Bilateral exchange of information
Agreements in place?
    No
FATF Statement re AML Strategic Deficiencies:

Date:  16 February 2012

Despite Thailand’s high-level political commitment to work with the
FATF and APG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies,
Thailand has not made sufficient progress in implementing its
action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain,
although Thailand has faced external   difficulties from 2009 to
2011 which significantly impacted the legislative process for the
necessary laws and regulations. Thailand has taken steps
towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by substantially
completing an AML/CFT risk assessment for its financial sector.
Thailand should work on implementing its action plan to address
the remaining deficiencies, including by: (1) adequately
criminalising terrorist financing (Special Recommendation II); (2)
establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify
and freeze terrorist assets (Special Recommendation III); and (3)
further strengthening AML/CFT supervision (Recommendation
23). The FATF encourages Thailand to address its remaining
deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action
plan.

____________________________________________________

Sanctions:

None applicable

____________________________________________________

Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:

Information unavailable.

____________________________________________________

US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:

Thailand is a centrally located, upper-middle-income Southeast
Asian country with an extremely porous border. Thailand is
vulnerable to money laundering within its own underground
economy as well as to many categories of cross-border crime,
including illicit narcotics and other contraband smuggling. The
Thai black market includes a wide range of pirated and smuggled
goods, from counterfeit medicines to luxury automobiles. Money
launderers and traffickers use banks, as well as non-bank
financial institutions and businesses, to move the profits of
narcotics trafficking and other criminal enterprises. In the informal
money-changing sector, there is an increasing presence of
hawalas - a remittance system that uses relationship-based
networks via money shops that service Middle Eastern travelers in
Thailand. Thai banking regulations cover financial institutions
adequately, but struggle to achieve effective oversight over less
formal operations.

Thailand is a source, transit, and destination country for
international migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, a
production and distribution center for counterfeit consumer goods
and, increasingly, a center for the production and sale of
fraudulent travel documents. Illegal gaming, corruption,
underground lotteries, and prostitution are all problems. Thailand’
s criminal justice system has low capacity to deal with these
challenges but is improving.

Thailand was publicly identified by the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) in February 2010 for its strategic anti-money
laundering/counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) deficiencies, for
which it has developed an action plan. Thailand’s action plan
includes adequately criminalizing terrorist financing and
establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify
and freeze terrorist assets. In October 2011, the FATF
determined that Thailand’s progress against the agreed action
plan’s timeline has been insufficient and the Government of
Thailand (GOT) needs to take adequate action to address its
main deficiencies or risk further action from the FATF.

For additional information focusing on terrorism financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/

Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: NO

Criminalization of Money Laundering:

“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: List approach

Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES

Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:

Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES

KYC covered entities: Banks (including state banks), finance
companies, mortgage finance companies, securities dealers,
insurance companies, money exchangers and remitters, asset
management companies, jewelry and gold shops, automotive hire-
purchase businesses or car dealers, real estate agents/brokers,
antiques shops, personal loan businesses, electronic card
businesses, credit card businesses, and electronic payment
businesses, as well as deposit/lending cooperatives with total
operating capital exceeding $67,000

Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:

Number of STRs received and time frame: 166,578 from October
1, 2010 to September 30, 2011

Number of CTRs received and time frame: 933,485 from October
1, 2010 to September 30, 2011

STR covered entities: Private and state-owned banks, finance
companies, insurance companies, savings cooperatives,
securities firms, asset management companies, and mortgage
finance companies; land registration offices, moneychangers,
remittance agents, jewelry and gold shops, automotive hire-
purchase businesses and car dealerships, real estate agents and
brokers, antique shops, personal loan companies, electronic and
credit card companies, and electronic payment companies

Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:

Prosecutions: Two in 2011

Convictions: One in 2011

Records exchange mechanism:

With U.S.: MLAT: YES Other mechanism: YES

With other governments/jurisdiction: YES

Thailand is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money
Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional
body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found here: http:
//www.apgml.org/documents/docs/17/Thailand%20DAR.pdf

Enforcement and implementation issues and comments:

Political and civil unrest in Thailand in mid-2010, followed by
catastrophic flooding, the dissolution of Parliament and
subsequent general election in July 2011, have impeded Thailand’
s implementation of its AML/CFT action plan. Despite high-level
political commitment to address strategic AML/CFT deficiencies,
Thailand’s legislative framework still does not adequately
criminalize terrorist financing and does not establish adequate
procedures for identifying and freezing terrorist assets.

