_________________________________________________________

US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012:

Timor-Leste appears to be a minor destination for narcotics
consumption. According to the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL),
there are five types of narcotics available in the capital city of Dili:
methamphetamine, MDMA (ecstasy), marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. In
January 2011, police seized 72 grams of cocaine pursuant to the
execution of five search warrants in Dili. Narcotics are smuggled over the
land border at Batugade, through Dili Airport, and by small boats.
Smuggled narcotics are concealed in cosmetics, grocery items, and
automobile and motorcycle parts and are sold in bars, karaoke lounges,
massage parlors, and hotels. The potential domestic market is limited by
the low income level of the general population. However, in the medium
term, moderate oil and gas revenues and steady economic growth have
the potential to stimulate economic development and raise income
levels, expanding the potential drug market if appropriate law
enforcement measures are not taken to curb narcotics trafficking.

There is little reported narcotics production in Timor-Leste. Unconfirmed
reports suggest there may be one or two small-scale methamphetamine
production facilities in and around Dili. Methamphetamine precursor
chemicals pseudo-ephedrine and ephedrine are readily available in
numerous Dili pharmacies and there is no limit on quantity that may be
purchased per customer per day, nor is customer information
documented at the time of purchase. Insufficient law enforcement
capacity, including limited vehicles and resources, would make it fairly
easy for clandestine laboratories to operate without fear of detection.
Police sources indicate that there is also a strong likelihood that
marijuana cultivation exists in the hill country areas of Timor-Leste.
Narcotics trafficking from neighboring Indonesia appears to be taking
place on a small scale, but there are no indications to date that Timor-
Leste is being used as a transit point for narcotics trafficking to other
countries. Illegal domestic drug use appears to be low, but is probably
rising modestly.

Timor-Leste is not a party to the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention. A United
Nations police peacekeeping presence supports the PNTL, but will likely
depart Timor-Leste by the end of 2012. Local law enforcement capacity
is limited, due especially to low levels of education and training among
the police force and insufficient investment in infrastructure, equipment,
and logistical capacity. Nevertheless, with support from international
peacekeepers, the PNTL has made modest efforts to identify and raid
establishments associated with narcotics trafficking. Despite a limited
number of arrests, however, a similar lack of capacity in the
prosecutorial and judicial system has hampered efforts to prosecute and
convict those arrested. Another obstacle is the inability to analyze seized
narcotics samples. To date, the PNTL has relied upon Australian
counterparts, who send narcotics to Australian government laboratories
for analysis. PNTL officials have cited delays or lapses in getting lab test
results as a hindrance to prosecuting suspects. In some cases, positive
results from narcotics test kits have been sufficient for prosecution.

There are also no drug abuse education, drug rehabilitation, or
treatment programs in Timor-Leste. Despite these shortcomings,
Timorese government policy strongly condemns and seeks to restrict
and impede narcotics trafficking. The Government of Timor-Leste does
not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit drug
production or distribution, nor is it involved in laundering the proceeds of
the sale of illicit drugs. To the contrary, many senior officials have
spoken publicly of the dangers that narcotics present to Timorese
society and of the need to undertake additional, stronger measures to
counter narcotics trafficking.

_________________________________________________________

US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 (introduction):

(Tier 2)

Timor-Leste is a destination country for women from Indonesia and
China subjected to forced prostitution. In addition, men and boys from
Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand are subjected to forced labor, including
on fishing boats operating in Timorese waters; they occasionally escape
their traffickers and swim ashore to seek refuge in Timor-Leste. The
placement of children in bonded labor by family members in order to pay
off family debts was also a problem. Timor-Leste may also be a source
country for women or girls sent to Singapore and elsewhere in Southeast
Asia for forced domestic work. Some migrant women recruited for work in
Dili report being locked up upon arrival, and forced by brothel ‘bosses’
and clients to use drugs or alcohol while providing sexual services. Some
women kept in brothels were allowed to leave the brothel only if they
paid 20 dollars an hour. Traffickers regularly retained the passports of
victims, and reportedly rotate sex trafficking victims in and out of the
country every few months. Male victims from Burma, Cambodia, and
Thailand who were forced to labor on fishing boats with little space, no
medical care, and poor food, sometimes escaped and swam ashore
while in Timorese waters to flee the fishing boats. Traffickers used debt
bondage through repayment of fees and loans acquired during their
recruitment and/or transport to Timorese waters to achieve consent of
some of the men laboring on the fishing vessels. Traffickers subjected
victims to threats, beatings, chronic sleep deprivation, insufficient food
and fresh water, and total restrictions on freedom of movement - victims
on fishing vessels rarely or never went ashore during their time on
board. Transnational traffickers may be members of Indonesian or
Chinese organized crime syndicates, and the trafficking offenders who
use male victims on fishing boats are reportedly Thai nationals.

The Government of Timor-Leste does not fully comply with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making
significant efforts to do so. During the year, the government increased
efforts to raise public awareness of human trafficking. There was,
however, a decrease in the number of trafficking cases the government
investigated and the number of victims referred to international
organizations and NGOs for assistance, and victim identification efforts
were inadequate. Authorities continued to refer identified trafficking
victims to protection services provided by NGOs and international
organizations, as a serious lack of resources and personnel continued
to limit the Timorese government’s ability to provide services directly.
The government did not investigate reports of trafficking-related
complicity, including lower-level police and immigrations officials
accepting bribes from traffickers.

