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FATF Statement re AML Strategic Deficiencies:
Date: 16 February 2012
Tanzania has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime,
including by the passage of amendments to the Anti-Money
Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act and the AML law for
Zanzibar. However, despite Tanzania’s high-level political
commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to address its
strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Tanzania has not made sufficient
progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic
AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Tanzania should work on
implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies,
including by: (1) determining whether money laundering is
adequately criminalised (Recommendation 1); (2) adequately
criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (3)
establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify
and freeze terrorist assets as well as implementing the UNSCRs
1267 and 1373 through law, regulations or other enforceable
means (Special Recommendation III); (4) establishing effective
CDD measures (Recommendation 5); (5) establishing adequate
record-keeping requirements (Recommendation 10); (6)
establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning
Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); and (7)
designating competent authorities to ensure compliance with
AML/CFT requirements (Recommendation 23). The FATF
encourages Tanzania to address its remaining deficiencies and
continue the process of implementing its action plan.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Tanzania is not an important regional financial center. Tanzania’s
location at the crossroads of southern, central and eastern Africa
leaves it vulnerable to activities that generate illicit revenue, such
as smuggling, and the trafficking of narcotics, arms, and humans.
The major profit generating crimes in Tanzania include theft,
robbery, corruption, smuggling of precious metals and stones,
and drug trafficking. With only twelve percent of the population
engaged in the formal financial sector, money laundering is more
likely to occur in the informal non-bank sectors. Officials indicate
the offshore sector and free trade zones are not currently
significant areas of concern. Criminals have been known to use
front companies, including hawaladars and bureaux de change, to
launder funds, though these are not currently significant areas of
concern for Tanzanian anti-money laundering officials. The use of
front companies to launder money is especially common on the
island of Zanzibar, where fewer federal regulations apply. Officials
indicate that money laundering schemes in Zanzibar generally
take the form of foreign investment in the tourist industry and bulk
cash smuggling. Real estate and used car businesses also
appear to be sources of money laundering in Tanzania.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
All serious crimes approach or list approach to predicate crimes:
List approach
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks and financial institutions; cash dealers;
accountants; art, metal, and precious stone dealers; customs
officials; and legal professionals
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks and financial institutions; cash dealers;
accountants; realtors; art, precious metals and stone dealers;
casino and gaming operators; regulators and customs officials;
and legal professionals
Number of STRs received and time frame: 20 in 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: 0
Convictions: 0
Assets forfeited: criminally: 0 civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: NO
Tanzania is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-
Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a Financial Action Task
Force (FATF)-style regional body. Its most recent mutual
evaluation can be found here: http://www.esaamlg.org/reports/me.
php
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
Tanzania does not have formal records exchange mechanisms,
though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and central Bank of
Tanzania do cooperate with other governments via memoranda of
understanding.
Tanzania has serious deficiencies in its legislation and AML/CFT
regime. Among the key issues are the inadequate criminalization
of terrorist financing; deficiencies in the mechanisms to freeze
and confiscate terrorist assets, including a lack of implementing
regulations to give effect to the freezing mechanism under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act for the purposes of UNSCRs 1267
and 1373; a lack of enforceable requirements to ensure customer
due diligence (CDD); weaknesses in supervision of the financial
sector; a focus mainly on the formal banking sector rather than
full coverage of designated non-financial businesses and
professions (DNFBPs); ineffective provisions pertaining to
recordkeeping, including a threshold approach to recordkeeping
requirements; and weaknesses in the structure and function of
Tanzania’s financial intelligence unit, including the lack of
designated competent authorities responsible for ensuring
compliance by financial institutions and inadequate provisions to
safeguard the operational independence of the FIU.