Despite these significant deficiencies, Thailand has made some
progress in improving its FIU and its regulatory framework. The
Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) now has a full staff and is
operational. The AMLO issued memoranda of understanding with
two financial supervisors, the Office of Insurance Commission,
signed April 26, and the Bank of Thailand, signed May 25. The
memoranda establish the role of the AMLO in monitoring
compliance with AML/CFT requirements, coordinating information
sharing and ensuring that financial supervisors carry out their
responsibilities effectively. Thailand has also made progress in
the training and supervision of reporting entities, particularly
money changers and transfer businesses. Ministerial regulations
for cash threshold transactions and customer identification were
endorsed and legalized via Cabinet resolution, and came into
force in August.

Thai law does not adequately prohibit tipping off, leaving financial
institutions and their employees subject to potential liability for
filing STRs. The GOT should amend its legislation as necessary
to ensure this deficiency is corrected.

On March 1, 2011, Thailand became a party to the UN
Convention against Corruption. Thailand should become a party
to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):

Thailand’s borders are vulnerable to narcotics trafficking.
Thailand remains a transshipment country and a target market for
drugs produced in neighboring countries. Heroin and
methamphetamine move from Burma directly across Thailand’s
northern border and indirectly through Laos and Cambodia for
consumers in Thailand and for export. Large quantities of
marijuana enter from Laos, while smaller quantities may enter
from Cambodia. Marijuana smuggled into southern Thailand is
frequently transshipped to Malaysia and other regional markets.

The first half of 2010 has seen continued growth in the seizure of
heroin, crystal methamphetamine (“ice”), and methamphetamine
tablets (“ya-ba”). Cultivation of opium and cannabis, and
production of synthetic drugs remain minimal. Poppy cultivation
remains well under 1000 hectares, the definition of a “major”
source country. Small quantities of opium produced in Thailand
are primarily intended for local consumption by hill tribe growers.

Thailand is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

For Full report, click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):

(Tier 2 Watch List)

Thailand is a source, destination, and transit country for men,
women, and children who are subjected to forced labor and sex
trafficking. Individuals from neighboring countries, as well as from
further away such as Uzbekistan and Fiji, migrate to Thailand for
reasons including to flee conditions of poverty. Migrants from
Burma, who make up the bulk of migrants in Thailand, seek
economic opportunity and escape from military repression. The
majority of the trafficking victims identified within Thailand are
migrants from Thailand’s neighboring countries who are forced,
coerced, or defrauded into labor or commercial sexual
exploitation; conservative estimates have this population
numbering in the tens of thousands of victims. Trafficking victims
within Thailand were found employed in maritime fishing, seafood
processing, low-end garment production, and domestic work.
Evidence suggests that the trafficking of men, women, and
children in labor sectors such as commercial fisheries, fishing-
related industries, and domestic work was a significant portion of
all labor trafficking in Thailand.

UN-affiliated NGO research made available during the year
reported a significant population of trafficking victims in the
country. An estimated 23 percent of all Cambodians deported by
Thai authorities at the Poipet border were trafficking victims. The
UN Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP) estimated
that Thai authorities deport over 23,000 Cambodian trafficking
victims a year. Similarly, Lao authorities reported during the year
that groups of 50 to 100 Lao trafficking victims were among the
thousands of Lao nationals deported by Thai authorities. An
assessment of the cumulative risk of labor trafficking among
Burmese migrant workers in the seafood industry in Samut
Sakhon, Thailand found that 57 percent of these workers
experience conditions of forced labor. An IOM report released in
May 2011 noted prevalent forced labor conditions, including debt
bondage, among Cambodian and Burmese individuals recruited –
some forcefully or through fraud – for work in the Thai fishing
industry. According to the report, Burmese, Cambodian, and Thai
men were trafficked onto Thai fishing boats that traveled
throughout Southeast Asia and beyond, and who remained at sea
for up to several years, did not receive pay, were forced to work
18 to 20 hours per day for seven days a week, and were
threatened and physically beaten. Similarly, an earlier UNIAP
study found 29 of 49 (58 percent) surveyed migrant fishermen
trafficked aboard Thai fishing boats had witnessed a fellow
fishermen killed by boat captains in instances when they were too
weak or sick to work. Fishermen typically did not have written
employment contracts with their employer. Observers noted that
traffickers (including labor brokers) who bring foreign victims into
Thailand generally work as individuals or in unorganized groups,
while those who enslave Thai victims abroad tend to be more
organized. Informed observers also reported that labor brokers,
some of whom facilitate or engage in trafficking, are of both Thai
and foreign origin and work in networks, collaborating with
employers and, at times, with law enforcement officials.

