|
|
Sanctions:
Council Regulation (EC) No 1859/2005 was repealed in November
2009.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report 2011:
Uzbekistan is not an important regional financial center and does
not have a well-developed financial system. A significant
percentage of the country’s GDP comes from remittances abroad,
posing a money laundering vulnerability. Corruption, especially in
relation to natural resources, narcotics trafficking and smuggling
generate the majority of illicit proceeds. Local and regional drug
trafficking and organized crime groups control the flow of
narcotics and proceeds from other criminal activities, such as
smuggling of cash, high-value transferable assets (e.g., gold),
property, or automobiles. Uzbekistan has a significant black
market for smuggled goods. This black market does not appear to
be significantly funded by narcotics proceeds but can be used to
launder drug-related money. In April 2009, the government of
Uzbekistan passed legislation to reestablish an anti-money
laundering regime that had been suspended by Presidential
decree in 2007.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: NO civilly: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/.
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks, credit unions, micro-credit institutions,
securities brokers, members of the stock exchange, insurance
brokers, leasing companies, money transfer companies, postal
operators, dealers in precious metals and stones, real estate
agents, notaries, lawyers, auditors, pawn shops, lotteries
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks, credit unions, micro-credit institutions,
securities brokers, members of the stock exchange, insurance
brokers, leasing companies, postal operators, dealers in precious
metals and stones, real estate agents, notaries, lawyers, auditors
Number of STRs received and time frame: 4,125 - November
2009 to April 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: 42 - January to November 2009
Convictions: Eight, covering 97 individuals - January to November
2009
Assets forfeited: criminally: 725 million UZS (approximately
$500,000) in 2009 civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Uzbekistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating
Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), a Financial
Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Its most recent
mutual evaluation can be found here: http://eurasiangroup.
org/mers.php.
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
Uzbekistan’s legal system is generally susceptible to corruption
and political influence. Legislation to reestablish AML measures
has been adopted piecemeal since April 2009, leading to
confusion from vague requirements, incomplete procedures, and
occasional conflicts with banking regulations. The short time
period since reimplementation makes it difficult to evaluate the
effectiveness and adaptability of the system, and government
secrecy surrounding cases and statistics inhibits evaluation. The
Prosecutor General’s Office attempts to maintain secrecy by not
releasing the criteria for identifying suspicious transactions, even
to banks. Fearing the consequences of not reporting criminal
activity, banks have adopted excessively cautious policies that
lead to significant over-reporting.
Ambiguities in the law make it difficult to determine the division of
authority among the Prosecutor General’s Office and other law
enforcement bodies in money laundering cases. Aside from the
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
the National Security Service also investigate money laundering
and terrorist financing, respectively, and both are making efforts
to build financial crime departments.
The ability to freeze assets is limited; financial institutions can
hold suspicious transactions for three business days, and the FIU
can extend that by two days. After five business days the
transaction must be resumed unless the assets can be seized as
the result of a criminal case, leaving a very narrow window for
investigation. The porous borders also allow for cash to exit
Uzbekistan into neighboring countries.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Uzbekistan is not a major producer of drugs, but it sits astride a
major trafficking route for illegal narcotics. An estimated 70 tons of
Afghan opiates transits through Central Asia, including a
significant portion either directly or indirectly through Uzbekistan,
to end-use markets in Russia and Europe. Uzbekistan shares a
137 kilometer border with Afghanistan and borders every other
Central Asian republic. In addition to 134 legal crossing points,
Uzbekistan’s borders include thousands of miles of open desert,
rugged mountains and the Amudarya River, which affords drug
traffickers opportunities to enter Uzbekistan’s territory undetected.