Nevertheless, the Government of Tanzania (GOT) has made
improvements in its compliance with international AML/CFT
standards. In January 2010, legislation mirroring the mainland
Anti-Money Laundering Act came into force in Zanzibar. The
Zanzibar legislation does not recognize the jurisdiction of the
mainland FIU and National AML Committee; however, the GOT
has agreed in principle to amend this. The GOT should focus its
efforts on practical implementation of the AMLA, including
dedicating the resources necessary to build an effective FIU. The
FIU should continue its efforts to hire additional staff to ensure
financial institutions are adequately supervised, to inform them of
their reporting and record keeping responsibilities, and to train
the financial sector to identify suspicious transactions. Tanzania
should work to increase the level of awareness and
understanding of money laundering issues in the financial, law
enforcement and judicial areas and should allocate the necessary
human, technical, and financial resources to implement its
AML/CFT regime. The GOT should ensure the Prevention of
Terrorism Act comports with international standards and
authorities implement all provisions in the law. The GOT should
also improve its cross-border cash declaration regime. The
capacity of Tanzanian police and customs officials to recognize
money laundering and value transfer methodologies used in the
region should be raised.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012:
Tanzania is primarily a transit country for narcotics, although
there is also some local consumption of heroin and domestic
production of marijuana. Tanzania borders eight countries to the
north, west, and south, and its eastern border is comprised of a
1,424-kilometer coastline. Due to porous borders, Tanzanian
authorities have historically struggled to combat the movement of
narcotics into and out of the country. Police forces believe that
the largest bulk shipments of narcotics enter the country through
unofficial seaports in areas such as Dar es Salaam's Kinondoni
District and the Tanga Region to the north. Large shipments of
heroin originating from Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, come
ashore in these areas. Tanzanian "drug mules" bring smaller
amounts of cocaine from Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru, which enter
Tanzania through commercial airports. The country serves as a
link between drug markets in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia,
Africa, Europe, and, to some extent, the United States. Growth in
drug addiction and the tourism sector have boosted domestic
demand for narcotics.
Tanzania is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961
Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Tanzania is also a
party to the UN Convention against Corruption, and the UN
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three
protocols. The 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty is applicable to
Tanzania. Tanzania has ratified the EAC Protocol on combating
drugs in the region.
Despite efforts dating to 2009, the Tanzanian Parliament has not
yet voted on a national drug control policy, though police
representatives are hopeful they will do so soon. President
Jakaya Kikwete has expressed interest in strengthening drug
controls and creating an entire government body tasked solely
with combating the drug trade. Problems in the judicial system,
including inadequate sentencing and relatively-modest bail
amounts contribute to the narcotics problem. Magistrates often
choose to fine narcotics offenders rather than sentence them to
prison, despite the legal requirement that both a fine and a prison
sentence are mandatory in such cases. Conviction rates are
therefore very high, as many defendants see an advantage in
pleading guilty and simply paying the fine. In some cases, the
court system has released more serious offenders on bail of TZS
10 million ($5,900). This, too, is against the law, and is a paltry
amount for many in the drug trade. Some offenders released on
bail return to the drug trade and become fugitives failing to
appear for trial.
The Drug Control Commission (DCC), the Tanzanian Intelligence
and Security Service (TISS), the Tanzanian Police and its Anti-
Narcotics Unit (ANU) continue to pool a portion of their resources
to combat drug trafficking through the anti-narcotics task force.
Task force representatives highlight cooperation and information
sharing as major successes for the year.
As a result of such cooperation, law enforcement officials in the
ANU have made a significant number of high-profile arrests. In
June, ANU apprehended alleged Kenyan narcotics trafficker
Mama Lela, designated by the United States as a significant
foreign narcotics kingpin per the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act. In February, ANU seized 179 kilograms of heroin
in a single raid - the largest narcotics seizure in Tanzanian history
and also the largest seizure in Africa in the last 18 years. Two
Pakistani nationals were arrested in connection with this seizure.
Of the 55 individuals charged with serious drug offenses this year,
almost one third of them are foreign nationals. As of October,
ANU had seized a total of some 357 kilograms of heroin, 95
kilograms of cocaine, 62 kilograms of khat, and more than 17,000
kilograms of marijuana. Tanzanian authorities also destroyed 18
acres of marijuana farmland, but the marijuana problem remains
difficult to control as most drug farmers operate in remote
mountain areas in Morogoro, Arusha, Mara, Shinyanga, Tabora,
Iringa, and Tanga.