Migrants, ethnic minorities, and stateless people in Thailand are
at a greater risk of being trafficked than Thai nationals, and
experience withholding of travel documents, migrant registration
cards, and work permits by employers. Undocumented migrants
remain particularly vulnerable to trafficking, due to their economic
status, education level, language barriers, and lack of knowledge
of Thai law. The greatest risk factor for highland women and girls
to being trafficked was their lack of citizenship. Some children
from neighboring countries are forced to sell flowers, beg, or work
in domestic service in urban areas. During the year, Vietnamese
women were found to have been confined and forced to act as
surrogate mothers after being recruited for work in Bangkok. Most
Thai trafficking victims abroad who were repatriated back to
Thailand during the year had been exploited in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Bahrain, and China. Thai
victims were also repatriated from Russia, South Africa, Yemen,
Vietnam, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), and
Singapore. Thai nationals are also known to be trafficked to
Australia, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kuwait,
Libya, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Timor-Leste. Some Thai men who migrate for low-
skilled contract work and agricultural labor are subjected to
conditions of forced labor and debt bondage. Sex trafficking
generally involves victims who are women and girls. Sex tourism
continues to be a problem in Thailand, and this demand likely
fuels trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation. Thailand is a
transit country for victims from North Korea, China, Vietnam,
Pakistan, and Burma destined for third countries such as
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Russia, Western Europe, South
Korea, and the United States. There were reports that separatist
groups recruited teenaged children to carry out attacks.

The Government of Thailand does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is
making significant efforts to do so. The government continued
implementation of its human trafficking law and conducted
awareness-raising activities on human trafficking. The
government continued work on its implementation of regulations
that will allow trafficking victims to temporarily live and work within
Thailand, though victims generally continue to be detained in
government shelters. The Thai prime minister chaired meetings
with labor and civil society organizations to coordinate anti-
trafficking efforts, which led to the development of the Thai
government’s second six-year National Policy Strategy on human
trafficking for 2011-2016. In July 2010, the prime minister publicly
acknowledged the need to improve the government’s weak
interagency coordination in addressing human trafficking. The
Thai government reported increases in trafficking prosecutions
and convictions, but as of May 2011 there was insufficient data
available to determine whether each of these could be
categorized as human trafficking convictions. Despite these
significant efforts, the government has not shown sufficient
evidence of increasing efforts to address human trafficking over
the previous year, particularly in the areas of prosecuting and
convicting both sex and labor trafficking offenders, combating
trafficking complicity of public officials, and trafficking victim
protection; therefore, Thailand is placed on Tier 2 Watch List for a
second consecutive year. Given the significant scope and
magnitude of trafficking in Thailand, there continued to be a low
number of convictions for both sex and labor trafficking, and of
victims identified among vulnerable populations. Direct
involvement in and facilitation of human trafficking by law
enforcement officials reportedly remained a significant problem in
Thailand; authorities reported investigating two cases of
complicity involving four officials, including at the police colonel
level, though there were no convictions or sentences of complicit
officials during the year. The government did not respond to
multiple reports of widespread corruption involving the extortion
and trafficking of Burmese deportees from Thailand. NGOs
reported that problems hindering the government’s anti-trafficking
efforts included local police corruption, biases against migrant
laborers, the lack of a comprehensive monitoring system of the
government’s efforts, lack of understanding among local officials
of trafficking, the courts’ lack of a human rights-based approach
to labor abuse cases, and systematic disincentives for trafficking
victims to be identified. Authorities continued efforts to prevent
human trafficking with assistance from international organizations
and NGOs, but have not yet adequately addressed structural
vulnerabilities to trafficking created by its migrant labor policies.
The government should continue to increase its efforts given the
significant scope and magnitude of trafficking in Thailand.

For full report click here

____________________________________________________

US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010

Overview: While officials have long expressed concern that
transnational terrorist groups could establish links with southern
Thailand-based separatist groups, there have been no indications
that transnational terrorist groups were directly involved in the
violence in the south, and there was no evidence of direct
operational links between southern Thai insurgent groups and
regional terrorist networks.

The ethno-nationalist separatist insurgency in Thailand’s
southernmost provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and portions
of Songkhla continued in 2010. A two-month political protest
organized by the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship
(UDD) in Bangkok between March and May 2010 paralyzed the
capital, descended into violence, and resulted in 92 deaths. The
Government of Thailand has since filed charges under the
terrorist-based provisions of the criminal code against a number
of the UDD core leaders and fugitive former Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra for allegedly having engaged in or abetted
acts of domestic terrorism. The circumstances surrounding the
violence and the deaths were under investigation at year's end by
both the Thai government’s Department of Special Investigation
(DSI) and an independent fact-finding commission.

Legislation and Law Enforcement: The porous nature of Thailand’
s southern border with Malaysia remained an issue of concern. At
the same time, cross-border law enforcement cooperation based
on long association between Thai and Malaysian police officers
was good.

On November 16, the Thai government extradited international
arms trafficker Viktor Bout to the United States. Bout was indicted
in New York for conspiring to kill U.S. nationals and officers, to
acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles, and to provide material
support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.

On November 30, Thai police arrested three persons with alleged
links through a document forgery ring with links to terrorist
groups. The arrests were part of a joint Thai-Spanish operation in
which Spanish police also arrested seven other persons in
connection with the same document forgery ring.

Thai police, security officials, and court system personnel
participated in a series of U.S. training programs sponsored
through the Antiterrorism Assistance Program, the Force
Protection Detachment (the criminal justice sector capacity
building programs for police, prosecutors, and judiciary mounted
by the Transnational Crime Affairs Section), and the International
Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok. The Thai National
Security Council and its Thai Immigration Bureau reconfirmed its
commitment to the U.S.-provided Personal Identification Secure
Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) program.

Countering Terrorist Finance: The Thai government expressed
high-level political commitment to addressing deficiencies that the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) had identified in Thailand's
anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance (AML/CTF) regime,
and reported taking multiple steps to address FATF
recommendations. Ministry of Finance regulations governing
cross border cash carrying were in line with the FATF Special
Recommendation on Terrorist Financing. On December 7, the
Thai cabinet approved the Ministry of Justice's proposed
AML/CTF National Strategy Plan (2011-2015), and as part of the
government's actions under this plan, the Anti-Money Laundering
Office and a Thai government working group drafted a proposed
Counterterrorism Financing Act which, in part, would criminalize
the collection or provision of funds for the purpose of supporting
terrorist acts or organizations. The Justice Minister has committed
to FATF that this legislation will be passed by October 2011.
Thailand is a member of the Egmont Group of financial
intelligence units.

To comply with international standards and to develop further an
effective regime to freeze terrorist funds and assets of designated
entities under UNSCRs 1267 and 1373, the Thai government
established the Anti-Money Laundering Board in November. The
Thai government drafted multiple amendments to its anti-money
laundering act, including one to increase the number of predicate
offenses and to decrease the minimum cash transaction reporting
threshold for electronic-payments. The amendments were
submitted to the Council of State where they remained under
review at year’s end.

Regional and International Cooperation: Thailand participated
actively in international counterterrorism efforts through the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation, ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional
Forum, and other multilateral fora.

____________________________________________________

Links:

Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Tables & Rankings
Are there Sanctions in force against it? (UN/EU/US)
N
?
Is it on FATF list of non-cooperative countries?
Y
?
Is it on OECD list of uncooperative Tax Havens?
N
?
OECD - Implementation status of Tax Standard
 
?
Is it on EU 'white' list of equivalent jurisdictions?
N
?
Offshore Finance Center (Original IMF List)?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of Treasury list of jurisdictions of
Primary Money Laundering concern?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of State list of jurisdictions
identified to be supporters of International Terrorism?
N
?
Is it on US Department of State International Narcotics
Control Majors List?
N
?
US Dept of State Money Laundering assessment (INCSR)
PC
?
Government Actions (For further info see INCRS below):
 
?
-  Criminalized Drug Money Laundering?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Beyond Drugs?
Y
 
-  Record Large Transactions?
Y
 
-  Maintain Records Over Time?
Y
 
-  Report Suspicious Transactions?(NMP)?
Y
 
-  Egmont Financial Intelligence Units?
Y
 
-  System for Identifying/Forfeiting Assets?
Y
 
-  Arrangements for Asset Sharing?
N
 
-  Cooperates with International Law Enforcement?
Y
 
-  International Transportation of Currency?
Y
 
-  Ability to Freeze Terrorist Assets w/o Delay?
N
 
-  Disclosure Protection "Safe Harbor"?
Y
 
-  Criminalized Financing of Terrorism?
Y
 
-  States Party to 1988 UN Convention?
Y
 
-  International Terrorism Financing Convention?
Y
 
 
Ranking
2011
Ranking
2010
 
Corruption (Transparency International)
80 (out of
183)
78 (out of
178)
?
Ease of doing business (World Bank)
17 (out of
183)
19 (out of
183)
?
FATF 40 + 9 recommendations
Mutual Evaluation Report: 2007
Further Tables
C
L
P
N
N/A
    C  -  Fully Compliant ,   
    L  -  Largely Compliant,    
    P  -  Partially Compliant    
    N  -  Non-Compliant
2
4
29
13
1
Legal Systems
 
1. Money Laundering Offence
P
 
14. Protection & no tipping-off
P
2. ML offence – mental element and
corporate liability
L
 
15. Internal controls,
compliance & audit
P
3. Confiscation and provisional
measures
L
 
16. DNFBP – R.13-15 & 21
N
4. Secrecy laws consistent with the
Recommendations
C
 
17. Sanctions
P
5. Customer due diligence
N
 
18. Shell banks
P
6. Politically exposed persons
N
 
19. Other forms of reporting
C
7. Correspondent banking
N
 
20. Other NFBP & secure
transaction techniques
P
8. New technologies & non
face-to-face business
N
 
21. Special attention for
higher risk countries
N
9. Third parties and introducers
N
 
22. Foreign branches &
subsidiaries
N
10. Record keeping
P
 
23. Regulation, supervision
and monitoring
P
11. Unusual transactions
P
 
24. DNFBP - regulation,
supervision and monitoring
N
12. Designated Non-Financial
Businesses and Professions – R.5,
6, 8-11
N
 
25. Guidelines & Feedback
P
13. Suspicious transaction reporting
P
     
Institutional and other
measures
 
26. The FIU
P
 
31. National co-operation
P
27. Law enforcement authorities
P
 
32. Statistics
P
28. Powers of competent authorities
L
 
33. Legal persons –
beneficial owners
P
29. Supervisors
P
 
34. Legal arrangements –
beneficial owners
N/A
30. Resources, integrity and training
P
 
 
 
International Co-operation
 
35. Conventions
P
 
38. MLA on confiscation and
freezing
P
36. Mutual legal assistance (MLA)
P
 
39. Extradition
P
37. Dual criminality
P
 
40. Other forms of
co-operation
L
Nine Special
Recommendations
 
SR.I Implement UN instruments
P
 
SR VI AML requirements for
money/value transfer services
P
SR.II Criminalise terrorist financing
P
 
SR VII Wire transfer rules
N
SR.III Freeze and confiscate
terrorist assets
P
 
SR.VIII Non profit
organisations
N
SR.IV Suspicious transaction
reporting
P
 
SR.IX Cross Border
Declaration & Disclosure
N
SR.V International co-operation
P
 
 
 
*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.

For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -        

R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV

Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
 
Higher Risk
 
Medium Risk
 
Info n/a
 
Lower Risk
KnowYourCountry
THAILAND
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Last Updated:   16 April 2012