Uzbekistan’s leadership has recently exhibited renewed political
will to deal with drug trafficking. However, some of the proceeds of
illegal narcotics are likely used to influence officials and corrupt
key government institutions. While law enforcement officials in
Uzbekistan are generally well-trained and professional, corruption
and a lack of resources seriously hinder Uzbekistan’s institutional
drug control capabilities. Official data on drug use is unreliable
and experts believe the actual number of drug addicts is ten times
the number officially reported. Drug abuse awareness, demand
reduction and treatment programs generally do not operate
effectively in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is a party to the three UN
Drug Conventions as well as the Transnational Organized Crime
Convention and the Convention against Corruption.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2 Watch List)
Uzbekistan is a source country for men, women, and children
subjected to conditions of forced labor and women and children
subjected to sex trafficking. Uzbek men who have emigrated in
search of work are forced to labor in Kazakhstan and Russia in
the construction, cotton, and tobacco industries. Women and
children are subjected to sex trafficking, often through fraudulent
offers of employment, in the United Arab Emirates, India,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey, Thailand, Israel, Malaysia, South
Korea, Japan, China, Indonesia, and also within Uzbekistan. Men
and women from Uzbekistan are subjected to domestic servitude
and forced labor in the agricultural and construction industries in
Russia. Domestic forced labor remains prevalent during the
annual cotton harvest, when many school-age children, college
students, and adults are forced to pick cotton.
The Government of Uzbekistan does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The Uzbek
government demonstrated negligible progress in ceasing forced
labor, including forced child labor, in the annual cotton harvest
and did not make efforts to investigate or prosecute government
officials suspected to be complicit in forced labor; therefore,
Uzbekistan is placed on Tier 2 Watch List for a fourth consecutive
year. Uzbekistan was not placed on Tier 3 per Section 107 of the
2008 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, however,
as the government has a written plan that, if implemented, would
constitute making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance
with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is
devoting sufficient resources to implement that plan. As in
previous years, the government set a quota for national cotton
production and paid farmers artificially low prices for the cotton
produced, making it almost impossible for Uzbek farmers to pay
wages that would attract a consenting workforce. Provincial
governors were held personally responsible for ensuring that the
quota was met; they in turn passed along this pressure to local
officials, who organized and forced school children, university
students, faculty, and other government employees to pick cotton.
The government permitted UNICEF to assess child labor in all 12
regions of the country. The government did not conduct any
awareness campaigns regarding forced labor in the annual cotton
harvest or other internal trafficking, but did continue its previous
awareness campaigns about the dangers of transnational
trafficking.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: Despite continued instability in several neighboring
countries, and the continued involvement of ethnic Uzbeks and
Uzbek nationals in terrorist incidents in other countries, including
Afghanistan and Pakistan, no terrorist incidents took place within
Uzbekistan. The Government of Uzbekistan continued to exercise
tight control over its security situation, convicting an unknown
number of people with alleged terrorist ties. As in the past, a lack
of reliable information made it difficult to analyze the extent of the
terrorist threat in Uzbekistan. It was possible that Uzbekistan
security forces neutralized terrorist threats without bringing them
to the attention of the press or the international community. It was
also well-documented that the government treated many non-
violent minority religious groups, such as Nur, Akromiya, and
Tablighi Jamaat, as extremist groups that were banned or treated
as banned organizations.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: Law enforcement officials
continued to arrest, prosecute, and convict an unknown number
of people under charges of extremism. It was unclear how many of
these defendants would be considered terrorists, as the
Government of Uzbekistan has targeted several religious groups
that international observers considered to be nonviolent.
On August 14, Uzbek police exchanged fire with four armed men,
allegedly religious extremists, near a village in the Tashkent
Region. Limited reports on the event stated that one of the armed
men was wounded and arrested, while the others escaped.
According to independent media reports, up to 83 people were
convicted of charges ranging from anti-constitutional activity to
membership in extremist groups and “inciting ethnic and religious
animosity” in closed trials during February and March 2010. The
trials were allegedly related to several terrorist incidents that took
place in 2009, including the assassinations of Khasan Asadov,
head of the Uzbek Interior Ministry’s directorate for
counterterrorism; and Abror Abrorov, the Deputy Director of
Kukeldash Madrassah; the attempted murder of Anvar-kori
Tursunov, the principal Imam of Tashkent; and a shoot-out that
took place in Tashkent in late August 2009. Uzbekistan sought
the extradition of 30 Uzbek asylum seekers from detention in
Kazakhstan, whose government stated that Uzbekistan provided
strong evidence that the asylum seekers had links to terrorist
organizations. By year’s end, in full consultation with UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR mandate refugee
status was revoked from the detainees and one of the 30 had
been extradited to Uzbekistan. A second was released.