Police efforts to publicize the dangers of drug abuse have led to
an increase in tip-offs and anonymous leads. DCC also
contributes to anti-drug education for children and rehabilitation
programs for drug addicts, drawing on funding from the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control. Earlier this year, DCC established a
series of drug abuse treatment trainings for hospital staff as part
of the Recovery-Oriented System of Care. These trainings are
supported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Sober
House, a Zanzibar-based NGO, manages a small network of
resident rehabilitation programs directed by former addicts in
Zanzibar. According to Sober House staff, 10 percent of the
population of Zanzibar suffers from addiction. Public access to
mental healthcare remains limited - there are only six public sector
psychiatrists in the country.
Due to the large amount of money in the drug trade, corruption
and bribery of public officials remains part of the problem. Local
NGOs and government officials report that corruption is pervasive
throughout the criminal justice system: involving police officers,
judges, clerks, and others. Tanzanian authorities have made
significant strides this year to curb the drug trade, but corrupt
police and judicial practices and loose interpretation of drug laws
remain significant problems.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2 Watch List)
Tanzania is a source, transit, and destination country for men,
women, and children who are subjected to forced labor and sex
trafficking. The incidence of internal trafficking is higher than that
of transnational trafficking, and is usually facilitated by family
members’, friends’, and intermediaries’ offers of assistance with
education or finding lucrative employment in urban areas. The
use of young girls for forced domestic service continues to be
Tanzania’s largest human trafficking problem. Girls from rural
areas of Iringa, Singida, Dodoma, Mbeya, Morogoro, and Bukoba
regions are taken to urban centers and Zanzibar for domestic
service; some domestic workers fleeing abusive employers fall
prey to sex trafficking. Boys are subjected primarily to forced labor
on farms, but also in mines, in the informal sector, and possibly on
small fishing boats. In the Arusha region, unscrupulous
agricultural subcontractors reportedly trafficked women and men
to work on coffee plantations. Smaller numbers of Tanzanian
children and adults are subjected to conditions of forced domestic
service and sex trafficking in surrounding countries, South Africa,
Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, France, and possibly other
European countries. Trafficking victims, primarily children, from
neighboring countries, such as Burundi and Kenya, are
sometimes forced to work in Tanzania’s agricultural, mining, and
domestic service sectors. Some also are forced into prostitution in
brothels. Citizens of neighboring countries may voluntarily migrate
through Tanzania before being forced into domestic servitude
and prostitution in South Africa, Europe, and the Middle East
The Government of Tanzania does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. Despite these significant
efforts, particularly the conviction of three trafficking offenders
during the reporting period, the government did not demonstrate
overall increasing efforts to address human trafficking over the
previous reporting period; therefore, Tanzania is placed on Tier 2
Watch List for a second consecutive year. The government made
limited progress towards implementation of its Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act, in part due to poor inter-ministerial coordination and
lack of understanding of what constitutes human trafficking; most
government officials remain unfamiliar with the Act’s provisions or
their responsibility to address trafficking under it. Moreover, the
ministries involved in anti-trafficking efforts had no budgetary
resources allocated to combating the crime.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: Elements of the terrorist network responsible for the
1998 U.S. Embassy bombing remained active in the region
making Tanzania vulnerable to international terrorism. The
Government of Tanzania continued to be an active and helpful
partner in bringing Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, one of the key
perpetrators of the bombings, to justice in the United States.
Following the Kampala bombings on July 11, Tanzania worked
closely with authorities in Uganda and Kenya to investigate the
attacks.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: On the evening of May 16, a 15-year-old
boy ran past a guard in front of the U.S. Embassy, lit a bottle
containing kerosene and threw it under one of two water trucks
parked outside the Embassy walls. The bottle broke, but did not
ignite. Embassy security guards captured the boy before he could
throw a second bottle. There was no breach of the Embassy
compound, no injuries, or property damage. A Tanzanian police
officer arrived immediately after the incident and arrested the
perpetrator. The boy had a note on him threatening possible
future attacks. He told police he was motivated to attack the
United States Embassy by violent extremist ideology.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: Following the Kampala
bombings, Tanzania stepped up its efforts to counter terrorism,
increased its collaboration, both regionally and internationally,
and adopted a more proactive approach. The National
Counterterrorism Center continued its participation in several multi-
year programs to strengthen Tanzania's law enforcement and
military capacity, improve aviation and border security, and
combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The Ministry of
Home Affairs worked jointly with the U.S. Embassy to strengthen
maritime security, particularly in Africa’s Great Lakes. A National
Maritime Training Academy was under construction on the shores
of Lake Victoria and two new boats began patrolling these waters
during the year. Immigration authorities collaborated with the
International Organization for Migration to improve security along
the northern and southern borders. This included introducing
electronic screening systems, improving regional coordination,
and establishing a Border Information Center in Mwanza to help
address issues arising from the adoption of the East African
Community's (EAC) Common Market Protocol, which allows for the
free movement of citizens within the EAC.
In advance of the trial of terrorism suspect Ahmed Ghailani,
accused and convicted for his involvement in the 1998 U. S.
Embassy bombing, Tanzanian officials helped U. S. law
enforcement agents prepare for the trial, including assisting with
witness preparation.
In the case involving the 15-year-old Tanzanian involved in the
May 16 U.S. Embassy incident, the police responded quickly,
arresting the perpetrator. However, the subsequent investigation
and prosecution has proceeded slowly. The suspect, a minor, was
released into the custody of his guardians.
Tanzania continued to process travelers on entry and departure
at three international airports, two seaports, and one land border
with the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and
Evaluation System (PISCES).
Countering Terrorist Finance: Tanzania’s Financial Intelligence
Unit (FIU) established its Anti-Money Laundering Act. However,
with only three technical staff, the FIU had limited resources to
investigate potential money laundering or terrorist financing
activities. Tanzania’s laws do not allow the assets of suspected
terrorists to be frozen unless the individual has been convicted for
criminal acts. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, however, gives the
Attorney General the authority to submit an application to the
court for an order of forfeiture of assets owned or controlled by a
terrorist group. Tanzania was a member of the Eastern and
Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial
Action Task Force-style regional body.
Regional and International Cooperation: Regional
counterterrorism cooperation intensified following the Kampala
bombings. Tanzanian authorities worked closely with their
Ugandan and Kenyan counterparts to investigate the incidents
and limit the ability of such dangerous elements to operate in the
region.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Date: 16 February 2012
Tanzania has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime,
including by the passage of amendments to the Anti-Money
Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act and the AML law for
Zanzibar. However, despite Tanzania’s high-level political
commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to address its
strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Tanzania has not made sufficient
progress in implementing its action plan, and certain strategic
AML/CFT deficiencies remain. Tanzania should work on
implementing its action plan to address these deficiencies,
including by: (1) determining whether money laundering is
adequately criminalised (Recommendation 1); (2) adequately
criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (3)
establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify
and freeze terrorist assets as well as implementing the UNSCRs
1267 and 1373 through law, regulations or other enforceable
means (Special Recommendation III); (4) establishing effective
CDD measures (Recommendation 5); (5) establishing adequate
record-keeping requirements (Recommendation 10); (6)
establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning
Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 26); and (7)
designating competent authorities to ensure compliance with
AML/CFT requirements (Recommendation 23). The FATF
encourages Tanzania to address its remaining deficiencies and
continue the process of implementing its action plan.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:
Tanzania is not an important regional financial center. Tanzania’s
location at the crossroads of southern, central and eastern Africa
leaves it vulnerable to activities that generate illicit revenue, such
as smuggling, and the trafficking of narcotics, arms, and humans.
The major profit generating crimes in Tanzania include theft,
robbery, corruption, smuggling of precious metals and stones,
and drug trafficking. With only twelve percent of the population
engaged in the formal financial sector, money laundering is more
likely to occur in the informal non-bank sectors. Officials indicate
the offshore sector and free trade zones are not currently
significant areas of concern. Criminals have been known to use
front companies, including hawaladars and bureaux de change, to
launder funds, though these are not currently significant areas of
concern for Tanzanian anti-money laundering officials. The use of
front companies to launder money is especially common on the
island of Zanzibar, where fewer federal regulations apply. Officials
indicate that money laundering schemes in Zanzibar generally
take the form of foreign investment in the tourist industry and bulk
cash smuggling. Real estate and used car businesses also
appear to be sources of money laundering in Tanzania.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
All serious crimes approach or list approach to predicate crimes:
List approach
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
(Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/)
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks and financial institutions; cash dealers;
accountants; art, metal, and precious stone dealers; customs
officials; and legal professionals
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks and financial institutions; cash dealers;
accountants; realtors; art, precious metals and stone dealers;
casino and gaming operators; regulators and customs officials;
and legal professionals
Number of STRs received and time frame: 20 in 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: 0
Convictions: 0
Assets forfeited: criminally: 0 civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: NO
With other governments/jurisdictions: NO
Tanzania is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-
Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a Financial Action Task
Force (FATF)-style regional body. Its most recent mutual
evaluation can be found here: http://www.esaamlg.org/reports/me.
php
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
Tanzania does not have formal records exchange mechanisms,
though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and central Bank of
Tanzania do cooperate with other governments via memoranda of
understanding.
Tanzania has serious deficiencies in its legislation and AML/CFT
regime. Among the key issues are the inadequate criminalization
of terrorist financing; deficiencies in the mechanisms to freeze
and confiscate terrorist assets, including a lack of implementing
regulations to give effect to the freezing mechanism under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act for the purposes of UNSCRs 1267
and 1373; a lack of enforceable requirements to ensure customer
due diligence (CDD); weaknesses in supervision of the financial
sector; a focus mainly on the formal banking sector rather than
full coverage of designated non-financial businesses and
professions (DNFBPs); ineffective provisions pertaining to
recordkeeping, including a threshold approach to recordkeeping
requirements; and weaknesses in the structure and function of
Tanzania’s financial intelligence unit, including the lack of
designated competent authorities responsible for ensuring
compliance by financial institutions and inadequate provisions to
safeguard the operational independence of the FIU.
Nevertheless, the Government of Tanzania (GOT) has made
improvements in its compliance with international AML/CFT
standards. In January 2010, legislation mirroring the mainland
Anti-Money Laundering Act came into force in Zanzibar. The
Zanzibar legislation does not recognize the jurisdiction of the
mainland FIU and National AML Committee; however, the GOT
has agreed in principle to amend this. The GOT should focus its
efforts on practical implementation of the AMLA, including
dedicating the resources necessary to build an effective FIU. The
FIU should continue its efforts to hire additional staff to ensure
financial institutions are adequately supervised, to inform them of
their reporting and record keeping responsibilities, and to train
the financial sector to identify suspicious transactions. Tanzania
should work to increase the level of awareness and
understanding of money laundering issues in the financial, law
enforcement and judicial areas and should allocate the necessary
human, technical, and financial resources to implement its
AML/CFT regime. The GOT should ensure the Prevention of
Terrorism Act comports with international standards and
authorities implement all provisions in the law. The GOT should
also improve its cross-border cash declaration regime. The
capacity of Tanzanian police and customs officials to recognize
money laundering and value transfer methodologies used in the
region should be raised.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012:
Tanzania is primarily a transit country for narcotics, although
there is also some local consumption of heroin and domestic
production of marijuana. Tanzania borders eight countries to the
north, west, and south, and its eastern border is comprised of a
1,424-kilometer coastline. Due to porous borders, Tanzanian
authorities have historically struggled to combat the movement of
narcotics into and out of the country. Police forces believe that
the largest bulk shipments of narcotics enter the country through
unofficial seaports in areas such as Dar es Salaam's Kinondoni
District and the Tanga Region to the north. Large shipments of
heroin originating from Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, come
ashore in these areas. Tanzanian "drug mules" bring smaller
amounts of cocaine from Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru, which enter
Tanzania through commercial airports. The country serves as a
link between drug markets in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia,
Africa, Europe, and, to some extent, the United States. Growth in
drug addiction and the tourism sector have boosted domestic
demand for narcotics.
Tanzania is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961
Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Tanzania is also a
party to the UN Convention against Corruption, and the UN
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three
protocols. The 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty is applicable to
Tanzania. Tanzania has ratified the EAC Protocol on combating
drugs in the region.
Despite efforts dating to 2009, the Tanzanian Parliament has not
yet voted on a national drug control policy, though police
representatives are hopeful they will do so soon. President
Jakaya Kikwete has expressed interest in strengthening drug
controls and creating an entire government body tasked solely
with combating the drug trade. Problems in the judicial system,
including inadequate sentencing and relatively-modest bail
amounts contribute to the narcotics problem. Magistrates often
choose to fine narcotics offenders rather than sentence them to
prison, despite the legal requirement that both a fine and a prison
sentence are mandatory in such cases. Conviction rates are
therefore very high, as many defendants see an advantage in
pleading guilty and simply paying the fine. In some cases, the
court system has released more serious offenders on bail of TZS
10 million ($5,900). This, too, is against the law, and is a paltry
amount for many in the drug trade. Some offenders released on
bail return to the drug trade and become fugitives failing to
appear for trial.
The Drug Control Commission (DCC), the Tanzanian Intelligence
and Security Service (TISS), the Tanzanian Police and its Anti-
Narcotics Unit (ANU) continue to pool a portion of their resources
to combat drug trafficking through the anti-narcotics task force.
Task force representatives highlight cooperation and information
sharing as major successes for the year.
As a result of such cooperation, law enforcement officials in the
ANU have made a significant number of high-profile arrests. In
June, ANU apprehended alleged Kenyan narcotics trafficker
Mama Lela, designated by the United States as a significant
foreign narcotics kingpin per the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act. In February, ANU seized 179 kilograms of heroin
in a single raid - the largest narcotics seizure in Tanzanian history
and also the largest seizure in Africa in the last 18 years. Two
Pakistani nationals were arrested in connection with this seizure.
Of the 55 individuals charged with serious drug offenses this year,
almost one third of them are foreign nationals. As of October,
ANU had seized a total of some 357 kilograms of heroin, 95
kilograms of cocaine, 62 kilograms of khat, and more than 17,000
kilograms of marijuana. Tanzanian authorities also destroyed 18
acres of marijuana farmland, but the marijuana problem remains
difficult to control as most drug farmers operate in remote
mountain areas in Morogoro, Arusha, Mara, Shinyanga, Tabora,
Iringa, and Tanga.
Police efforts to publicize the dangers of drug abuse have led to
an increase in tip-offs and anonymous leads. DCC also
contributes to anti-drug education for children and rehabilitation
programs for drug addicts, drawing on funding from the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control. Earlier this year, DCC established a
series of drug abuse treatment trainings for hospital staff as part
of the Recovery-Oriented System of Care. These trainings are
supported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Sober
House, a Zanzibar-based NGO, manages a small network of
resident rehabilitation programs directed by former addicts in
Zanzibar. According to Sober House staff, 10 percent of the
population of Zanzibar suffers from addiction. Public access to
mental healthcare remains limited - there are only six public sector
psychiatrists in the country.
Due to the large amount of money in the drug trade, corruption
and bribery of public officials remains part of the problem. Local
NGOs and government officials report that corruption is pervasive
throughout the criminal justice system: involving police officers,
judges, clerks, and others. Tanzanian authorities have made
significant strides this year to curb the drug trade, but corrupt
police and judicial practices and loose interpretation of drug laws
remain significant problems.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2 Watch List)
Tanzania is a source, transit, and destination country for men,
women, and children who are subjected to forced labor and sex
trafficking. The incidence of internal trafficking is higher than that
of transnational trafficking, and is usually facilitated by family
members’, friends’, and intermediaries’ offers of assistance with
education or finding lucrative employment in urban areas. The
use of young girls for forced domestic service continues to be
Tanzania’s largest human trafficking problem. Girls from rural
areas of Iringa, Singida, Dodoma, Mbeya, Morogoro, and Bukoba
regions are taken to urban centers and Zanzibar for domestic
service; some domestic workers fleeing abusive employers fall
prey to sex trafficking. Boys are subjected primarily to forced labor
on farms, but also in mines, in the informal sector, and possibly on
small fishing boats. In the Arusha region, unscrupulous
agricultural subcontractors reportedly trafficked women and men
to work on coffee plantations. Smaller numbers of Tanzanian
children and adults are subjected to conditions of forced domestic
service and sex trafficking in surrounding countries, South Africa,
Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, France, and possibly other
European countries. Trafficking victims, primarily children, from
neighboring countries, such as Burundi and Kenya, are
sometimes forced to work in Tanzania’s agricultural, mining, and
domestic service sectors. Some also are forced into prostitution in
brothels. Citizens of neighboring countries may voluntarily migrate
through Tanzania before being forced into domestic servitude
and prostitution in South Africa, Europe, and the Middle East
The Government of Tanzania does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. Despite these significant
efforts, particularly the conviction of three trafficking offenders
during the reporting period, the government did not demonstrate
overall increasing efforts to address human trafficking over the
previous reporting period; therefore, Tanzania is placed on Tier 2
Watch List for a second consecutive year. The government made
limited progress towards implementation of its Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act, in part due to poor inter-ministerial coordination and
lack of understanding of what constitutes human trafficking; most
government officials remain unfamiliar with the Act’s provisions or
their responsibility to address trafficking under it. Moreover, the
ministries involved in anti-trafficking efforts had no budgetary
resources allocated to combating the crime.
For full report click here
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US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: Elements of the terrorist network responsible for the
1998 U.S. Embassy bombing remained active in the region
making Tanzania vulnerable to international terrorism. The
Government of Tanzania continued to be an active and helpful
partner in bringing Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, one of the key
perpetrators of the bombings, to justice in the United States.
Following the Kampala bombings on July 11, Tanzania worked
closely with authorities in Uganda and Kenya to investigate the
attacks.
2010 Terrorist Incidents: On the evening of May 16, a 15-year-old
boy ran past a guard in front of the U.S. Embassy, lit a bottle
containing kerosene and threw it under one of two water trucks
parked outside the Embassy walls. The bottle broke, but did not
ignite. Embassy security guards captured the boy before he could
throw a second bottle. There was no breach of the Embassy
compound, no injuries, or property damage. A Tanzanian police
officer arrived immediately after the incident and arrested the
perpetrator. The boy had a note on him threatening possible
future attacks. He told police he was motivated to attack the
United States Embassy by violent extremist ideology.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: Following the Kampala
bombings, Tanzania stepped up its efforts to counter terrorism,
increased its collaboration, both regionally and internationally,
and adopted a more proactive approach. The National
Counterterrorism Center continued its participation in several multi-
year programs to strengthen Tanzania's law enforcement and
military capacity, improve aviation and border security, and
combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The Ministry of
Home Affairs worked jointly with the U.S. Embassy to strengthen
maritime security, particularly in Africa’s Great Lakes. A National
Maritime Training Academy was under construction on the shores
of Lake Victoria and two new boats began patrolling these waters
during the year. Immigration authorities collaborated with the
International Organization for Migration to improve security along
the northern and southern borders. This included introducing
electronic screening systems, improving regional coordination,
and establishing a Border Information Center in Mwanza to help
address issues arising from the adoption of the East African
Community's (EAC) Common Market Protocol, which allows for the
free movement of citizens within the EAC.
In advance of the trial of terrorism suspect Ahmed Ghailani,
accused and convicted for his involvement in the 1998 U. S.
Embassy bombing, Tanzanian officials helped U. S. law
enforcement agents prepare for the trial, including assisting with
witness preparation.
In the case involving the 15-year-old Tanzanian involved in the
May 16 U.S. Embassy incident, the police responded quickly,
arresting the perpetrator. However, the subsequent investigation
and prosecution has proceeded slowly. The suspect, a minor, was
released into the custody of his guardians.
Tanzania continued to process travelers on entry and departure
at three international airports, two seaports, and one land border
with the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and
Evaluation System (PISCES).
Countering Terrorist Finance: Tanzania’s Financial Intelligence
Unit (FIU) established its Anti-Money Laundering Act. However,
with only three technical staff, the FIU had limited resources to
investigate potential money laundering or terrorist financing
activities. Tanzania’s laws do not allow the assets of suspected
terrorists to be frozen unless the individual has been convicted for
criminal acts. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, however, gives the
Attorney General the authority to submit an application to the
court for an order of forfeiture of assets owned or controlled by a
terrorist group. Tanzania was a member of the Eastern and
Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial
Action Task Force-style regional body.
Regional and International Cooperation: Regional
counterterrorism cooperation intensified following the Kampala
bombings. Tanzanian authorities worked closely with their
Ugandan and Kenyan counterparts to investigate the incidents
and limit the ability of such dangerous elements to operate in the
region.
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Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
| TANZANIA |
| KnowYourCountry |
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| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |