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FATF Statement re AML Strategic Deficiencies:
Date: 16 February 2012
In October 2010, Venezuela made a high-level political
commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to address its
strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. Since then, Venezuela has taken
steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by
approving AML/CFT amendments. However, the FATF has
determined that certain strategic deficiencies remain. Venezuela
should continue to work on implementing its action plan to
address the remaining strategic deficiencies, including by: (1)
adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special
Recommendation II); (2) establishing and implementing adequate
procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special
Recommendations I and III); (3) ensuring a fully operational and
effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit
(Recommendation 26); (4) implementing adequate CDD
guidelines for all sectors (Recommendation 5); and (5)
establishing adequate suspicious transaction reporting (STR)
obligations for money laundering and financing of terrorism
(Recommendation 13 and Special Recommendation IV). The
FATF encourages Venezuela to address its remaining
deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action
plan.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Venezuela has over 80 deemed low-tax jurisdictions on its
blacklist. Jurisdictions entering into exchange of information
agreements with Venezuela will be removed from the list.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:
Venezuela is a major cocaine-transit country. The country’s
proximity to drug producing countries, weaknesses in its anti-
money laundering regime, limited bilateral cooperation, and
substantial corruption in law enforcement and other relevant
sectors continue to make Venezuela vulnerable to money
laundering. The main sources of money laundering are proceeds
generated by drug trafficking organizations and illegal
transactions that exploit Venezuela’s currency controls and its
various exchange rates. The current regime of price and foreign
exchange controls has provided opportunities for corruption; and
corruption continues to be a very serious problem in Venezuela.
Money laundering occurs through commercial banks, exchange
houses, gambling sites, fraudulently invoiced foreign trade
transactions, smuggling, real estate, agriculture and livestock
businesses, securities transactions, and trade in precious metals.
Venezuela’s multiple exchange rates allow launderers to profit
from arbitrage conditions while using the black market. Trade-
based money laundering, such as the black market peso
exchange, through which money launderers furnish narcotics-
generated dollars in the United States to commercial smugglers,
travel agents, investors, and others in exchange for Colombian
pesos, remains a prominent method for laundering regional
narcotics proceeds. It is reported that many black market traders
ship their goods through Margarita Island’s free port.
For additional information focusing on terrorist financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: YES
Criminalization of Money Laundering:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
KYC covered entities: Banks, leasing companies, money market
and risk capital funds, savings and loans, foreign exchange
operators, regulated financial groups, and credit card operators;
hotels and tourist institutions that provide foreign exchange;
general warehouses or storage companies; regulated securities
entities; regulated insurance entities; casinos, bingo halls, and
slot machine operators; and regulated notaries and public
registration offices
Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:
Number of STRs received and time frame: 582 through June 30,
2011
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
STR covered entities: Banks, leasing companies, money market
funds, savings and loans, foreign exchange operators, regulated
financial groups, and credit card operators; hotels and tourist
institutions that provide foreign exchange; general warehouses or
storage companies; regulated securities entities; regulated
insurance entities; casinos, bingo halls, and slot machine
operators; and regulated notaries and public registration offices
Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:
Prosecutions: 13 from July 2010 - January 2011
Convictions: Two cases, involving seven persons from July 2010 -
January 2011
Records exchange mechanism:
With U.S.: MLAT: YES Other mechanism: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Venezuela is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force (CFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style
regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found
here: http://www.cfatf-gafic.
org/downloadables/mer/Venezuela_3rd_Round_MER_(Final)
_English.pdf
Enforcement and implementation issues and comments:
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) suspended
the exchange of information with Venezuela’s National Financial
Intelligence Unit (UNIF) in January 2007 due to the unauthorized
disclosure of information provided by FinCEN, and the relationship
has not resumed to date. In 2009 - 2011, there was no financial
intelligence information exchange between Venezuela and the
United States.
In 2010, the country was identified as having strategic anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing deficiencies and
developed an action plan to address the following issues:
criminalizing terrorist financing; establishing and implementing
adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets;
ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning financial
intelligence unit; implementing adequate customer due diligence
guidelines for all sectors; and establishing adequate STR
reporting obligations for money laundering and terrorist financing.
The country has approved new regulations and improved the
supervision of banks and securities intermediaries/brokers.
The judicial system has been ineffective and is politicized. During
the year, legislation to strengthen supervision of insurance,
securities, notaries and operators of casinos, bingo halls and slot
machines was passed. Venezuela must increase its institutional
infrastructure and technical capacity so it can effectively
implement these new regulations. The government should adopt
the amendments to incorporate anti-money laundering reforms
into the organic law as recommended by international experts.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Venezuela is a major drug-transit country. A porous western
border with Colombia, a weak judicial system, inconsistent
international counternarcotics cooperation, generally permissive
law enforcement, and a corrupt political environment have made
Venezuela one of the preferred trafficking routes for cocaine from
South America to the Eastern Caribbean, Central America, the
United States, western Africa and Europe. The President of the
United States determined in 2011 that Venezuela had failed
demonstrably to adhere to its obligations under international
counternarcotics agreements.
The Government of Venezuela’s counternarcotics efforts are led
by the National Anti-Drug Office (ONA). Enforcement is principally
carried out by the National Guard and the Scientific, Penal, and
Criminal Investigative Body, although state and municipal police
forces also conduct some counternarcotics operations. The
Venezuelan Coast Guard, which is under the authority of the
Navy, has a counternarcotics mission both at sea and in the
ports. Venezuelan law enforcement lacks the equipment, training,
and reach to match the resources and scope of major drug
trafficking organizations. Effective prosecution of drug traffickers
is hindered by corruption and a lack of judicial independence.
During 2011, Venezuela and Colombia continued to develop their
bilateral counternarcotics cooperation to address the transit of
illicit drugs from Colombia to Venezuela and onward to third
countries. On May 9, 2011, Colombia extradited to Venezuela
Walid Makled, allegedly Venezuela's most prominent drug
trafficker, who is reportedly connected to the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and who is wanted in the United
States on drug trafficking charges. In 2009, the U.S. Department
of Treasury designated Makled a Significant Foreign Narcotics
Trafficker under the Kingpin Act. Makled was arraigned on May
10, 2011, and the court ordered his case to trial on July 26;
however, the trial was pending at year's end.
Venezuelan authorities deported to Colombia three members of
the National Liberation Army (ELN) and two members of the
FARC, including security chief Gildardo Garcia Carmona (aka
“Alirio”) in 2011. On May 31, the Venezuelan government
arrested another FARC member, Guillermo Enrique Torres Cueter
(aka “Julian Conrado”), but had not deported him to Colombia by
year's end. Despite these steps, the Venezuelan government
appeared to continue to tolerate a FARC and ELN presence and
did not take significant steps to limit their ability to operate in
Venezuelan territory.
The media continued to report on the presence of Mexican drug
trafficking organizations, including the Sinaloa Cartel and Los
Zetas, trafficking drugs through Venezuela. In January,
Venezuelan authorities arrested Colombian Gloria Rojas, who was
allegedly working for Los Zetas in Venezuela, and deported her to
the United States on March 21, 2011.
Some limited coca cultivation occurs along Venezuela’s border
with Colombia, but the levels are insignificant. Low-grade
marijuana is grown in various parts of Venezuela but is not
exported because of its poor quality. Trafficking of precursor
chemicals through the country is minimal. According to a 2009
drug consumption study by the ONA, illegal drug use remained a
problem, with marijuana the most commonly consumed illicit drug,
followed by “crack” cocaine and “basuco” (cocaine paste).
Bilateral counternarcotics cooperation between Venezuela and
the United States is limited and continues only on a case-by-case
basis. The lack of greater counternarcotics cooperation is
consistent with the Venezuelan government’s decision to reduce
bilateral contact with the United States. Venezuela has not signed
the addendum to the 1978 Bilateral Counternarcotics
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United States that
was negotiated in 2005.
Venezuela is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 3)
Venezuela is a source, transit, and destination country for men,
women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor.
Venezuelan women and girls are found in conditions of sex
trafficking within the country, lured from poor interior regions to
urban and tourist centers, such as Caracas, Maracaibo, and
Margarita Island. Victims are often recruited through false job
offers. To a lesser extent, Brazilian women and Colombian women
are subjected to forced prostitution in Venezuela. Some
Venezuelan children are forced to work as street beggars or as
domestic servants. Some Venezuelan women are transported
from coastal areas by small boats to Caribbean islands,
particularly Aruba, Curacao and Trinidad & Tobago, where they
are subjected to forced prostitution. Organized crime is widely
believed to be involved in sex trafficking in Venezuela. Venezuela
is a transit country for men, women, and children from
neighboring countries, such as Colombia, as well as a destination
for migrants from China, who may be subjected to commercial
sexual exploitation and forced labor in Venezuela.
The Government of Venezuela does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and has been
placed on Tier 2 Watch for the last four consecutive years.
Therefore, pursuant to Section 107 of the 2008 Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act, Venezuela is deemed not to be
making significant efforts to comply with the minimum standards
and is placed on Tier 3. According to the public ministry’s website,
the government investigated potential cases of suspected human
trafficking and arrested at least 12 people for trafficking crimes
during the reporting period; however, there was no further publicly
available information regarding those cases. Authorities
maintained public awareness initiatives but did not implement
formal procedures for identifying trafficking victims or provide
victims with specialized care or services. The government drafted
a comprehensive bill that would prohibit all forms of trafficking in
persons, but did not enhance its interagency efforts to combat
trafficking. The Government of Venezuela did not provide
information on its efforts to combat human trafficking for this
report, and there were no official statistics or comprehensive data
on the extent and nature of the trafficking problem in Venezuela.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: In May 2010, for the fifth consecutive year, the U.S.
Department of State determined that Venezuela was not
cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to section
40A of the Arms Export Control Act. Throughout the year,
President Chavez rejected allegations that he or his government
supported terrorism and instead accused the United States of
sponsoring terrorism. Several times during the year, the
Colombian government publicly accused the Venezuelan
government of harboring members of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army
(ELN) on its territory. It alleged that these groups used
Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup, engage in narcotics
trafficking, and extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans
to finance their operations. In a July 22 special session of OAS
Permanent Council, the Colombian Permanent Representative
presented alleged evidence of FARC training camps in Venezuela
and proposed an international verification commission to
investigate the presence of FARC and ELN members in
Venezuela.
In response to these charges, the Venezuelan government broke
diplomatic relations with Colombia, and on July 25, President
Chavez denied that "a foreign paramilitary or military guerrilla
force has taken over even the smallest millimeter squared of our
sovereign territory." On August 10, newly-inaugurated Colombian
President Juan Manual Santos and President Chavez met in
Santa Marta, Colombia, and announced the restoration of
diplomatic relations, including the establishment of a bilateral
commission with five working groups, including one on security.
Since then, there have been ministerial-level meetings to discuss
bilateral security issues.
During the year, the Spanish government asked Venezuela for
information regarding allegations that it was providing support to
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA). Although President Chavez
initially said that Venezuela "has nothing to explain," the two
governments later issued a statement that "condemned terrorism
in all its forms" and promised police and judicial cooperation.
There was no information publicly available about the results of
that cooperation.
In October, the Spanish government requested the extradition of
Arturo Cubillas Fontan, a naturalized Venezuelan citizen and
employee of the Venezuelan National Land Institute, on several
charges, including murder, in connection with an ongoing
investigation in Spain about ETA-FARC links in Venezuela. Two
former ETA members accused Cubillas in a Spanish court of
having given training to ETA members in weapons and explosives
in an undisclosed training camp in Venezuela in 2008. President
Chavez "dismissed and denied" the accusations on October 4,
2010, which he claimed were the result of a "permanent
international conspiracy" against his “Bolivarian revolution.” The
Venezuelan prosecutor general said the constitution prohibited
the extradition of Venezuelan nationals.
The Venezuelan government took no action against government
and military officials linked to the FARC or ELN. General Hugo
Armando Carvajal Barrios, who was designated by the United
States in September 2008 for materially assisting the narcotics
trafficking activities of the FARC, remained Director of the Military
Intelligence Directorate. In November, President Chavez promoted
another official also designated by the United States in 2008 for
materially assisting the FARC, Henry Rangel Silva, Chief of the
Armed Force's Strategic Operation Command, to the four-star
equivalent General in Chief. The prosecutor general also awarded
Rangel Silva with a Citizen's Merit Medal for his "service in
defense of the interests of the country and the constitution."
President Chavez has continued to strengthen Venezuela’s
relationship with state sponsor of terrorism Iran. In October 2010,
President Chavez met President Ahmadinejad during a two-day
visit to Iran. During the visit, Chavez condemned international
sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program and signed
cooperation agreements in areas including oil and gas, trade, and
construction.
We remain concerned about Hizballah’s fundraising activities in
Venezuela.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The Government of Venezuela
took the following actions in connection with individuals allegedly
connected to terrorist organizations:
* In July, Venezuelan officials arrested and extradited the
Salvadoran Francisco Chavez Abarca in connection with the
bombings of Cuban hotels in 1997.
* On November 17, the Venezuelan government extradited to
Colombia two suspected members of the ELN and one of the
FARC.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Venezuela is a member of the
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and its Financial
Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group; it also
participates in the Money Laundering Experts Working Group of
the OAS Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control. In
March, Venezuela hosted a five-day CFATF training workshop on
"The Legal Framework against Money Laundering."
Regional and International Cooperation: As a member of the
Union of South American Nations, Venezuela publicly condemned
the terrorist action of those behind the August 12 car bomb attack
in Bogota, Colombia.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Unidad Nacional de Inteligencia Financiera (UNIF)
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
Date: 16 February 2012
In October 2010, Venezuela made a high-level political
commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to address its
strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. Since then, Venezuela has taken
steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by
approving AML/CFT amendments. However, the FATF has
determined that certain strategic deficiencies remain. Venezuela
should continue to work on implementing its action plan to
address the remaining strategic deficiencies, including by: (1)
adequately criminalising terrorist financing (Special
Recommendation II); (2) establishing and implementing adequate
procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets (Special
Recommendations I and III); (3) ensuring a fully operational and
effectively functioning Financial Intelligence Unit
(Recommendation 26); (4) implementing adequate CDD
guidelines for all sectors (Recommendation 5); and (5)
establishing adequate suspicious transaction reporting (STR)
obligations for money laundering and financing of terrorism
(Recommendation 13 and Special Recommendation IV). The
FATF encourages Venezuela to address its remaining
deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action
plan.
____________________________________________________
Sanctions:
None applicable
____________________________________________________
Offshore Jurisdiction Blacklists:
Venezuela has over 80 deemed low-tax jurisdictions on its
blacklist. Jurisdictions entering into exchange of information
agreements with Venezuela will be removed from the list.
____________________________________________________
US State Department Money Laundering Report - 2012:
Venezuela is a major cocaine-transit country. The country’s
proximity to drug producing countries, weaknesses in its anti-
money laundering regime, limited bilateral cooperation, and
substantial corruption in law enforcement and other relevant
sectors continue to make Venezuela vulnerable to money
laundering. The main sources of money laundering are proceeds
generated by drug trafficking organizations and illegal
transactions that exploit Venezuela’s currency controls and its
various exchange rates. The current regime of price and foreign
exchange controls has provided opportunities for corruption; and
corruption continues to be a very serious problem in Venezuela.
Money laundering occurs through commercial banks, exchange
houses, gambling sites, fraudulently invoiced foreign trade
transactions, smuggling, real estate, agriculture and livestock
businesses, securities transactions, and trade in precious metals.
Venezuela’s multiple exchange rates allow launderers to profit
from arbitrage conditions while using the black market. Trade-
based money laundering, such as the black market peso
exchange, through which money launderers furnish narcotics-
generated dollars in the United States to commercial smugglers,
travel agents, investors, and others in exchange for Colombian
pesos, remains a prominent method for laundering regional
narcotics proceeds. It is reported that many black market traders
ship their goods through Margarita Island’s free port.
For additional information focusing on terrorist financing, please
refer to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
which can be found here: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
Do Financial Institutions engage in currency transactions related
to international narcotics trafficking that include significant
amounts of US currency; currency derived from illegal sales in the
U.S.; or that otherwise significantly affect the U.S.: YES
Criminalization of Money Laundering:
“All serious crimes” approach or “list” approach to predicate
crimes: All serious crimes
Legal persons covered: criminally: YES civilly: YES
Know-your-customer (KYC) rules:
Enhanced due diligence procedures for PEPs: Foreign: YES
Domestic: YES
KYC covered entities: Banks, leasing companies, money market
and risk capital funds, savings and loans, foreign exchange
operators, regulated financial groups, and credit card operators;
hotels and tourist institutions that provide foreign exchange;
general warehouses or storage companies; regulated securities
entities; regulated insurance entities; casinos, bingo halls, and
slot machine operators; and regulated notaries and public
registration offices
Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) Requirements:
Number of STRs received and time frame: 582 through June 30,
2011
Number of CTRs received and time frame: Not available
STR covered entities: Banks, leasing companies, money market
funds, savings and loans, foreign exchange operators, regulated
financial groups, and credit card operators; hotels and tourist
institutions that provide foreign exchange; general warehouses or
storage companies; regulated securities entities; regulated
insurance entities; casinos, bingo halls, and slot machine
operators; and regulated notaries and public registration offices
Money Laundering Criminal Prosecutions/Convictions:
Prosecutions: 13 from July 2010 - January 2011
Convictions: Two cases, involving seven persons from July 2010 -
January 2011
Records exchange mechanism:
With U.S.: MLAT: YES Other mechanism: YES
With other governments/jurisdictions: YES
Venezuela is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force (CFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style
regional body. Its most recent mutual evaluation can be found
here: http://www.cfatf-gafic.
org/downloadables/mer/Venezuela_3rd_Round_MER_(Final)
_English.pdf
Enforcement and implementation issues and comments:
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) suspended
the exchange of information with Venezuela’s National Financial
Intelligence Unit (UNIF) in January 2007 due to the unauthorized
disclosure of information provided by FinCEN, and the relationship
has not resumed to date. In 2009 - 2011, there was no financial
intelligence information exchange between Venezuela and the
United States.
In 2010, the country was identified as having strategic anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorist financing deficiencies and
developed an action plan to address the following issues:
criminalizing terrorist financing; establishing and implementing
adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets;
ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning financial
intelligence unit; implementing adequate customer due diligence
guidelines for all sectors; and establishing adequate STR
reporting obligations for money laundering and terrorist financing.
The country has approved new regulations and improved the
supervision of banks and securities intermediaries/brokers.
The judicial system has been ineffective and is politicized. During
the year, legislation to strengthen supervision of insurance,
securities, notaries and operators of casinos, bingo halls and slot
machines was passed. Venezuela must increase its institutional
infrastructure and technical capacity so it can effectively
implement these new regulations. The government should adopt
the amendments to incorporate anti-money laundering reforms
into the organic law as recommended by international experts.
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Narcotics Report 2012 (introduction):
Venezuela is a major drug-transit country. A porous western
border with Colombia, a weak judicial system, inconsistent
international counternarcotics cooperation, generally permissive
law enforcement, and a corrupt political environment have made
Venezuela one of the preferred trafficking routes for cocaine from
South America to the Eastern Caribbean, Central America, the
United States, western Africa and Europe. The President of the
United States determined in 2011 that Venezuela had failed
demonstrably to adhere to its obligations under international
counternarcotics agreements.
The Government of Venezuela’s counternarcotics efforts are led
by the National Anti-Drug Office (ONA). Enforcement is principally
carried out by the National Guard and the Scientific, Penal, and
Criminal Investigative Body, although state and municipal police
forces also conduct some counternarcotics operations. The
Venezuelan Coast Guard, which is under the authority of the
Navy, has a counternarcotics mission both at sea and in the
ports. Venezuelan law enforcement lacks the equipment, training,
and reach to match the resources and scope of major drug
trafficking organizations. Effective prosecution of drug traffickers
is hindered by corruption and a lack of judicial independence.
During 2011, Venezuela and Colombia continued to develop their
bilateral counternarcotics cooperation to address the transit of
illicit drugs from Colombia to Venezuela and onward to third
countries. On May 9, 2011, Colombia extradited to Venezuela
Walid Makled, allegedly Venezuela's most prominent drug
trafficker, who is reportedly connected to the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and who is wanted in the United
States on drug trafficking charges. In 2009, the U.S. Department
of Treasury designated Makled a Significant Foreign Narcotics
Trafficker under the Kingpin Act. Makled was arraigned on May
10, 2011, and the court ordered his case to trial on July 26;
however, the trial was pending at year's end.
Venezuelan authorities deported to Colombia three members of
the National Liberation Army (ELN) and two members of the
FARC, including security chief Gildardo Garcia Carmona (aka
“Alirio”) in 2011. On May 31, the Venezuelan government
arrested another FARC member, Guillermo Enrique Torres Cueter
(aka “Julian Conrado”), but had not deported him to Colombia by
year's end. Despite these steps, the Venezuelan government
appeared to continue to tolerate a FARC and ELN presence and
did not take significant steps to limit their ability to operate in
Venezuelan territory.
The media continued to report on the presence of Mexican drug
trafficking organizations, including the Sinaloa Cartel and Los
Zetas, trafficking drugs through Venezuela. In January,
Venezuelan authorities arrested Colombian Gloria Rojas, who was
allegedly working for Los Zetas in Venezuela, and deported her to
the United States on March 21, 2011.
Some limited coca cultivation occurs along Venezuela’s border
with Colombia, but the levels are insignificant. Low-grade
marijuana is grown in various parts of Venezuela but is not
exported because of its poor quality. Trafficking of precursor
chemicals through the country is minimal. According to a 2009
drug consumption study by the ONA, illegal drug use remained a
problem, with marijuana the most commonly consumed illicit drug,
followed by “crack” cocaine and “basuco” (cocaine paste).
Bilateral counternarcotics cooperation between Venezuela and
the United States is limited and continues only on a case-by-case
basis. The lack of greater counternarcotics cooperation is
consistent with the Venezuelan government’s decision to reduce
bilateral contact with the United States. Venezuela has not signed
the addendum to the 1978 Bilateral Counternarcotics
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United States that
was negotiated in 2005.
Venezuela is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.
For Full report, click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
(introduction):
(Tier 3)
Venezuela is a source, transit, and destination country for men,
women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor.
Venezuelan women and girls are found in conditions of sex
trafficking within the country, lured from poor interior regions to
urban and tourist centers, such as Caracas, Maracaibo, and
Margarita Island. Victims are often recruited through false job
offers. To a lesser extent, Brazilian women and Colombian women
are subjected to forced prostitution in Venezuela. Some
Venezuelan children are forced to work as street beggars or as
domestic servants. Some Venezuelan women are transported
from coastal areas by small boats to Caribbean islands,
particularly Aruba, Curacao and Trinidad & Tobago, where they
are subjected to forced prostitution. Organized crime is widely
believed to be involved in sex trafficking in Venezuela. Venezuela
is a transit country for men, women, and children from
neighboring countries, such as Colombia, as well as a destination
for migrants from China, who may be subjected to commercial
sexual exploitation and forced labor in Venezuela.
The Government of Venezuela does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and has been
placed on Tier 2 Watch for the last four consecutive years.
Therefore, pursuant to Section 107 of the 2008 Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act, Venezuela is deemed not to be
making significant efforts to comply with the minimum standards
and is placed on Tier 3. According to the public ministry’s website,
the government investigated potential cases of suspected human
trafficking and arrested at least 12 people for trafficking crimes
during the reporting period; however, there was no further publicly
available information regarding those cases. Authorities
maintained public awareness initiatives but did not implement
formal procedures for identifying trafficking victims or provide
victims with specialized care or services. The government drafted
a comprehensive bill that would prohibit all forms of trafficking in
persons, but did not enhance its interagency efforts to combat
trafficking. The Government of Venezuela did not provide
information on its efforts to combat human trafficking for this
report, and there were no official statistics or comprehensive data
on the extent and nature of the trafficking problem in Venezuela.
For full report click here
____________________________________________________
US State Dept Terrorism Report 2010
Overview: In May 2010, for the fifth consecutive year, the U.S.
Department of State determined that Venezuela was not
cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts pursuant to section
40A of the Arms Export Control Act. Throughout the year,
President Chavez rejected allegations that he or his government
supported terrorism and instead accused the United States of
sponsoring terrorism. Several times during the year, the
Colombian government publicly accused the Venezuelan
government of harboring members of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army
(ELN) on its territory. It alleged that these groups used
Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup, engage in narcotics
trafficking, and extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans
to finance their operations. In a July 22 special session of OAS
Permanent Council, the Colombian Permanent Representative
presented alleged evidence of FARC training camps in Venezuela
and proposed an international verification commission to
investigate the presence of FARC and ELN members in
Venezuela.
In response to these charges, the Venezuelan government broke
diplomatic relations with Colombia, and on July 25, President
Chavez denied that "a foreign paramilitary or military guerrilla
force has taken over even the smallest millimeter squared of our
sovereign territory." On August 10, newly-inaugurated Colombian
President Juan Manual Santos and President Chavez met in
Santa Marta, Colombia, and announced the restoration of
diplomatic relations, including the establishment of a bilateral
commission with five working groups, including one on security.
Since then, there have been ministerial-level meetings to discuss
bilateral security issues.
During the year, the Spanish government asked Venezuela for
information regarding allegations that it was providing support to
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA). Although President Chavez
initially said that Venezuela "has nothing to explain," the two
governments later issued a statement that "condemned terrorism
in all its forms" and promised police and judicial cooperation.
There was no information publicly available about the results of
that cooperation.
In October, the Spanish government requested the extradition of
Arturo Cubillas Fontan, a naturalized Venezuelan citizen and
employee of the Venezuelan National Land Institute, on several
charges, including murder, in connection with an ongoing
investigation in Spain about ETA-FARC links in Venezuela. Two
former ETA members accused Cubillas in a Spanish court of
having given training to ETA members in weapons and explosives
in an undisclosed training camp in Venezuela in 2008. President
Chavez "dismissed and denied" the accusations on October 4,
2010, which he claimed were the result of a "permanent
international conspiracy" against his “Bolivarian revolution.” The
Venezuelan prosecutor general said the constitution prohibited
the extradition of Venezuelan nationals.
The Venezuelan government took no action against government
and military officials linked to the FARC or ELN. General Hugo
Armando Carvajal Barrios, who was designated by the United
States in September 2008 for materially assisting the narcotics
trafficking activities of the FARC, remained Director of the Military
Intelligence Directorate. In November, President Chavez promoted
another official also designated by the United States in 2008 for
materially assisting the FARC, Henry Rangel Silva, Chief of the
Armed Force's Strategic Operation Command, to the four-star
equivalent General in Chief. The prosecutor general also awarded
Rangel Silva with a Citizen's Merit Medal for his "service in
defense of the interests of the country and the constitution."
President Chavez has continued to strengthen Venezuela’s
relationship with state sponsor of terrorism Iran. In October 2010,
President Chavez met President Ahmadinejad during a two-day
visit to Iran. During the visit, Chavez condemned international
sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program and signed
cooperation agreements in areas including oil and gas, trade, and
construction.
We remain concerned about Hizballah’s fundraising activities in
Venezuela.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The Government of Venezuela
took the following actions in connection with individuals allegedly
connected to terrorist organizations:
* In July, Venezuelan officials arrested and extradited the
Salvadoran Francisco Chavez Abarca in connection with the
bombings of Cuban hotels in 1997.
* On November 17, the Venezuelan government extradited to
Colombia two suspected members of the ELN and one of the
FARC.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Venezuela is a member of the
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and its Financial
Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group; it also
participates in the Money Laundering Experts Working Group of
the OAS Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control. In
March, Venezuela hosted a five-day CFATF training workshop on
"The Legal Framework against Money Laundering."
Regional and International Cooperation: As a member of the
Union of South American Nations, Venezuela publicly condemned
the terrorist action of those behind the August 12 car bomb attack
in Bogota, Colombia.
____________________________________________________
Links:
Unidad Nacional de Inteligencia Financiera (UNIF)
Worldwide AML Legislation (International Bar Association)
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*Please note that FATF deems that a country has significant aml deficiencies if
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
any of the 'Core' Recommendations, R1, R5, R10, R13, SRII, or SRIV are rated
either Partially of Non-Compliant. These are marked in red.
For FATF to remove a country from the regular follow-up process, it has to be rated
Compliant or Largely Compliant in the above mentioned Core Recommendations
and the following Key Recommendations: -
R3, R4, R23, R26, R35, R36, R40, SRI, SRIII, SRV
Please also note that any risk assessment should take into consideration all
follow-up reports.
| VENEZUELA |
| KnowYourCountry |
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| Last Updated: 16 April 2012 |