For full report click here

_________________________________________________________

US State Dept Terrorism Report 2009

No report available

_________________________________________________________

Links:

Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
 
Higher Risk
 
Medium Risk
 
Info n/a
 
Lower Risk
Bilateral exchange of information
Agreements in place?
    No
Sanctions:

None applicable

____________________________________________________

Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:

Information unavailable.

____________________________________________________

US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2011:

Timor-Leste is not a regional or offshore financial center, and has
no free trade zones. The economy is cash based, and the
Ministry of Finance estimates only 1.3 percent of Timorese
regularly use banking facilities. Private sector growth is hampered
by a lack of human capital and regulatory capacity. The national
economy depends on petroleum and natural gas revenues and
assistance from international donors.

Timor-Leste has experienced relative stability over the past three
years but remains in a state of transition. Governmental
institutions are still being established, and legal and financial
systems are limited. Years of violent conflict devastated Timor-
Leste’s physical infrastructure, which has compromised the
government’s ability to provide reliable basic services. Continued
stability will depend on ongoing efforts to professionalize and
bolster the capacity of law enforcement and security institutions.

Weak controls at the land border with Indonesia and even weaker
maritime border controls make Timor-Leste vulnerable to
smuggling, organized crime, and terrorist activities. Narcotics
trafficking is not considered a significant source of illegal
proceeds, but the inadequacy of reporting and data systems
makes it difficult to track cross-border activities.

DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO

CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:

“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: Not applicable

Legal persons covered: criminally: NO civilly: NO

CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:

Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: NO

UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: NO

KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:

Covered entities: Not applicable

Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: NO
Domestic: NO

SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:

Covered entities: Not applicable

Number of STRs received and time frame: Not applicable

Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not applicable

MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:

Prosecutions: 0

Convictions: 0

Assets forfeited: criminally: None civilly: None

RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:

With U.S.: NO

With other governments/jurisdictions: NO

Timor-Leste is not a member of any a Financial Action Task Force
(FATF)-style regional body (FSRB).

ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:

Timor-Leste lacks critical AML/CFT controls; and low technical,
financial, and human capacity make it difficult to enforce
adequately the laws that are in place. The National Parliament is
considering a draft AML/CFT law, which is not expected to pass
before the end of 2011. The draft law uses an “all serious crimes”
approach to the predicate offense, and also covers legal persons.
It contains provisions for immediately freezing terrorist assets and
allows asset forfeiture. The draft law contains “know your
customer rules” that cover financial institutions and non-financial
businesses and professions, and specifies suspicious transaction
reporting requirements for covered entities. The draft law would
also provide a records exchange mechanism between Timor-
Leste, the United States and other nations. The Government of
Timor-Leste should make passage of this law a priority.

Recently, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), an
FSRB, dispatched a working group to Timor-Leste to discuss
performing a mutual evaluation during 2011. The date of that
evaluation has not been determined.
Tables & Rankings
Are there Sanctions in force against it? (UN/EU/US)
N
?
Is it on FATF list of non-cooperative countries?
N
?
Is it on OECD list of uncooperative Tax Havens?
N
?
OECD - Implementation status of Tax Standard
 
?
Is it on EU 'white' list of equivalent jurisdictions?
N
?
Offshore Finance Center (Original IMF List)?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of Treasury list of jurisdictions of
Primary Money Laundering concern?
N
?
Is it on the US Secretary of State list of jurisdictions
identified to be supporters of International Terrorism?
N
?
Is it on US Department of State International Narcotics
Control Majors List?
N
?
US Dept of State Money Laundering assessment (INCSR)
M
?
Government Actions (For further info see INCRS below):
 
?
-  Criminalized Drug Money Laundering?
N
 
-  Criminalized Beyond Drugs?
N
 
-  Record Large Transactions?
N
 
-  Maintain Records Over Time?
N
 
-  Report Suspicious Transactions?(NMP)?
Y
 
-  Egmont Financial Intelligence Units?
N
 
-  System for Identifying/Forfeiting Assets?
N
 
-  Arrangements for Asset Sharing?
N
 
-  Cooperates with International Law Enforcement?
N
 
-  International Transportation of Currency?
Y
 
-  Ability to Freeze Terrorist Assets w/o Delay?
N
 
-  Disclosure Protection "Safe Harbor"?
N
 
-  Criminalized Financing of Terrorism?
N
 
-  States Party to 1988 UN Convention?
N
 
-  International Terrorism Financing Convention?
N
 
Compliance with
FATF 40 + 9
recommendations
% Fully or Largely
Compliant
Date of last
Report
 
N/A
N/A
?
 
Ranking
2011
Ranking
2010
 
Corruption (Transparency International)
143 (out of
183)
127 (out
of 178)
?
Ease of doing business (World Bank)
168 (out of
183)
174 (out
of 183)
?
TIMOR-LESTE
KnowYourCountry
-  Know Your Customer Provisions
Y
 
-  Criminalized Tipping Off?
N
 
-  Report Suspected Terrorist Financing?
N
 
-  State Party to United Nations TOC?
Y
 
-  State Party to United Nations CAC?
Y
 
Local AML News / Sanctions
Tax Information
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Last Updated:   16 April 2012