Uzbekistan continued to seek the extradition of the remaining 28.
At year’s end the extradition was pending.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Uzbekistan is a member of the
Eurasian Group against Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing (EAG). After passing anti-money laundering legislation
in 2009, the Government of Uzbekistan did not pass any new
legislation or take any new measures against terrorist finance in
2010. The government did not report any efforts to seize terrorist
assets. Although terrorist financing was not a significant problem
in Uzbekistan, a large and robust black market functioned outside
the confines of the official financial system. The unofficial,
unmonitored cash-based market created an opportunity for small-
scale terrorist money laundering.
Regional and International Cooperation: The Government of
Uzbekistan continued to cooperate bilaterally with other foreign
governments and multilaterally with several international
organizations on general security issues, including border control.
In December, the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive
Directorate and the OSCE jointly sponsored a conference in
Tashkent that focused on countering violent extremism in Central
Asia.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The
Government of Uzbekistan continued to label minority religious
groups and Muslim groups operating outside the parameters of
State control as extremists. State-controlled media frequently ran
programs designed to denigrate terrorist and extremist
propaganda, including “documentaries” about extremist groups
aired on state-run television, news stories, and opinion columns
about the dangers of extremism in state-run newspapers, and
public confessions and apologies by alleged extremists who
claimed to have seen the error of their ways. However, non-
violent religious minorities, including Nur, the Bahais and
evangelical Protestants, have been branded as extremists and as
threats to society in these "documentaries" and articles.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Council Regulation (EC) No 1859/2005 was repealed in November
2009.
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Information unavailable.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report 2011:
Uzbekistan is not an important regional financial center and does
not have a well-developed financial system. A significant
percentage of the country’s GDP comes from remittances abroad,
posing a money laundering vulnerability. Corruption, especially in
relation to natural resources, narcotics trafficking and smuggling
generate the majority of illicit proceeds. Local and regional drug
trafficking and organized crime groups control the flow of
narcotics and proceeds from other criminal activities, such as
smuggling of cash, high-value transferable assets (e.g., gold),
property, or automobiles. Uzbekistan has a significant black
market for smuggled goods. This black market does not appear to
be significantly funded by narcotics proceeds but can be used to
launder drug-related money. In April 2009, the government of
Uzbekistan passed legislation to reestablish an anti-money
laundering regime that had been suspended by Presidential
decree in 2007.
DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ENGAGE IN CURRENCY
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING THAT INCLUDE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US
CURRENCY; CURRENCY DERIVED FROM ILLEGAL SALES IN
THE U.S.; OR THAT OTHERWISE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE
U.S.: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: NO civilly: NO
CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORIST FINANCING:
Ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay: YES
UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities distributed to
financial institutions: YES
Please refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on
Terrorism, which can be found here: http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/.
KNOW-YOUR-CUSTOMER RULES:
Covered entities: Banks, credit unions, micro-credit institutions,
securities brokers, members of the stock exchange, insurance
brokers, leasing companies, money transfer companies, postal
operators, dealers in precious metals and stones, real estate
agents, notaries, lawyers, auditors, pawn shops, lotteries
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: NO
SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:
Covered entities: Banks, credit unions, micro-credit institutions,
securities brokers, members of the stock exchange, insurance
brokers, leasing companies, postal operators, dealers in precious
metals and stones, real estate agents, notaries, lawyers, auditors
Number of STRs received and time frame: 4,125 - November
2009 to April 2010
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS/CONVICTIONS:
Prosecutions: 42 - January to November 2009
Convictions: Eight, covering 97 individuals - January to November
2009
Assets forfeited: criminally: 725 million UZS (approximately
$500,000) in 2009 civilly: Not available
RECORDS EXCHANGE MECHANISM:
With U.S.: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Uzbekistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating
Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), a Financial
Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Its most recent
mutual evaluation can be found here: http://eurasiangroup.
org/mers.php.
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND
COMMENTS:
Uzbekistan’s legal system is generally susceptible to corruption
and political influence. Legislation to reestablish AML measures
has been adopted piecemeal since April 2009, leading to
confusion from vague requirements, incomplete procedures, and
occasional conflicts with banking regulations. The short time
period since reimplementation makes it difficult to evaluate the
effectiveness and adaptability of the system, and government
secrecy surrounding cases and statistics inhibits evaluation. The
Prosecutor General’s Office attempts to maintain secrecy by not
releasing the criteria for identifying suspicious transactions, even
to banks. Fearing the consequences of not reporting criminal
activity, banks have adopted excessively cautious policies that
lead to significant over-reporting.
Ambiguities in the law make it difficult to determine the division of
authority among the Prosecutor General’s Office and other law
enforcement bodies in money laundering cases. Aside from the
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
the National Security Service also investigate money laundering
and terrorist financing, respectively, and both are making efforts
to build financial crime departments.
The ability to freeze assets is limited; financial institutions can
hold suspicious transactions for three business days, and the FIU
can extend that by two days. After five business days the
transaction must be resumed unless the assets can be seized as
the result of a criminal case, leaving a very narrow window for
investigation. The porous borders also allow for cash to exit
Uzbekistan into neighboring countries.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Uzbekistan is not a major producer of drugs, but it sits astride a
major trafficking route for illegal narcotics. An estimated 70 tons of
Afghan opiates transits through Central Asia, including a
significant portion either directly or indirectly through Uzbekistan,
to end-use markets in Russia and Europe. Uzbekistan shares a
137 kilometer border with Afghanistan and borders every other
Central Asian republic. In addition to 134 legal crossing points,
Uzbekistan’s borders include thousands of miles of open desert,
rugged mountains and the Amudarya River, which affords drug
traffickers opportunities to enter Uzbekistan’s territory undetected.
Uzbekistan’s leadership has recently exhibited renewed political
will to deal with drug trafficking. However, some of the proceeds of
illegal narcotics are likely used to influence officials and corrupt
key government institutions. While law enforcement officials in
Uzbekistan are generally well-trained and professional, corruption
and a lack of resources seriously hinder Uzbekistan’s institutional
drug control capabilities. Official data on drug use is unreliable
and experts believe the actual number of drug addicts is ten times
the number officially reported. Drug abuse awareness, demand
reduction and treatment programs generally do not operate
effectively in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is a party to the three UN
Drug Conventions as well as the Transnational Organized Crime
Convention and the Convention against Corruption.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 2 Watch List)
Uzbekistan is a source country for men, women, and children
subjected to conditions of forced labor and women and children
subjected to sex trafficking. Uzbek men who have emigrated in
search of work are forced to labor in Kazakhstan and Russia in
the construction, cotton, and tobacco industries. Women and
children are subjected to sex trafficking, often through fraudulent
offers of employment, in the United Arab Emirates, India,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey, Thailand, Israel, Malaysia, South
Korea, Japan, China, Indonesia, and also within Uzbekistan. Men
and women from Uzbekistan are subjected to domestic servitude
and forced labor in the agricultural and construction industries in
Russia. Domestic forced labor remains prevalent during the
annual cotton harvest, when many school-age children, college
students, and adults are forced to pick cotton.
The Government of Uzbekistan does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The Uzbek
government demonstrated negligible progress in ceasing forced
labor, including forced child labor, in the annual cotton harvest
and did not make efforts to investigate or prosecute government
officials suspected to be complicit in forced labor; therefore,
Uzbekistan is placed on Tier 2 Watch List for a fourth consecutive
year. Uzbekistan was not placed on Tier 3 per Section 107 of the
2008 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, however,
as the government has a written plan that, if implemented, would
constitute making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance
with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is
devoting sufficient resources to implement that plan. As in
previous years, the government set a quota for national cotton
production and paid farmers artificially low prices for the cotton
produced, making it almost impossible for Uzbek farmers to pay
wages that would attract a consenting workforce. Provincial
governors were held personally responsible for ensuring that the
quota was met; they in turn passed along this pressure to local
officials, who organized and forced school children, university
students, faculty, and other government employees to pick cotton.
The government permitted UNICEF to assess child labor in all 12
regions of the country. The government did not conduct any
awareness campaigns regarding forced labor in the annual cotton
harvest or other internal trafficking, but did continue its previous
awareness campaigns about the dangers of transnational
trafficking.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: Despite continued instability in several neighboring
countries, and the continued involvement of ethnic Uzbeks and
Uzbek nationals in terrorist incidents in other countries, including
Afghanistan and Pakistan, no terrorist incidents took place within
Uzbekistan. The Government of Uzbekistan continued to exercise
tight control over its security situation, convicting an unknown
number of people with alleged terrorist ties. As in the past, a lack
of reliable information made it difficult to analyze the extent of the
terrorist threat in Uzbekistan. It was possible that Uzbekistan
security forces neutralized terrorist threats without bringing them
to the attention of the press or the international community. It was
also well-documented that the government treated many non-
violent minority religious groups, such as Nur, Akromiya, and
Tablighi Jamaat, as extremist groups that were banned or treated
as banned organizations.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: Law enforcement officials
continued to arrest, prosecute, and convict an unknown number
of people under charges of extremism. It was unclear how many of
these defendants would be considered terrorists, as the
Government of Uzbekistan has targeted several religious groups
that international observers considered to be nonviolent.
On August 14, Uzbek police exchanged fire with four armed men,
allegedly religious extremists, near a village in the Tashkent
Region. Limited reports on the event stated that one of the armed
men was wounded and arrested, while the others escaped.
According to independent media reports, up to 83 people were
convicted of charges ranging from anti-constitutional activity to
membership in extremist groups and “inciting ethnic and religious
animosity” in closed trials during February and March 2010. The
trials were allegedly related to several terrorist incidents that took
place in 2009, including the assassinations of Khasan Asadov,
head of the Uzbek Interior Ministry’s directorate for
counterterrorism; and Abror Abrorov, the Deputy Director of
Kukeldash Madrassah; the attempted murder of Anvar-kori
Tursunov, the principal Imam of Tashkent; and a shoot-out that
took place in Tashkent in late August 2009. Uzbekistan sought
the extradition of 30 Uzbek asylum seekers from detention in
Kazakhstan, whose government stated that Uzbekistan provided
strong evidence that the asylum seekers had links to terrorist
organizations. By year’s end, in full consultation with UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR mandate refugee
status was revoked from the detainees and one of the 30 had
been extradited to Uzbekistan. A second was released.
Uzbekistan continued to seek the extradition of the remaining 28.
At year’s end the extradition was pending.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Uzbekistan is a member of the
Eurasian Group against Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing (EAG). After passing anti-money laundering legislation
in 2009, the Government of Uzbekistan did not pass any new
legislation or take any new measures against terrorist finance in
2010. The government did not report any efforts to seize terrorist
assets. Although terrorist financing was not a significant problem
in Uzbekistan, a large and robust black market functioned outside
the confines of the official financial system. The unofficial,
unmonitored cash-based market created an opportunity for small-
scale terrorist money laundering.
Regional and International Cooperation: The Government of
Uzbekistan continued to cooperate bilaterally with other foreign
governments and multilaterally with several international
organizations on general security issues, including border control.
In December, the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive
Directorate and the OSCE jointly sponsored a conference in
Tashkent that focused on countering violent extremism in Central
Asia.
Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The
Government of Uzbekistan continued to label minority religious
groups and Muslim groups operating outside the parameters of
State control as extremists. State-controlled media frequently ran
programs designed to denigrate terrorist and extremist
propaganda, including “documentaries” about extremist groups
aired on state-run television, news stories, and opinion columns
about the dangers of extremism in state-run newspapers, and
public confessions and apologies by alleged extremists who
claimed to have seen the error of their ways. However, non-
violent religious minorities, including Nur, the Bahais and
evangelical Protestants, have been branded as extremists and as
threats to society in these "documentaries" and articles.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
| Further Tables |
| UZBEKISTAN |
| KnowYourCountry |
|
|
| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |