Ministry of Defense reported that former
opposition commanders Mullo Abdullo Rahimov and Ali Bedaki
Davlatov led the attack with a contingent of foreign and Tajik
fighters that had slipped into Tajikistan from Afghanistan.
On September 3, a Vehicle Born Improvised Implosive Device
(VBIED) detonated on the compound of the Regional Department
for Combating Organized Crime (UBOP) in the northern city of
Khujand, killing two officers and injuring 26 others as they
gathered for morning formation. This was the first VBIED attack in
Tajikistan since at least the end of the civil war. According to the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the VBIED was detonated by a suicide
bomber with possible links to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU). The previously unknown group “Jamatt Ansarullah in
Tajikistan” later claimed responsibility. Many speculated that the
attack was an act of revenge against UBOP by a local group for
the alleged death of a young man in its custody. The driver was
reportedly the deceased man’s brother. UBOP is notorious for its
abusive interrogation methods. Government security operations in
the northern Sughd region against suspected IMU members
continued throughout the year.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The Government of Tajikistan
used counterterrorism statutes to suppress legitimate political
opposition and dissent as well as to prosecute terrorists.
Unfortunately, the judicial system in Tajikistan was also plagued
by endemic corruption.
An August 23 prison break by suspected insurgents from the
Rasht Valley resulted in the death of six police officers and
sparked a months-long manhunt. As 2010 drew to a close, more
than half of the prisoners had been recaptured or killed. Some
were recaptured in Afghanistan with the assistance of Afghan
security forces.
Effectively policing the rugged and remote Tajik/Afghan border is
a daunting task and the Government of Tajikistan has made
progress in improving border security by leveraging bilateral
assistance.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Terrorist financing and money
laundering were illegal, but existing laws were not comprehensive
and did not meet international standards. Despite pressure from
the international community, Tajikistan has not taken action to
modernize its money laundering criminal code.
Regional and International Cooperation: In September, Tajikistan
participated in regional counterterrorism exercises with Shanghai
Cooperation Organization partner nations.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Many of the
government's measures to counter extremism and radicalization
restricted religious freedom. Various initiatives have been
undertaken, such as banning the hijab in schools and a recent
draft law prohibiting minors from attending mosques. Rather than
specifically addressing radicalization and violent extremism, the
government sought to marginalize Islam as a whole. Critics
claimed that heavy-handed government tactics actually
contributed to radicalization rather than deterred it.
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Date: 16 February 2012
In June 2011, Tajikistan made a high-level political commitment to
work with the FATF and EAG to address its strategic AML/CFT
deficiencies. Since October 2011, Tajikistan has taken steps
towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by addressing
the concerns regarding its Voluntary Tax Compliance programme
expressed by the FATF in February 2011 and by improving the
functionality and operational independence of the FIU. However,
the FATF has determined that certain strategic AML/CFT
deficiencies remain. Tajikistan should continue to work on
implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies,
including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and
terrorist financing (Recommendation 1 and Special
Recommendation II); (2) establishing and implementing adequate
procedures for the confiscation of funds related to money
laundering and identifying and freezing terrorist assets
(Recommendation 3 and Special Recommendation III); (3)
enhancing financial transparency (Recommendation 4); (4)
ensuring a fully operational, and effectively functioning Financial
Intelligence Unit and improving suspicious transaction reporting
requirements (Recommendation 13, Special Recommendation IV,
and Recommendation 26); and (5) improving and broadening
CDD measures (Recommendation 5). The FATF encourages
Tajikistan to address its remaining deficiencies and continue the
process of implementing its action plan.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Tajikistan operates largely on a cash economy and with
decentralized accounting systems, which makes money
laundering difficult to detect. Money laundering schemes are
relatively easy to perpetrate due to the absence of strict record
keeping laws for financial institutions.
Criminal proceeds laundered in Tajikistan are derived from both
foreign and domestic criminal activity related to the large amounts
of opium and heroin trafficked from Afghanistan to Russia via
Tajikistan. Corruption related to large scale industries, such as
aluminum production, also presents serious risks. The money
laundering proceeds are controlled by high level drug trafficking
networks, with some smaller actors involved. It is suspected high-
level corruption facilitates the drug trade and its associated
money laundering. Tajik authorities have reported that some
unlawfully derived proceeds are handled through offshore
accounts in the Middle East. Large scale smuggling of domestic
goods occurs in Tajikistan to avoid customs duties and local taxes.
In February 2010, Tajikistan introduced a Voluntary Tax
Compliance (VTC) program that is to remain in force until
December 2011 and that appears to conflict with international
AML/CFT standards. The VTC program applies to undeclared and
repatriated funds belonging to citizens and legal persons of
Tajikistan that are transferred from foreign banks to banks in
Tajikistan. Repatriated funds—including proceeds of certain
offenses that are money laundering predicates under the FATF
Recommendations--are exempted from criminal responsibility.
Moreover, the Tajik authorities are obliged to ensure
confidentiality of the funds transferred into banks in Tajikistan
under the program, establishing bank secrecy requirements that
undermine effective AML regulatory supervision and law
enforcement activities.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: NO civilly: YES
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: NO
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: NO
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/).
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks money remitters, insurance companies
and securities firms
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: NO
Covered entities: Not applicable
Number of STRs received and time frame: Not applicable
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: One since 2008
Convictions: None
Assets forfeited: criminally: None civilly: None
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Tajikistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating
Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), a Financial
Action Task Force-style regional body. Its most recent mutual
evaluation report can be found here: http://www.eurasiangroup.
org/files/MERs%20-%20ENG/tajikistan.pdf
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
The Government of Tajikistan (GOT) has customs information
exchange agreements with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan,
Iran, Turkey, China, Russia, and Belarus.
The GOT has not implemented many of its treaty obligations in
domestic law. UNSCR 1373 has been partially implemented, but
the freezing of terrorist assets is still not codified in the laws of
Tajikistan. The authorities can confiscate property belonging to
terrorist organizations under the Law on Combating Terrorism.
The proceeds from the financing of terrorism offenses can also be
confiscated under the Criminal Procedure Code. However, these
measures do not permit freezing of terrorist assets without delay,
and UNSCR 1267 has not been used for this purpose. Banks and
non-banking institutions report the lists of designated persons
under UNSCR 1267 have not been distributed. The Criminal Code
criminalizes terrorist financing, but it does not apply to individual
terrorists.
The absence of legally mandated customer due diligence
requirements makes it very difficult for authorities to detect
financial crime or money laundering. Article 262 of the Criminal
Code criminalizes money laundering, but does not meet
international standards. The Criminal Code states confiscation of
the offender’s belongings is possible in certain cases but also
specifies exceptions. In 2008, the Tajik Parliament adopted the
Law on Executive Proceedings that enables asset-seizure
mechanisms.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Tajikistan shares a long border with Afghanistan, where almost 90
percent of the world’s opium and heroin originates. As such, it is
on the front lines of the fight to stop the trafficking of opiates from
Afghanistan to Europe and beyond. Tajikistan is not a major
narcotics producer, but it is a favorite transit route for drug
traffickers due to its location between Afghanistan and Russia.
The drug trade is a serious threat to stability and good
governance in Tajikistan, and a terrorist financing concern. Drug
trafficking has reinforced serious corruption throughout all levels
of the Tajik government.
Tajikistan’s 1,344 kilometer border with Afghanistan is mostly
demarcated by the Panj River, which can be easily crossed on
foot in some areas. Russian border guards helped secure
Tajikistan’s southern border until 2005, when Tajik authorities
assumed control. Since then, the number of border guards
stationed on the border has fallen, as have drug seizures.
UNODC estimates that about 15 percent of the opium and 20
percent of the heroin produced in Afghanistan are smuggled
through Central Asia en route to consumers in Russia, Europe,
and China. The majority of these drugs pass through Tajikistan.
Up to 100 tons of Afghan heroin are smuggled through Tajikistan
every year. Based on this figure, Tajik law enforcement annually
seizes about 2 percent of heroin transiting Tajikistan.
Domestic consumption of drugs in Tajikistan is relatively low, with
most transited narcotics consumed in Russia and Eastern Europe.
While there are only about 8,000 registered addicts in Tajikistan,
the UNODC and the International Red Cross Society estimate that
about 70,000 persons regularly use opiates in the country. These
estimates suggest that about 1 percent of the population is
addicted to opium or heroin. Tajikistan is party to the 1988 UN
Drug Convention and major multilateral conventions for legal
assistance and law enforcement cooperation. The United States
does not have an extradition treaty with Tajikistan.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2)
Tajikistan is a source country for women and children subjected to
forced prostitution and for men, women, and children subjected to
conditions of forced labor. Women from Tajikistan are subjected
to forced prostitution in the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Kazakhstan, and within Tajikistan. These women often
transit through Russia and Kyrgyzstan en route to their
destination country. IOM estimates that a significant percentage of
Tajikistan’s estimated one million labor migrants are victims of
forced labor, sometimes after voluntarily migrating to Russia in
search of work. Men from Tajikistan are subjected to conditions of
forced labor in Russia’s agricultural and construction sectors and,
to a lesser extent, the same sectors in Kazakhstan and
Afghanistan. Tajik children have been subjected to sex trafficking
and forced labor, including forced begging, within Tajikistan.
There were limited reports that Tajik children were exploited within
Tajikistan during the annual cotton harvest; NGOs report a
significant reduction of this practice compared to previous years.
The Government of Tajikistan does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. The government made
important progress over the past year in addressing the use of
forced labor in the annual cotton harvest. During the fall 2010
cotton harvest, the government disseminated a directive that
ordered enforcement of existing prohibitions against forced labor.
The government also accredited and assisted NGOs to monitor
the cotton harvest. Government officials, with IOM and Tajik NGO
representatives, met with local government and school officials to
reiterate the government’s prohibition against forced child labor.
The government prosecuted and convicted trafficking offenders
for the first time under its anti-trafficking statute and protected
victims threatened by traffickers during criminal proceedings. The
government also instituted quarterly meetings to coordinate anti-
trafficking activities with government partners.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: Severe weaknesses were exposed in Tajikistan’s
counterterrorism strategy and its ability to conduct effective
counterterrorism operations. Events in the Rasht Valley
demonstrated that Tajikistan was vulnerable to an organized
insurgency by well-trained and motivated terrorists, both foreign
and domestic. The inability of the Government of Tajikistan to
police its border with Afghanistan and deal decisively with attacks
against government forces emboldened its domestic and foreign
enemies. Terrorists, criminals, and fighters of varied allegiances
effectively exploited Tajikistan’s mountainous terrain and domestic
political rivalries.
Tajikistan’s counterterrorism policies were focused mainly on
controlling Islam in society and increasing the capacity of
Tajikistan’s military and law enforcement community to conduct
tactical operations. The latter was undertaken with support from
bilateral assistance programs with the international community.
While the government maintained a list of banned groups it
considers "extremist", the list included several religious groups –
including Jehovah's Witnesses; Tablighi Jamaat, an Islamic
missionary organization; and the Salafiya sect – that the
government banned despite a lack of any evidence that members
engaged in violent extremist activities.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: On September 22, 23 soldiers were
killed when militants in the Kamarob Valley (an opposition
stronghold just outside of Gharm in the Rasht Valley) ambushed a
military convoy. The Ministry of Defense reported that former
opposition commanders Mullo Abdullo Rahimov and Ali Bedaki
Davlatov led the attack with a contingent of foreign and Tajik
fighters that had slipped into Tajikistan from Afghanistan.
On September 3, a Vehicle Born Improvised Implosive Device
(VBIED) detonated on the compound of the Regional Department
for Combating Organized Crime (UBOP) in the northern city of
Khujand, killing two officers and injuring 26 others as they
gathered for morning formation. This was the first VBIED attack in
Tajikistan since at least the end of the civil war. According to the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the VBIED was detonated by a suicide
bomber with possible links to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU). The previously unknown group “Jamatt Ansarullah in
Tajikistan” later claimed responsibility. Many speculated that the
attack was an act of revenge against UBOP by a local group for
the alleged death of a young man in its custody. The driver was
reportedly the deceased man’s brother. UBOP is notorious for its
abusive interrogation methods. Government security operations in
the northern Sughd region against suspected IMU members
continued throughout the year.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The Government of Tajikistan
used counterterrorism statutes to suppress legitimate political
opposition and dissent as well as to prosecute terrorists.
Unfortunately, the judicial system in Tajikistan was also plagued
by endemic corruption.
An August 23 prison break by suspected insurgents from the
Rasht Valley resulted in the death of six police officers and
sparked a months-long manhunt. As 2010 drew to a close, more
than half of the prisoners had been recaptured or killed. Some
were recaptured in Afghanistan with the assistance of Afghan
security forces.
Effectively policing the rugged and remote Tajik/Afghan border is
a daunting task and the Government of Tajikistan has made
progress in improving border security by leveraging bilateral
assistance.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Terrorist financing and money
laundering were illegal, but existing laws were not comprehensive
and did not meet international standards. Despite pressure from
the international community, Tajikistan has not taken action to
modernize its money laundering criminal code.
Regional and International Cooperation: In September, Tajikistan
participated in regional counterterrorism exercises with Shanghai
Cooperation Organization partner nations.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Many of the
government's measures to counter extremism and radicalization
restricted religious freedom. Various initiatives have been
undertaken, such as banning the hijab in schools and a recent
draft law prohibiting minors from attending mosques. Rather than
specifically addressing radicalization and violent extremism, the
government sought to marginalize Islam as a whole. Critics
claimed that heavy-handed government tactics actually
contributed to radicalization rather than deterred it.
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
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| Further Tables |
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
| TAJIKISTAN |
| KnowYourCountry |
|
|
| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |